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**HEADQUARTERS  
PHILIPPINES COMMAND  
UNITED STATES ARMY**



**U. S. ARMY  
RECOGNITION PROGRAM OF  
PHILIPPINE GUERRILLAS**

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## FOREWORD

This booklet is prepared with the dual intent of furnishing an overall picture of the guerrilla resistance movement in the Philippines and the mission of the United States Army to award those valiant members of this fraternity who contributed materially to the defeat of the common foe, official guerrilla recognition. This recognition is tantamount to induction into the Philippine Army which during the late war was in the service of the Armed Forces of the United States, thus establishing their entitlement to soldier emoluments and veterans benefits.

The material presented in this report has been secured from official records and the knowledge obtained in the investigation of over a million and a quarter claims for guerrilla recognition. The policies governing such a mission, problems incident thereto, and chaotic personnel problems experienced by an army undergoing the process of rapid demobilization are submitted for objective evaluation of such an unprecedented mission.

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PART ONE

JAPANESE AND AMERICAN CAMPAIGNS IN THE PHILIPPINES

I - Japanese Invasion of the Philippines (December 10, 1941 - May 31, 1942)

Presidential order, dated July 26, 1941, ordered all of the organized military forces of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines into the service of the armed forces of the United States. Mobilization of the Philippine Army was not completed when the Japanese forces invaded Luzon three days subsequent to the attack on Pearl Harbor, December 10, 1941.

The rapid Japanese advances from numerous amphibious landings on Luzon eventually forced the USAFFE forces into executing a withdrawal into the Bataan Peninsula. The Japanese, reinforced by units that had conquered Singapore and the Indies, commenced an all out drive and on April 9, 1942, Bataan surrendered and by May 7, 1942, organized resistance ceased on Corregidor.

By May 31, 1942, the Japanese invasion which had commenced on December 10, 1941, had completely overrun the entire Philippine Archipelago and all organized resistance had ceased. However, the failure of the Japanese to intern all USAFFE soldiers, to obtain all weapons, and to heavily garrison every island, permitted the formation of guer-

rilla movements which were of considerable nuisance value to the Japanese and materially assisted the return of the American liberation forces on October 20, 1945.

II - American Reconquest of the Philippines (October 20, 1944 - July 4, 1945)

Toward the end of August 1944, Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet began a probing operation in the western Carolines and the Philippines. His carrier planes struck at Yap and the Palau Islands on September 7 and 8, and the next two days bombed Mindanao. On the morning of the 12th, Admiral Halsey struck the central Philippines and arrived at a conclusion which prompted him to recommend to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on September 13, 1944, the abandonment of the projected intermediate operations against Yap, Mindanao, Talaud, and Sangihi Islands in favor of a rapid landing on Leyte in the central Philippines. Within a matter of days plans were changed and the attack on Leyte was advanced two months.

On October 20, 1944, the X and XXIV Corps of the Sixth Army hit the beaches between Dulag and Tacloban, thereby commencing the liberation of the Philippine Islands. By October 24, 1944, the X Corps had crossed San Juanico Strait to seize La Paz, Samar, and by November had recrossed the strait to assault Limon, Leyte. Organized Japanese resistance being crushed by December 21, 1944, and the invasion of Luzon pending, the Sixth Army was relieved of all further tactical responsibility on Leyte on December 26, 1944, and the Eighth Army was assigned the mission of mopping up and preparing to mount assaults



against the remaining Japanese troops in the Visayas and Mindanao. Meanwhile, troops of the Western Visayan Task Force had landed on Mindoro and Masbate December 15, 1944.

The liberation of Luzon commenced with the landing on January 9, 1945, of the I and XIV Corps of the Sixth Army at Lingayen. This landing was preceded by a planned guerrilla uprising emphasizing sabotage, demolition, and disruption of Japanese lines of communication and supply. As the Japanese fell back in confusion, the XI Corps of the Eighth Army hit the Zambales coast line at Sta. Cruz on January 29, 1945, fought its way over Zigzag Pass and scaled off the peninsula of Bataan, thereby preventing a Japanese version of the Fil-American stand in 1942. Two days later the 11th Airborne Division landed on the coast at Nasugbu, Batangas, and immediately advanced on Manila by way of the National Highway. On February 3, 1945, a parachute regiment of the Division was dropped at Tagaytay Ridge to protect the right flank of the remainder of the Division.

By February 3, 1945, the 1st Cavalry Division had entered the northern outskirts of Manila and by the 6th, the 11th Airborne Division was at Nichols Field. Organized resistance in Manila ceased on February 23, 1945. Meanwhile, elements of the 28th Division landed at Mariveles, Bataan, on the 15th of February and on the 16th a battalion of the 503rd Parachute Regiment dropped on Corregidor simultaneously with the amphibious landing of elements of the 34th Infantry Regiment.

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To clean out the Bicol provinces, the 158th Regimental Combat Team landed at Legaspi on April 1, 1945, and, with the assistance of the guerrillas, destroyed what Japanese remained in those provinces. Balote Pass, the southern gateway to the Cagayan Valley, fell to the 25th Infantry Division on May 13, 1945, and the way into the Cagayan Valley lay open. Aparri in the north fell to a combined force of Sixth Army Rangers and guerrillas on June 21, 1945, and two days later elements of the 11th Airborne Division were dropped south of Aparri to continue the southward drive. By July 4, 1945, the Luzon campaign was declared officially closed although mopping up operations continued until as late as February 1946.

The 186th Regimental Combat Team of the 41st Division seized Puerto Princesa, Palawan, on February 28, 1945, as the Eighth Army offensive in the southern islands got under way. By March 10, 1945, other elements of the 41st Division landed at Zamboanga, Mindanao, and upon Jolo and Tawi-Tawi in the Sulu Archipelago. The 40th Infantry Division of the Eighth Army effected landings on Panay March 18, 1945, and Cebu was invaded by the Americal Division eight days later. Elements of the 40th Division, not engaged in the liberation of Panay, proceeded to Negros on March 29, 1945. Similarly, elements of the Americal Division hit the beaches of Bohol on 11 April. Six days later the X Corps, consisting of the 24th and 31st Divisions, struck at Cotabato, drove east to Davao and north to join the 108th Regimental Combat Team which landed at Agusan on 14 May. On July 1, 1945, the campaign in the southern islands was declared officially closed.

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## PART TWO

### DEVELOPMENT OF THE GUERRILLA MOVEMENT

Such legendary heroes as Captain Walter Cushing, Governors Ablan and Vinzon, fired with an intense hatred of the Jap and inspired by the justice of their cause, raised such havoc among the Japanese forces with small groups of determined men that their exploits were recounted and became a source of inspiration to the Filipinos prior to General Wainwright's surrender. Thus was kindled the guerrilla movement. Though Cushing was treacherously betrayed and ambushed, committing suicide with his last remaining cartridge rather than surrender, Ablan was captured and never heard of again, and Vinzon was killed, and all three guerrilla bands for want of inspiring leaders slowly disintegrated and fused themselves with other organizations, the guerrilla standard was raised. This banner was never furled though units rose and fell under various leaders until the strongest rose to the top and fused all subordinate units into an overall effective command. It was not unexpected that during the Japanese occupation many unsavory acts were committed against the civil population by guerrillas or under the guise of guerrillas. Coupled with the

severe Jap retaliatory methods against the civil populace, such as burning entire barrios to the ground, and the unfavorable position of the allied armed forces in the year 1943, these acts caused considerable dampening of spirit among the civil populace. It was only through the indomitable spirit of the present-day recognized guerrilla leaders in their constant effort at perfecting combat efficiency and suppressing brigands, plus the dissemination of war news and counterpropaganda by small groups of valiant and capable men endeavoring to counter the Jap propaganda, that the general support of the civil populace was kept.

The guerrilla organizations that were engendered as the result of the surrender of USAFFE were not actually recognized by, nor did they completely subscribe to, the rules of international warfare. Some adhered to the soldier's code more closely than others, depending somewhat upon location, enemy activity, and the personality of the leaders. These were desperate men, not knowing who to turn to for assistance or who could be relied upon to maintain their anonymity; thus, in general, possessing but a singularity of purpose flamed by the searing hatred that fused all patriots the world over in their determined desire to rid their country of a ruthless conqueror. A guerrilla who was captured by the enemy was not accorded a soldier's treatment but more the treatment due a brigand. To combat a desperate situation, orders in consonance with this were directed and disseminated throughout the guerrilla commands. Naturally, these orders, of necessity, placed greater

responsibility of interpretation and execution on many individuals not capable of, or denied the use of, mature council.

As the allied situation improved, a fleet of large cargo submarines was used by General MacArthur to ship arms, supplies, and medicines to the guerrillas. During the occupation the greatest service performed by the guerrillas was rendering intelligence reports. In the Visayas and Mindanao the guerrillas maintained coast watch stations. These stations were equipped with radio and reported the movements of the Japanese fleet. They reported the Japanese fleet concentrations and extensive antiaircraft practice off Tawi-Tawi. When Admiral Spruance was going into the Marianas, the 7th Military District (Guerrilla) spotted the movement of this Japanese fleet through an opening of the fog off Negros and their report assisted Admiral Spruance in striking it and winning one of the outstanding naval victories of the war.

On Luzon, those guerrilla organizations in contact with General Headquarters, Armed Forces Pacific (GHQ AFPAC), performed outstanding services to the liberating forces by destroying enemy supply lines, disrupting communications, and performing noisy demonstrations in southern Luzon to divert Japanese attention to the south. This coupled with the many ingenious methods employed by the GHQ AFPAC created such utter confusion in the Japanese High Command that the landings of the American forces caught every major hostile combat unit in motion, with the exception of two, but these two were unable to influence our plan of battle.

## LUZON

### I - General

Before Bataan and Corregidor fell, guerrilla movements got under way particularly in northern Luzon, in and around the Manila area, and in the Bicol provinces. The success of these movements was due in part to the lack of information of the pitiful weakness of the USAFFE forces and the inevitability of their surrender and to the staunch belief in the widely disseminated propaganda that relief convoys were on their way from the United States. Although the surrenders on Bataan and Corregidor revealed the weakness of the USAFFE forces and stunned the Filipino people, faith in the arrival of the relief convoys and of a reinvading American army did not die until the close of 1942. As a result, a large number of small units as well as the forerunners of the overall commands on Luzon organized or expanded until the entire island of Luzon was dotted with guerrilla organizations. Somewhat slow to believe that the Filipino people did not welcome their "freedom," it soon became obvious to the Japanese that their presence was strongly resented by the great mass of Filipinos. It never occurred to them that their ruthless treatment and exploitation of the Filipinos did not harmonize with their much publicized Co-Prosperity Sphere. As resistance became stronger in the late fall of 1942, the Japanese embarked upon severe punitive expeditions in the mountains of the northern Luzon, the Zambales mountains, and the Sierra Madres. The well-developed road net on Luzon facilitated this program. Meeting

with considerable success, they dampened the ardour of the greatest majority of small independent units which, under this pressure and realizing that American troops could not and would not return to the Philippine Islands for some time to come, disbanded or were dispersed, leaving only what were to become the large overall commands still in existence but well underground.

The success of the Japanese lulled them into a sense of false security throughout the early part of 1943 since, pressure easing off, the overall commands recommenced activities. In Mid-1943, therefore, the Japanese again instituted severe punitive expeditions throughout the central Luzon plain and in the mountains of northern Luzon. In the former area and particularly in the province of Tarlac the guerilla movement was to all intents and purposes completely destroyed. In the latter area the capture of leading American and Filipino guerilla leaders, although not destroying, successfully retarded the development of what was to become USAFIP NL.

The establishment of the Puppet Republic of the Philippines in September 1943 and the subsequent proclamation of amnesty which extended into February 1944, further discouraged but did not destroy the guerrilla movement on Luzon. Upon the establishment of the Puppet Republic, prominent members of the government journeyed throughout the provinces advising the guerrillas to cease their activities. Whereas Filipino guerrillas would not surrender to the Japanese, they would surrender to their own countrymen and many did, accepting the guarantees of the

government that they would not be molested. Unfortunately those who surrendered were required to register, with the result that, when the invasion of Iuzon became imminent in late 1944, the Japanese rounded up and summarily executed many of them on the mere suspicion that, since they had been guerrillas, they still were. In point of fact, not a small number who surrendered did so by order of their commanding officers in order to gain access to information of Japanese movements.

Throughout the entire period of the occupation, the Japanese employed their military police, the Kempetai, in what was termed the "Zona" or "zonification." Zonification consisted of nothing more than taking a certain city, town, or barrio and dividing it into easily controlled zones from which, by prearranged plan and at a given signal, all males were herded into an open field or a church and required to undergo the scrutiny of a spy, a traitor, or a captured guerrilla who pointed out known guerrillas to Japanese authorities. Oftentimes the person pointing out these guerrillas concealed his identity by covering his head with a mask through which two holes were cut for him to see through, which practice became known as the "magic eye." By these means, employed at intervals and applied to no particular section of the island, the Japanese succeeded in further discouraging would-be guerrillas as well as the small, not well organized independent units which sprang up in 1942.

In September 1944 the first shipment of supplies arrived by submarine. Although the supplies amounted to little more than token



shipments, the morale effect was such as to give added strength and determination to the overall commands which had maintained their organizations under the most adverse conditions. The first bombings of the Manila area in September 1944 further increased their determination and at the same time occasioned the formation of a number of small guerrilla units. The landing of the liberation forces on Leyte on October 20, 1944, and the desertion to the guerrillas of the Philippine Constabulary gave rise to a veritable rash of independent organizations the members of which, some genuinely patriotic but some because of three years collaborationist activities and seeing the handwriting on the wall, jumped on the band wagon. Meanwhile, as more supplies reached Luzon by submarine and weapons taken from the Japanese increased in number, the overall commands expanded in strength and commenced overt activities against the Japanese.

Four days prior to the landing at Lingayen on January 9, 1945, and in obedience to radio directives, most of the overall commands initiated large-scale operations, insofar as their capabilities permitted, against Japanese troops, installations, transportation facilities and bridges. So widespread and thorough were their activities and their demolition work that the Japanese were caught completely off guard and partially or completely immobilized to the extent that the Lingayen landing was unopposed and no serious resistance offered until the American troops reached Clark Field in their dash towards Manila. What organized resistance was offered, came in Manila, at Zigzag Pass, at

Balete Pass, the Villa Verde Trail, and in the mountains east of the Mariquina Watershed.

By July 1945, independent guerrilla organizations existed by the hundreds with membership in the tens of thousands as, the danger passed and benefits in the offing, opportunists climbed aboard the band wagon. It cannot be denied, however, that amongst the late comers were many genuinely patriotic individuals who, when given a fighting chance, wished to do their bit. For every such patriot, on the other hand, there flocked to the colors hundreds who desired to cover up their past collaborationist activities or desired to obtain pay, food, weapons, and clothing. That this condition existed has been proved by subsequent investigations which revealed that one out of every eight persons on the island of Luzon, man, woman, and child, submitted claims for guerrilla recognition, or out of a total of one million individuals claiming guerrilla status on Luzon, less than 200,000 were recognized and the remainder considered part time guerrillas or pure, unadulterated frauds. Because of the advanced invasion dates of the liberation forces, GHQ guerrilla coordinators were unable to properly unify the Luzon guerrillas prior to our invasion and thus was created the most confused of all administrative matters.

## II - Northern Luzon

Until the surrender of Corregidor in May 1942, no guerrilla movement as such was authorized in northern Luzon, such a movement being specifically forbidden by the senior USAFFE officer in the area,

Colonel John P. Horan. Nevertheless, two such movements actually got under way when Governors Roque Ablan and Marcelo Adduru re-established their provincial governments in the mountains of Ilocos Norte and Mountain Province and used remnants of USAFFE troops in the defense of those governments. The disappearance of Ablan and the capture of Adduru during the Japanese punitive expeditions of mid-1943 caused the dispersal of both organizations, many of the members subsequently joining United States Army Forces in the Philippines, Northern Luzon (USAFIP NL).

The basis for a successful guerrilla movement in northern Luzon at a later date was laid, on the other hand, prior to the surrender of Corregidor. Elements of the 12th, 13th, 71st and 91st Infantry Regiments (PS), cut off from the Northern Luzon Force by the Japanese landing in the vicinity of Lingayen and completely isolated with the loss of the southern entrance to the Kennon Road, were reformed into the 14th Infantry Regiment (PA), under Lieutenant Colonel Warner, in January and February 1942. Orders from General Wainwright on April 8, 1942, activated the 121st Infantry Regiment (PA) under Colonel Horan and directed that it be composed of Philippine Army trainees. Also used in the formation of the 121st were elements of the 43rd Provisional Regiment (PS) under Lieutenant Colonel Gitter. In addition to Major Praeger's Troop C, 26th Cavalry (PS), there were numerous organizations formed from scattered Philippine Constabulary and Philippine Army units by the inimitable Captain Walter Cushing. Few American and fewer Filipino officers obeyed the surrender orders, Lieutenant Colonel

Guillermo Nakar taking over the 14th Infantry Regiment, Captain Cushing the 121st, Colonel Calvert assuming command of the 43rd, and Major Praeger remaining with Troop C. By August 1942, Colonels Moses and Noble, having escaped from Bataan, arrived in northern Luzon and by virtue of their rank assumed control of guerrilla units then in existence. At a later date, Colonel Russell W. Volckmann reached the northern provinces but, suffering severe illness, took no part in guerrilla operations initially. One by one, though, the outstanding guerrilla leaders disappeared in the punitive expeditions of late 1942 and mid-1943. Nakar surrendered in September 1942; Cushing, caught in an ambush, died the same month; Moses and Noble, hounded from one province to another, surrendered in June 1943; Praeger was caught in August. The existing organizations melted away in confusion until October 1943 when Colonel Volckmann (then Major) assumed full command and commenced a reorganization. The old 14th and 121st Regiments were revamped and a 66th Regiment was formed from elements of the old 11th, 12th, and 43rd Regiments. By January 9, 1945, an 11th and 15th Regiments had been added, the five of which completely covered northern Luzon. In the ensuing liberation campaign these five regiments took a major part in the final destruction of the Japanese in northern Luzon. An approximate total of 25,000 men were recognized as members of the guerrilla USAFIP NL.

### III - North Central Luzon

In north central Luzon one guerrilla movement, that of Lieutenant

Colonel Claude A. Thorp, received specific authorization from HQ USAFFE on January 20, 1942. With the mission of gathering intelligence of Japanese movements in and around Pampanga and Tarlac, and organizing a guerrilla unit, perhaps with the main mission of attacking the airfield at Clark Field being operated by the Japanese, Colonel Thorp left Bataan in February with a small party and worked his way northward to Mount Pinatubo. Although discouraged by the turn of events on Bataan and inclined to obey the surrender order in May, he was persuaded by his officers to carry on the guerrilla movement. To that end he issued his General Order No. 1 on May 15, 1942, assuming command of all guerrilla forces on Luzon. At the same time he subdivided his newly designated United States Army Forces in the Far East, Luzon Guerrilla Army Forces (USAFFE LGAF) into four major areas and designated commanders from amongst his officers and those officers known to be still resisting: The Northern Luzon Guerrilla Area (NLGA) under Major Praeger to consist of all provinces north of Pangasinan and Nueva Ecija; the Western Luzon Guerrilla Area (WLGA) under Captain Ralph McGuire to consist of Zambales; the East Central Luzon Guerrilla Area (ECLGA) under Captain Joseph R. Barker II to consist of all provinces south of the NLGA, east of the WLGA, west of the Sierra Madres, and north of, but including, Manila; the South Luzon Guerrilla Area (SLGA) under Captain Jack J. Spies to consist of all Luzon south of Manila. Major Praeger never acknowledged Colonel Thorp's authority and as a result northern Luzon continued on its own under Praeger, Moses and

Noble, and Volckmann. Captain Spies died of pneumonia in Bulacan in August 1942 on his way south and the SLGA never got started. The WLGA disintegrated after a promising start with the betrayal and murder of Captain McGuire in April 1943. Only the ECLGA survived. By October 1942, Colonel Thorp, too, was betrayed, captured, and killed, and the command of the USAFFE LGAF fell to Captain Barker. Meanwhile, Major (then 1st Lieutenant) Robert B. Lapham commenced organizing in Nueva Ecija and eastern Pangasinan as a part of the LGAF. Captain Barker, having commenced organizing in Bulacan, moved on south to Manila where he commenced the organization of the Manila District. Lieutenant Colonel (then Captain) Bernard L. Anderson, Captain Barker's executive officer, continued the organization of Bulacan. Pampanga being controlled by the Hukbalahaps, little organization was attempted in that province at that time. The capture of Captain Barker near Manila in January 1943 led to the first split within the USAFFE LGAF.

East Central Luzon Guerrilla Area (ECLGA)

Upon the capture of Captain Barker, Lieutenant Colonel (then 1st Lieutenant) Edwin P. Ramsey assumed command of the ECLGA, not knowing that Lieutenant Colonel Anderson (then Captain) who had proceeded on to Tayabas to organize, ranked him and that Barker had appointed him commander of the ECLGA in December 1942. The resulting dispute and animosity between the two, even though ostensibly settled by the acknowledgment by Ramsey of Anderson's seniority in September 1943, never healed and caused a corresponding disaffection amongst the Filipino subordinates of

both officers, particularly in Bulacan where the commanding officer, Colonel (then Captain) Alejo Santos (PA), acknowledged only the authority of Colonel Anderson even though his Bulacan Military Area (BMA) was in the center of the territory allegedly controlled by Colonel Ramsey. By late fall of 1943, Ramsey had supposedly organized the Pangasinan, Tarlac, Pampanga, Bulacan, Bataan, and Manila Military Districts with organizations initially in the form of squadrons but later reorganized into regiments. Learning of the arrival of Major Lawrence H. Philipps, Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB) agent from GHQ Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), on Mindoro in November 1943, Ramsey left Luzon in February 1944 and headed for Mindoro in order to establish contact with Australia through Major Philipps. Because of the latter's death in March 1944 at the hands of the Japanese, Ramsey never made contact and returned to Luzon by way of Batangas and Cavite in April. His disappearance and apparent failure to inform subordinates of the reason for his departure caused a further split in the ECLGA when Major Lapham, believing he had headed for Australia, incorporated all units operating in eastern Tarlac, eastern Pangasinan, and in Nueva Ecija, into the Luzon Guerrilla Army Forces (LGAF). Yet another split developed within the Manila Military District of the ECLGA in September 1944 when Dominador Barilea, alias Dan Barrion, the adjutant of the MMD, departed from the MMD under peculiar circumstances and took with him several of Ramsey's best units to form the Barrion Manila Division. Having no radio equipment with which to contact GHQ SWPA or Sixth Army, the ECLGA received no prelanding instructions and consequently did not participate

effectively during the initial stages of the Luzon landings. Nevertheless, some 37,000 alleged members of the ECLGA succeeded in obtaining recognition. Subsequent and exhaustive investigations revealed that during the Liberation a number of independent units joined the ECLGA believing that Ramsey's name would secure recognition. Many of these units were erroneously accorded recognition and their recognitions were subsequently revoked, leaving an official recognized strength of 13,308 individuals.

#### Luzon Guerrilla Army Forces (LGAF)

One of the original members of Colonel Thorp's party which left Bataan in February 1942, Major Lapham, received permission in April from Colonel Thorp to organize guerrilla squadrons in Nueva Ecija from patriotic civilians. When Colonel Thorp was convinced in May to continue the guerrilla movement and the four geographical divisions of Luzon were assigned, Major Lapham was appointed Inspector General of the USAFFE LGAF. Contact with Captain Barker being lost when he went south to organize in Bulacan and Manila, Major Lapham continued organizing in Nueva Ecija and slowly expanded into eastern Pangasinan and eastern Tarlac. Although nominally under the control of Ramsey when the latter assumed command of the ECLGA upon Captain Barker's capture, Major Lapham actually remained independent, maintaining his independence up to and including the Liberation, even though Colonel Anderson, Colonel Volckmann, Colonel Peralta (on Panay) and General Lim attempted to give him orders at various times during the Occupation. In May 1944, the LGAF established contact with GHQ SWPA through the radio station established near Baler, Tayabas,



by Captain Robert V. Ball who had been sent into Luzon by Lieutenant Colonel (then Major) Charles N. Smith, Allied Intelligence Bureau agent on Samar. Through this radio, submarine contacts were arranged and the first shipment arrived in September. By that time the LGAF had organized into the Nueva Ecija, Pangasinan, and Tarlac Military Areas with squadrons numbered as follows: Eastern Nueva Ecija in the 400's, western Nueva Ecija in the 200's, Tarlac in the 300's, Pangasinan in the 100's. Orders received from GHQ SWPA directed that hostilities on Luzon commence at midnight, January 4, 1945. Identical orders were issued to USAFIP NL. Demolition teams, aided by experts brought in by submarine, raised havoc with roads, bridges, and Japanese rolling stock while Japanese garrisons and patrols were attacked wherever the guerrillas had an equal fighting chance. Subsequent to the landing on January 9, 1945, elements of the LGAF were attached to American units and fought in the battles for the Villa Verde and Santa Fe Trails, at the liberation of the POW camp at Cabanatuan and in the liberation of Baguio and Manila. Prior to the termination of the war and before the fighting ceased on Luzon, Sixth Army directed the reorganization of the LGAF squadrons into regiments for eventual incorporation into the reorganizing Philippine Army. One regiment was so reorganized and a second in the process when hostilities ceased. Approximately 15,000 members of the LGAF received recognition.

Luzon Guerrilla Forces(LGF)

Among the escapees from Bataan was a Colonel Gyles Merrill who,

with a small group of officers and enlisted men, made his way into the Zambales mountains and there remained throughout the Occupation. Learning of the guerrilla movement initiated by Colonel Thorp, Colonel Merrill contacted the former through messengers and announced his assumption of control by virtue of his rank as senior officer remaining free on the island of Luzon. When his authority to assume control was contested by Colonel Thorp, Colonel Merrill withdrew from all guerrilla affairs with the exception of an alleged attempt to bring Captain McGuire's well-organized WLGA under his control. The murder of Captain McGuire at the hands of a Filipino traitor in April 1943 caused the disintegration of the WLGA and all organized resistance in Zambales ceased until late 1944. With the bombings of Manila in September 1944 and the Leyte landings the following month, the Luzon Guerrilla Forces (LGF) under Colonel Merrill came into being. This organization covered parts of three provinces: The Zambales Military District (ZMD), the Southern Tarlac Military District (STMD), and a Western Pampanga Military District (WPMD) -- the first under Ramon Magsaysay, the second under Captain Alfred D. Bruce, and the last, an extremely nebulous organization, under Captain O'Conner. Best organized of the three was the ZMD, which, based upon Captain McGuire's original plan, consisted of five squadron areas, sectors within squadrons and companies within sectors. Within this district some 11,000 members received recognition for attachment to elements of the XI Corps which landed near Sta. Cruz on January 29, 1945. Regiments were organized in the STMD but not until the Liberation period, some

2,500 being recognized for attachment to American units. Nothing definite was determined relative to the WPMD except for claims of various commanders, no units as such being located. In September 1944, contacts with Colonel Merrill were attempted by members of Captain Bartolome C. Cabangbang's AIB party, which had reached Bulacan, but were refused. After considerable difficulty, Colonel Merrill's headquarters was reached and radio contact established with GHQ just prior to our landings on Luzon.

#### Bulacan Military Area (BMA)

Organization within Bulacan commenced in July 1942 when Captain Barker and Lieutenant Colonel Anderson arrived in the area. Upon the departure of Captain Barker for Colonel Thorp's headquarters and his subsequent return to Manila, Colonel Anderson continued with the organization and, once established, proceeded on to Tayabas in March 1943. Until changed by Colonel Ramsey to the Bulacan Military District (BMD) in mid-1943, the organization existed as the Sibul District under Colonel Alejo Santos. With the settlement of the question of seniority between Colonel Anderson and Colonel Ramsey, the latter's appointment of Colonel Santos as commanding officer of the BMD in September was confirmed by the former in December 1943 but the name was changed to the Bulacan Military Area (BMA) with the code name of Ball Military Area. Colonel Santos continued to take orders from Colonel Anderson's headquarters, then known as the Kalayaan Command. By September of the

same year, squadrons had given way to regiments of which there were four, numbered from one to four. By November 1944, six more regiments had been added and numerical designations changed to place names, such as : Buena- vista, Valenzuela, Kakarong, etc. Regiments. Meanwhile, the establish- ment of radio contact with GHQ SWPA, first through Lieutenant Robert Stahl's AIB station on the Bontoc Peninsula and then through his own radio, per- mitted Colonel Anderson to forward the intelligence reports of the BMA. The arrival in Bulacan of Captain Cabangbang with radio equipment facilitated the transmission of intelligence since the station was set up in Colonel Santos' headquarters. On November 23, 1944, and upon the recommendation of Lieutenant Colonel Anderson, the BMA was placed under the direct operational control of GHQ SWPA. As in the case of USAFIP NL and the LGAF, attack orders were received on January 4, 1945, and, with the additional arms and equipment issued by Colonel Anderson from the supplies received by submarines, the first of which arrived on September 1, 1944, the BMA commenced operations against the Japanese. By January 22, 1945, the BMA was placed under the direct operational control of Sixth Army. In addition to actual attachments to American units which took those units attached as far south as Tayabas and as far north as the Cagayan Valley, those regiments not actually attached guarded the left flank of the American forces by harassing Japanese forces in the foothills of the Sierra Madres east of Highway No. 5. Approximately 8,500 members were extended recognition.

### Anderson's Guerrillas

Lieutenant Colonel Anderson accompanied by several other American officers, declined to surrender on April 9, 1942, and made good his escape from Bataan by traveling northward over the mountains. Sometime in May they reached Colonel Thorp's camp and by June, Colonel Anderson and Captain Barker were on their way south at the request of Colonel Thorp to reach an agreement with the Hukbalahaps. Unsuccessful with the Huks, the two continued on to Bulacan where organization of guerrilla units commenced. Appointed executive officer of the ECLGA by Captain Barker, Colonel Anderson continued organizing in Bulacan while Captain Barker reported back to Colonel Thorp and then turned southward to organize in Manila. Japanese raids and expeditions in the central Luzon plain becoming more intense throughout the latter part of 1942, Colonel Anderson made his way into the Sierra Madres in January 1943 and set up his headquarters in a state of mobility. By March he had proceeded to the vicinity of Infanta, Tayabas, and remained in that general area for the remainder of the Occupation. Word had reached him meanwhile of Captain Barker's capture which left both the USAFFE LGAF and the ECLGA without a commanding officer. In the first contact between Anderson and Ramsey on April 23, 1943, Ramsey announced his assumption of command by virtue of his rank as the senior line officer remaining free and active in central Luzon, Colonel Anderson being, he claimed, an Air Corps administrative officer and therefore ineligible to command line troops. Not until September was Ramsey convinced that Colonel

Anderson was an Infantry officer detailed to the Air Corps and, hence, his superior, at which time he acknowledge the latter's seniority, though remaining uncooperative. On June 1, 1943, Colonel Anderson announced in orders his assumption of command of the USAFFE LGAF, redesignated the command as the USAFFE LGF on January 1, 1944, as the USFIP Kalayaan Command on July 3, 1944, and, upon orders from Sixth Army, as Anderson's Command on January 1, 1945. By late 1944, southern Tayabas had been organized as the Salt Military Area, Batangas as the Batangas Military Area, and Bulacan as the Ball Military Area. Purely intelligence organizations had been established in the Manila area as the Atlanta, Keywest, and Orlando York Sectors, York being the code name used for Manila. Similar organizations were established in Laguna as the Bonn Military Corps, in the Bicol region as the Ohio Military Area, and in the Southern Nueva Ecija Sector as the Birth of Victory Command. Sectors were assigned within areas and squadrons within sectors, blocks of numbers being assigned each area for assignment to squadrons at the discretion of area commanders. The first indirect contact with GHQ SWPA was established in May 1944 through the relay station of Lieutenant Robert Stahl on the Bontoc Peninsula, which transmitted to Lieutenant Colonel Charles N. Smith on Samar and thence to Australia. Colonel Anderson received and put into operation his own radio the following month and maintained continuous contact until the areas under his control were liberated by American troops. Submarine contacts were then arranged and the first shipment of supplies unloaded on September 1, 1944, such

shipments continuing until 1945 when airdrops from Leyte took their place. By 1945 the airfield on Alabat Island had been taken by the 1st Anderson Battalion and supplies came in directly. Through Colonel Anderson's headquarters came AIB and GHQ parties under Lieutenant Commander Chic Parsons (USNR), Captain Cabangbang, Lieutenant Colonel (then Captain) Jay D. Vanderpool, and Major (then Captain) George Miller. Commander Parsons, on an inspection trip, returned to Australia; Captain Cabangbang proceeded on to Bulacan; Colonel Vanderpool moved west to Batangas and Cavite where he contacted the Hunter's ROTC; Major Miller reached the headquarters of Marking's Fil-Americans; the latter two reaching their assigned areas in late November or early December 1944. On January 4, 1945, the Kalayaan Command, in obedience to orders from GHQ, commenced open hostilities. During the subsequent liberation campaign, elements of Anderson's Command fought with American troops from northern to southern Tayabas, in the central Luzon plain, throughout the Batangas and Laguna area, and conducted amphibious landings against the Alabat, Polillo and Batanes Islands. Approximately 7,100 members were extended recognition.

#### Hukbalahaps

One other unit in north central Luzon deserves mention because of its size and activities -- the Hukbalahaps. Centered in Pampanga, the seat of agrarian unrest in Luzon, this organization was comprised of the prewar Socialista Party, a land reform party formed from amongst the taos who had been long oppressed by the continued dominance of the

great Spanish landholders. Upon the beginning of the Japanese invasion the party adopted the name of HUKbo ng Bayan Laban sa HAPon, meaning Army of the Country Against the Japanese. Initially and as late as the fall of 1942, the Huks actually fought the Japanese at every turn of the road and the Japanese gradually respected their fighting valor by giving them a wide berth. From then on their efforts were merely passive in nature. They first entered into several agreements with Colonel Thorp in the late spring of 1942 to cooperate with the USAFFE LGAF and thereby received authority from Thorp to organize guerrilla units. Upon refusing to accept Colonel Thorp as their commanding officer, Colonel Thorp broke off negotiations and rescinded their authority to organize. Several months thereafter, Colonel Thorp was betrayed to the Japanese by a suspected Huk sympathizer. Throughout the rest of the Occupation a state of warfare existed between the Huks and the USAFFE guerrillas, with the Huks attempting to expand and the USAFFE guerrillas attempting to contain them within Pampanga. Numerous attempts at negotiations, usually initiated by the Huks, failed when representatives of the USAFFE guerrillas were ambushed on the way to the conferences, until all attempts to secure cooperation were dropped. With Pampanga secure, they moved southward into Bulacan but did not get far because of the Bulacan Military Area; moving westward, they established a strong foothold in southern Tarlac; moving northward, they infiltrated into southern Nueva Ecija but were prevented from reaching the remainder of Nueva Ecija and Pangasinan by Major Lapham's LGAF. Several small Huk units even managed to operate



in and around the Laguna and central Tayabas 'area but whether or not they were an integral part of the Pampanga Huks is not definitely known. During the Liberation some 2,500 Huks received guerrilla recognition. At the present writing the Huks constitute the largest dissident element in the Philippines.

#### IV - South Central Luzon

##### Fil-American Irregular Troops (FAIT)

In south central Luzon, Colonel Hugh Straughn, a retired Army officer, commenced the organization of a guerrilla movement which existed successfully from April 1942 until his capture in August 1943 and subsequent inhuman execution. Known as the Fil-American Irregular Troops (FAIT), it covered Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Batangas, and Cavite and possessed numerous contacts throughout the Bicol Region, Tayabas, and in the central Luzon plain. Colonel Straughn, realizing that some time would elapse before the return of American troops and that poorly armed guerrillas could not hope to cope with the Japanese, concentrated strictly upon organization and intelligence. In order to maintain this organization so that it would be of maximum benefit to a liberating army, he issued definite "lay low" orders and forbade overt resistance against the Japanese. During the existence of this organization, contacts were maintained with adjacent units and other units operating within the sphere of operations of the FAIT, many of the latter group actually affiliating at one time or another with Colonel Straughn. Of these,

Marking's Fil-American (MFA), Hunters ROTC, and President Quezon's Own Guerrillas (PQOG) are the most notable. The MFA, however, did not desire to follow the "lay low" policy and embarked upon a program of active resistance against the Japanese in late 1942 and early 1943. The resulting differences between Colonel Straughn and Marking lead to the breaking away of the MFA from the FAIT. Shortly thereafter, in August 1943, Colonel Straughn was betrayed and captured. With his capture the FAIT fell to pieces although several Filipino leaders, notably General Lim who was captured and executed by the Japanese, attempted to hold it together. Some of the units joined the MFA, others the ROTC, some hung on in an independent status, but the greater majority simply disintegrated. Shortly prior to and during the Liberation many of these long-abandoned organizations came to life and were of some assistance to the liberating forces. However, the organization of the FAIT as such did not exist after the capture of Colonel Straughn.

#### Marking's Fil-Americans (MFA)

In the mountains of Rizal Province a small group of some 200 men under the leadership of Marcos Villa Agustin, alias Marking, a former Manila taxi driver and at present head of the Philippine National Bureau of Investigation, assembled in April 1942 to form the nucleus of the MFA. Committed to direct action, the unit staged many small but vicious raids against the Japanese until they affiliated with Colonel Straughn's FAIT in June of the same year. For nearly a year thereafter overt action was reduced to a bare minimum until Marking, no longer agreeing with the

"lay low" policy, severed relations with the FAIT and struck out on his own. Upon the capture of Colonel Straughn in August 1943 and the disintegration of his organization, many of his units joined Marking, some willingly but some unwillingly. In the latter category was the organization, perhaps the best organized and armed in the Laguna area, commanded by Justiniano Estrella, alias David. Upon being invited by Marking to a conference to discuss unification, David was held prisoner until he agreed to join, the fusion resulting in the renaming of the two forces as Marking's Fil-Americans. By mid-1944 the MFA had reached out and induced, either by mutual agreement or by force, a number of small units in Tayabas, Cavite, Manila, and Batangas to join. A further reorganization along semimilitary lines resulted in the establishment of four army corps; The I Corps covering Rizal, the II Corps covering Manila, the III Corps covering Laguna, and the IV Corps covering Cavite. Some regiments were formed but for the most part elements of each corps retained their quaint names and quaint irregular organizations. In late November 1944, Major George Miller arrived at Marking's headquarters in Rizal with radio equipment and proceeded to coordinate the activities of the MFA in the provinces of Rizal and Laguna, all intelligence reports being forwarded to Colonel Anderson's headquarters for further transmittal. Prior to the landing of the 11th Airborne Division at Nasugbu, Batangas, radio instructions were received to commence harassing the Japanese in every way possible and to that end the MFA struck. During the Liberation campaign, elements of the MFA fought throughout

south central Luzon, their most notable engagement being that at the capture of Ipo Dam when the 1st and 2nd, Yay Regiments were organized from MFA troops and the 1st Yay Regiment fought side by side with the 43rd Division (US). Although the III Army Corps withdrew from the MFA for the purpose of recognition and revision of recognition dates and as a result of the manner in which David was forced to join Marking, the MFA received approximately 12,200 recognitions under the direct control of Marking. Notwithstanding the exaggerated claim of 200,000 members, the constant struggles between adjacent units over actual or fancied wrongs, the ruthless manner in which Marking forced cooperation and the nonmilitary type of organization, the MFA existed throughout the Occupation as a symbol of resistance against the Japanese.

#### Hunters ROTC

First organized in January 1942 to assist the USAFFE forces on Bataan with information of Japanese troop movements, the Hunters ROTC consisted of a small group of Philippine Military Academy and ROTC cadets under the command of Miguel Ver. When it became apparent that the USAFFE could not hold out on Bataan, the unit moved into the mountains of Rizal with the exception of a small group left behind to collect arms and ammunition. Several raids within the city of Manila in May 1942 netted some 200 rifles but soon thereafter brought retaliation from the Japanese. Miguel Ver was killed in July 1942 when the Hunters camp was raided and Eleuterio Adevosio, alias Terry Magtangol, assumed command and retained that command until the cessation of

hostilities. Continuing to operate from the mountains with small, highly mobile combat patrols, the Hunters slowly developed an intelligence and supply net throughout south central Luzon, affiliating at one time with FAIT and then with the MFA. By mid-1943, contact had been established with 6th Military District agents but was not maintained because these agents attempted to take over command of the unit upon instruction from Peralta. It subsequently developed that intelligence furnished by the Hunters had been forwarded to Australia under the name of the 6th Military District. Contacts were established with the 7th Military District on Negros in February 1944 but the difficulties of transportation and communication made impractical the forwarding of information through that channel. The arrival of Lieutenant Commander George Rowe on Mindoro during the fall of 1944, however, presented an easily accessible and reliable outlet for Luzon intelligence which was immediately seized by the Hunters and maintained until Lieutenant Colonel Vanderpool reached the headquarters of Magtangol with radio equipment during the first week of December. Meanwhile, organization had continued with the establishment of a number of units in Batangas and Cavite as well as those already operating in Rizal, Laguna, and Manila. In addition, intelligence nets had been pushed into the Bicol, into north and north central Luzon, although the lack of rapid transportation and communication facilities lessened to a great extent their worth. By January 1945, the Hunters had been reorganized into three divisions: The 44th, 45th and 46th of three regiments each with a number of miscellaneous

intelligence and supply units. With the arrival of Lieutenant Colonel Vanderpool from Colonel Anderson's headquarters in December 1944, almost simultaneously with the arrival of Major Miller at Marking's headquarters, emphasis was placed upon the gathering of detailed intelligence and the securing of coordination between the many rival units long in existence and the new arrivals. Under the supervision of Colonel Vanderpool, the Hunters concentrated their activities in Batangas and Cavite and, when the orders came to harass the Japanese to the greatest possible extent, that organization contributed considerably. In the ensuing campaign throughout the south central Luzon area, elements of the Hunters were attached to and fought with the 11th Airborne and 1st Cavalry Division. Approximately 8,900 men were recognized.

#### President Quezon's Own Guerrillas (PQOG)

The last organization on Luzon of any consequence which maintained itself continuously throughout the Occupation was the President Quezon's Own Guerrillas (PQOG). Although formed in December 1941 under Vicente Umali, a practicing lawyer from Tiaong, Tayabas, and then known as the Philippine Defenders, it first struck at the Japanese on May 7, 1942, when it raided Tiaong and destroyed several government buildings. Affiliated with FAIT when Umali was commissioned a major in October 1942 by Colonel Straughn, it eventually drifted into the MFA, but then broke completely away and remained independent for the duration. In April 1943, the Philippine Defenders joined forces with the Quezon Intelligence Bureau (QIB), then commanded by Captain Primitivo San Agustin, and the

organization was redesignated the PQOG. December of the same year saw the 25th Red Lion Regiment under Phil Avancena join the PQOG. Contact with Australia was established when San Agustin succeeded in reaching Colonel Fertig's headquarters in Mindanao during the latter part of 1943, although previous contacts had been made with agents from both the 6th and 10th Military Districts. The radio brought back by San Agustin in February 1944 was placed into operation and contact was made with the 10th Military District. Unfortunately, the station was raided by the Japanese and, although not lost, the radio did not get back into effective operation. The last expansion of the PQOG took place in late 1944 when an organization under Valenzona which operated in Cavite and Manila, joined. At this time the PQOG underwent a reorganization which resulted in the establishment of the I and II Corps, Valenzona's unit comprising the II Corps. At the same time a somewhat more military organization was attempted with the redesignation of existing units as divisions and regiments covering parts of Tayabas, Laguna, Batangas, and that part of Cavite controlled by the II Corps. Fighting with the 1st Cavalry and 11th Airborne Divisions in Tayabas, Laguna, and Batangas, the PQOG received approximately 7,400 recognitions.

V - Southern Luzon (the Bicol Provinces)

Except for two outstanding incidents which took place in May 1942, little good can be said of the guerrilla movement in this area. In the first instance, a group of civilians under the command of Governor Wenceslao Q. Vinzons and known as the USAFFE Camarines Norte Station

(Vinzon's Guerrillas), attacked the Japanese held city of Daet, capital of Camarines Norte, on May 3, 1942, drove the Japanese out with heavy losses and held the city until May 27, when Japanese reinforcements drove them into the hills. On July 8, Governor Vinzons was captured and his unit dispersed. In the second instance, another group of civilians under the command of a USAFFE noncommissioned officer, Faustino Flor, and known as the Camp Isarog Guerrilla Unit, liberated Naga, capital of Camarines Sur, on May 3, 1942, and freed thirty Allied prisoners. On May 24, however, Flor was persuaded to surrender by Major General Guillermo B. Francisco, Commanding General of the Philippine Constabulary, and Colonel Pugh, General Wainwright's aide. Even though he returned to guerrilla warfare shortly after his surrender, his unit never became of any great consequence.

Among the large number of so-called guerrilla leaders but a handful of names stand out, and those not so much for their accomplishments but for their bloody, inter-unit struggles to command the 5th Military District. In addition to the confusion occasioned by these struggles, the genealogy of most units is difficult to trace due to the constant redesignation of units to conform to innumerable, never consummated agreements. Furthermore, only a scattered handful, less than 6,000, received recognition within the entire Bicol Region. In the province of Camarines Norte the predominant leader was Francisco D. Boayes, alias Turko, a former USAFFE sergeant who fought with Governor Vinzons and, some time after the latter's capture, took over the remnants of Vinzons'



unit. In the province of Camarines Sur, two leaders, Captain Juan Miranda and Captain Teofilio Padua, the former a USAFFE sergeant and the latter a local government official, operated in different parts of the province. Major Francisco Sandico, Lieutenant Colonel M. M. Zabat, and Faustino Flor controlled the province of Albay, all three being USAFFE, the first two in the Philippine Constabulary and the last in the Philippine Army. Within the province of Sorsogon two leaders dominated the scene: Governor Salvador Escudero and Major Licerio Lapus. Due to the aforementioned confusion, no attempt will be made to describe any one unit nor to trace in chronological order anything other than the series of events contributing to the failure of the guerrillas in that area to unite.

As early as December 1942, intelligence agents from the IV Philippine Corps had penetrated the Bicol and plans had been laid for the establishment of a 67th Infantry Regiment (the 61st to 66th existing on Panay). By March 1943, Lapus had received the blessings of Colonel Peralta via Lieutenant Colonel Pedron Serran, G-2, IV Philippine Corps, and was coordinating intelligence coverage of the Bicol and forwarding it to Panay. The formal dissolution of the IV Philippine Corps in the same month caused Lapus to redesignate the paper 67th Regiment as the 54th to conform to the apparent policy of GHQ SWPA to recognize by prewar military districts. Two months later, however, Zabat's emissaries contacted Lieutenant Colonel Serran, informed him that Lapus was unsuccessful in unifying the Bicol and consequently received a new set

of instructions, the former set never being rescinded. In the meantime, Escudero, too, had received letters from the 6th Military District purporting to back him for commanding officer of the 5th Military District. By July 1943, all three, Lopus, Zabat, and Escudero, considered themselves the logical district commanders and could present written documents to prove the backing of the 6th Military District. All attempts on their part to receive a clarification of Panay's stand failed and there the situation stood. As each man received the backing of Peralta, the smaller leaders would join or break away until no one man could effectively count upon their assistance. In July 1943, Escudero received an order from Colonel Straughn promoting him to the rank of colonel. Thereupon he warned Panay to cease backing Lopus, and by early 1944 had succeeded in driving Lopus from Sorsogon in a number of bloody encounters which had been growing in number and violence since early 1943. The arrival of Lieutenant Colonel Smith on Samar and his contacts with Lopus in February 1944 further confused the issue when he turned around and backed Escudero the following month. Although the mission of Lieutenant Colonel Russel D. Barros, ordered to the Bicol by Lieutenant Colonel Anderson in April 1944, was primarily to establish an intelligence net and to locate suitable sites for the receipt of supplies by submarine, he, too, attempted to bring about some semblance of unity but failed.

With the invasion of Luzon well under way and plans being laid for clearing out the Bicol, a number of American Officers from Sixth

Army, mostly demolition experts, were slipped into the area to secure assistance from the guerrillas and arrange for future coordination. On February 12, 1945, Lieutenant William Nellist was placed in command of the Albay and Sorsogon guerrillas by Sixth Army with orders to unify them. Identical instructions were issued on the same date to Lieutenant Colonel Barros for Camarines Sur and to Lieutenant Woodrow Hobbs for Camarines Norte. None was successful due to the bitter rivalries still existing between the many leaders. On March 11, 1945, GHQ SWPA ordered Barros to unify all Bicol guerrillas but he could not accomplish the mission.

On April 1, 1945, the 158th Regimental Combat Team landed at Legaspi and commenced the liberation of the entire Bicol area. As guerrilla units came under their control they were assigned missions as combat or security troops depending upon their equipment and their state of organization. In order to extend recognition to the guerrillas, the commanding general, 158th Regimental Combat Team, formed the Bicol Brigade, a composite of the guerrillas of all four provinces. Approximately 6,000 individuals received official guerrilla recognition.

In retrospect, the Bicol guerrillas did nothing but wrangle and fight amongst themselves, putting their personal interests before those of their country and the cause for which they should have been fighting. Many of the so-called guerrilla units were actually nothing more than bandits who were the bane of the civilian populace, commandeering whatever touched their fancies and then leaving them to suffer reprisals from the Japanese for allegedly supplying the guerrillas. Continued

interference from Panay and to a lesser extent Samar, although a major contributing factor to the confusion, cannot be blamed entirely because too many personal elements entered into the picture.

#### SOUTHERN ISLANDS

##### VI - General

The development of a guerrilla movement in the southern islands was marked by the fact that it consisted of a number of individual efforts completely unrelated at first because of an isolation enforced by expanses of heavily patrolled water. As the initial shock occasioned by the unexpected surrender of all USAFFE forces wore off and the heavy concentration of Japanese combat troops gave way to second and third rate garrison troops, the inhabitants turned their attention to restoring civil law and order. Within several months after the surrender most of the larger islands had succeeded in suppressing banditry to a great extent and those responsible were turning their attention to the possibility of resistance against the Japanese. The relatively large number of trained soldiers, the availability of much military equipment, the weakness of the Japanese garrisons, and the determination of the people not to submit to the Japanese made an ideal situation for the development of resistance. Slowly at first, but gaining momentum with the establishment of radio and submarine contact with Australia, organizations developed within the several islands, merged, consolidated, and broadened out to extend control over adjacent islands. The aspirations of some guerrilla commanders were suppressed

by GHQ. With the extension of recognition came more supplies and sufficient radios to establish excellent intelligence nets throughout the southern islands. The commencement of radio traffic from unknown stations in 1943 and the increase in volume throughout 1944 gave warning to the Japanese that resistance had not been crushed and led to a series of savage and brutal expeditions throughout the islands, particularly in late 1943 and the first half of 1944. None of these expeditions succeeded in destroying the guerrilla organizations attacked, although some were badly disrupted and disorganized temporarily. As liberation approached, the volume and accuracy of intelligence increased and at the same time the guerrillas began the slow process of pushing the Japanese out of the island interiors until, when American troops landed, most remaining Japanese troops were confined to a few coastal cities. With the exception of the guerrilla organizations on Palawan, Mindoro, Masbate, and Marinduque, which were subsequently recognized by attachment, all the remainder had been recognized prior to 20 October 1944 by GHQ SWPA. That fact, together with the generally accepted view that a duly appointed district or island commander was the sole representative of General Mac Arthur within that district or command, acted to prevent the wholesale submission of recognition claims which was experienced on Luzon. There were, however, some units which had remained independent of the duly appointed commanders and which did submit claims for recognition. Too, several spurious units appeared but none, either the independent or the spurious, received recognition.

10th Military District (Mindanao, less the Sulu Archipelago)

No island other than Luzon saw a greater concentration of USAFFE troops than did Mindanao, nor was the interior of any island as difficult of access. It was inevitable that those who refused to surrender, not trusting themselves to the mercy of the Japanese, would work their way into the wild hinterlands and await developments. That such a large proportion of officers, both American and Filipino, refused to surrender was due to their belief that General Wainwright, being in the hands of the Japanese, had no authority to issue orders to General Sharp and that such orders, even when accepted by General Sharp, were still invalid. In any event, the number of officers who refused to surrender and disappeared into the hills probably exceeded those of all the other major islands combined.

The final surrender on May 27, 1942, was followed by a period of wild disorder in which the Moros came down out of the hills of Lanao to plunder and pillage Christian settlements while bands of USAFFE soldiers roamed at will, using their weapons to support themselves. Two months after the surrender saw order slowly prevailing over chaos as senior ranking American and Filipino officers contacted the many small bands and convinced them to join forces against the Japanese rather than against their own people. An American mestizo, Captain Luis P. Morgan, gathered together a band of ruthless fighters and, in conjunction with the band of William "Nigger" Tate, a Moro-American mestizo, inflicted such punishment upon the marauding Moros

of Lanao that they returned to their own territory and did not again seek to take advantage of the unsettled conditions. In September Captain Morgan contacted Colonel (then Lieutenant Colonel) Wendell W. Fertig, who had spent a few years in the Philippines as a mining engineer, was recalled to active duty with the Engineer Corps and served on Bataan, and requested that he take command of his, Morgan's, guerrilla headquarters while he, Morgan, became his Chief of Staff. Fertig established his headquarters in the only province of Mindanao void of Japanese, Misamis Occidental, promoted himself to Brigadier General and proclaimed himself as commanding officer of all guerrilla forces in Mindanao and the Visayan Islands. Eight months later he had in his own territory of Misamis Occidental and northern Zamboanga the 106th and 107th Regiments, with both areas void of Japs.

With the Japanese confining themselves mostly to the coastal cities and to patrols of inland roads and waterways and with large food producing areas available to the guerrillas, Colonel Fertig performed the difficult mission of persuading other guerrilla leaders on Mindanao to join him. Following the old prewar military district system and a Philippine Army Table of organization, he organized the 105th Division with corresponding regiments in the area first liberated by Captain Morgan. Expanding eastward into the predominantly Moro province of Lanao in early 1943, he organized the 108th Division with several Christian regiments and a relatively large force of Moros known as the Maranao Militia Force (MMF) under Datu Kalaw, composed

of the Maranao Moros, perhaps the most intelligent and hardest fighting of all the Moro tribes. For political reasons this force was maintained separately and by 1945 consisted of the 124th, 126th, 127th, 128th, 129th, and the 1st and 2nd Provisional Regiments as well as the 2nd, 4th, and 6th Separate Battalions, plus some eleven separate companies. Due to weapons taken from and abandoned by the USAFFE in May 1942, the MMF, consisting of approximately 8,000 Moros from the former Bolo Battalions and Blade Weapons Units, was considered the best armed of Colonel Fertig's troops.

Contact being established with Colonel (then Major) Alejandro Suarez in Sulu by February 1943, his forces were accepted into the Mindanao and Sulu Force as the 125th Regiment and remained until a year later when the Sulu Area Command was established by General MacArthur separately from the 10th Military District. As the now 10th Military District grew stronger and pressed the Japanese harder, it continued its eastward expansion, absorbing independent units until the 109th Division was organized in early 1943 in the areas of Cagayan de Misamis and Bukidnon, the 110th Division in mid-1943 in the areas of northern Agusan and Surigao, the 106th Division in late 1943 in Cotabato, and the 107th Division in early 1944 in southern Agusan and Davao. At the time of the first American landings on Mindanao in March 1945 and in addition to the MMF, the 10th Military District consisted of the 105th to the 121st Regiments, inclusive, the 130th Regiment and a number of provisional battalions and divisional service



troops. To further facilitate command and administrative functions, an "A" Corps was organized in January 1944 to cover western Mindanao and consisted of the 105th, 106th, 108th and 109th Divisions plus the 116th and 121st Regiments.

Contact was first established with Australia in late December 1942 when Lieutenant Colonel (then Captain) Charles N. Smith and several other American officers reached General MacArthur's headquarters and revealed the existence of a guerrilla movement on Mindanao and that Colonel Fertig had been attempting to contact Australia by radio since November. Radio contact was established in January 1943. By late February or early March 1943, Lieutenant Commander Charles Parsons reached Mindanao by submarine and delivered to Colonel Fertig four tons of supplies which included much signal equipment. From that date on, Mindanao became the base from which supplies and intelligence agents funneled into the Philippine Islands. On February 13, 1943, General MacArthur appointed Colonel Fertig as commanding officer of the 10th Military District and granted him authority to extend an intelligence net over the 9th Military District. Similar instructions being given Colonel Macario Peralta Jr. for the 6th Military District with intelligence coverage over the 7th and 8th Military Districts. Fertig reduced himself to a colonel and dropped his aspiration for control of the Visayas which had incurred the wrath of Peralta in Panay, Villamor in Negros, and Cushing in Cebu.

Early contacts in 1942 had been made with Mr. Roy S. Bell, a

professor at Siliman University in Dumaguete, Negros Oriental, and, when the latter invited Lieutenant Colonel (then Major) Placido A. Ausejo to command the guerrilla units then forming in the Dumaguete area, and he accepted, Colonel Fertig appointed Ausejo commanding officer of the 75th Infantry. Close and very cordial contacts between the two were maintained. When, however, the 7th Military District was recognized by GHQ, SWPA on May 14, 1943, Colonel Fertig released Ausejo to Major Villamor and, except for mutual exchanges of intelligence, ceased all activities in Negros. A similar situation existed on Siquijor with Major Cunanan commanding the 1st Provisional Battalion, 86th Infantry, and acknowledging only the command of Colonel Fertig. On Leyte and Samar, Colonel Fertig backed Colonel Kangleon until the recognition of the Leyte Area Command on October 21, 1943, after which time he backed Lieutenant Colonel Juan Causing for Commanding Officer of the Samar Area Command. Within the 9th Military District, Colonel Fertig was consistently opposed by Colonel Peralta, who, even though limited by direct orders from GHQ to confine his activities to the 6th, 7th, and 8th Military Districts, continued to interfere with the 9th by backing Blas Miranda against Colonel Kangleon on Leyte and Pedro V. Merritt against Lieutenant Colonel Causing on Samar.

In mid-1943, things didn't augur too well for Fertig. Morgan, the chief of staff, became disaffected; Major Limena, the commander of the 109th Regiment led a mutiny lasting four months; and Major Jaldon made a truce with the Japs which affected another regiment. The head-

quarters of the 10th Military District had been established in the seaport of Misamis; the only two transmitters which could reach Australia were in the outskirts of this town; the 406 available rifles had been scattered along 200 kilometers of coastline; no reserve food supplies were available. On June 26, 1943, the Japanese struck and occupied Misamis and the other more important coastal towns. Fertig withdrew to untenable positions which were subsequently penetrated and forced his movement to the province of Lanao. Morgan mutinied, assumed the rank of Brigadier General and command of all the "fighting" forces. The officer who led the first mutiny, Major Limena, persuaded Morgan to return to Australia by submarine and Limena's reward was his return of command.

After the above, Fertig shifted his headquarters many times and for great distances. Once again the Japs forced movement of his headquarters in June 1944, at which time two columns moved in. Fertig maintained a "highly mobile command post," and perfected his organization which contained over 25,000 arms, 10,000 of which were shipped in from Australia. His recognized command approximates the strength of 32,000 guerrillas.

#### 6th Military District (Panay)

Unique amongst the guerrilla movements in the southern islands for the fact that one leader early seized the initiative and retained it with no opposition was that of the 6th Military District under Colonel Peralta. With a nucleus of some 1,500 reasonably well-trained

and armed men from the remnants of the 61st Division, Colonel Peralta wasted no time in crushing bands of looters who, as throughout the islands, sprang up after the surrender on or about May 31, 1942. Within a month after the surrender the three provinces of Panay, Iloilo, Capiz and Antique, had been organized into forces, these forces further subdivided into sectors and the sectors into small, mobile raiding forces based upon and named after the towns in which they were organized. By August 1942, plans had been laid to reconstitute the 61st Division and orders were issued to commence reorganizing the raiding forces into standard Philippine Army companies of five officers and 110 men.

In the meantime, Tomas Confesor, who was acting as Governor of Panay and was later confirmed by President Quezon, began to come into increasing prominence, and a certain amount of friction developed between him and Peralta. Confesor had previously served as the Secretary of Commerce and Industry and was a prominent figure in the Philippines whereas Peralta, who was slightly over thirty years of age, was unknown before the war began. Because of Confesor's standing, the Japanese were particularly anxious to obtain his surrender, and prepared leaflets containing pictures of his father, mother, and children, and letters allegedly written by them which were dropped by plane. Confesor rejected this offer even to save the lives of his family. The Japs next sent a committee composed of Dr. Caram, the puppet governor of Panay, former General Zuimbo, Senator Velasco, Captain Tando, and Jap Colonel Furukawa. These men wrote pleading for his discontinuance

of resistance against the Japanese. His refusal was contained in a letter considered something of a masterpiece and subsequently gained wide circulation throughout the Philippines. Friction between Peralta and Confesor increased for three principal reasons: (1) Declaration of martial law by Peralta which would have subordinated the civil government to the military (2) The printing of emergency currency by Peralta after the civil government had initially controlled that printing (3) Confesor's formation of the Emergency Provincial Guards (EPG) from men given by Peralta for Confesor's protection. Friction became so great that the late Colonel Edwin Andrews, then of the AIB on Negros, was instructed by GHQ SWPA to evacuate Confesor in order to save his life. In late November or early December 1944, Andrews evacuated Confesor to Leyte.

So successful was the organization of Panay and so wholehearted the civilian support, Colonel Peralta became expansive with ideas and envisioned an organization embracing all of the Visayan Islands. To that end he established on October 1, 1942, the IV Philippine Corps to consist of the 61st Division on Panay, the 72nd Division on Negros, and the 83rd Division on Cebu and Bohol, and appointed island and division commanders. Before the end of the year, he had further authorized on paper the formation of the 67th Regiment in the Bicol Region and the 43rd Division to cover the old 4th Military District. Within Panay he established his corps headquarters and corps troops and the 61st Division with the 63rd to the 66th Regiments, inclusive, plus divisional

service troops and intelligence troops, the latter responsible for establishing contacts with and control over islands to the north of Panay. With transportation and communication facilities being practically nonexistent, GHQ SWPA did not see fit to permit the continuance of so ambitious a project as the IV Philippine Corps which could not be effectively controlled. As a result, the appointment of Colonel Peralta on February 13, 1943, limited his command functions to the 6th Military District only and his intelligence coverage to the 7th and 8th Military Districts. Consequently, the IV Philippine Corps was abandoned effective February 22, 1943, and all Panay corps troops redesignated as 6th Military District troops with few other changes than the formation of additional service units. When a severe Japanese punitive expedition (December 43 - February 44) captured Peralta's headquarters, drove him into the mountain province of Antique, and killed an estimated two to three thousand civilians, Peralta reorganized his command. He abandoned the dual district and division headquarters in March 1944 and established in their place one headquarters consisting of a first or rear echelon and a second or forward echelon. The regiments gave way to combat teams with three additional, the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd, added and all in contact with both echelons. By March 1945 the tactical situation and the additional equipment no longer necessitated the two echelons and they were combined into one. At the same time the 1st and 2nd Combat Teams were redesignated as the 61st and 62nd Combat Teams and the 3rd Combat Team was combined with the 64th Combat

Team. Upon the landing of American troops on Panay in March 1945, troops of the 6th Military District had driven the Japanese out of the interior and had confined them to a few coastal cities where they were quickly destroyed.

Concerning the IV Philippine Corps established in October 1942, but one island outside of Panay saw fit to cooperate in any measure, and that was Negros where the officer appointed by Colonel Peralta, Colonel (then Major) Salvador Abcede, was a personal friend. At the time of the formation of the Corps, however, Negros was not unified and did not become completely unified until better than a year later. Between the two, on the other hand, the closest of cooperation was maintained. Cebu and Bohol, for which Colonel Peralta had designated Harry Fenton as commanding officer, never acknowledged Colonel Peralta's authority to appoint, let alone to command. Nor, for that matter, was Cebu exercising any control over Bohol, enemy pressure in Cebu being such as to preclude anything other than maintaining their own organization intact. In addition, both Fenton and Lieutenant Colonel James M. Cushing, dual commanders of Cebu, disliked and distrusted Colonel Peralta to the extent that agents from Panay were kept off Cebu under pain of death if detected. Bohol, while maintaining irregular contact with Panay, never acknowledge Colonel Peralta's authority, maintaining a semi-independent existence throughout the Occupation. The 67th Infantry, a paper organization from the start, never functioned and disappeared in the welter of inter-unit rivalries and bloodshed. Nor did

the 43rd Division get beyond the paper stage. The IV Philippine Corps, then, while enjoying a limited amount of success for a short period of time, was too ambitious a project to succeed under the tactical conditions at the time.

In the matter of intelligence the 6th Military District outdid itself. By early 1943, every major island of the Philippine Archipelago had been contacted by Colonel Peralta's agents. By mid-1943, however, rivalries or indifferences had frozen him out of Sulu, Mindanao, Cebu, and Bohol, while the recognition of the 7th Military District had terminated his authority there. Although his agents were active on Luzon, they had lost out by the end of 1943 partly because their efforts to take over units with which they came in contact were resented and thwarted, partly because it became apparent that the 6th Military District was taking full credit for the intelligence forwarded through Panay by those agents and partly because the time factor involved in getting intelligence from Luzon reduced the value of the intelligence submitted. In maintaining agents on Leyte and Samar, in direct disobedience to General MacArthur's orders, the 6th Military District prevented the unification, and hence the recognition, of both islands. In the case of Leyte, Lieutenant Blas Miranda, backed by Colonel Peralta, never subordinated himself to Colonel Kangloon even though the Leyte Area Command had been recognized on October 21, 1943. On Palawan and Marinduque, the latter a stepping stone into Luzon from Mindoro for intelligence agents, the 6th Military District succeeded both in



establishing effective intelligence nets and relay centers and incorporating the units thereon into the 6th Military District, the former as the Palawan Special Battalion and the latter as a battalion of the 61st Combat Team. On Mindoro and Masbate, key stepping stones to Luzon, Colonel Peralta initially succeeded in establishing excellent intelligence relay stations but the tactics of his subordinates in preferring to take over existing organizations rather than to cooperate with them led to his complete ejection from Mindoro when his intelligence penetration chief, Lieutenant Colonel Enrique Jurade, was killed by men of Major Ramon Ruffy, and from Masbate when Captain Manuel O. Donate rebelled against the 6th Military District.

The American enlisted men who served on Panay seem to have been shown little consideration and they brand Peralta as anti-American. At any rate, he was difficult to handle by GHQ because of his radical views, impetuosity, and self-importance. Approximately 23,456 guerrillas were recognized as members of the 6th Military District.

#### 7th Military District (Negros and Siquijor)

Quite to the opposite of the 6th Military District, the 7th Military District got off to a slow start, there being no less than six independent and powerful leaders well established in Negros by October 1942. Colonel Abcede, commanding officer of the unsundered 3rd Battalion, 74th Infantry (USAFFE), established a well-run organization in the central portion of Negros Occidental. To the north of him and in the

same province was Lieutenant Colonel (then Major) Ernesto S. Mata, commanding officer of the unsundered 2nd Battalion, 74th Infantry (USAFFE). On the east coast of Negros and centered around the northern boundary of Negros Oriental flourished a bandit group known, amongst other names, as the Wild Unit or United Strength of Soldiers and Civilian Forces under a USAFFE enlisted man by name of "Puring" Gemillan. South of, but adjacent to, this unit was the East Negros Force of Lieutenant Colonel (then Captain) Hermenegildo Mercado, while further south was the Eastern Negros Guerrilla Force of 73rd Division of Lieutenant Colonel Gabriel Gador. In the extreme southern part of Negros and in the general vicinity of Dumaguete operated the 75th Infantry Regiment under Lieutenant Colonel Ausejo (see 10th MD).

Upon the appointment of Colonel Abcede as island commander of Negros and commanding officer of the 72nd Division of the IV Philippine Corps on October 1, 1942, attempts were made to establish regular contacts with Lieutenant Colonel Mata in the north, he never having been unfriendly towards Colonel Abcede and equally desirous of combining forces. The two met in Mata's headquarters on November 17, 1942, and, though ranking him, Mata agreed to accept the leadership of Abcede. With this agreement it was decided that the regiment in the process of being formed by Mata would be designated the 74th Infantry and that being formed by Abcede the 76th. All subsequent contacts with Gemillan, Mercado, and Gador in 1942 and in early 1943 failed to secure even cooperation. At that time the existence of the 75th Infantry under

Ausejo was unknown to the leaders in the north.

Major Villamor, AIB agent from GHQ SWPA, landed on Negros in late 1943 with radio equipment and orders to establish an intelligence net. Contacting Abcede he received information of the confused situation on Negros and informed Australia of the refusal of the leading officer to cooperate. Further personal contacts with Ausejo and Gador confirmed his earlier reports and he advised GHQ SWPA that the strongest man and the only one capable of receiving full cooperation was Abcede. When it became apparent that Abcede and Gador were about to come to blows, General MacArthur appointed Villamor as the acting commander on the 7th Military District on May 14, 1943, and instructed him to unify the guerrillas. Ausejo, receiving Colonel Fertig's approval, joined the 7th Military District and became the 75th Infantry, 7th Military District. The Wild Unit and Gador, both on excellent terms, refused to join while Mercado held out for a better position. Villamor's efforts to unify the Negros guerrillas interfered with his primary mission to the extent that he was relieved of his command on July 8, 1943, and replaced as acting commanding officer by the able soldier Abcede. Villamor continued the development of his 7th AIB (PAAC) intelligence net and, upon his evacuation to Australia in October 1943, was replaced by Colonel (then Major ) Edwin Andrews.

By November 1943, Mercado's unit had been fully absorbed into the 7th Military District and eventually became the 72nd Field Artillery Regiment (a division plus in strength was formed and divisional designa-

tions were applied even though they did not function according to their designations, all except service units being organized as infantry). In late November of the same year, Lieutenant Colonel Julian C. Aspillá, Gador's Chief of Staff, led a group of officers and men disgusted with Gador's obstructionist tactics in a coup d'etat which drove Gador from the island and brought his small unit into the 7th Military District. These men eventually formed the 77th Infantry. The last resistance to unification, in the form of the Wild Unit, was shattered in April 1944 when troops of the 7th Military District drove the unit off the island. What few did not evacuate to Cebu and thence to Bohol were absorbed and for the first time Negros was entirely unified. In February 1944, 45 tons of supplies were delivered and in March Abcede was promoted to a lieutenant colonel and made permanent commanding officer by MacArthur.

In the meantime, following the organizations initially adopted by Abcede and Mata, the entire island had been divided into sectors and further divided into subsectors, both being tactical as well as administrative in nature, with regiments garrisoning the sectors. To facilitate control, a 73rd Provisional Division was organized in May 1944 and troops already activated assigned to it. This division remained active until March 1945 when both divisions were dissolved and the elements thereof reformed into combat groups and teams in order to participate more effectively in the liberation of Negros which commenced on March 29, 1945. In June 1944, the Japanese made a heavy attack on southwestern Negros and though they reached district headquarters and killed many

civilians, no serious damage was done to the organization. Approximately 11,400 men received official guerrilla recognition.

#### Leyte Area Command (Leyte)

The scarcity of USAFFE troops on Leyte prevented the early establishment of an homogeneous guerrilla command. Nevertheless, patriotic civilians banded together in groups and within six months after the surrender organizations covered Leyte, and, although neither cooperating nor coordinating with each other, had restored law and order. The escape of Colonel Kangleon from the POW camp at Butuan, Mindanao, in December 1942 and his arrival at Sogod, Leyte, on January 1, 1943, signaled the start of a conference which lasted until the 6th and was attended by all the prominent Leyte guerrilla leaders or their representatives, with the exception of Lieutenant Blas Miranda, commanding officer of the Western Leyte Guerrilla Warfare Forces (WLGWF). All agreed to accept Colonel Kangleon as their leader by virtue of his rank as one of the senior colonels in the Philippine Army, and provisions were made to reorganize and consolidate the organizations then in existence. However, no definite action was taken until April when Lieutenant Commander Parsons arrived by submarine, brought in radio equipment and informed Colonel Kangleon that no recognition would be extended by GHQ until unification had been secured. Later in the month, Lieutenant Colonel Morgan arrived from Mindanao and, in Colonel Fertig's name, appointed Colonel Kangleon commanding officer of the 9th Military District.

On April 20, 1943, Colonel Kangleon assumed command of the 9th Military District, radioed Australia through the 10th Military District of his action and renamed the then Leyte Guerrilla Forces as the 92nd Division. By the end of the month, orders had been issued activating the 94th and 95th Regiments on Leyte and the 96th on Samar, the first two being organized by July but the latter remaining a paper organization because of the refusal of rival groups in Samar either to submit to Colonel Kangleon or to cooperate with each other. In August the command was redesignated as the 9th Military District and the following month, Lieutenant Colonel Causing was ordered to Samar to organize the 93rd Division. When Colonel Kangleon received his appointment as commanding officer of the Leyte Area Command (LAC) on November 28, 1943, effective October 21, 1943, he immediately dissolved the 9th Military District and the 96th Infantry on Samar, ordering elements of the latter unit to report for instructions to Lieutenant Colonel Causing, and directed that elements of the 93rd Division would remain under Causing's control.

Due to the interference of the 6th Military District in territory over which it had no jurisdiction, Blas Miranda in the northern part of the island consistently refused to join Colonel Kangleon and looked to Colonel Peralta for advice and assistance. Bitter fighting between these two groups reached a climax at Bay-Bay in August 1943 resulting in an alleged 300 casualties. Even after the recognition of the LAC he refused to subordinate himself as directed by General MacArthur.

In July or August of 1944, approximately 200 members joined Colonel Kangleon and were inducted into the 96th Regiment. With this organization the LAC continued its primary mission of intelligence and, when the Liberation Forces first set foot on Philippine soil between Dulag and Tacloban on October 20, 1944, participated in the liberation of Leyte. Approximately 4,500 men were recognized.

#### Bohol Area Command (Bohol)

Small guerrilla bands of mixed USAFFE and patriotic civilians offered meager postsurrender resistance to the Japanese in 1942. Of these the Behind the Clouds unit led by Major (then Lieutenant) Ismael P. Ingeniero, dominated the western part of Bohol while the Guerrilla Warfare Regiment of Captain E. Achacuso, a coalition regiment, dominated the eastern part. On November 29, 1942, in a conference held by these guerrilla leaders at Batuan, the Bohol Force was formed under the leadership of Major Ingeniero by the simple expedient of jailing his competitor. All guerrilla units on Bohol were gradually absorbed and no schism disrupted the organization thereafter.

By November 1943, the unit was redesignated the Bohol Area Command (BAC) in conformity with the appointment of Major Ingeniero as commanding officer as per a letter dated October 21, 1943, received through the 10th Military District. This recognition stimulated organization and in January 1944 the 84th and 85th Regiments were formed. In November 1944, in expectation of American landings, the 86th Regiment was activated but never fully organized. On April 10, 1945, a reinforced battalion of

the Americal Division landed and, with little assistance from the BAC which had permitted the Japanese to escape from Tagbilaran into the hills, officially cleared the island by May 24, 1945. On May 31 the BAC was dissolved.

Some questions have been raised concerning the effectiveness of this organization and the loyalty of its leader. During the heaviest Japanese punitive penetrations, Major Ingeniero was never present on the island and, during the worst penetration of mid-1944, the entire island was occupied in several days and all radio equipment lost without a shot being fired. Adjacent area commanders questioned the intelligence reports submitted and questioned his motives in calling certain conferences. Although supplied with ample arms and ammunition in late 1944 with which to contain the Japanese, no more than several hundred at most, in Tagbilaran the Japanese slipped through the alleged "ring of steel" forged by the BAC and disappeared into the hills, thereby causing an unnecessarily costly campaign in routing them out. General Arnold, Commanding General of the Americal Division, recommended that the Eighth Army recognize only 1,000 men. Records reveal that 5,429 plus 59 casualties were recognized by the Eighth Army. This increase was occasioned by an apparent policy of paying all guerrillas who presented themselves for pay in an effort to disarm them.

Sulu Area Command (Sulu Archipelago)

The 8th Sulu Company (PS), specifically ordered by Colonel Suarez .



not to surrender and found intact by him in Tawi-Tawi after his escape from the POW camp at Cotabato in January 1943, formed the core upon which he built what was to become the Sulu Area Command. On February 10, 1943, Colonel Suarez assumed command both of all resistance forces in Sulu and the post of governor of the free areas. Because of his immense personal prestige as former governor and of his reputation for bravery his leadership was never questioned. An envoy sent to Colonel Fertig returned with orders designating him as commanding officer of the 125th Regiment, 10th Military District, effective February 10, 1943. By February 12, 1944, the Sulu area was redesignated as the Sulu Area Command by GHQ SWPA as a command separate from the 10th Military District and a reorganization commenced which ultimately led to the formation of the 1st and 2nd Sulu Infantry Regiments.

Intelligence operations of the Sulu Area Command extended from Palawan and the nearby Visayas to Borneo and the Celebes Islands. The establishment of an AIB radio near Suarez' headquarters by Captain J. A. Hammer in July 1943 accelerated the submission of intelligence gathered by members of the command. The first massing of a Japanese fleet near Tawi-Tawi and reported in May 1944, picked up by the 7th Military District the following month as the fleet passed Negros, resulted in a crushing defeat of that fleet in the First Battle of the Philippine Sea. Likewise reported was the departure in October 1944 of some 20,000 troops which had been massed in Sulu in anticipation of an Allied landing and which resulted in mass naval and air

attacks to prevent their arrival as reinforcements for Leyte.

With the receipt of arms and supplies by submarine in August 1944, the Sulu Area Command commenced a series of small-scale attacks in November which gradually intensified until by March 1945 the Japanese had been confined to the naval base at Bongao, Tawi-Tawi, and to a few hills on Jolo. In April 1945 elements of the 41st Division (US) landed on Tawi-Tawi and Jolo and, with the assistance of the Sulu Area Command, destroyed the Japanese forces except for a small number of stragglers who were left to the SAC to eliminate. Approximately 3,700 men were recognized.

#### Cebu Area Command (Cebu)

By no means the largest but one of the most unusual, both from the standpoint of the dual leadership initially employed as well as from the number of Japanese killed during the Occupation, was the Cebu Area Command (CAC). Somewhat better off than adjacent islands because of the large stocks of food and ammunition cached in the hills from the ammunition and food ships which had been unable to reach Corregidor, the Cebu guerrillas got off to an early start. In northern Cebu a movement commenced shortly after the surrender under Harry Fenton, a former radio announcer whose correct name was Aaron Feinstein. In southern Cebu a similar movement developed under Lieutenant Colonel James M. Cushing, formerly a mining engineer in the Philippines whose two brothers, Walter and Charles, organized guerrillas in northern Luzon. Because the Japanese occupied central Cebu as well as the coastal plains, some time elapsed before the two met and coordinated their activities.

By September 1942, however, the two had met and agreed to combine their organizations. Under the combination Harry Fenton concerned himself with the administration of the command while Lieutenant Colonel Cushing took charge of the combat elements. Early 1943 saw the island of Cebu divided into the North, Northeast, Northwest, Central, and South Cebu Sectors. To garrison these sectors eleven battalions were organized, using the prewar Philippine Army table of organization as a model. Two heavy Japanese penetrations, one in March 1943 and another in January 1944, failed to destroy the command but did succeed in seriously disrupting operations. In order to bolster the morale of the Cebu guerrillas, sagging from the effects of the January penetration, GHQ SWPA extended recognition to the Cebu Area Command on February 12, 1944, effective January 22. Upon receipt of recognition, Lieutenant Colonel Cushing, then the sole commanding officer, reorganized his command into the 85th, 86th, 87th, and 88th Infantry Regiments, each regiment consisting of four battalions. This organization remained in effect without major changes and through another severe punitive expedition in August 1944 until redesignated the 82nd Division on March 26, 1945.

The Cushing-Fenton combination worked extremely well, Fenton being an able administrator but not personally popular and Cushing being a rugged fighter and immensely popular. He repeatedly met the Japanese in open combat as contrasted with the guerrilla tactics practiced on other islands. Unfortunately, however, Fenton became so suspicious of individuals that his activities caused unfavorable comment and out-

right indignation, particularly when his executions of spies and collaborators unfortunately included several innocent persons. His consistent refusal to print emergency money further estranged his formerly loyal supporters and, when friction developed with neighboring islands over his equally consistent refusal to part with food and ammunition stocks, many considered his actions preventing GHQ recognition. On September 15, 1943, in the absence of Lieutenant Colonel Cushing, who had gone to Negros in July to confer with Major Villamor on the possibility of receiving aid from Australia, Lieutenant Colonel Ricardo Estrella, chief of staff, led an armed revolt against Fenton, tried and executed him along with several members of his staff. Cushing assumed sole command upon his return from Negros in November and Estrella subsequently was court-martialed and executed.

The CAC, having its hands full with the Japanese, attempted no expansion either of territory or of intelligence nets, being content to maintain a few agents on adjacent islands to warn of impending Japanese operations and maintain friendly relations with those islands. Cushing did, however, consider Bohol to be within his sphere of operations insofar as it was a part of the 8th Military District and was particularly desirous of receiving GHQ approval to include it when he became convinced that Japanese agents were operating from that island and the BAC was making no attempt to stop them. Cordial relations were maintained with all organizations with the exception of the 6th Military District which both Cushing and Fenton mistrusted. As a result, 6th Military District

agents seldom landed on Cebu and took their lives in their hands when they did.

Cebu, being the most important Japanese base south of Manila, became an excellent source of intelligence information for GHQ SWPA. Ship movements as well as troop movements were regularly reported and the number of aircraft arriving, departing, and stationed on the various airfields was systematically recorded and forwarded. In mid-1944, a large Japanese military plane crash-landed near territory controlled by the CAC and those who survived, including several high-ranking army and navy officers which included an Admiral carrying top secret plans, were captured and taken to Cushing's headquarters. When radio requests to Australia for the disposition of these officers failed to elicit any response and the Japanese threatened to destroy every town in Cebu, one by one, if they were not turned loose, Cushing released them only when his headquarters was surrounded but retained all documents which were subsequently forwarded to Australia through Colonel Andrews on Negros. Colonel Cushing believes he and his men were not captured after releasing these Japs because he extended to them the same courtesies due him and his men.

The ability of the CAC to exist under a dual leadership, until the execution of Fenton, on the most densely populated island in the Archipelago where Japanese activities in the southern islands were the greatest and their retaliations the most savage, and strike back to the extent that more Japanese were killed during the Occupation on this island than on any other and still retain the loyalty of the population is a tribute

to the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Cushing. He successfully fought off the Japs in open country for two years, which constitutes an outstanding military performance which cannot be matched by any other district or area commander of guerrilla forces in the Philippines. Approximately 10,400 were recognized.

#### Samar Area Command (Samar)

Few guerrilla organizations in the southern islands present as poor a record as that of the Samar guerrillas. In the first place, there were few USAFFE personnel available with which to form a workable, military organization, and, in the second place, few Japanese garrisoned the island because the Japanese High Command did not consider it of sufficient strategic importance to garrison, let alone defend. Early attempts were made by Colonel Kangleon to unify the island in order to secure recognition for the entire 9th Military District but failed. Lieutenant Colonel Causing, once released by Colonel Kangleon in November 1943, continued attempting to organize a 93rd Division, but, while managing to bring the independent units of Southern Samar under his control, did not succeed in reaching an agreement with Pedro V. Merritt, the only other leader on the island capable of unifying all guerrillas. Merritt himself had formed a 93rd Division and could not understand why it should be disbanded and another 93rd Division organized by Colonel Kangleon and Lieutenant Colonel Causing. Backed by the ambitious Peralta on Panay, he refused to submit to Causing and

there the situation stood until the recognition of the Samar Area Command (SAC) on October 4, 1944, with Lieutenant Colonel Charles N. Smith commanding. In point of fact, no recognition would have been extended at all had it not been for Lieutenant Colonel Smith's ability to bring Causing and Merritt together since, to the bitter end, neither would serve under the other. Approximately 3,400 were recognized as guerrillas by GHQ.

#### Mindoro Guerrillas (Mindoro)

In somewhat the same class as the guerrillas on Samar but displaying better organization and a little more determination to fight the Japanese were the Mindoro guerrillas. Two rival organizations, one under Captain Esteban Beloncio and the other under Major Ramon Ruffy, commenced organization shortly after the surrender, the former being the more active of the two. Establishing contact with Pancy in December 1942 when he went to Colonel Peralta's headquarters for intelligence training, Beloncio remained loyal to the 6th Military District from that date on. Due to personal animosities, the two leaders did not get along well and no attempt by either was made to fuse their separate organizations until October 1943. At that time a conference between the two resulted in the formation of a Bolo Battalion, Bolo Area, 6th Military District, consisting of a Headquarters Company and four rifle companies with Ruffy as commanding officer and Beloncio as executive officer. This fusion did not prosper until the arrival of Major Lawrence H. Philipps, AIB agent from GHQ, in November 1943 to establish a radio and weather base. Major Philipps took

it upon himself to cement the fusion and all went well until he was killed by the Japanese in March 1944. The battalion immediately fell apart. In May 1944, Lieutenant Colonel Enrique Jurado, Luzon intelligence penetration chief of the 6th Military District, landed on Mindoro to establish an intelligence base. Beloncio immediately contacted him and apparently received his support while at the same time Ruffy, never favorably disposed towards the 6th Military District, ordered Lieutenant Colonel Jurado off the island. With the arrival in July 1944 of Major Philipps' successor, Lieutenant Commander George Rowe, Ruffy made contact and furnished some of his own men as security guards. In August an attempt was made to resolve all difficulties in a meeting attended by Rowe, Jurado, Beloncio, and Ruffy. The meeting resulted in the formation of two Bolo Battalions, one under Ruffy and one under Beloncio, but was completely negated when, Ruffy being successful in obtaining the loyalty of most of the former battalion as well as the lion's share of the weapons, Jurado refused to grant passage to Ruffy's men on their way to join Rowe. The inevitable clash resulted in Jurado's death on October 10, 1944, and on the first of the following month Beloncio set sail for Panay to report the incident. In late December he returned to Mindoro but was arrested, placed in jail with his two sons and his men disarmed by the Western Visayan Task Force under Brigadier General Dunckel which had landed on December 15. On March 15, 1945, the Mindoro Guerrilla Forces under Major Ruffy and consisting of approximately 700 men were granted guerrilla recognition.



Masbate Guerrilla Regiment (Masbate)

Little if any guerrilla activity commenced in Masbate until October 1942 when three bands emerged: in southeastern Masbate, Captain Manuel Donato formed the Masbate Guerrilla Unit; in the north, Nolasco Rosel, a fugitive from Samar and Leyte, formed the Rosel's Unit; while in the southwest the three Azarraga brothers, of whom Jesus, more popularly known as Villaojado, was the leader, not only formed a guerrilla unit but also a free government along socialistic lines. In late 1942, Colonel Peralta on Panay, at that time creating the IV Philippine Corps, designated Donato as the island commander of Masbate. In a series of conferences in February 1943, a unification of the three Masbate groups was agreed upon with Donato as commanding officer and Villaojado as executive officer of a battalion of four companies. This battalion, designated as the 1st Battalion, 66th Infantry, 61st Division, IV Philippine Corps, was redesignated as the Paris Special Infantry Battalion (Paris SIB), 64th Infantry (CP4), 6th Military District, in April 1943. Internecine jealousy and bitter rivalry actually prevented the unification, for in May 1943 Rosel tried to form his own regiment but his officers and men mutinied and remained with Donato. The remainder of Rosel's unit was then disbanded and he himself imprisoned. Following what appeared to be Colonel Peralta's policy of penetrating, dividing, and controlling, Major Vicente Tansiangco arrived from Panay on July 27, 1943, to assume command of the Paris SIB. Donato was demoted to the position of executive officer replacing Villaojado who immediately resented

the turn of events. The latter officer and his men mutinied, attempted to capture Tansiango and drove him from the island. Returning from Panay on September 11, 1945, with a punitive expedition, Tansiango tried for the next three months to effect a settlement with Villaojado but to no avail. By December 1943 he had determined to destroy Villaojado and his unit but to get at him entered into a truce with the Japanese to permit his men to pass through Japanese controlled territory. By January 1944, Villaojado's unit was dispersed. Two months later the Masbate SIB was reorganized and redesignated as the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Combat Team, 6th Military District. By May 1944, Panay had ordered a further reorganization which resulted in the replacement of many key positions then held by Masbate officers with officers from Panay. Strongly resenting the 6th Military District's action in assuming control of the Masbate Unit, Donato rebelled against the 6th Military District on July 24, 1944, redesignated his unit the Gold Area and organized along the lines of a special infantry battalion. Only the landing of American forces on Leyte on October 20, 1944, prevented the sending of a punitive expedition from the 6th Military District to return Donato to the fold. On April 1, 1945, American troops landed on Masbate and the liberation of the island commenced. The Masbate Unit was recognized in an approximate strength of 1,000 men.

#### Marinduque Forces (Marinduque)

A small organization consisting of approximately two companies was organized on Marinduque in late 1942 under Captain S. T. Untalan, senior

Philippine Constabulary officer on the island, and with the assistance of a Sergeant C. H. Hickok (USA). Although information concerning the guerrilla movement on Marinduque is still scarce, it would appear that the early activities of this unit consisted mostly of opposing another guerrilla organization known as the Marinduque Patriotic Army under the command of Osmundo Mondonedo. Nevertheless, Untalan succeeded in contacting Colonel Peralta in November 1942 and by March 1943 the Marinduque Forces had been placed under the command of the 6th Military District. In January and February 1944 the islands of Romblon province, a part of the 6th Military District, underwent a heavy penetration by Japanese punitive forces which swept the island clean of guerrillas. Untalan, apparently having nothing else to do in Marinduque, prepared an expedition of three sailboats and set forth to take over command of the Romblon islands. For a short time, Colonel Peralta sanctioned the move since Untalan was furnishing protection to newly arrived 6th Military District intelligence teams, but subsequently ordered him back to Marinduque in mid-1944 upon the arrival of the commanding officer, 61st Combat Team, 6th Military District. In January 1945 the Marinduque Forces were detached from the 6th Military District, placed under the tactical control of the 24th Infantry Division (US) and participated in the liberation of Marinduque. Approximately 300 men were recognized.

Palawan Special Battalion (Palawan)

Resistance movement on Palawan, although not in every case anti-Japanese, sprang up in five general localities by mid-1942. One group,

known as the Coron World War II Volunteers under a Carlos Amores and organized on the islands of Coron and Busuanga, destroyed the manganese mines then being worked by the Japanese. Somewhat farther south, the Cobb brothers formed a guerrilla unit from their ranch hands on Dumaran and extended operations to the northern mainland. Yet another group developed in northeastern Palawan under Major Guillermo Maramba (PC). In central Palawan, ex-governor Higinio Mendoza formed his group while at Brooks Point in southeastern Palawan an organization grew up from a number of escaped US Navy and Marine prisoners of war and Constabulary troops. Initially none of these organizations was aware of the others but, as happened so often on other islands, friction developed particularly amongst the first three as their activities conflicted.

A reconnaissance mission left Panay in November 1942 and returned several months later with the report that several guerrilla resistance movements existed on Palawan. With that information Colonel Peralta ordered on April 12, 1943, the organization of a Palawan Special Battalion under the command of Major P. Manigque. The latter officer was unable to organize, let alone control, the independent units then operating, and his conduct arousing resentment amongst the other leaders. This situation was reported by the 6th Military District liaison officer and further confirmed in July 1943 by the arrival of an officer from the Palawan Special Battalion who reported the irregularities existing on Palawan. Realizing that no local leader could effect unity on Palawan, the 6th Military District sent Major Pablo Muyco from Panay as commanding officer

of the Palawan Area with a directive calling for the unification of the guerrillas, the creation of a special battalion divided into four companies operating in four definite sectors, and the creation of such special units considered necessary to support that battalion. Arriving on October 1, 1943, Major Muyco was successful in obtaining the allegiance of all guerrilla leaders with the exception of Manigue who was subsequently arrested and placed in a concentration camp. By January 1944, the Palawan Special Battalion was completely organized and efficiently functioned.

In anticipation of American landings, operations against the Japanese commenced in November 1944 and continued until February 28, 1945, when elements of the 41st Infantry Division (US) landed at Puerto Princesa. By May 1945 all organized resistance ceased and Palawan was declared liberated. Approximately 1,200 guerrillas were recognized.

### PART THREE

#### DEVELOPMENT OF GUERRILLA RECOGNITION POLICY

##### I - Overall Headquarters Involved in Guerrilla Policy

Between December 7, 1941, and March 20, 1942, the designation of the headquarters commanding all Fil-American troops was known as United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE). It was this headquarters which, on or about January 20, 1942, authorized the guerrilla mission of Lieutenant Colonel Claude A. Thorp, the only known authorized guerrilla movement prior to the surrender. No other guerrilla movement was authorized by that headquarters or by its successor, Headquarters United States Army Forces in the Philippines (USAFIP).

In early March 1942, General Douglas MacArthur left the Philippines, taking with him to Australia, where he arrived on March 17, 1942, a group of senior officers around which he built General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area (GHQ SWPA). On March 20, 1942, the War Department redesignated USAFFE as USAFIP and by February 20, 1943, General MacArthur had re-established Headquarters, USAFFE, as a major administrative headquarters within GHQ SWPA.

From May 7, 1942, until October 20, 1944, all policy relative to guerrilla recognition emanated directly from GHQ SWPA and only with the

specific approval of General MacArthur. However, the various individuals and sections responsible for staff studies and recommendations are so varied and so tied up with the Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB) that a description of the latter agency is necessary for a full understanding (Appendix 1).

Organized on July 6, 1942, the AIB consisted of four functional sections, i.e., special operations, secret intelligence, combined field intelligence and propaganda. The field agencies responsible for carrying out the specific missions of the above four functional sections were assigned to geographical areas of prewar political sovereignty: the Northeast Area Section (Australian), the Netherlands East Indies Area Section (Dutch) and the Philippine Archipelago Area Section (American). Only the Combined Field Intelligence and Philippine Archipelago Area Sections will be considered in this discussion.

In order to keep GHQ in close touch with events in the Philippines a special Philippine Subsection of the AIB was formally established on October 21, 1942, with the specific mission of establishing military intelligence and secret service nets, channels of communication within the islands and to Australia, an eventual "escape route" from the islands and organizations to foster subversive activity and propaganda.

A reorganization of the AIB on April 16, 1943, redesignated the Philippine Archipelago Area Section as the Philippine Regional Section (PRS) (similar redesignations were made for the other sections), the mission remaining the same but an expansion of activities being undertaken. Brigadier General (then Colonel) Courtney Whitney assumed control

of the PRS on May 24, 1943, and from that time until a final redesignation on June 2, 1944, reported directly to the Chief of Staff, GHQ SWPA, Major General R. K. Sutherland, circumventing the AIB chain of command. During this period all matters pertaining to guerrilla recognition and Philippine affairs, with the exception of intelligence, were handled by General Whitney's section.

On June 2, 1944, orders removed the PRS from the AIB entirely and split it up into two Philippine Special Sections, one going to G-3, but remaining under the control of General Whitney, and the other to G-4.

From October 20, 1944, until June 9, 1945, all matters pertaining to guerrilla recognition were handled exclusively by Headquarters, USAFFE, subject to General MacArthur's approval, the Philippine Special Section, G-3, under General Whitney being replaced in November 1944 by the Philippine Army Section, USAFFE, under Major General Charles P. Stivers when General Whitney was assigned as G-5. The original mission of this section was to reorganize and train the Philippine Army.

On April 20, 1945, the USAFFE Training Group was established under Colonel James D. Taylor, its primary mission being to recover ex-USAFFE personnel, to assist in the organization and training of the new Philippine Army and to provide liaison between it and Headquarters, USAFFE. A Guerrilla Affairs Section (GAS) with Major George Miller as Chief was formed on May 10, 1945, under the USAFFE Training Group with the primary purpose of processing recognized guerrillas, recommending to the Commanding General, USAFFE, recognition for those unrecognized guerrilla



units already attached to American units and recommending recognition of those unrecognized guerrilla units not attached to American units.

Also on April 20, 1945, the PA Section, Headquarters USAFFE, was discontinued and the duties of the section assumed by appropriate staff sections of Headquarters, USAFFE, the former members of the section being assigned as liaison officers to Headquarters, Philippine Army (HPA). (It appears, however, that the PA Section was again reconstituted when GHQ SWPA was redesignated United States Army Forces in the Pacific (AFPAC) on June 9, 1945, and continued in operation until November 5, 1945, at which time the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Western Pacific (AFWESPAC) assumed responsibility for all matters pertaining to the Philippine Army.)

With the redesignation as GHQ AFPAC on April 6, 1945, of existing headquarters (General Order No. 1, GHQ AFPAC, April 6, 1945) and reassignment of personnel on June 9, 1945, to AFPAC (General Order No. 5, GHQ AFPAC, June 9, 1945) the USAFFE Training Group was transferred to the new headquarters and redesignated as the United States Army Training Group (USATG) (General Order No. 136, Headquarters USAFFE, June 9, 1945; Letter GHQ AFPAC, AGO 330, June 9, 1945, subject: "Assignment of Units," to Commanding General, USAFFE). Its mission remained unchanged.

When on November 5, 1945, responsibility for all matters pertaining to the Philippine Army was transferred to the Commanding General, AFWESPAC (Appendix 2), the USATG was assigned to Headquarters AFWESPAC (General Order No. 306, GHQ AFPAC, November 1, 1945). At the same time the

GAS was separated from the USATG and further assigned to G-3, Headquarters AFWESPAC, as the Guerrilla Affairs Branch (GAB) under Major R. L. Otti, where it functioned as one of two branches of the Philippine Army Division, G-3, under Colonel R. H. Kreuter. When the Philippine Commonwealth received its independence on July 4, 1946, the GAB was placed under the direction of Colonel G. F. Lillard.

On January 1, 1947, AFWESPAC was redesignated as the Philippines-Ryukyus Command (PHILRYCOM). At that time the GAB became the Guerrilla Affairs Division (GAD). On July 1, 1947, Lieutenant Colonel W. M. Hanes became the Director of the Division and remained until its deactivation on July 1, 1948.

## II - Tactical and Service Commands Dealing with Guerrillas

Prior to May 7, 1942, the only headquarters connected with guerrillas were Headquarters USAFFE and Headquarters USAFIP.

By Operation Instructions No. 70 of GHQ SWPA, the Leyte Area Command (LAC) came under the operational control of Sixth Army on September 21, 1944, although matters pertaining to guerrilla recognition remained a function of GHQ SWPA and Headquarters USAFFE. From the invasion of Leyte on October 20, 1944, until Sixth Army was relieved of tactical responsibility on December 26, 1944, in order to prepare for the Luzon landings, Sixth Army controlled the guerrillas of Leyte in a tactical sense only. As plans were formulated by Headquarters USAFFE for the reorganization of the Philippine Army employing recognized guerrillas, Sixth Army was further required to gather recognized guerrillas into

previously designated camp sites, when they were no longer needed tactically, and furnish them with supplies and equipment. No further recognitions were being extended.

On December 26, 1944, Eighth Army was assigned the mission of liberating the remaining Philippine Islands with the exception of Luzon and, consequently, as subordinate elements of Eighth Army pushed southward and westward, those guerrillas recognized by GHQ SWPA were placed under the operational control of Eighth Army as later confirmed by General Order No. 26, 27, and 45, Headquarters, Eighth Army, dated 15 and 19 April and 24 May 1945, respectively. Subordinate elements of Eighth Army misconstrued orders from Headquarters, USAFFE, relative to the employment of guerrilla forces and attempted to recognize guerrillas on Mindoro. Headquarters, USAFFE, had directed that no recognitions would be extended by any subordinate headquarters, this order being in force as late as February 12, 1945.

Landing at Lingayen Gulf on January 9, 1945, Sixth Army, in conjunction with the Eighth Army landings of the XI Corps on the Zambales Coast on January 29, 1945, and the 11th Airborne Division on the Batangas Coast on January 31, 1945, proceeded with the liberation of Luzon and in the process utilized large numbers of unrecognized guerrillas. By February 16, 1945, the policy of extending no further recognition to guerrillas had changed and both Sixth and Eighth Armies were authorized to recommend to Headquarters, USAFFE, guerrilla units worthy of recognition. Sometime prior to March 18, 1945, full responsibility for guerrillas on

Luzon was turned over to Sixth Army. Meanwhile, Eighth Army in the southern islands had been given full authority to proceed with the processing of recognized guerrillas for the purpose of incorporating them into the Philippine Army then being reorganized.

In July 1945, Sixth Army was relieved of all tactical and administrative responsibilities on Luzon in order to prepare for the impending invasion of Japan. Eighth Army therefore assumed responsibility for all matters pertaining to combat and administrative missions in the entire Philippine Islands.

By August 20, 1945, Headquarters, AFWESPAC (established effective June 7, 1945, by General Order No. 3, GHQ AFPAC, dated June 1, 1945), the successor to the United States Army Services of Supply (USASOS), was charged with the processing of all unprocessed guerrillas but had no authority to recognize, that authority being retained by GHQ AFPAC. Until November 5, 1945, GHQ AFPAC continued to accept recommendations for recognitions, the worth of which was determined by the GAS of the USATG. Meanwhile, a number of tactical and administrative changes had been made throughout the Philippines insofar as the deployment of American troops was concerned. These changes were as follows:

Between August 20 and November 15, 1945. The Eighth Army Area Command embracing the entire Philippine Archipelago was reorganized on August 20 into the Luzon Area Command (LAC) and the Southern Islands Area Command (SISAC), the latter embracing all islands other than Luzon.

Subsequent to the assumption of responsibility for all affairs

relative to the Philippine Army by the Commanding General, AFWESPAC, on November 5, 1945, the following administrative changes were made:

November 15, 1945 - January 1, 1946. LAC gave way to the USAFIP Area Command and the 86th Division Area Command; SISAC, to the 96th and the 93rd Division Area Commands.

January 1, 1946 - June 1, 1946. Due to the demobilization of the American Army the above area commands were again reshuffled and became the USAFIP Area Command, the 86th Division Area Command, and the 32nd AAA Area Command.

On June 1, 1946, the above area commands gave way to the Philippine Ground Forces (PGF).

By the end of 1945, however, American using units had ceased recommending unrecognized guerrilla units for recognition and all recognitions were based solely upon field investigation by officers of the GAB.

### III - Background of the Philippine Army

The Tydings-McDuffie Act, passed by the Congress of the United States in 1935, provided for the establishment of the Commonwealth of the Philippines under certain measures of United States control until July 1946, on which date the Philippines were to become completely independent. This act provided that the President of the United States might call into the service of the armed forces of the United States in the Philippines all military forces organized by the Commonwealth

of the Philippines. On July 26, 1941, President Roosevelt, by executive order, established a new command, the United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE), Major General Douglas MacArthur commanding, and authorized him to call Philippine Army units into the service as he so directed. Such calls commenced August 15, 1941.

Commonwealth Act No. 1, December 21, 1935, the first legislative act by the new Commonwealth, known as the "National Defense Act," provided for the establishment of a Philippine Army consisting of a Regular force and a Reserve force. All male citizens were obligated for military service. A system of calling those at the age of 21 for military training was prescribed.

For military purposes the Philippine Commonwealth was organized into ten military districts of approximately equal population. Functions were comparable to the prewar corps areas of the continental United States. The general areas of the military districts were as follows:

- 1st MD - Northern Luzon
- 2nd MD - North central Luzon
- 3rd MD - Central Luzon north of Manila
- 4th MD - South central Luzon, including  
Manila, Mindoro, and Palawan
- 5th MD - Bicol Peninsula of Luzon and Masbate
- 6th MD - Panay and Romblon Islands
- 7th MD - Negros and Siquijor Islands
- 8th MD - Cebu and Bohol
- 9th MD - Leyte and Samar
- 10th MD - Mindanao and Sulu Archipelago

Each military district was so organized as to furnish three reserve infantry divisions, each division being numbered according to the district; for example, the 71st, 72nd, and 73rd of the 7th Military District. Numerical numbering of the regiments within each division was,

using the above example, as follows: the 71st, 72nd, and 73rd Regiments of the 71st Division; 74th, 75th, and 76th Regiments of the 72nd Division; and 77th, 78th and 79th Regiments of the 73rd Division. Prior to the final collapse of resistance in the Philippine Islands on or about May 30, 1942, however, only the first division of each military district had been called into the service and some of them were not completely organized.

The military districts have considerable bearing upon the development of both guerrilla organizations and guerrilla recognition policy inasmuch as the guerrilla leaders, particularly in the southern islands, attempted to mold their organizations along the lines of those districts. In so doing, personalities clashed and bitter rivalries flamed, thereby preventing or retarding unification of guerrillas even within single islands and, consequently, preventing recognition by GHQ SWPA.

#### IV - Differences between the Luzon Guerrillas and those of the Southern Islands

In examining the development of guerrilla recognition policy, attention must be called to the marked differences between the Luzon guerrillas and those of the larger southern islands (Sulu, Mindanao, Panay, Negros, Cebu, Bohol and Leyte), these differences having considerable bearing upon the separate treatment accorded the two. In general the development of a successful guerrilla organization depended upon the following:

Available commissioned personnel, American and Filipino

(Regular USA and PA, AUS, PS, PC, PA Reserve).

Available trained enlisted personnel.

Available military equipment.

Tactical disposition of Japanese troops.

On Luzon comparatively few commissioned personnel, American and Filipino, escaped the surrender of Bataan and Corregidor and of those escapees only a small percentage survived the Japanese punitive expeditions of late 1942 and mid-1943. Philippine Army officers, paroled from concentration at Camp O'Donnel, were kept under strict surveillance and could not readily conduct guerrilla activities; American officers were not paroled. Of the many hundreds of guerrilla units on Luzon, a few functioned under trained officers and even these, for the most part, adopted unorthodox quasi-military organizations. In most cases, patriotic but untrained civilians assembled in mobs, giving themselves fantastic names and existing with neither workable organizations nor definite plans. Correspondence of a military nature, even in some of the larger overall commands, was negligible in quantity and questionable in quality. Intelligence, the greatest claimed activity of the Luzon guerrillas during the Occupation, was voluminous in quantity but negligible in quality. The number of such units, their conflicting and exaggerated claims, their rivalries and their failure to contribute reliable, timely information to GHQ SWPA left that headquarters in considerable doubt as to the guerrilla situation on Luzon until mid-1944.

In direct contrast to the situation on Luzon, fewer commissioned



personnel surrendered in the southern islands. This condition may be accounted for in part by the belief of many officers that neither the surrender orders of General Wainwright nor of General Sharp were valid since both were known to be prisoners at the time of issuance and were assumed to be under duress. In any event, a few American officers and considerably more Filipino officers refused to surrender and took to the hills. As the initial confusion occasioned by the surrender wore off, guerrilla organizations sprang up, led almost without exception by USAFFE officers. The organizations formed by these men followed Philippine Army tables of organization and were patterned in numerical designation according to the military districts. Military correspondence of all types was voluminous in quantity and excellent in quality. Similarly, intelligence, the primary mission of the southern islands guerrillas, as well was of an extremely high standard.

As in the case of officer personnel the bulk of the trained USAFFE troops on Luzon were trapped on Bataan and Corregidor, surrendered and were concentrated, thus leaving Luzon stripped relatively bare of trained troops to conduct military operations or to organize military units capable of resistance against the Japanese. Philippine Army personnel released from concentration camps on Luzon were generally in such poor condition that their services could not be made available. It therefore follows that membership in guerrilla organizations on Luzon consisted mostly of untrained civilians.

Again in the southern islands the situation was precisely the

opposite. Since the Japanese did not commence extensive military operations in those islands until April or May of 1942, except on Mindanao, mobilization was continued without interruption and recruits reasonably well trained. Except for the troops on Mindanao, Panay, and Cebu, few saw fighting because of the abrupt surrender and these were not favorably inclined to surrender. Under the leadership of their officers entire units disappeared into the hills or disbanded with orders to reassemble at a future date. These trained men formed the nucleus of the large organizations later to be developed, in some cases accounting for 50% of the total strength of the organization.

In the matter of military equipment such as weapons, ammunition, and radios, the Luzon guerrillas were again deficient, most of the equipment originally in the hands of the USAFFE having been abandoned in their retreat to Bataan or confiscated by the Japanese upon the surrender of Bataan and Corregidor. The inability of GHQ SWPA to supply the few known guerrilla units on Luzon until mid-1944 precluded the effective resistance or submission of intelligence by them.

As indicated in the paragraphs above, little equipment, relatively speaking, was lost by the USAFFE in the southern islands. This is accounted for by the fact that, as in the case of Cebu, Panay, Negros, and possibly Mindanao, the USAFFE troops had already moved from the beaches into the hills taking with them all available equipment with the entention of carrying on the struggle in the hills. When entire units refused to surrender and remained in the hills or disbanded with

orders to reassemble, the equipment was either buried or taken by the individuals to their homes. The early resupply by submarine from Australia augmented, although in negligible quantities, the equipment still on hand.

The Japanese concentrated the greatest number of their troops on Luzon, the maximum estimate for any one given time being 250,000. This concentration was not effected because of guerrilla activity but because Luzon, with its excellent port of Manila, presented the best staging area for the shuttle of Japanese troops to the Solomons, Dutch East Indies, Burma, Indo-China, and Malaya. In addition, by heavy commandeering upon the populace, food was plentiful. This concentration of troops prevented any extensive guerrilla activities with the possible exception of those in the mountains of northern Luzon and in the Sierra Madres. Extensive road nets further assisted the Japanese in controlling the civil populace.

In the southern islands few Japanese troops were concentrated, the question of suitable areas and the supply of food probably being the reasons therefor. They did, however, maintain garrisons on the major islands and occasionally conducted punitive expeditions of varying intensities against the guerrillas but invariably withdrew their troops, except for the garrisons, shortly thereafter. This ebb and flow of Japanese pressure enabled the guerrillas of the southern islands to maintain their organizations reasonably intact.

V - General Categories of Guerrilla Units considered by this Headquarters

Until the early part of 1945, when Sixth and Eighth Armies commenced recommending guerrilla units to Headquarters, USAFFE, for recognition, no differentiation between different types of guerrilla organizations as to their geographical locations or their sizes had been made. Commencing in early 1945, and apparently by common usage, various types of guerrilla organizations became known to concerned headquarters as: (1) island commands (2) overall commands (3) independent commands. An island command is defined as a guerrilla organization covering all or parts of any island or groups of islands under the command of one officer. These commands are considered to have existed on islands other than Luzon, for example, the 6th Military District on Panay and Romblon, the 10th Military District on Mindanao (less the Sulu Archipelago), the 7th Military District on Negros, the Cebu Area Command (CAC), the Bohol Area Command (BAC), etc. An overall command is defined as a guerrilla organization covering the major portion of one province or a group of provinces under the command of one officer. Overall commands are considered only on the island of Luzon, for example, the United States Army Forces in the Philippines, Northern Luzon (USAFIP NL), Luzon Guerrilla Army Forces (LGAF), Bulacan Military Area (BMA), President Quezon's Own Guerrillas (PQOG), etc. An independent unit is defined as a unit that existed and operated independently of a large island or overall command. There are less than six independent units not on Luzon. A few independent units are as follows: The Live or Die Unit, Lawins Patriot and Suicide Forces, the Thorp Guerrilla Regiment, Castaneda Unit, the Straughn Manila Division, etc.

In the early fall of 1946, when guerrilla organizations were no longer being recognized solely for attachment to using American units, as on Luzon, or for military necessity, as was the case of the larger southern islands during the Occupation, it became necessary to further define types of units in order to determine whether or not recognition was warranted. This breakdown revealed only three types worthy of consideration for recognition: (1) combat (2) intelligence (3) sabotage and demolition organizations.

VI - Development of Guerrilla Policy between December 7, 1941 and  
May 30, 1942

The only known guerrilla movement prior to May 30, 1942, was that authorized on January 20, 1942, by Headquarters, USAFFE. At that time Lieutenant Colonel Thorp was directed to infiltrate the Japanese lines on Bataan and proceed northward to the vicinity of Clark Field and report Japanese activity and to organize guerrillas with perhaps the mission of destroying the Japanese planes based at Clark Field and which were conducting daily bombing raids over Bataan and Corregidor. It is further known that Headquarters, USAFFE, was aware of the activities of the Huk-balahaps against the Japanese in Pampanga, and it may have been decided to enlist their support. Upon the surrender of Bataan and Corregidor it is known from statements made by officers who left Bataan with him and who have survived that Colonel Thorp became discouraged and contemplated surrender. An undecipherable radio message from Corregidor the day prior to the surrender was construed as an order to surrender. Only after

being encouraged by his officers and those escapees who arrived at his camp, was he convinced to continue the movement. By General Order No. 1, Headquarters, USAFFE Luzon Guerrilla Army Forces, dated May 15, 1942 (Appendix 3), he assumed responsibility as commanding officer of all guerrilla forces on Luzon and stated as his authority verbal instructions from General MacArthur. In the same general order he further stated that only those appointed by him had authority to induct into the guerrillas. Authenticity of this authority to induct is unknown by General Wainwright.

Remnants of USAFFE troops cut off in northern Luzon by the rapid advance of the Japanese continued to hold out in the mountains and oppose the Japanese. Colonel John P. Horan, senior USAFFE officer at large in northern Luzon, assumed command of all United States Army Forces in the Mountain Province and adjacent provinces and specifically forbade guerrilla warfare. He further authorized recruiting. A radio from General Wainwright to Colonel Horan on March 22, 1942 (Appendix 4), advised Colonel Horan that his authorized strength was not to exceed the number of weapons available to equip any recruits. A later radio from General Wainwright to Colonel Horan on April 9, 1942 (Appendix 4), constituted the 121st Infantry (PA) effective April 8, 1942, by General Order No. 19, Headquarters, USAFIP, dated April 8, 1942, and stated that personnel to be used would be Philippine Army trainees. It is therefore evident that civilian guerrilla activities in northern Luzon were neither contemplated nor authorized by responsible headquarters.

The organizations formed or led by Lieutenant Colonel Guillermo Nakar, Major (then Captain) Ralph Praeger, and Captain Walter Cushing prior to May 10, 1942, consisted of duly constituted military organizations and, since they received orders from Colonel Horan, cannot have been considered guerrilla organizations. Governors Roque Ablan and Marcelo Adduru, although employing some cut off USAFFE elements (the latter allegedly inducted by Captain Cushing), had no authority whatsoever to form the organizations they did prior to May 10, 1942.

In the Bicol provinces, and in addition to several small USAFFE units which had been cut off by the southern arm of the Japanese pincers, guerrilla organizations developed under Governor Salvador Escudero, Representative Wenceslao Vinzons, and Faustino Flor, the latter being a USAFFE sergeant. Prior to the surrender of Corregidor, Vinzons and Flor had attacked the towns of Daet and Naga, respectively, and had succeeded in capturing them. Subsequent to the surrender of Corregidor, and upon being informed by the Japanese that certain USAFFE organizations remained at large in the Bicol provinces, General Wainwright sent Major General Guillermo B. Francisco, Commanding General of the Philippine Constabulary, Lieutenant Colonel John R. Pugh, and Lieutenant Robert C. Silhavy into the Bicol to effect their surrender. As in the case of northern Luzon, it is very evident that guerrilla organizations in the Bicol were neither contemplated nor authorized by Headquarters, USAFFE, or headquarters, USAFIP. Headquarters USAFIP, did not issue any orders providing for a guerrilla resistance movement in the southern islands, although General MacArthur attempted to retain the southern islands.

On Cebu, Panay, and Negros preparations were made to fight in the hills rather than on the beaches by moving supplies, installations, and troops far back into the hills. The same preparations may have been made in certain parts of Mindanao. Recent conversations with American personnel present on those islands during the Japanese invasion reveal that these moves were tactical in nature, the officers commanding the troops involved realizing the uselessness of opposing troops superior in number, equipment and training, on the beaches.

#### VII - Development of Guerrilla Recognition Policy

The development of guerrilla recognition policy falls into three periods, that is: May 31, 1942 - February 12, 1945; February 13, 1945-October 2, 1945; October 3, 1945 - June 30, 1948. In elaboration of the foregoing the first period commences with the collapse of the last USAFFE resistance in the Philippine Islands and ends with a decision of February 12, 1945, to deny further recognitions in the southern islands. This period is marked for its noticeable lack of available staff studies of any sort upon which were based the recognitions of the large island commands in the southern islands. The only records now available reveal the effect of such studies rather than the cause. However, these documents definitely reveal a policy and changes thereto over the passage of time. The second period opens with instructions on February 16, 1945, to induct (recognize) Luzon and southern islands guerrilla units into the Philippine Army and terminates with the formulation of the Five Points which consolidated and added to the criteria of recognition.



The last period commences with the implementation of this criterion and enlargements thereto and ends with the termination of the guerrilla recognition program.

Period May 31, 1942 - February 12, 1945

Development of guerrilla recognition policy displays marked differences in the treatment of Luzon and southern islands guerrillas.

LUZON

Upon the surrender of Corregidor, two radios remained on the entire island of Luzon with sufficient power to communicate directly with Australia. One of these belonged to the 14th Infantry (PA) commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Guillermo Nakar, and the other to Major (then Captain) Praeger of Troop C, 26th Cavalry (PS), both radios operating in the mountains of northern Luzon.

On June 30, 1942, a radiogram from MacArthur (Appendix 5), commended Nakar and his men on their stand against the Japanese and promised a fitting reward at an appropriate time. By radiogram, MacArthur to Nakar, dated July 12, 1942 (copy not available), the 14th Infantry (PA) was offered AUS status in recognition of outstanding service. Lieutenant Colonel Nakar accepted this offer on July 15, 1942, effective July 14. Unfortunately, Nakar and a portion of his troops surrendered between September 29 and October 3, 1942, and the radio set was captured. Although some elements of the 14th Infantry did not surrender and were eventually absorbed by USAFIP NL, all further communications with Australia ceased until direct contact with Major Praeger was

effected in January 1943.

No records are available of radio communications between Praeger and Australia until January 11, 1943. On January 23, radiogram NR 11, MacArthur to WYY (Praeger) (Appendix 6) requested the status of guerrilla units on Luzon, requested advice from Praeger regarding ways and means of developing a unified organization, instructed Praeger to cease offensive activities and ordered him to concentrate on organization and intelligence. The orders to cease offensive activities, similarly and concurrently conveyed to guerrillas in the southern islands, became known as the "lay low" policy. The application of the "Five Points" of recognition in judging the merits of a guerrilla unit in late 1945 to the deactivation of the Guerrilla Affairs Division occasioned a storm of protest over the "harsh" and "ruthless" rejection of hundreds of guerrilla units, mostly on Luzon, for lack of continued resistance against the enemy. Insofar as recognition policy is concerned, the first basic requirement, unified organization, appears as well as GHQ SWPA's cognizance of a guerrilla movement on Luzon. Radiogram WYY, dated January 26, 1943, Praeger to MacArthur (Appendix 7), announced the presence of Lieutenant Colonels Martin Moses and Arthur K. Noble and their request for authority to induct one regiment into their guerrilla organization. In reply on February 12, 1943 (Appendix 7), MacArthur approved the request provided that sufficient equipment was available to arm and supply the unit. Of note here is the authority granted to induct, which infers that GHQ SWPA considered unsurrendered American officers and their organizations still in a regular status. A certificate (Appendix 8) certified

to the promotion of Major Ali Al-Raschid (PA) to lieutenant colonel by authority of Radiogram No. 20, February 14, 1943, MacArthur to Moses (no copy available). An additional radiogram from MacArthur to Praeger, July 19, 1943 (Appendix 8), authorized enlistments to maintain Troop C, 26th Cavalry (PS) at a strength of 100 with original ratings, personnel to be enlisted in the AUS. The same radiogram authorized appropriate grades for the Apayao Company, a Philippine Constabulary company.

In February 1943 Major Praeger lost his radio but came back on the air in June only to be captured with the radio in August. The capture of Major Praeger's radio ended all direct radio contact between Australia and Luzon until June 25, 1944, when Lieutenant Colonel Anderson placed in operation a radio which came to him from Australia. Relay contacts, however, had been established the previous month through the station of Captain Robert V. Ball in the vicinity of Baler, Tayabas, in Major Robert B. Lapham's headquarters and through the station of Lieutenant Robert Stahl on the Bontoc peninsula. This complete lack of reliable contact between Luzon and Australia left GHQ SWPA in darkness as to the guerilla movement on Luzon and may be considered the direct cause for the extension of no recognition.

By radiogram, June 25, 1944, the Kalayaan Command of Lieutenant Colonel Anderson was considered by GHQ SWPA as a separate unit under the guidance of that headquarters. Between this date and January 9, 1945, the BMA, the LGAF, and USAFIP NL were similarly placed under the operational control first of GHQ SWPA and then of Sixth Army but area

commands were not established. Although the guerrilla commands considered this the equivalent to recognition, it was not so construed by GHQ SWPA.

A request from Sixth Army, assigned the mission of invading Luzon, dated December 20, 1944, for a directive clarifying the policy to be followed in extending recognition to guerrilla units on Luzon received from GHQ SWPA on December 27, 1944 (Appendix 9) a positive statement that the entire guerrilla movement on Luzon would be considered as a patriotic effort on the part of the whole people. The reply pointed out the difference in the conditions prevalent on Luzon as compared with those on the major southern islands and referred to the Luzon movement as being classic type of underground movement. This clearly meant no further recognitions.

#### SOUTHERN ISLANDS

After the surrender, all radio contact with Australia ceased until December 12, 1942, when the Panay guerrillas established direct radio contact. By February 20, 1943, the Mindanao guerrillas had likewise succeeded in establishing contact. Meanwhile, the only information concerning conditions in the Philippine Islands came from escapees, one of whom was Captain (later Lieutenant Colonel) Charles N. Smith who, after spending a short time with Lieutenant Colonel Wendell W. Fertig on Mindanao, sailed for Australia and arrived in early January 1943. Smith recommended that intelligence operatives be returned to the Philippine

Islands and the gathering of intelligence commence immediately. Major (then Captain) Jesus A. Villamor (PA) was given a mission to land either on Mindanao or Negros by submarine with radio equipment. Generally speaking, Villamor's mission was twofold in nature, i.e., to gather intelligence of the enemy, to report on the activities of any guerrilla movement and to prepare the groundwork for an extensive intelligence net in the Philippine Islands. Arriving on Negros in January 1943 and establishing radio contact by February 10, 1943, Villamor quickly learned that Colonel Macario Peralta Jr. (PA) in Panay had conceived a grandiose scheme for control of the Visayan islands by means of his IV Philippine Corps while Colonel Fertig in Mindanao was entertaining the same idea but had not at the time gone to that extent. Mutual animosity springing up between the two led to conflicting jurisdictional claims and the threat of bloodshed. Villamor recommended that neither of the two be permitted to control anything other than their own islands on the premise that they had sufficient trouble maintaining themselves, let alone controlling guerrillas on adjacent islands, communication and transportation facilities being practically nonexistent.

A directive from General MacArthur to district commanders, PI, February 13, 1945 (Appendix 10), limited their control to the 6th and 10th Military Districts, respectively; stated that it was the plan to progressively establish territorial command areas based on the prewar military districts, retention of appointments to be based upon performance of duty and, lastly, commanders functioned under the direct

control of that headquarters. Of considerable note is the fact that neither units nor strengths were specified, this condition creating at a later date a considerable problem for the Guerrilla Affairs Division.

Formal recognition of these commands carried with it three things: authority to communicate directly with GHQ; authorization to issue script to finance guerrilla operations; and the promise of future deliveries of supplies.

Additional policy appears in radio No. 25, MacArthur to Lieutenant Colonel Salvador Abcede (PA), April 7, 1943, stating in effect that the Commander of the 7th Military District would not be designated until the confused guerrilla situation on Negros became sufficiently clear, there being at that time no less than five guerrilla organizations on Negros, none of which were acting in accord. Obviously such was the requirement of "unity before recognition." The policy as pertains to district commands was adhered to when Villamor was appointed acting commanding officer of the 7th Military District May 14, 1943, and again reiterated with the acting appointment of Abcede as Villamor's successor July 8, 1943. In the interest of unity within Negros, General MacArthur further directed the transfer of Lieutenant Colonel Placido Ausejo's (PA) organization in southeastern Negros from Fertig's command to Abcede but upon Fertig's approval only. (Ausejo initially acknowledged only the authority of Colonel Fertig.)

The development of recognition policy becomes clearer with a series of check sheets within GHQ SWPA relative to the findings of Lieutenant Commander Charles Parsons concerning his submarine trip to Leyte in March or April 1943. Commander Parsons informed Colonel Ruperto K. Kangleon (PA) that no recognition would be forthcoming until there was unification of guerrillas on Leyte and Samar. In an opinion from General Whitney on the correspondence, submitted by Commander Parsons to the Chief of Staff (Lieutenant General Sutherland) GHQ SWPA, dated August 6, 1943, General Whitney recommended no recognition for the 9th Military District for the following reasons: (1) there were few Japanese in the 9th MD (2) such recognition would immediately be made known to the Japanese and would cause a prompt reaction on their part (3) the 9th MD was not unified. In a similar check sheet from General Willoughby, dated August 8, 1943, recognition was recommended on the ground that such recognition would bring unity. The recommendations of General Whitney were approved and a radio, dated August 28, 1943 (Appendix 11), dispatched to Colonel Kangleon which stated that the decision to re-activate the 9th Military District had not been reached. Between August 28, 1943, and October 21, 1943, another major change in recognition policy appeared with the recognition of the Bohol Area Command (Appendix 12) and the Leyte Area Command on the latter date. The reasoning behind the decision to cease recognizing by military districts is not known but, from a careful perusal of radiograms coming out of the islands and relating the confused situation on Cebu (together with Bohol, the 8th MD) and on Samar (together

with Leyte, the 9th MD), it can be safely assumed that GHQ SWPA no longer considered one man strong enough to control more than one large island.

The radio proclamation from Leyte, October 28, 1944, by President Sergio Osmena of Executive Orders No. 21 and 22 confirmed in the minds of guerrillas throughout the entire archipelago that their services would be rewarded by recognition and that such recognition would entitle them to the pay, allowances, and benefits of soldiers belonging to the Philippine Army, although such was never the intention of GHQ SWPA. (United States Secretary of War subsequently disallowed the AUS pay scales as provided for in Executive Order No. 22 and ruled that only prewar PA pay scales would apply.) The publication of Circular No. 100, Headquarters, USAFFE, on November 17, 1944 (Appendix 13), for information and guidance officially confirmed Executive Orders No. 21 and 22. There is no information available concerning the staff work behind these executive orders which produced such tremendous implications.

A recommendation by the Commanding General, Eighth Army, for the recognition of Mindoro guerrillas under Major Raymond Ruffy (PA) was disapproved by 1st Indorsement of GHQ SWPA, January 25, 1945 (Appendix 14). A 4th Indorsement to the same recommendation, February 12, 1945 (Appendix 14) reiterated the disapproval contained in the 1st Indorsement and gave the following reasons as to why the Mindoro guerrillas had not already been recognized: (1) Recognition would have been inimical to the maintenance of Mindoro as a base of communication



and intelligence (2) Enemy interest in Mindoro did not justify guerrilla action (3) the guerrillas on Mindoro were composed mostly of civilians (4) they lived upon rather than served the interest of the people. This 4th Indorsement uncovers four previously unstated principles of policy, the origination date and the thought behind which are unknown.

In summary, there appears to have been no policy in handling guerrillas on Luzon other than to give unsundered American and Filipino officers the right to induct in order to maintain existing USAFFE organizations provided that equipment could be found for each man so inducted. "Lay low" instructions and others in effect told the Luzon guerrillas to shift for themselves but to consider themselves under the guidance of GHQ SWPA. Lastly, instructions to Sixth Army clearly indicated that no recognitions would be extended to Luzon guerrillas.

In the southern islands, where early contact with GHQ SWPA was established and maintained, recognitions were extended and policy evolved which started with the primary requirement of unity before recognition and which requirement never changed. Recognitions initially embraced entire prewar military districts but then embraced only large, single islands; commanding officers were duly appointed subject to further information and performance of duty, but no commanders were ever relieved, although several acting commanders were appointed, later to be confirmed; duly appointed commanders functioned under the direct

command of General MacArthur; recognitions were held up and occasionally denied because Japanese activity either did not warrant existence of guerrillas or would bring about retaliation; guerrilla organizations were expected to consist mainly of ex-USAFFE personnel; those who preyed upon the civilian populace were not considered worthy of recognition and, lastly, further recognitions as coming within the purview of Executive Order No. 21 was, as late as February 12, 1945, considered terminated.

Period February 13, 1945 - October 2, 1945

As the liberation of the southern islands by the Eighth Army and of Luzon by the Sixth Army progressed both armies utilized the services of a number of guerrillas, mostly recognized in the southern islands but none recognized on Luzon. The problems which confronted the GAD stem for the most part from the handling of the guerrilla situation during this period. Since both Sixth and Eighth Armies received definite instructions that no more guerrillas would be recognized, Sixth Army prior to its invasion of Luzon and Eighth Army prior to its invasion of the remaining Japanese-held southern islands, neither Army prepared any plans for the disposition of unrecognized guerrillas. The lesser problem confronted the Eighth Army since it contacted mostly recognized guerrillas and by January 1945 (Appendix 15) had laid the groundwork for the reorganization of recognized guerrilla forces pursuant to USAFFE instructions dated October 26, 1944 (Appendix 16).

Conversely the Sixth Army plunged head-on into a situation apparently neither expected nor prepared for. To confuse the issue, during the presence of hordes of guerrillas, came a reversal of the decision to recognize no guerrilla units on Luzon with instructions from the Advanced Detachment, USAFFE, to the Commanding General, Sixth Army, February 16, 1945, to induct as rapidly as possible into the Philippine Army those guerrilla elements who had been or were being employed by Sixth Army units in support of combat operations (Appendix 17). Then the small beginnings of problems, later to become very complex, put in their appearance. A few such problems were the handling of individuals, disposition of casualties, the discharge of personnel and the rumblings of arrears in pay, later to become known as "back pay."

In February 1945, a decision was made to recommence recognizing guerrilla units. In the complete absence of any supporting staff studies to explain this reversal of policy, it is possible to conjecture upon the reasons only. There are three possible explanations: The plan to reorganize the Philippine Army, the unavailability of American replacements for battle casualties which may have influenced the size of the Philippine Army, and the activities of the Philippine Civil Affairs Unit (PCAU).

(1) On October 26, 1944, Headquarters, USAFFE, stated in a letter both to Sixth and Eighth Armies that it was planned to reorganize and re-equip as standard units of the Philippine Army those recognized guerrillas as they become available for such action. By February 7,

1945, Headquarters, USAFFE, had approved an Eighth Army plan (Appendix 15) for the reorganization of the Philippine Army. The first directive, however, referred to recognized units only, as did the plan of the Eighth Army. The latter plan, however, contemplated the use of ex-USAFFE personnel but did not exclude civilian guerrillas who desired to volunteer. The possibility cannot be overlooked, on the other hand, that insufficient ex-USAFFE personnel remained alive or in acceptable physical condition, an estimated 50,000 out of 90,000, to man the number of PA units contemplated. It is possible that the size of the Philippine Army was also based on the desire to turn over the task of final mop-up of the Jap to it and thereby release American units for greater training periods prior to the assault on Japan proper.

(2) Because of the casualties suffered by American armies while penetrating the Siegfried Line in Europe during November and the first half of December 1944, which was immediately followed up by Von Rundstedt's breakthrough in the Ardennes, diverted a decreasing number of available replacements from the Pacific Theater to the European Theater of Operations. Two infantry divisions, the 86th and the 97th, destined for shipment to the Pacific Theater, were halted on the West Coast in February, rushed across the United States and into fast ships for Europe to give General Eisenhower the impetus for final destruction of the German armies of the west. With the flow of replacements practically cut off, it may have been considered to employ to the fullest extent every guerrilla capable of bearing arms in order to fill the gaps created

in the ranks of American divisions by casualties.

(3) The third possibility originates with PCAU. This organization, whose primary mission was to relieve the destitute, ill and underfed, employed large numbers of civilians in the execution of its mission, paying them daily wages in the process. Meanwhile, many more guerrillas, carrying rifles on their shoulders, subjected themselves to the dangers of combat and received nothing. This inequality is believed to have resulted in a feeling of resentment amongst the guerrillas which eventually came to the attention of higher headquarters.

Until the formation on or about May 10, 1945, of the Guerrilla Affairs Section of the USAFFE Training Group, approval of recommendations for recognition forwarded through channels by using American units had been given by the PA Section of Headquarters, USAFFE, with the further approval of the Commander-in-Chief, SWPA. After that date, and in addition to that particular procedure, the GAS commenced the investigation of units and likewise made its recommendations. On the surface a duplication of effort appears but such is not actually the case. Guerrilla units on Luzon at that time fell into two general categories: those who had been or were being employed by using American units and those who had never been attached and had had no opportunity of being attached. The former received recommendations for recognition through the unit which employed them. In order to handle the latter the GAS was formed and field investigations were conducted by contact teams.

Initially, recognitions approved from both sources were made a matter of record by the issuance of a letter of recognition to the Army Commander, who in turn published a list of recognized units for information and guidance of subordinate units. Unfortunately, and which later caused considerable confusion, early letters of recognition, as in the case of the southern islands, neglected to mention strengths or, if strengths were mentioned at all, they were given in terms of "to be announced at a later date" or "approximate strengths are as follows." In addition, as far as the Luzon guerrillas are concerned, numerous errors were made in unit terminology and in the proper designation of overall commands and commanders. Not only did these initial errors cause the loss of considerable time by the GAD in attempting to clarify the component units of the overall commands and their strengths, but also, left wide open the door for anomalies perpetrated by farsighted and unscrupulous guerrillas.

As more guerrilla units were recognized on Luzon and the fact became known that they were receiving current pay, food, and clothing, the clamor for recognition by unrecognized guerrilla units increased in volume and doubled in intensity throughout 1946 and early 1947. In mid-1945, when this clamor was but a muted whisper, the first complex problems appeared.

#### UNITS

The first attempt to systematize a procedure in the handling of attached guerrillas developed on paper in a letter from Sixth Army to

XI Corps on February 25, 1945 (Appendix 18). When recommending units for recognition, subordinate units were requested to submit the name, strength, inclusive dates of service, summary of service, and rosters with complete personnel data of the recommended unit. Of particular note here is the fact that only those individuals who actually participated in the activities of the unit during its period of attachment were to be included in the submitted strength and on the rosters. Furthermore, information concerning the service of women guerrillas was desired in a very specific form. By March 14, the first Luzon unit, USAFIP NL, was recognized by USAFFE. The letter of recognition gave no strengths.

Apparently to confirm the new recognition policy and to acquaint all major, subordinate commands with late developments, a conference took place in Manila on March 18, 1945 (Appendix 19), with representatives of USAFFE, Philippine Army, Sixth and Eighth Armies present. Amongst other matters Sixth Army received authorization to recommend guerrilla units to USAFFE for recognition, this recognition to be based upon military usefulness only. In addition all civilian guerrillas, that is, non-USAFFE, were to be released and returned to their homes.

A letter from Headquarters, Sixth Army, to subordinate units on March 26, 1945, infers that some units had already at that time been not favorably considered for recognition. A further elaboration on the status of women came with a USAFFE letter, dated April 8, 1945,

concerning personnel to be relieved from active duty or discharged, i.e., women guerrillas, excepting nurses, were to be discharged after recognition. Although not at this time barring women from recognition, the close scrutiny given the functions of women guerrillas ultimately led to the belief that, again excepting nurses, no women should be recognized. However, the unfamiliarity of American personnel with the spelling of female names in Spanish and in native dialect permitted the recognition of a small number of women.

A letter from USAFFE to USASOS, dated April 24, 1945 (Appendix 20), provided that a guerrilla unit whose services were no longer required but which had been recommended for recognition was to be quartered and rationed by the using American unit until action was taken on its request for recognition. (These instructions gave rise at a later date to a complex problem involving, notably, guerrillas of the Zambales Military District, LGF, and of the Manila Military District, ECLGA.) An indorsement from Sixth Army on April 24, 1945, which caused considerable confusion at a later date did not require the submission for recognition of additional rosters as guerrilla replacements for casualties were called or other elements of a unit already being employed were attached for the first time. These replacements and additional attachments were merely placed on the payrolls of the originally attached unit and consequently never appeared on a recognized roster. The effort required to solve this problem will be discussed later under the headings "Supplementary Rosters" and "Reconstruction



of Rosters." On May 3, 1945, Sixth Army in a letter to subordinate units covering procurement, recognition, supply, use, etc., of guerrilla units (Appendix 21), advised that it was preferable to use guerrilla units in their entirety before requesting the services of other guerrilla units; that guerrilla units would be considered military organizations, to be used in any military capacity to the limit of their capabilities, and could be moved from one sector to another; that formal published orders were required when attaching a guerrilla unit. To the second item, i.e., movement of guerrilla units from one sector to another, can be attributed the situation in which some guerrillas, recognized as replacements under a certain unit designation but originating from an entirely different unit, later requested reconstitution of rosters and redesignation of the unit name so that they be recognized under the designation of their parent unit. This did not become a problem until the guerrillas learned that, when recognized with one unit, revision of dates would not apply to them if their service records show recognition service with another unit whether that unit was recognized or not. The last item, i.e., attachment orders, created the erroneous impression amongst unrecognized, unattached guerrillas that recognition without attachment papers was impossible. (Thus was accelerated the anomaly of forged or altered attachment papers.) A memorandum from the GAS, USAFFE Training Group, May 12, 1945, to unrecognized guerrilla commanders (Appendix 22), laid down new ground rules for recognition of guerrilla units. Briefly, a

unit was investigated and, when it was determined that the unit was worthy of recognition, the unit commander was directed to "screen" his unit down in numbers and in ranks comparable to a PA table of organization, and at the same time submit a formal request for recognition in writing. The reasoning behind screening was that the unit would, after reorganization, proper training, and receipt of equipment, be incorporated into the Philippine Army as a standard unit (as differentiated from a non-standard or guerrilla unit).

In Circular 142 and 185, dated May 14 and June 27, 1945, respectively, (Appendixes 23 & 24) Eighth Army provided for the processing of southern islands guerrillas, the cessation of recruiting by guerrillas, the placing of limiting dates beyond which no processing would be continued in the southern islands, an unprocessed guerrilla to be processed provided that he submitted a written request to the nearest Philippine Army installation and gave cogent reasons for his not being processed, and the dropping of all unprocessed individuals from payrolls. Although processing was undertaken for the purpose of obtaining records of all guerrillas whose services might be required in the reorganizing of the Philippine Army, the GAD was forced to consider the processing records as also representing the maximum number of recognized guerrillas in any one guerrilla organization provided that they also received current pay, the cause again being the fact that in the southern islands and Luzon no strengths were given initially when the unit was recognized. An additional reason lies in the fact that the

original rosters submitted to GHQ SWPA, Sixth and Eighth Armies, have either been destroyed, lost in storage at various headquarters, or shipped to the Central Records Depot, St. Louis, Missouri. Another problem arose in connection with processing. Philippine Army processing teams, particularly in the southern islands, processed not only recognized guerrillas but also many unrecognized. In some cases those unrecognized guerrillas processed claimed they were recognized; in other cases they claimed they were expecting recognition; while in still other cases they merely claimed they were guerrillas. Precisely why the last two types were processed is not known but a possible explanation lies in the limited number of trained Philippine Army teams available, the large number of recognized guerrillas (approximately 95,000 in the southern islands alone) to be processed, the shortage of transportation, and the desire to complete each island in its entirety without the necessity of returning, and lucrative considerations. In any event, many unrecognized guerrillas, processed but unpaid, applied for recognition using as a basis for recognition the fact that they were processed.

On October 2, 1945, a rudimentary criterion of Five Points, comprising for the most part a compendium of previous policy for recognition of guerrilla units, was approved.

#### INDIVIDUALS

During this period the problem of recognition of individuals never became serious but the germ had been planted and the nucleus of

a policy laid. Radiogram (Appendix 17) dated February 16, 1945, announcing the resumption of recognition on Luzon, advised that it was desired to induct groups or individuals into the Philippine Army as rapidly as possible. Later, on March 26, 1945, Headquarters, Sixth Army, brought to the attention of subordinate units the fact that they were recommending individuals or small groups of from two to five individuals from much larger unrecognized units and advised these subordinate units that such individuals or groups of individuals be included on the payrolls of a recognized unit.

Meanwhile, there appeared the problem of confirmation of ranks and grades, subsequently to become a major item affecting individual requests for confirmation or correction of existing ranks and grades. Even though Headquarters, USAFFE, solved that problem on May 28, 1945, by declaring that grades and ratings held by members of a guerrilla unit were confirmed as of the date of recognition of the unit and that all promotions of officers subsequent to recognition were to be approved by Headquarters, Philippine Army, with the additional approval of the highest American Army headquarters in the Philippines; however, requests for such confirmation or correction continued to reach the GAD, not a few coming from HPA itself. This situation was further clarified on July 16, 1945, upon instructions from AFPAC, by Eighth Army (Appendix 25).

#### CASUALTIES

As in the case of individuals, little thought if any was given to

the recognition of guerrilla casualties. The only official documents showing awareness of guerrilla casualties are those of USAFFE, dated April 8, 1945, and Circular No. 142 of Eighth Army, dated May 14, 1945 (Appendix 23). The former merely specified policy governing the discharge of guerrillas physically incapacitated by virtue of wounds, illness or non-service connected disabilities, with the exception of nurses; the latter authorized the admission of guerrillas to American Army hospitals in the Philippines only.

#### DISCHARGE, DISBANDMENT AND/OR DEMOBILIZATION

Until the proclamation of Executive Order No. 68 on September 26, 1945 (Appendix 26), no positive nor official action was taken to dispose of guerrilla units, recognized or unrecognized. During a conference of March 18, 1945, in Manila, it was decided to encourage unrecognized guerrillas to disband. USAFFE letter of April 8, 1945, concerning relief from active duty and discharge of guerrilla personnel, provided for the discharge of individuals, except nurses, for failure to meet induction standards. For the disbandment of units no provision was made, and again the reorganization of the Philippine Army explains this condition.

Termination of the war changed the entire guerrilla picture and on September 10, 1945, Headquarters, AFPAC, advised the Chief of Staff, Philippine Army (Appendix 27) that the termination of hostilities with Japan and the surrender of the Japanese forces in the Philippines necessitated a complete revision of the organization of five PA infantry

divisions and supporting service troops. It further ordered the immediate discharge or relief from active duty of 50% of all officers and enlisted men then casualties unassigned, mostly recognized guerrillas, in PA replacement battalions. The report of a conference (Appendix 28) held two days later between representatives of AFPAC and AFWESPAC revealed the tentative formation of a demobilization policy which included the cessation of all further recognitions.

#### ARREARS IN PAY

The question of arrears in pay, i.e., that pay due recognized guerrillas prior to the time the unit to which they belonged came under the operational control of Sixth or Eighth Armies or the initial date of recognition, later became a contributing factor to the revision of existing recognition dates of guerrilla units.

References to arrears in pay appear continuously throughout official correspondence of this period (Appendix 29). As often as mentioned, however, the answer remained the same, "the question of arrears in pay is not settled at this time." The problem of arrears in pay did not become acute, nor receive any settlement, until November 1945.

In summary of the foregoing and with particular respect to recognition policy, the following stands out:

- (1) The recognition of guerrilla units was resumed.
- (2) Recognition during the liberation period was based upon military usefulness.
- (3) Guerrilla recognition was extended only to those individuals

within a unit who actively participated with the unit.

(4) Attachment to a using American unit was not a prerequisite for recognition.

(5) No rosters were required for replacements or newly attached elements of units already attached and recognized, personnel merely being added to the payrolls.

(6) Screening of units to comparable PA organizations commenced.

(7) Guerrilla ranks were likewise reduced to conform to comparable PA tables of organization.

(8) A new criterion, the Five Points for recognition, was established.

The following procedures led to problems complex in nature which required solving at a later date:

(1) The issuance of attachment orders and commendations by using American units.

(2) The retention by an American using unit of an unrecognized unit until action was taken upon its recommendation for recognition.

(3) The employment of elements of units rather than one entire unit and their movement from one sector to another.

(4) The processing of guerrillas.

(5) Orders to guerrilla leaders to cease recruiting.

The following represent a tightening up of requirements for guerrilla recognitions:

(1) The submission by using American units as well as by unattached,

unrecognized units of pertinent information relative to the unit, its members and its services, as well as the submission of rosters.

(2) The submission to the Commanding General, USAFFE, of a letter requesting recognition.

(3) The close scrutiny of the service of women guerrillas.

Insofar as individuals and casualties had not become a problem at that time nor had the question of arrears in pay which ultimately led to the revision of dates for recognized units, no policy as such had appeared.

Discharge of individuals, but not units, was provided for; demobilization was in the wind and the first indications were appearing that further recognitions should cease.

Period October 3, 1945 - June 30, 1948

Coincident with the introduction of the Five Points and the announcement of a deadline for the receipt of unit requests for recognition, requests ultimately approximating 1,300,000 poured into an unexpected and undermanned GAB. Heretofore, recognition policy had been concerned solely with units. In the latter part of 1945 the tremendous number of claims and the complexities resulting therefrom brought about a separation of claims for recognition into two general types: (1) unit (2) individual: casualty and non-casualty.

UNITS

Since the recognition of all types of guerrilla claims subsequent



to October 2, 1945, has been based upon the Five Points, a brief synopsis is given below. At the same time, however, it should be kept in mind that the Five Points as such were not a radically new innovation upon which guerrillas were judged but a compilation of previous policies dating back to 1943 with additions to cope with previously unmet situations.

Requirements for Recognition (Five Basic Points)

- (1) Maintenance of the unit in the field and in such a manner as to have contributed materially to the defeat of the enemy.
- (2) Establishment of a definite organization with ranks comparable to a PA or US Army table of organization (no guerrillas to be recognized in General rank) and maintenance of adequate records.
- (3) Adequate control maintained by unit commander. Sphere of operations and unit strengths to be commensurate with terrain and situation.
- (4) Continuity of activity since formation.
- (5) Full time efforts on the part of members.

Specifically disqualifying a unit from recognition were any one or a combination of the following, the first three being corollaries to Point 3, the fourth to Point 4, and the fifth to Point 5.

- (1) Dispersal of personnel to other units.
- (2) Preying upon civilian population.
- (3) Unwarranted attacks upon other guerrilla units.
- (4) Dissolution under pressure and failure to reorganize.

(5) Part time activities.

The Five Points listed above and the corollaries thereto were employed as a guide only since few, if any, guerrilla units now recognized could have complied with all five points. Initially, those units which measured up to a majority of the points received recognition while those which could comply with none or but a minority were not favorably considered for recognition. Units that were not attached to American using units were required to measure up to all five requirements. The authority to continue recognition having been established by AFPAC and delegated to the Commanding General AFWESPAC, on November 5, 1945, and the establishment of the Five Points as a recognition criterion on October 2, 1945, left little more to be developed in the way of recognition policy. Consequently and insofar as recognition alone is concerned what later became known as policy was, in effect, little more than administrative procedure in solving various problems.

Until the investigation of unattached guerrilla units was undertaken by the GAS, USAFFE, most units recognized through recommendation of using American units were strictly combat units. Investigating officers of the GAS soon found a great variety of units which fell into three general categories: (1) combat (2) sabotage and demolition (3) intelligence. A fourth category, volunteer units, appeared in late 1945 and early 1946. Of these four only the first three, by virtue of falling within the scope of the Five Points, have been considered by the GAD.

Volunteer type units have been known under the following designations:

- (1) Volunteer guards
- (2) Home Guards
- (3) Women's Auxiliary Services
- (4) Men's Auxiliary Services
- (5) Air Raid Wardens
- (6) Bolo Units
- (7) Spearmen Units
- (8) Blade Weapon Units
- (9) First Aiders

Until early 1946, this type of unit did not become a serious problem, although a few cases appeared in January and February 1945, since few submitted requests for recognition until the last few months preceding the March 15, 1946, deadline. Also, since units were investigated for recognition in the order in which they arrived, it was not until late April and May 1946 that the first cases came up for investigation. Insofar as a volunteer type unit could not comply with Points 1, 3, and 5, the GAB determined that such units, when so identified, would be automatically not favorably considered for recognition without the formality of a field investigation. Subsequent statements by the commanding officers of a number of the larger and better organized organizations throughout the Philippine Islands indicated that, although the services of such units aided considerably in the maintenance of their

organizations, they did not consider such services warranted the extension of a PA status with the attendant pay, allowances, and benefits of soldiers.

Upon the surrender of the Japanese in the Philippines, numerous attempts were made by personnel familiar with the guerrilla situation to stop all further recognitions. The first of such attempts was made by Major Miller of the GAS, AFPAC, on September 8, 1945. Although his recommendation received tentative approval on September 10, no action was taken. On October 2, 1945, a letter from GHQ AFPAC to all major subordinate commands (Appendix 30) stated specifically "In view of the termination of hostilities, decision has been made to recognize no more guerrilla forces for continuation in service in the Philippine Army." President Osmena's Executive Order No. 68 of September 26, 1945 ordered all unrecognized guerrilla units to disband, but at the same time specified that disbandment would not prejudice their rights to recognition if acceptable evidence was presented. The intent of AFPAC's letter of October 2, 1945, is not, therefore, clear. Apparently it was intended that recognitions would continue but that units recognized would not be incorporated into the Philippine Army for service. Letter from Headquarters, AFWESPAC, October 27, 1945 (Appendix 31), to the Commanding General, Base "X" on the subject of disbandment of unrecognized guerrilla forces bears out this contention since it stated in effect that existing procedure for recommending for recognition through channels deserving guerrilla units would continue. A further attempt by Major

Miller to halt recognitions by means of substituting a letter of merit or its equivalent was disapproved by AFPAC. By November 29, 1945, however, it had been determined not to cease recognitions but to place a deadline upon the receipt of any further requests for recognition. A special press release set that deadline date as the 31st of January 1946. Due to the poor dissemination of that press release, it was decided to extend the deadline to March 15, 1946. This extension was accomplished by means of press and radio release No. 32, dated February 5, 1946. From the first announcement on December 18, 1945, to the closing date of March 15, 1946, between 500,000 and 600,000 additional claims for recognition deluged the GAB. Subsequent investigations have revealed that 90% of that number either were entirely undeserving of recognition or were organizations never in existence during the Occupation or the Liberation but conceived and organized after the termination of the war.

#### Cadre or Composite Units

By mid-1946, investigation of several of the large overall commands on Luzon had progressed to the point where several startling conclusions could be drawn. Most noticeable was the dearth of military records of sufficient worth to aid an investigating officer in arriving at a fair estimate of the contributions of a particular unit, this being most noticeable in guerrilla organizations led by Filipino civilians. Secondly, it became apparent that the scores of subordinate units of certain

overall commands, when separately investigated, could conform to none of the Five Points or, at best, a minority. Thirdly, it was equally obvious that within some of these units were a few deserving subordinate units and individuals who had definitely contributed to the cause. Fourthly, some deserving units had been used as a nucleus to build up large unwarranted commands. Fifthly, the task of locating these deserving individuals posed, in view of the diminishing personnel available to the GAB, a problem of gigantic, time-consuming proportions. These realizations brought about in August 1946 a plan for the recognition of deserving members, irrespective of their units, which became known as the "cadre" or "composite" unit plan.

In brief, this plan contemplated a field investigation of each and every unit not yet recognized or recognized in part to determine the total number of deserving members therein. Upon acceptance by the overall commander of the total number of deserving members thus determined, he was instructed to select that number of deserving guerrillas and insert them in rosters based upon a US Army table of organization. That done, the overall commander was required to prepare and sign a letter withdrawing all pending unit and individual requests for recognition emanating from his command. Failure on the part of the overall commander to sign this agreement immediately subjected each and every unit to separate consideration and, since subordinate unit commanders either could not or would not reveal their most deserving members, meant little if any further recognition for that overall

command.

In effect this cadre or composite unit was nothing more than the application of the old screening process but to an infinitely greater number of units with total strengths approximating 50,000 to 100,000 men. In order to facilitate the revision of dates of the overall command as a whole, recognition dates for the composite unit were established for the Luzon liberation period only, no Luzon units having been recognized prior to January 9, 1945, by USAFFE or AFPAC. Of the nine overall commands on Luzon, this method was applied to five. Subsequent to the recognition, separate letters were sent to each subordinate unit commander turning down the remainder of his men.

#### Units which Dissolved under Pressure

In late 1946 and early 1947, a new problem arose over the recognition of units which had dissolved under Japanese pressure and had failed to reorganize. Even prior to the surrender of Bataan and Corregidor, guerrilla units had sprung up throughout Luzon. Many of these units continued to exist until the latter part of 1942 but, when it became apparent that American troops would not return within six months after the surrender, they became discouraged and voluntarily disbanded. Other small units remained in existence until dispersed by severe Japanese punitive expeditions during the fall of 1942 and mid-1943. In not a few cases many of their members joined other organizations which were subsequently recognized. A few of these organizations,

particularly in northern Luzon and in the Bicol provinces, undeniably caused the Japanese considerable embarrassment, while others were factitious or fictitious. When several submitted requests for recognition, based upon their early activities, it became necessary to decide whether or not those which had definitely contributed until their dispersal should be granted recognition, thereby inviting similar requests and pressure from spurious units, notably from the Moros in Lanao, Mindanao. A close application of the Five Points in which the items (1) dispersal of personnel to other units (2) continuity of activity, and (3) dissolution under pressure figure prominently, resulted in the decision to extend no recognition to such units. The phrase "discontinuous service" being coined for future application.

#### Terminal Date Recognition

As late as November 1945, the GAB was recommending guerrilla units for recognition with an initial date of recognition only. Such recognitions automatically made of the guerrilla unit so recognized a non-standard element of the Philippine Army whose members received pay and allowances until duly discharged from the service by competent authority. Furthermore, the letter of recognition directed each unit to report to a certain Philippine Army replacement center for processing and assignment. Since units recommended for recognition after September 26, 1945, were presumed to have been disbanded in obedience to Executive Order No. 68, they could hardly have been considered in continuous service from the initial date of recognition assigned them as a result of the



investigation conducted by the GAB. Consequently, the GAB assigned an "initial" date and a "terminal" date which theoretically covered the entire period of active service during the liberation period only. The letter of recognition was likewise revised and a paragraph inserted to indicate the terminating date of the unit recognition as the date of discharge for members. Such recognitions then became known as "terminal date recognitions" and units which, although never having been attached to an American using unit, had received an initial date recognition only were reviewed and terminal dates assigned. Terminal date recognitions therefore implied that units so recognized had been integral parts of the Philippine Army serving with the Armed Forces of the United States for the period of recognition only but that after the terminating date, were no longer in the service of any Army.

Generally speaking, no terminal dates were to be assigned later than September 26, 1945. But, due to the fact that mopping up activities were still being conducted against isolated elements of the Japanese Army as late as February 1946, a few guerrilla units previously recommended for recognition but not at the time recognized were employed by American units. Also, and in spite of directives from Headquarters, AFWESPAC, to disband immediately all unrecognized guerrillas, the 86th Infantry Division (US), the Far Eastern Air Force (FEAF), Base "X" and elements of the United States Navy continued to employ and give commendations to unrecognized guerrilla units. It therefore became necessary in a few instances to assign a terminating date later than September 26,

1945, except where the evidence indicated that the guerrilla units requesting either an extension of the terminal date or recognition up to the time they were turned out of camp were deliberately "hanging on" to extract the maximum pay, food, and clothing from the U. S. Army, in which case they were automatically assigned a terminating date of September 26, 1945.

A terminal date unit which in early 1946 had been directed to report to a reprocessing camp established by the 86th Infantry Division for processing, pay, and discharge, requested an extension of the terminal date to include the time spent in that camp, was denied on the premise that the 86th Division letter ordering members of the unit to report to the camp had specifically stated that the order did not constitute a recall to active duty. The processing and paying of terminal date guerrillas and demobilization of recognized organizations caused considerable trouble to the GAD prior to the assumption of this mission by the Recovered Personnel Division. Subordinate units executing this mission failed to carry out directives of Headquarters, AFWESPAC, failed to carry out directives of Headquarters, AFWESPAC, failed to initiate requests for policy when the broad directives of AFWESPAC did not cover each situation, exercised poor control over the units under their control, permitted junior officers to recommend units for recognition without investigating the work done by those units, and permitted the issuance of ambiguous letters which left loopholes, as in the above instance, for guerrilla units to request additional recognition. The Magirog Unit

(strength 1,187) as the result of the above and through chicanery received overpayment for a period of seven months amounting to approximately \$500,000.

Payment of Unrecognized Guerrillas as Laborers

Executive Order No. 68 of September 26, 1945, ordered the disbandment of all unrecognized guerrillas but did not prejudice their right to future recognition provided that the units could prove their service. AFPAC letter of October 2, 1945, ordered the cessation of employment of unrecognized guerrillas by US Army units except as civilians. AFWESPAC letter of October 27, 1945, forwarded the preceding letter to subordinate units for compliance but did state that existing procedure for recommending for recognition through channels deserving units would continue. AFWESPAC letter of November 29, 1945 (Appendix 32), again directed the immediate disbandment of unrecognized guerrillas provided that no recommendations for recognition had been initiated by US Army units employing such personnel. At the same time authorization was granted to pay disbanded guerrillas as laborers. Another AFWESPAC letter of even date (Appendix 33) specifically directed an investigation of certain guerrilla units in the process of being moved from one location to another and directed that, should any of the units mentioned be found unrecognized, they were to be disbanded in accordance with previous directives. By January 29, 1946, the GAB had taken cognizance of civilian laborers and civilian employees of PCAU appearing

on rosters submitted for recognition and had denied their requests for recognition. During the month of December the Provost Marshal of the MPC (US) in Manila submitted a report on the trouble being caused by certain recognized and unrecognized units, mostly of the Manila Military District, ECLGA, and requested that they be withdrawn from Manila. This request resulted in the publication of orders moving the offending units to the 21st Replacement Depot for disbandment. Upon processing, payment, and discharge of the recognized guerrillas at this camp, approximately a battalion of unrecognized guerrillas came to light which, upon receiving no pay, set up a clamor for recognition. The agitation caused by the members of this battalion resulted in an investigation which denied them recognition as guerrillas but extended payment as civilian laborers, which offer was promptly refused. This decision was reached when it had been clearly established that the recognized guerrilla commanders had failed to obey orders from using American units in late 1945 to disband immediately their unrecognized members. To the investigating officer at that time it was very apparent that the guerrilla commanders had made promises to their unrecognized members and deliberately retained them in their organizations, requesting certifications and commendations from unsuspecting American officers with which, since that constituted proof of attachment, they hoped to get additional recognitions.

#### Supplementary Rosters

An exasperating problem besetting the GAB from late 1945 was that

of supplementary rosters. A ruling from Sixth Army, dated April 24, 1945 (Appendix 34), stated in effect that the initial roster submitted by a guerrilla unit for recognition was sufficient and that, as replacements were called to fill the gaps created by casualties or additional members of the unit were attached, these men would merely be placed on the payrolls. Later, as the guerrilla leaders learned that the GAB considered only those members carried on duly approved rosters as being recognized, numerous requests for recognition of supplementary rosters appeared, all quoting this ruling of Sixth Army. Under the circumstances the GAD had no alternative but to extend recognition. In this manner and particularly in the case of the Zambales Military District as many as five and six supplementary rosters to one unit of company size can be found, thereby placing in extreme doubt not only the number of units but the total strength recognized. Here again existed a situation ripe for the commission of anomalies and fully appreciated by a number of unscrupulous guerrilla leaders.

Frequently requests were received from guerrilla leaders for the recognition of supplementary rosters containing genuine deserving members. Investigation revealed that those previously recognized were either less deserving or not deserving at all, their names having been placed on the original rosters or initial supplementary rosters by the unit commander because of their political or financial influence. It was considered that a commanding officer had abused the trust placed in him by this headquarters and that the United States Army would not recognize such

additional personnel.

#### Substitutions on Recognized Rosters

In late 1947, innumerable requests were received for substitutions on recognized rosters. Generally speaking, the reasons given were as follows: (1) The same personnel were recognized in as many as two or more entirely different units (2) Names were "inadvertently" omitted from the original roster (3) "Clerical" errors were made (4) Aliases were used on the original roster and the "correct" names were to be substituted to permit final receipt of pay. In the case of the first item it was considered that duplication of names on two or more rosters indicated lack of control on the part of both commanders and that substitutions would not be permitted. Also, when individuals were so recognized, they retained the ranks and grades held on the first roster to be recognized and were removed entirely from the second. When inadvertent omissions and clerical errors were determined to have been legitimate, recognition was extended. Where question existed as to the motive behind the request and the evidence at hand showed no basis for inclusion, either of individuals or of rosters, the request was denied. It was held that, when a roster was presented for recognition, it consisted of an accurate and legitimate muster of the troops involved and that the presence of aliases on the rosters represented neither an accurate nor a legitimate muster, and that most aliases were only assumed by the overall commanders. This opinion was further substantiated when the GAD received a request

from the Banal Regiment (Hukbalahap) to change 580 aliases in a battalion of a recognized strength of 871 individuals. This unit was known to have operated two recruiting stations as late as 1947 and sold affidavits. A note from the Auditor, Army of the Philippines, stated that past experience revealed that disbursing officers had been victimized for erroneous payments to wrong parties on account of erroneous identification of payees and claimants.

Later, because of the number of requests for changing of aliases, the fact that none could be adjudicated by the RPD and that the civil laws of the United States recognize an individual's acquisition of an alias under proper identification, it was decided that responsibility reposed upon the Army of the Philippines for proper identity inasmuch as it accomplished final payment. Such persons were advised that rosters would not be changed by the US Army; however, if the claimant could show sufficient legal proof and a statement was made by the Judge Advocate General, Philippine Army, in each case that such proof is legally sufficient to comply with all requirements of Philippine law, that the alias claimed by the claimant is genuine and bona fide, such evidence may be acceptable in the adjudication of either terminal date or arrears in pay.

#### Withdrawal of Subordinate Units from Overall Commands

In a number of cases, particularly dealing with Marking's Fil-Americans, subordinate units of overall commands became dissatisfied with the capricious and fractious manner in which the overall commanders were

dealing with the GAB. They felt that the high-handed and arbitrary manner of refusing to cooperate prejudiced their chances for additional recognition and subsequent revision of dates. Consequently, they requested verbally, at first, that they be considered separately from the overall command. When this met with the approval of the overall commander, the units so requesting were withdrawn and considered separately for recognition and revision of dates. The best example of this type is the III Army Corps of Marking's Fil-American.

A slightly different situation arose when a request was received to separate from an already recognized unit a subordinate element thereof whose parent unit was actually an entirely different organization. This condition resulted from the transfer of attached, but unrecognized, guerrilla units which were moved from one locality to another as dictated by the tactical situation. As units decreased in strength due to casualties they were combined by the using American unit regardless of their parent organizations. In many instances using American units designated these guerrilla units by separate names and ordered, when recommending for recognition, that a composite roster under one name only be submitted. The resulting unit therefore consisted oftentimes of members acknowledging two or more entirely separate parent units. When the overall commands were revised as a whole, it became necessary to segregate the individual members of such units in order that all might be entitled to a revision of dates.



### Proposal of President Roxas

In July 1946, President Roxas proposed that the GAB extend recognition to all individuals who would turn in serviceable weapons. For various types of weapons different numbers of individuals would be recognized, that is, a rifle was worth one recognition, an automatic weapon two recognitions, and so forth. The period of recognition and the ranks in which recognized were considered immaterial by President Roxas. He further recommended that, after a certain date, no further recognitions of any type be extended by the GAB. This request was denied (Appendix 35).

### Revision of Dates

Revision of recognition dates evolved from the question of arrears in pay which had first been subject to discussion in late 1944 and continually appeared, but still unsettled, in official correspondence from January to November 1945. Arrears in pay insofar as it pertains to guerrilla affairs is defined as that pay due a recognized guerrilla from the date of his induction into a recognized guerrilla unit or the earliest recognition date of that unit, whichever is later, to the date upon which he received current pay, the latter date being either the date the unit came under operational control of Sixth or Eighth Armies or the initial date of recognition of the unit. The question of arrears in pay reached serious proportions in November 1945 during the early stages of the demobilization of the Philippine Army. The then Secretary of National Defense, Alfredo Montelibano, delayed the effective

demobilization from November 1945 through January 1946 by his insistence that no soldier be demobilized until he had received his arrears in pay. Insofar as the question of paying arrears in pay to ex-USAFFE as well as civilian guerrillas had received no solution at that time it was obvious that the Philippine Army would either be demobilized notwithstanding Montelibano's protest or would continue in its present strength, then approximately 200,000, receiving pay and allowances until the question was settled or the Commonwealth received its independence, at which time the Republic automatically assumed the burden of supporting its own army. Later the decision to demobilize was made with the understanding that discharge in no wise prejudiced the right of a discharged soldier to collect his arrears in pay at a later date.

In the meantime, the problem of correcting the initial recognition dates of Luzon guerrillas was to be considered. Dates of the Luzon guerrillas had been established tentatively and the GAB examined available records to determine the earliest date of organization and actual operation as military forces of the units already recognized. To give further emphasis to the now urgent problem of arrears in pay or revision of dates, Colonel Russell W. Volckmann, commanding officer of USAFIP NL, submitted a request on November 26, 1945, for the amendment of date of recognition of his organization.

The latter item thereupon became the subject of an intense study in which the GAB submitted to interested general and special staff sections a proposed amendment to previously published AFPAC lists of recognized units. This amendment termed the already published recognition

dates as "tentative" dates of recognition and at the same time submitted what the GAB considered correct dates. Between December 4 and 19, 1945, this proposal was commented upon by RPD, Claims Service, Fiscal Director, and Judge Advocate (Appendix 36). RPD did not dissent on the establishment of new dates but definitely pointed out the dangers involved from a political and financial standpoint; nor did Claims Service dissent, merely stating that such revision would enable the settlement of legitimate claims; the Fiscal Director maintained that the Commanding General, AFWESPAC, had no authority to change the dates established by the Commanding General, USAFFE, and repeated the warnings of RPD, while the Judge Advocate ruled that the Commanding General, AFWESPAC, could change the initial recognition dates if AFPAC's recognitions were considered tentative. The Judge Advocate likewise warned of multiple, complex and important problems involved.

A conference held on December 21, 1945 (Appendix 37), presided over by Major General Leo Donovan, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, and consisting of all interested staff sections decided that the Commanding General, AFWESPAC, possessed the authority to set the dates of recognition of recognized guerrilla units as well as any to be recognized in the future at such time as an investigation warranted. At the same time it was decided that civilian guerrillas were eligible to receive arrears in pay. The results of this conference were approved by the Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff, Major General W. A. Wood, Jr., on December 31, 1945.

Two recommendations of considerable importance were submitted. The first recommended that the dates originally assigned units in the southern islands remain unchanged, and the second that no guerrilla unit on Luzon be revised prior to October 1, 1943. These recommendations, which apparently were approved throughout all the discussions, did not figure in later revisions. The reasoning behind the change is unknown but press and radio release of March 27, 1946 (Appendix 38), included all units, thereby including those in the southern islands. Furthermore, although the latter revising USAFIP NL only revised the command as a whole to October 1, 1943, subordinate elements thereof were revised to May 10, 1942. An assumption was therefore made by succeeding officers in the GAB that no time limitations were fixed beyond which a guerrilla unit could not be revised. Previously, January 12, 1946, a slightly different subject appeared when the GAB received a letter from Colonel Fertig requesting revision of the recognized date of the 10th Military District in order to honor receipts for supplies issued by that district prior to February 13, 1943. The GAB stated that the claims factor was not entertained in the setting of recognition dates and recommended that the policy of the Claims Service, AFWESPAC, be altered to honor legitimate claims incurred by American officers.

Until mid-1946, the few revisions completed dealt with large, well-organized units whose records were voluminous and reasonably complete. No concerted effort had been made to complete revisions

of all previously recognized units at that time because of the large number of units still pending initial investigation. As pressure was applied by guerrillas for the settlement of arrears in pay (the RPD refused to settle claims for any one given unit until the GAB had established final recognition dates), more thought was given to the matter of revision. It was recognized at the time that revising the well-established southern commands would cause the least difficulty because of the excellent military organizations established there. The discoveries which led to the proposal in August 1946 of the cadre or composite unit plan for recognition made it apparent that, if the semimilitary organizations on Luzon were to be revised, some new method would have to be devised. This resulted in a plan for revising the overall commands on Luzon which was submitted on October 17, 1946. Briefly, this plan took cognizance of the following:

(1) That the forerunners of the recognized overall commands had actually been in continuous existence since 1942.

(2) That for the most part they were semimilitary organizations with few records, relatively speaking.

(3) That they had commenced activities with a small group of men and had gradually increased in size, as conditions warranted, until they reached the strengths as recognized for services during the liberation period.

(4) That their claimed strengths included a far greater percentage of home guards than combatants.

(5) That the services of the combatants throughout the Occupation caused embarrassment to the Japanese, maintained the morale of the Filipino people and, therefore, merited recognition.

The solution to this problem was extremely hypothetical in nature but no better alternative could be found. The sum and substance of the plan was to determine the first date upon which the unit became an effective organization, irrespective of its size, and from that date to permit a gradual increase in strength, based upon certain critical dates at which a logical expansion could be expected in view of the tactical situation, until the unit reached the total strength recognized for service during the liberation period. These strengths, at best merely arbitrary, were reached with an American table of organization in mind and ranks were required to conform to that table of organization. With each increase in strength an appropriate table of organization was added to account for the additional personnel and promotions permitted. Seldom did a guerrilla commander commence activities with the same rank he held during the Liberation, but started with a lower rank which in many cases was that of a non-commissioned officer. After having been given the exact strengths, the appropriate tables of organization, together with units and individuals which were entitled to no revision, the guerrilla commander prepared his own rosters in a form approved by the RPD. At the same time a very detailed letter of revision was prepared, primarily for the benefit of Claims Service, listing all subordinate units of the overall command, when

they came into existence and any changes in their designations or status--this to facilitate payment of claims for goods and services.

The basis for revision of dates was, as in the case of unit recognition, primarily the Five Points. Also, as in the case of unit recognition only three general types of units were considered, namely, combat, sabotage and demolition, and intelligence. To enable investigating officers to better judge the merits of units being revised and in elaboration of the Five Points, a discussion of the requirements of an effective type of the three acceptable units was prepared.

In the case of a combat unit it was considered that combat during the years of occupation must have consisted of a consistent series of ambushes, sniping, and harassment. A unit which could show such activities was considered to have had a definite plan of action vigorously carried out. It was necessary to keep in mind at the same time, however, that definite "lay low" orders had been issued by General MacArthur and that a unit could not be condemned for not having engaged in combat activities. Units which claimed, for example, a certain ambush but entered upon no further activities for another six months were considered as having had no consistent plan of action and therefore were not considered for revision of dates.

In the case of a sabotage and demolition unit it was considered that its activities required the consistent sabotaging or demolishing of bridges, ammunition dumps, oil dumps, telephone exchanges, or any other type of installation or equipment whose destruction or damage

impaired the ability of the Japanese to carry out their assigned missions. Such claimed activities as the sporadic cutting of wires, ripping out of railroad ties, the raiding of bodegas and the selling or converting to personal use of the contents, the stealing of automobiles and spare parts, the sprinkling of nails, tacks and glass on highways, could not be considered as sabotage and demolition activities unless they were ordered by the unit commander as a part of a definite and consistent plan of action.

In the case of intelligence units, it was considered that their activities must have consisted of the collection, collation, evaluation, and the dissemination of military information which, when received in GHQ SWPA, Headquarters Sixth and Eighth Armies and the headquarters of various special combat teams or task forces, was of assistance to them. Furthermore, it was considered that this information should have been consistently collected and forwarded to higher headquarters. One other special type of activity favorably considered was that of publishing such underground newspapers as the well-known "Liberator". Such claimed activities as the listening to short-wave radio broadcasts and the spreading of news heard therein, the advising of people not to lose faith in the hope of liberation, the collection of information of no military value, the submission of outdated information, the sporadic submission of information, the failure to submit information to a guerrilla headquarters in contact with the above headquarters, or the submission of information to different headquarters



with no outside contacts, were not considered as intelligence activities and therefore did not warrant recognition.

By June 1946, it had become obvious that, without the assistance of former commanding officers of the larger overall and island commands, the GAB would encounter considerable difficulty in successfully accomplishing revisions of dates. To that end it was decided to recall to active duty those discharged officers and assign them or to reassign those officers still on duty to the GAB. Those returned or reassigned were: Colonel W. W. Fertig\* (10th MD), Colonel R. W. Volckmann\* (USA-FIP NL), Major R. B. Speilman (10th MD), Lieutenant Colonel J. M. Cushing (CAC), Lieutenant Colonel E. P. Ramsey (ECLGA), Lieutenant Colonel B. L. Anderson (Anderson's Guerrillas), and Major R. B. Lapham (LGAF). (\*Not actually assigned to the GAB but worked with it.) In the case of units commanded by PA officers either they or their duly authorized representatives were requested to work with the American officers investigating their units. In this manner revisions of dates were expedited and claims of arbitrary decisions on the part of the GAB were somewhat lessened.

In mid-1946 and previous to formulation of the plan presented in October, it was decided by the GAB to investigate each independent unit and, if recognition was warranted, to recognize that unit for its entire period of service rather than for the liberation period only. Few independent units received any revision of dates prior to January 9, 1945, since investigations proved beyond the shadow of a doubt that practically

all were opportunists who had jumped on the band wagon between September 1944 and January 1945. This procedure dispensed with the necessity of two separate investigations, one for recognition and one for revision. At the same time it was tentatively decided, in view of the cadre or composite plan for recognition and the pending plan for revision, to recognize subordinate units of overall commands only for the liberation period in order to prevent confusion in the future when the overall command was revised as a whole. It was further determined to complete all initial investigations as well as reconsiderations prior to undertaking revision of any one command so that, the latter being accomplished, the overall command was completely finished.

Due to the necessity of completing initial investigations first and due to diminishing personnel, only four large island and overall commands and a few independent units had been revised or denied revision by January 1947. In February 1947, however, a Revision Section was established and plans were made for an acceleration of the revision problem along with the still acute initial investigation and growing reconsideration problems. As greater thought was given the question of revision of dates, several problems appeared. It was decided that no unit would be revised prior to May 11, 1942 (actually May 7, 1942, insofar as the legal surrender date of Corregidor remains in doubt), since guerrillas were neither recognized nor authorized by Headquarters, USAFFE, or Headquarters, USAFIP, prior to the surrender date. It was likewise decided that ex-USAFFE men, regardless of their ranks

or grades at the time of surrender in 1942, would be recognized only in those guerrilla ranks or grades commensurate with the guerrilla staff or command positions they held.

A problem arising from the amendment of letters of revision, occasioned by pertinent information received at a later date, concerned the use of the term "on or about" in such letters. In a number of the larger southern island commands and overall commands on Luzon the actual order activating a particular unit could not be located but reference to the unit in question appeared in other orders. Investigating officers were thus able to approximate the activation date of the unit in question within a month or two of the correct date.

#### Reconsiderations

To further complicate a most complex situation because of increasing problems and decreasing personnel, guerrilla units rejected for recognition began submitting requests for reconsideration of the original decisions. This situation did not become serious until the late spring of 1946 when so many of the patently spurious units which had sneaked in under the deadline received their rejections. An initial recommendation that requests for reconsideration be accepted or rejected upon receipt by the GAB was disapproved. (A study of the previous investigation and evaluation of additional evidence not previously considered would determine the validity of a reinvestigation.) Later it was decided that a Guerrilla Review Board, comprised of three disinterested senior ranking officers from this headquarters, be established to act

as the final authority on unfavorable recommendations made by the GAB subsequent to investigations for the reconsideration of rejected units.

Due to the number of requests received for reconsideration, a review of this imposing problem preceded an approved recommendation from the Commanding General that the Guerrilla Review Board be dispensed with, that reconsideration be handled entirely within the GAD and that, in view of newly arrived and unbiased personnel, reconsiderations be undertaken with the least practicable delay. All requests then being received were filed for future study.

With the establishment of a Unit Reconsideration Section it became evident that field investigations were necessary in but a few instances since 95% of all claimant units were undeserving of a guerrilla status. Recommendations were based upon a comparison of the additional evidence, submitted as per instructions to the unit commander upon granting him reconsideration, with evidence initially submitted as well as with the much greater knowledge gained in two years of operation by the GAD of the guerrilla movement on Luzon.

Starting in July, as each request came in with the additional evidence required, a spot comparison of the evidence with previously submitted evidence was conducted and, by means of a letter, the unit commander was notified as to whether or not his request would be accepted. In the event it was not accepted, a letter to that effect was mailed to him and the case considered closed. If accepted, he was so informed and the unit took its place in the files awaiting investigation. As expected few reconsiderations resulted in recognition.

STATISTICS

UNITS BRANCH

(1) Initial Investigations

Rejected	895 units - strength	929,661
Approved	<u>277</u> units - strength	<u>237,529</u>
	1,172 units - strength	1,167,190

(2) Revision of Recognition Dates

Rejected	139 units - strength	88,342
Approved	<u>138</u> units - strength	<u>149,187</u>
	277 units - strength	237,529

(3) Reconsiderations

Rejected	145 units - strength	231,846
Approved	<u>12</u> units - strength	<u>2,018</u>
Total reconsidered	157	233,864

Requested recon- sideration but not accepted:	78 units - strength	212,749
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Total requested reconsideration:	235 units - strength	446,613
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### INDIVIDUAL CASES

During March 1946, the Individual Section was established as a subdivision of the Unit Branch. The section was further specialized by the creation of the Casualty and Non-Casualty Sections. In October 1946, the Individual Section was separated from the Unit Branch and was designated as a separate branch with two subsections. The Individual Section was activated to accept and investigate claims as follows:

Claims from individuals whose names were not submitted for recognition on a unit roster.

Claims from deserving individuals whose names may have been omitted or deleted from a recognized roster by inadvertence or discrimination.

Claims from individuals who performed military service to the resistance movement which was personal and distinct from any activities of guerrilla units.

Claims of individuals who incurred a casualty status and which satisfied the service requirements of our recognition criteria and which disability was in line of duty.

To permit proper evaluation of the work load of this branch and in fairness to all claimants concerned, subsequent press releases limited the dates after which the sections would not accept applications for individual guerrilla recognition. Requests by the thousands were received and decisions were suspended for a period of approximately one month to process, mail questionnaires, and establish individual files. As decisions were resumed, many requests were received from individuals recognized on rosters and requesting revision of dates or higher ranks. These requests were denied on the premise that

individuals were assigned appropriate ranks and periods of recognition by their commanding officers who submitted rosters in accordance with instructions from this headquarters as to the availability of ranks and periods of recognition.

The target date for initial decision on all individual requests by December 1947 would have been realized when the RPD discovered in September 1947 that thousands of requests had been erroneously received by that division prior to our announced deadline date. This was of particular importance in the case of USAFFE personnel as, in the absence of a recognized status, their claims could not be adjudicated to include their claimed guerrilla services. It was decided that since the RPD and the GAD are under the same headquarters and that determinations are closely correlated, the claimants had undoubtedly assumed that their applications were properly filed. The GAD accepted these claims which eventually totaled 44,000.

#### Casualty Section

Guerrilla commanders were forbidden to include on unit rosters submitted for approval the names of individuals who were physically unable to present themselves for processing. Therefore, it was decided to consider the casualties of each unit individually.

Initially this section received few applications because:

(1) Ignorance on part of claimants as to proper method and place to file applications.

(2) Inability of claimants to locate or identify former superior

officers to obtain documentary evidence to support their claims.

(3) Misapprehension that a claim filed with the Recovered Personnel Division was likewise an application for guerrilla casualty recognition.

(4) Physical condition of those individuals hospitalized preventing the filing of applications.

(5) Delay of guerrilla commanders in disseminating information afforded by the Guerrilla Affairs Branch pertinent to casualties.

(6) Efforts of the Casualty Section were devoted mostly to the recording of cases received and the interviewing of individuals seeking information as to the proper method of filing, etc.

The following criterion was established for the consideration of claims submitted for guerrilla casualty recognition:

(1) Eligibility for individual guerrilla casualty recognition was determined upon documentary evidence that the casualty status of the individual was entered as a direct result of his military operations against the enemy while a member of a constituted guerrilla organization. A casualty status incurred through the contraction of a major illness such as tuberculosis, malaria, leprosy, or any other diseases commonly predominant in the Philippines, would be considered on the basis of documentary proof that the illness claimed was developed or aggravated by the direct military activity of the individual concerned.

(2) Casualty status is classified into six (6) categories and



was defined as follows:

- (a) KIA - Death incurred in combat
- (b) KILD - Death incurred through an accident or by execution
- (c) DILD - Death incurred through disease (See Par (1) above)
- (d) IILD - Serious illness (See last sentence, Par (1) above)
- (e) WIA - Wounds incurred in combat
- (f) MIA - Missing in combat or from specific military mission

(3) Such services as assistance to prisoners of war and escaped military personnel, procurement of finance and various supplies, certain types of intelligence service, distribution of propaganda material, and other such services which are not rendered in the field exclusive of normal civilian pursuits according to the standard of the era are regarded as patriotic services, truly commendable but not eligible for consideration as military service. Services rendered to constituted guerrilla organizations as laborers, intelligence operatives, etc., by individuals not actually inducted into the unit served are also regarded as patriotic and not military service. Many of these types of services were paid for on a day to day basis by certain recognized guerrilla organizations. Many others upon proper qualification are compensated through approval of claims for such services by the Claims Service.

(4) Period of recognition:

The period of recognition of members of recognized guerrilla

organizations may extend from their date of induction or the date of unit recognition, whichever is later, to the date of death or, in the case of the wounded or diseased, to the date of discharge from hospitalization or 30 June 1946, the arbitrarily established date of termination of United States jurisdiction over the Philippine Army prior to the establishment of the Philippine Republic, whichever is earlier.

Persons who were casualties prior to the recognition period of their unit and the casualties of non-recognized guerrilla units may be awarded recognition for appropriate period as supported by documentary proof that the services rendered were over and above the collective efficiency of the unit served, otherwise recognition shall be restricted to the date of casualty only, which would qualify the individual concerned for veterans benefits. However, any period of recognition of the wounded and diseased persons in this category may not exceed the terminal date limitations imposed on the casualties of recognized units.

Terminal date guerrillas who were hospitalized subsequent to the terminal date of recognition of their unit but as a result of their processing as recognized guerrillas must apply for an extension of their terminal date of recognition not to exceed the period of hospitalization or June 30, 1946, before additional pay or veterans benefits may be obtained. Recognized members of non-terminal date units are automatically paid through the Army of the Philippines under

authority of Circular No. 182, Headquarters, Philippine Army, dated December 3, 1945.

insufficient trained personnel and the inability of claimants to obtain authentic unit casualty records and other pertinent information necessary to complete the documentation of their individual applications, plus the delay in obtaining such data either through lack of proper contact or because of hospitalization, delayed the development and investigation of claims to a degree that the Casualty Section was unable to complete investigations in sufficient number to assure completion of its mission prior to June 30, 1948. Therefore, to enhance and expedite the investigation of these individual applications, it was decided to consider unit casualties by roster. Such rosters, however, were to be restricted to recognized units only.

Casualty rosters for all recognized units whose original records were available and whose responsible officers' assistance was available were considered. These considerations endeavored to exclude individuals in a casualty status incurred through arrest, execution, illness, zonification, etc., since it is deemed necessary to investigate such circumstances more thoroughly and individually and inasmuch as many non-guerrillas were also casualties of the same conditions.

General adjustments of ranks of individuals listed on most casualty rosters submitted were effected on the rosters finally approved due to the excessive ranks usually claimed without regard to tables of organization, etc.

On June 15, 1947, a press and radio release announced that July 31, 1947 would be the final date for the acceptance of guerrilla casualty claims. Since applications had been acceptable for over a period of twenty (20) months at that time, it was deemed that ample opportunity had been afforded for those individuals concerned to prepare and file their claims for investigation.

Those individuals who were screened from unit rosters still under consideration on July 31, 1947, and who had failed to submit their claims for individual recognition were afforded the opportunity to do so on a reconsideration basis within a period expiring sixty days subsequent to the approval of the unit casualty rosters, the unit commander being informed to disseminate this information to all concerned.

All individual claims not favorably considered were reinvestigated upon receipt of a request for reconsideration and additional supporting evidence from the claimants concerned. The decisions resulting from these reinvestigations represent the final action taken and each case so affected was considered permanently closed.

Statistics

Total claims received:	<u>46,323</u>	
Total claims approved:		<u>22,713</u>
Total reconsiderations received:	<u>2,706</u>	
Total reconsiderations approved:		<u>101</u>
Total received:	<u>49,029</u>	
Total approved:		<u>22,814</u>

### Non-Casualty Section

A favorable decision concerning individual non-casualty guerrilla claims depends upon the ability of the claimant to present conclusive evidence which disclosed a satisfactory explanation for the omission of his name on the approved recognized roster of his unit, cognizance being taken of the recognized strength of the unit. In cases of individuals from units not favorably considered, the claimant must produce conclusive evidence of his own individual activity, distinct and separate from the activity of the unit, which justifies his individual recognition in the face of the unfavorable determination of the unit claim.

Consideration is given to the type of service performed, which must be military service based on the five basic points for unit recognition. The individual service performed must have contributed materially to the defeat of the enemy, and the rank of the individual must be commensurate with duties performed and in accordance with an American table of organization. Further, the individual must show continuity of service and full time military service to the exclusion of normal civilian pursuits. Volunteer guards, propaganda agents, self-styled civilian morale boosters, individuals whose only service was aiding and abetting American prisoners of war or internees, air raid wardens, and contributors to guerrilla units have been excluded from consideration as guerrillas.

Individual claimants whose service satisfies the criterion de-

scribed must produce acceptable, reliable evidence to prove their service. Little credence is based on certificates and affidavits of guerrilla leaders, inasmuch as most all claims are abundantly supplied with this type of unreliable evidence. Proof that a claimant was processed and received current pay was considered to indicate genuine guerrilla activity, but, as it was known that thousands of undeserving guerrillas were processed and paid, this served as a corroborating factor only. Written or oral statements from American officers who have personal knowledge of the activities of the claimant were given considerable weight. Military awards for meritorious or valorous military service were considered as being cogent evidence. Occasionally, unit investigating officers, during a field investigation, discovered an individual deserving of recognition although the unit was deemed not worthy of recognition. Substantiating evidence was sometimes found from the library of archive records (at RPD) of a few of the larger guerrilla organizations.

The initial efforts of this section were devoted to receiving, filing, and sending applicants questionnaires to be completed and returned prior to investigation of a claim. Few personnel were initially assigned this section as it was decided to refrain from individual investigations until the unit investigations were completed. Thus, few claims received decision in 1946. A press release of January 9, 1947, which announced that March 15, 1947, would be the closing date for the acceptance of applications for individual non-casualty guer-

rilla recognition, deluged the section with applications.

The filing and administrative handling of claims by this section underwent many changes subsequent to which an efficient "mail order" type of organization was organized which assured the absolute maximum results for effort expended to permit timely accomplishment of mission. The two-way flow of correspondence became enormous in relation to the number of personnel available and necessitated the establishment of production line procedure, feeding correspondence to batteries of typists. Form letters were devised, printed or mimeographed, upon every profitable occasion. It is estimated that an average of three letters have been dispatched to each request for recognition.

The investigating officers were organized on an assembly line procedure, each handling only specific parts of a case, the conclusion of which received the attention of reviewing officers prior to forwarding for approval of the recommended decision. It was discovered that the most efficient method of investigation was to work all available claims of one entire command or unit. These investigations were preceded by the presentation of the history and status of the unit to the investigating officers to permit a working knowledge of background material. The majority of claims were decided upon by the evaluation of the evidence presented by the applicant. However, in many instances it was necessary to secure additional information from archive records, individual processing papers or original rosters at the RPD, recognized rosters, individual 201 files and pay records at

HAP, and from the G-2 section, Headquarters, PHILRYCOM.

The most efficient administrative method to handle the prodigious amount of correspondence by such a limited number of personnel was the establishment of a filing system of alphabetized locator cards and the filing of the applicants' 201 files by unit. After various modifications, generally from mid-1947 to deactivation of the section, the following administrative handling of claims was followed with slight variation:

Receipt of applicant's request established a 201 file.

A questionnaire was mailed to the applicant with the stipulation that failure to return the completed form and requested evidence within sixty (60) days would be construed as an indication of the claimant's intention to withdraw his request. Actually a period of ninety (90) days was permitted to expire prior to such action.

Failure to receive a reply to our questionnaire after a period of ninety (90) days transpired, the applicant was mailed a letter informing him that his claim was closed. Upon the receipt of the questionnaire and supporting evidence it was filed in the 201 folder pending appropriate investigation.

Prior to decision on claims, most applicants wrote letters of inquiry concerning the status of their application and this necessitated a letter informing them that their claim was on file pending decision.

Decisions on claims were immediately dispatched to the applicant.



Upon receipt of a request for reconsideration the applicant was informed that his request was accepted, that he should submit all evidence not previously considered and which he believes has a bearing on his request, and that all initial investigations will be completed prior to reinvestigation of his claim.

It was later decided to consider that individuals whose names appeared on rosters submitted prior to the deadline date and not approved or were screened off the recognized rosters, to be considered as having received initial decision and their requests for individual recognition were accepted as requests for reconsideration.

It is believed that the creation of the individual non-casualty branch was an error, especially when you compare the infinitesimal percentage recognized. The vast majority of claimants were screened off recognized rosters by their guerrilla leaders, which should have been the final decision; the rest were members of unrecognized organizations. The name "individual" would appear as a misnomer. With extremely rare occasion, only through collective effort could an individual render military service. He had to be associated with some organization that was operating under an overall plan of operation or his personal endeavor could be classified as no more than emotional opportunism subscribed to by any normal individual under the yoke of a conqueror.

Statistics

Individual Non-Casualties

Total claims received:	<u>64,254</u>	
Total claims approved:		<u>362</u>
Total reconsiderations received:	<u>20,000</u>	
Total reconsiderations approved:		<u>10</u>
Total received:	<u>84,254</u>	
Total approved:		<u>372</u>

### VIII Revocation of Recognition

As was to be expected in executing such a peculiar mission, some recognitions were extended erroneously. Further, as this mission neared completion an amalgamation of the facts obtained placed the GAD in possession of irrefutable evidence on which to base its decisions. Because of the large volume of complaint letters received concerning certain recognitions, an evaluation of the entire Luzon guerrilla movement, and the furious activity of the undeserving who were encouraged by this anomaly, it was decided that reinvestigation would be in order with the intent of revoking any erroneous recognitions.

During the months of December 1945, January and February 1946, the GAB under Major Raymond L. Otti recognized units that later caused extreme embarrassment in the execution of the recognition program. While there was insufficient evidence to establish collusion, there was definite connivance on the part of Major Otti. The errors committed were not known until the Manila newspapers blasted the recognition of these units in January and continuing through April 1946. Outstanding guerrilla leaders mentioned units and individuals by name and pointed out the collaborationist activities of the many ranking officers within the units. Eventually the wrath of the press struck at the GAB for recognizing these "phony" units and, second, for not recognizing more genuine units, and accusing certain officers within the branch of accepting bribes. Many part-time guerrillas who had

not been recognized but who would have been content to consider their contributions as a patriotic duty reasoned that if "phonies" were to receive recognition and pay, then they, too, should be so entitled. For those 1945 and 1946 pseudo-guerrillas who noted the ease with which approximately 25,000 fake guerrillas in and around Manila, Batangas, and Cavite areas were recognized, this was cause for redoubled effort. In brief, until this press criticism most guerrillas were content to accept our decisions of non-recognition.

The first revocation to be effected was preceded by extensive staff studies to determine the validity and merits of such an action, cognizance being taken of the effect such action would have on Fil-American relations. The American Ambassador and President Roxas were both apprised of the situation, and it was decided to withhold action on the Blue Eagle Brigade pending vote on the Parity Bill. The revocation of this unit was disseminated by press and radio release. To soften the blow and to dispense with the appearance of arbitrary decisions, all members were permitted to submit individual requests for recognition provided they had distinctive supporting papers.

It was interesting to note that the initial revocation was well received by the press. Equally interesting was the consensus of press opinion that more genuine guerrillas could then be recognized. Subsequent revocations became less liberal, as it became increasingly obvious that fraud had been perpetrated against the United States Government, in that individuals were not permitted to apply for in-

dividual recognition. This for the reason that if during the rein-  
vestigation an individual was determined worthy of separate investi-  
gation his name was submitted for individual recognition.

Of considerable embarrassment to the GAD was the fact that two  
of the organizations that were erroneously recognized were commanded  
by Americans. Mr. Edwin P. Ramsey, commanding officer of the ECLGA,  
was assigned to the GAB during the period when the services of all  
recognized American guerrilla leaders were requested in order to  
facilitate the handling of their units. Through artifice and chi-  
canery Ramsey secured recognition for many times the number of indi-  
viduals of his unit deserving of guerrilla recognition. This led to  
constant accusations that only members who belonged to a unit that  
was commanded by an American were being properly considered and honored.

A study was made concerning the feasibility of collecting the  
millions of pesos paid to members of a revoked unit. It was considered  
that such action would be inequitable, cognizance being taken of the  
majority of persons unable to accomplish reimbursement, that the pay-  
ments made and received were in good faith on the part of all con-  
cerned. Cognizant also of public reaction to such a program it was  
decided that no action would be taken to recover these vast sums.

REVOCATION OF RECOGNITION

	<u>Name of Unit</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Type</u>
(1)	Blue Eagle Brigade	6,229	Recognition Revoked
(2)	Mt. Sierra Regiment, 1st Battalion	706	Recognition Revoked
(3)	Redor's Unit, FAIT Battalion Headquarters Headquarters Company 1st Battalion Companies, A, B, C, and D	861	Recognition Revoked
(4)	Lubang Special Battalion Company A	193	Recognition Revoked
(5)	1st Regiment, Folsom's Fil-American Guerrillas, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th & 5th Battalions	4,246	Recognition Revoked
(6)	Nakar Division Casualty Roster	555	Recognition Revoked
(7)	Entire ECLGA Unit (Deleted by Roster Reconstruc- tion)	24,397	Recognition Revoked
(8)	3 Separate Individual Cases	<u>3</u>	Recognition Revoked
	Grand Total Revoked.....	37,190	

REVOCATION OF REVISION OF DATES

(1)	61st Infantry, ECLGA	455
(2)	1st Tarlac Regiment, ECLGA	1,956
(3)	Pampanga Military District, ECLGA	2,211
(4)	Northwest Pampanga Military District	1,791
(5)	Remainder of ECLGA Command Revoked	<u>29,066</u>
		35,479

## IX. Reconstruction of Guerrilla Rosters

Generally the southern islands guerrilla commanders maintained satisfactory records which were shipped by submarine to GHQ SWPA. During the liberation period the organizations submitted their rosters monthly to either Headquarters, USAFFE, or Headquarters, Sixth and Eighth Armies. These rosters became temporary parts of the records of those headquarters and were received until the reorganization of the guerrilla units into standard units of the Philippine Army. Copies were likewise furnished Headquarters, Philippine Army, and were extracted in order that Philippine Army disbursing officers could pay current pay.

Prior to the invasion of Luzon the same situation existed. However, in most cases the rosters submitted to GHQ SWPA did not represent true and accurate musters of guerrilla organizations as many units tried to impress GHQ and thereby receive recognition and supplies by padding the rosters. Many units signed up any person indicating his desire to become a guerrilla irrespective of whether he was a genuine guerrilla, home guard, or a civilian with no guerrilla affiliation. One unit in the Manila area claimed an obviously preposterous strength of 200,000. As the liberation of Luzon progressed and units became attached to using American units of Sixth and Eighth Armies and were subsequently recognized, their rosters were turned in to those headquarters and also to HPA. A directive of Sixth Army on April 24, 1945 did not require additional rosters as casualties

were replaced and additional personnel were attached, which eventually resulted in requests for the recognition of innumerable supplementary rosters and confirmation of recognition for those whose names indicated that they had been processed and paid current pay.

Until AFWESPAC assumed responsibility for all matters pertaining to the Philippine Army on November 5, 1945, all rosters, including those of units recognized by the GAS, were turned in to GHQ AFPAC, headquarters, Sixth or Eighth Armies, and HPA. Few if any of those rosters and those submitted from the southern islands were ever recovered, the reason being that when the various headquarters and armies left the Philippine Islands for new assignments or deactivation, they took all records with them, destroyed those considered of no further importance, or shipped them to the War Department Central Records Depot, at St. Louis, Missouri.

A situation therefore existed in which hundreds of unit rosters were missing, that no one interested agency possessed a complete set of rosters, that rosters in the possession of RPD and HPA were being tampered with by guerrilla personnel employed and that the only authentic records were those in the possession of the Auditing Division, HPA, which consisted of the field payroll rosters and attached pay abstracts of all personnel duly processed and considered to have been guerrillas. Later it was discovered that because of the complete loss of rosters through no fault of their own, a number of guerrillas had been processed and paid but no records existed of their having been recognized.



Due to the increased correspondence concerning individual queries as to their respective status, it was realized that the work of the GAD, RPD, and the VA would be seriously affected. A request to the Central Records Depot to secure all available records of the Sixth and Eighth Armies was answered by the statement that they possessed several folders only.

The serious complications arising from the lack of duly authenticated rosters became most apparent with the revision of dates of large units as far back as 1942. The RPD was seriously handicapped in the adjudication of claims. To assist RPD, the GAD attempted to authenticate many rosters, but it became apparent that a major roster reconstruction and authentication project would be necessary in order to protect the United States Government and to assist all agencies related to this program.

On January 1, 1948, a complete Roster Branch was activated to furnish complete authentic copies of recognized guerrilla rosters to the following agencies: (1) one copy for GAD records, (2) one copy to the RPD, (3) one copy to HPA, (4) three copies to VA, two being sent to zone of interior. All rosters, authenticated and unauthenticated, were withdrawn from the RPD and the GAS of HPA. Many units had to be reconstructed through the laborious process of individual card indexing. (Appendix 39).

The present number of recognized guerrillas which was ascertained only through the reconstruction of rosters is not a true figure as time did not permit alphabetizing of all names to obviate many

duplicate listings. Of the few units that were alphabetized it was discovered that due to various reasons, namely, transfer between subordinate units within an overall command, some individuals were simultaneously listed in as many as three subordinate unit rosters. The adjudication of an individual's records by RPD obviated an individual in this category from receiving more than one pay.

## X. Unit Investigation Procedure

From the termination of the incorporation of guerrilla units into the Philippine Army for reorganization into standard units in November 1945, the procedure of screening units in the field and directing them to Philippine Army replacement depots ceased. A new procedure was adopted and remained in effect with little variance from March 1946 until the deactivation of the GAD.

### Research Period

This period extended from a day to several months depending upon the size of the unit. The submitted history and supporting evidence underwent a close scrutiny and evaluation concurrently with information available and obtained from other sources in the accomplishment of the recognition mission. This gave the investigating officer a thorough background of the unit.

### Contact Period

The research period concluded, the investigating officer notified the unit commander that his unit was to be physically contacted at a certain place and hour agreed upon by both parties. The contact team usually consisted of an American officer with a PA officer or enlisted man as assistant and interpreter. The unit commander and a cross section of his officers and enlisted men were interrogated in accordance with a standard questionnaire in order to verify the claims as alleged in the unit history, affidavits, and other supporting evidence. Not limited to unit members only, questioning extended to individuals

claiming no guerrilla status, preferably clergymen, local government officials, and law-enforcement agencies, this questioning giving the contact team a well-rounded and unbiased picture of the unit as a whole. In addition, reports required contacts with and statements from, pro or con, the recognized overall commanders who operated in the area of the unit claiming recognition.

#### Preparation of the Report

Upon completion of the field contact, the team returned to its headquarters in order to evaluate the information gathered and to prepare the administrative report justifying whatever recommendation was made. When further information was desired and the unit within easy travel distance of Manila, the unit commander and his senior officers were often requested to appear with the necessary information. The report itself, frequently of great length and in great detail, again depending upon the size of the unit, consisted of five major sections as follows:

- (1) Authorization for investigation, unit investigated, and date investigation conducted.
- (2) A brief synopsis of the alleged history.
- (3) The actual findings of the contact team and refutation or substantiation of the claims advanced by the unit.
- (4) Political aspects of the unit.
- (5) Recommendations, favorable or unfavorable.

### Final Determination

When the unit was determined worthy of recognition, the unit commander submitted a roster in accordance with the number of deserving guerrillas allotted and in accordance with a US Army table of organization. If the roster presented satisfied a close check by the contact team for anomalies, the roster was authenticated and a letter of recognition was dispatch to HAP. When, on the other hand, the unit did not meet the necessary requirements, the unit commander received a letter rejecting his unit, stating briefly the reasons therefor.

### Sources of Information

In general, the same procedure has been used irrespective of the type of investigation whether initial, revision, reconsideration, or revocation, the main difference being that revisions and reconsiderations required less field investigation. Of major importance in all investigations has been the source of information upon which recommendations and, subsequently, decisions were based. Listed below are the main sources:

(1) Unit History. -- These histories, prepared by the units themselves, allegedly covered the entire existence of the unit and listed all activities. Experience, however, made it necessary to discount 90% of all received as a basis upon which to make recommendations because of the distortion of facts, gross exaggerations, and downright lies found therein.

(2) Supporting Evidence. -- This evidence, preferred in the original but not often so received and incorporated as a permanent

part of the records, consisted of the following:

- (a) General, special, and letter orders.
- (b) Memorandums, bulletins, circulars.
- (c) Records of courts-martial, rosters, financial statements.
- (d) Personal and official correspondence of the unit and adjacent units.
- (e) Affidavits, commendations, certificates of attachment.

(3) The testimony of unit members, civilians in all walks of life within the area of operation of the investigated unit, and members of adjacent units.

(4) Confidential records of the Counter Intelligence Corps (US), the Criminal Investigation Division (US), and the People's Court (Filipino).

(5) The files of G-2, GHQ SWPA and GHQ AFPAC.

(6) Available records of Sixth and Eighth Armies and Headquarters, USAFFE.

(7) The combat histories of American units which fought in the Philippines during the liberation.

(8) The written and verbal statements of American military and naval personnel who fought in the liberation campaign.

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In the final phase of the recognition program it became necessary to render final decision on many units of previous violent reactionary nature and posing peculiar problems of validity, it became frequently

necessary to add to the recognition criteria. This was primarily occasioned by many units discovering advantageous technicalities in relation to the five basic steps of our recognition criterion, then attempting to employ legal representatives, exerting delaying action to forestall unfavorable decisions, and exerting political tactics, i. e., failure to cooperate in rendering screened rosters of the deserving individuals when the stipulated figure was unsatisfactory to the unit. They knew that it was mandatory that the GAD complete its mission prior to the completion of the RPD and Claims Service and reasoned that evasive action on their part would eventually secure compromise. The press was utilized as a means of psychological warfare. It became increasingly apparent that a concerted effort was being made to delay the mission of guerrilla recognition, and it became necessary to approach each new subtle request from Secretary of National Defense Ruperto K. Kangleon and the Chairman, Philippine Veterans Board, Macario Peralta, Jr., with meticulous care as between them they submitted a dearth of requests, each of which would have established a precedent, the shortest of which, it is estimated, would have prolonged the recognition program for a period of three months.

As for example, it became necessary to add the word continuous to the requirement of full-time military service. Secretary Kangleon requested that former members of the 92d Division, Leyte Area Command, who were discharged or otherwise reverted into inactive status, be paid for their services from the date of recognition of his unit to the date

such individuals entered inactive status. Two lines of reasoning were in opposition to this request. First, generally the strength of a guerrilla unit is determined primarily by the mission and commensurate effort rendered the resistance movement. Thus, the present recognized strength being adequate, no further recognitions were justified. Second, to recognize an individual as a guerrilla precedes immediate induction as a member of the Philippine Army in the service of the Armed Forces of the United States. During the late war, with few exceptions, physical disability was the primary means by which an individual could resign from the armed services of his country. It was considered that those individuals in the latter category were duly placed on the recognized casualty roster of the unit. Without the word continuous many thousands of persons could request recognition for reverting to inactive duty at their own request; for the good of the service; to accept civil administrative positions; and, in the case of women, to marry or give birth.

In order to obviate precedents and prolong the recognition mission for an indefinite period it became necessary to so enlarge on the five basic steps of the recognition criterion that in fairness to the many vociferous expostulations concerning the criterion, no unit could satisfy all requirements, which was an advertised stipulation, and secure recognition.

Due to the gifted nature in which organizations manufactured evidence, intimidated individuals, ingeniously circumvented a stipulated



fault, etc., it was decided not to publicize the recognition criteria, but to so inform each unit of the specific criterion it failed to satisfy. The applicant alone is fully aware of his guerrilla activities and was uniformly requested to submit all evidence pertaining thereto. This headquarters would then decide which of the presented evidence was acceptable. Though an amalgamation of a few letters of rejection gave them the criteria and during the investigation of the unit the general criterion was verbally conveyed to them, nothing in print stipulating the exact criteria was given so as to enable subtle additions thereto as the situation dictated and which could then be applied to any of the many attempts to open more lucrative fields of endeavor by units that had already received recognition.

In the final analysis, the total number of recognized guerrillas should dispel any basis for criticism that the requirements for guerrilla recognition were too harsh.

## PART FOUR

### RELATIONS OF THE GAD TO OTHER AGENCIES

The activities of four organizations, two United States Army, one State Department, and one independent, hinged in part upon the mission of the GAD. These agencies were: the Recovered Personnel Division of the Adjutant General Section, and Claims Service, both of Headquarters, PHILRYCOM; the Veterans Administration, and the War Damage Commission of the State Department.

#### I. The Recovered Personnel Division (RPD)

The mission of the RPD was to administer the provisions of the Missing Persons Act in this theater and of supervising the processing and disposition of all claims for arrears in pay under that act for AUS, PS, and War Department civilian personnel. Amended in November 1945 to include Philippine Army personnel, it therefore became applicable to guerrilla personnel since recognition extended a PA status.

Legal authority covering the activities of the RPD are:

Missing Persons Act (War Department Circular No. 305, July 18, 1944).

War Department Plan for Casualty Administration upon reoccupation of the Philippines, November 7, 1944, as amended by Change No. 1, March 21, 1945.

Letter from former Secretary of War Stimson, delegating authority to the Commander-in-Chief, USAFFE, to administer the Missing Persons Act and subsequent letters to the Commander-in-Chief, AFPAC, and Commanding General, AFWESPAC.

The Commander-in-Chief in turn delegated this authority in letter form to the Commanding General, AFWESPAC, and the Commanding General, PHILRYCOM, as they assumed command and each, in turn, designated the RPD to act in his behalf.

Last authority is a letter from the Secretary of War to Commanding General, PHILRYCOM, dated January 20, 1947, subject: "Delegation of Authority under Missing Persons Act," and a letter from the Commanding General, PHILRYCOM, dated February 11, 1947, designating the Director, RPD, to administer the Missing Persons Act in this theater.

The connection between the GAD and the RPD existed in the matter of paying or supervising the payment of terminal date pay for terminal date guerrillas and arrears in pay for all recognized guerrillas revised. Initially, terminal date guerrillas were paid by the 86th Infantry Division (US) until February 1946, when RPD assumed that responsibility. All payments, whether terminal date or arrears in pay, depended upon receipt by the RPD of recognized and duly authenticated rosters from the GAD. Upon receipt of these rosters, terminal date or revision, RPD extracted all names to 201 files which before payment were compared with the guerrillas' Forms 23, a blank form which when properly accomplished constituted the complete history of each indi-

vidual from December 8, 1941 (if USAFFE) or date of commencement of his guerrilla service to the date the form was accomplished in the form of a sworn statement. When discrepancies existed between the roster and the Form 23, RPD adjudicated in favor of the United States Army unless the GAD specifically stated to the contrary.

Since the funds for all such payments were derived from the appropriation "Expenses, Army of the Philippines," and since those appropriations ceased on June 30, 1946, with a two-year period of grace for liquidation, it was readily apparent to all concerned that, if the provisions of the Missing Persons Act were to be successfully carried out, all payments had to be completed by June 30, 1948.

Equally apparent was the fact that the disbursing agencies would be the last in existence and would require a reasonable margin of time in which to complete all necessary adjudications. Both RPD and GAD maintained that a minimum of six months would be required for RPD to terminate activities insofar as they concerned guerrilla affairs. To that end the GAD consistently strived under ominous deadlines and decreasing available personnel which were unable to be replaced.

The lack of duly authenticated rosters of units which had been recognized by using American units during the liberation period or those units recognized by the SWPA in the southern islands and which had been revised in 1947 retarded the work of RPD. Because of sufficient 7th and 10th Military Districts records being available, RPD agreed to adjudicate all claims from those two units from records

available in its library. In all other cases, however, RPD requested duly authenticated rosters from the GAD and this Division compiled, prepared, and authenticated such rosters.

Interesting to note is the fact that RPD actually made no payment itself. Concerning terminal date pay, all payments were made by finance officers of the Philippine Army upon the submission of a voucher by the claimant with proof that service was rendered but pay not recieved. However, RPD exercised staff supervision of the processing of claimants and furnished supplies and equipment. The procedure in handling terminal date pay was as follows:

- (1) Receipt of approved roster.
- (2) Contact with the guerrilla leader.
- (3) Arrangements of place and time for processing.
- (4) Processing of members.
- (5) Forwarding of payrolls and vouchers for payment.

In deceased cases current pay was paid at the same time as arrears in pay but only after approval by the RPD.

Arrears in pay were paid by the Chief, Finance Service, PA, after approval in each case by RPD. In living cases the action was initiated by RPD using as a basis the sworn statement (Form 23) of service of the claimant. In deceased cases the beneficiary was required to initiate action by submission of a claim for arrears in pay of the deceased individual. Approval for payment was given after a procedure called "adjudication," which consisted of examination, consideration,

and adjudication of all available documentary evidence pertaining to the military service of the individual concerned. Upon completion of this procedure the Chief of Staff, Army of the Philippines, was requested to settle the arrears in pay for the approved periods. In living cases payment was made to the individual and in deceased cases to the Judge Advocate General, Army of the Philippines, who was the legally appointed administrator of estates of deceased military personnel which had been created by arrears in pay.

## II. Claims Service

This service was organized within Headquarters, USAFFE, on October 4, 1944 and transferred to Headquarters, AFWESPAC, on June 10, 1945. No change took place with the redesignation of AFWESPAC as PHILRYCOM on January 1, 1947.

The mission of Claims Service was to supervise, direct, and coordinate the investigation, processing, and settlement of claims against or in favor of the United States Army and its agencies.

Legal authority for the settlement of such claims was covered in the following documents:

First War Power Act of 1941

Executive Order 9001

War Department Circular No. 53, 1946

Organization and procedures of Claims Service were provided for in the following documents:

USAFFE Regulations 1 - 75, October 4, 1944

AFPAC Regulations 25 - 20, October 5, 1946

Letter, Far East Command, June 2, 1947

Claims Service was made responsible for the settlement of certain types of guerrilla claims on August 6, 1945 by GHQ AFPAC. The types of claims honored by Claims Service were limited to payment for: (1) equipment (2) supplies (3) services of civilians (4) use and occupation of land not in connection with actual combat operations and (5) loans of certain types of currency.

Before payment was made the following proof was required:

(1) That the claims accrued between the initial date of recognition and date of disbandment or inactivation of the recognized guerrilla unit.

(2) That loans were not intended as donations to the common cause against the enemy but were furnished with an agreement for repayment.

(3) That the obligation was incurred for the conduct of operations against the enemy.

The settlement of claims arising from guerrilla activities depended completely therefore upon action taken by GAD relative to guerrilla units. Unlike the RPD, which concerned itself only with names on rosters, Claims Service required both the names of unit procurement officers and the size and period of the units recognized. Because of the necessity of determining the authority of certain individuals

whose names appeared on requisitions, individual information was required; because of the necessity of determining what units were considered recognized and for how long, the recognition dates of specific units were required. The GAD consequently found it necessary to exercise extreme care, insofar as scanty records permitted, in preparing the letters of recognition and revision. In the case of the large island and overall commands the genealogy of each subordinate unit required tracing so that, if its activities warranted revision, any legitimate claims incurred by it could be met. The GAD encountered little difficulty in the southern islands and with several of the Luzon overall commands, but the greater majority of the latter group could produce few records to prove the activation dates of their subordinate units and the multitudinous redesignations. Nevertheless every effort was made to include any unit deserving of revision and hence considered authorized to have requisitioned equipment, supplies, services, and currency.

Again, as in the case of RPD, funds for the settlement of such claims derived from the appropriation "Expenses, Army of the Philippines" which, as previously indicated, ceased on June 30, 1946, but received a two-year liquidation period. As the progress of revision of dates, and a large bulk of Claims Service's work depended upon revision of dates, evidenced no sign of completion by mid-1947, this program received considerable emphasis with a deadline of September 1, 1947.



A problem confronting Claims Service resulted from the inability of the GAD to give specific dates of activation, organization, reorganization, inactivation, disbandment, etc., for every subordinate unit of an island or overall command. In such cases investigating officers of the GAD had determined from existing records the approximate date and had so indicated in the letter of revision as "on or about."

### III. The Veterans Administration

That organization, as the name implies, concerns itself with all affairs covered by law relative to veterans. Inasmuch as all recognized guerrillas, whether USAFFE or civilian, became a part of the Philippine Army upon recognition and hence veterans upon discharge, they fall under the provisions of Public Law 301, 79th Congress.

The specific benefits applicable to such personnel and administered by Veterans Administration are:

(1) Contracts entered into prior to February 18, 1946, under the National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940, as amended.

(2) Payment of compensation on account of service-connected disability or death under laws administered by the Veterans Administration, provided that such pensions be paid at the rate of one Philippine peso for each dollar authorized to be paid under the laws providing for such pensions.

(3) The GI Bill of Rights (if amended to include the Philippine Army.)

Each Filipino civilian recognized as a guerrilla thereby became a veteran upon discharge and a possible subject for future action by the Veterans Administration. Consequently, the rosters of recognized units became of vital interest to the Veterans Administration. The GAD furnished three copies of all guerrilla units recognized to the VA. The VA estimated that approximately one billion dollars (\$1,000,000,000) will be expended in behalf of these veterans or their beneficiaries over a period of one hundred (100) years.

Of vital and immediate importance to the Veterans Administration was the action taken upon guerrilla units whose recognition is revoked. The revocation of the unit withdraws from each member thereof, unless specifically designated to the contrary, the status of a member of the Philippine Army and hence any benefits due such a member.

#### IV. War Damage Commission

Provided for by Public Law 370, April 30, 1946, "Philippine Rehabilitation Act," the War Damage Commission commenced operations in the Philippines on March 1, 1947, to complement the activities of Claims Service and RPD.

Only certain types of claims fall within the jurisdiction of the Commission and pertain to claims arising on account of physical loss or destruction of, or damage to, property in the Philippines occurring after December 7, 1941, and before October 1, 1945, as a result of one or more of the following causes:

(1) Enemy attack.

(2) Action taken by or at the request of the military, naval, or air forces of the United States to prevent such property from coming into the possession of the enemy.

(3) Action by the armed forces of the United States in opposing, resisting, or expelling the enemy from the Philippines.

(4) Looting, pillage, or other lawlessness or disorder accompanying the collapse of civil authority determined by the Commission to have resulted from any of the other causes enumerated or from control by enemy forces.

Since they fall within the jurisdiction of Claims Service, the War Damage Commission is not empowered to pay contractual or quasi-contractual claims including salary claims of guerrilla forces and claims for services, equipment, supplies, and loans furnished to the guerrilla forces under a clearly expressed or implied agreement to pay their fair or their stated value. Activities of the War Damage Commission depended in part, as have those of the RPD, Claims Service and VA, upon action taken by the GAD on guerrilla recognition. Since recognized guerrilla units were considered as members of the Armed Forces of the United States, any action taken by them in destroying or damaging certain types of property automatically made the government of the United States liable for the cost of the property so damaged or destroyed. Similarly, damages resulting from action taken by the enemy and resulting from guerrilla activity brought the same liability.

Consequently, the units recognized by the GAD, as well as those turned down for recognition, became of primary importance to the Commission in ascertaining the circumstances involved in the damage or destruction to property for which claims have been presented. As in the case of the three other interested agencies, copies of letters dealing with action taken, i.e., recognition, revision, revocation, or non-recognition, are furnished the Commission.

In summary of the relationship of the GAD to the RPD, Claims Service, Veterans Administration, and the War Damage Commission, the GAD extended or denied recognition to units and individuals; the RPD provided for the payment of salaries and allowances due for the periods of recognition; the Claims Service honored debts incurred by recognized guerrilla units and individuals for the prosecution of the war during the period of recognition only; the Veterans Administration conferred benefits due veterans; the War Damage Commission paid claims for damage to or destruction of property so damaged or destroyed as a result of activity by recognized or unrecognized guerrillas, depending upon the circumstances.

The above will indicate the necessitated unrelenting pressure placed on the GAD to accomplish its mission with the least possible delay.

PART FIVE

PERSONNEL, PUBLIC RELATIONS AND IRREGULARITIES

I. Personnel

The table of organization adopted by the GAS on May 10, 1945 remained in existence without any appreciable change until mid-February 1946 when a new table of organization was approved. Roughly speaking, the GAS consisted of an Executive Section with two sub-sections, the Interview and Administrative Sections, and four to six contact teams. This table of organization called for 7 officers and 19 enlisted men. Throughout December 1945 and January 1946 the strength dropped slowly as high-point personnel returned to the United States. To replace this personnel returning to the zone of interior and the personnel on loan from the USATG, several requests were instituted to complete the table of organization and to secure the necessary office equipment. On December 6, 1945 a slight increase was proposed to bring the officer strength to 13 and the enlisted strength to 20 and at the same time a request for civilian personnel instituted. On December 18, 1945, although considering the staff and facilities to be adequate for the needs of the Section at that time, a request for replacements for several officers already departed and more expected to depart was made. It was further requested

that the replacements be junior officers who could be trained with a minimum expenditure of time rather than senior company grade officers or field grade officers who, by virtue of their rank, would, perforce, be placed in an executive position for which more training would be required. This request repeated the anticipated loss of the personnel loaned by the USATG but also estimated that all guerrilla recognitions would be completed within 60 to 90 days. Obviously, the establishing on December 18, 1945 of the first deadline for the acceptance of unit recognition requests at January 31, 1946 had not yet been fully disseminated to the public.

By January 5, 1946, however, came the first indication of an influx of requests for unit recognition and the request for replacements, previously submitted on December 5, 1945, became more urgent. The same check sheet warned of the danger of failing to complete investigations within 90 days. By January 28, 1946 the officer strength had increased to 16, some of whom were high-point personnel.

The full impact of the January 31, 1946 deadline was felt before the month of January ran out. So great was this impact that on February 1, 1946 a staff study recommended an immediate reorganization and expansion of the GAB to a strength of 49 officers, 3 warrant officers, 55 enlisted men, and 17 civilians, making a grand total of 124, 10 officers and 30 enlisted men of whom were to be drawn from the Philippine Army. The reorganization called for an Executive Section to be comprised essentially of the Chief, a Control Plans Operation and a

Legal Section, and Administrative Branch, a Casualty Branch, and an Investigation Branch comprised of Unit Investigations with investigation teams and an Individual Section. Special note should be taken of the request for two officers from the JAG for the Legal Section of the Division, which was never organized due to non-availability of personnel. On February 13, 1946 the Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff advised the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, that the proposed organization was approved but that, because of personnel limitations imposed upon Headquarters, AFWESPAC, the Commander-in-Chief, AFPAC, would be requested to authorize the GAB a table of distribution over and above the bulk allotment for overhead assigned that headquarters. The Commander-in-Chief, AFPAC, was advised of the situation and requested to approve the additional allotment. By late February and early March a large number of personnel had been assigned and the reorganization got under way.

The organization within the GAB remained relatively stable, except with the changes indicated below which were undertaken within the Branch to suit the varying situations and except for fluctuating personnel allotted, until January 1, 1947. In May 1946 the Casualty Branch was subordinated to the Investigation Branch so that all investigations, i.e., unit, individual, and casualty, were placed under one individual. The next major shift within this latter section took place in October 1946 when it became apparent that the volume of the work was too much for one man to supervise. Consequently the Investi-

gation Branch was reorganized to consist of two sections, i.e., the Unit Section and the Individual Section, the latter being further subdivided into individuals and casualties.

A weekly report of February 26, 1946 revealed a tremendous increase in the number of claims received, due, first to the January 31, 1946 deadline and, second, to the extension of that deadline on February 5, 1946, to March 15, 1946. On the same report attention was invited to the fact that the majority of the American personnel being assigned were high-point men and due for early return to the United States, four out of the five key positions to be vacated within 60 days. Unfortunately, low-point personnel were not available, the division experiencing a turnover of thirty (30) officers within a one-month period. The personnel problem was critical throughout the command but apprehension over the fact that a decrease in output would seriously hamper the RPD and the need to conclude the guerrilla recognition program occasioned repeated personnel requests. On March 9, 1946, attention was called to a similar deficiency in the assignment of civilian personnel authorized by the table of organization; available at that time were 4 out of an authorized 17. In March approximately 25 relatively low-point men were assigned to the Branch, but by June 30 there were only 34 out of the 39 authorized American officers on duty. Notwithstanding the now critical situation of the GAB, not only from the standpoint of work load but also from the political standpoint, the Branch was continually tapped for officers to meet



the Korea quota, for War Crimes details, and for special assignments. By August 2, the authorized table of organization of 39 American officers had been whittled to 32 and, due to more departures, only 30 officers were available. At the same time the possibility of employing civil service personnel was explored and met with negative results. Previous to this date, September 26, 1946, verbal representations had been made to secure American or Australian replacements for Filipino civilians since, even at that time, it was known that some of the civilian personnel were working for the specific purpose of obtaining inside information concerning actions taken upon guerrilla units and upon recognition policy.

Shortly prior to July 1, 1946 it had been anticipated that recognitions would be completed by the end of that year. In view of the failure to receive adequate replacements this estimate was jumped on July 1, 1946 to June 30, 1947. On October 10, 1946 G-3 brought to the attention of the Commanding General the fact that out of 32 investigating officers available in April, only 9 remained of which 7 were to be returned on or before December 1, 1946. It was further pointed out that the Fiscal Director had warned that the appropriation "Expenses, Army of the Philippines" would expire by June 30, 1946 and that all remaining funds would have to be liquidated by June 30, 1948. A recommendation for 24 additional American officers, which would bring the authorized American officer strength to 41, was made and a second request submitted that they be assigned by November 1

in order that their training be completed by December 1. This increase was approved. Ostensibly due to shortages of available personnel, the decision reached on October 12, 1946 was not carried out so that on December 16, 1946 it became necessary for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, to bring the matter to the attention of the Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff. This check sheet revealed that the personnel requested would not be available until January 1, 1947 and, consequently, all target dates would of necessity be retarded, the final date of completion for all claims being estimated at June 1, 1948. The shortage of American enlisted men, as had consistently been revealed, as well as that of officers, was likewise stressed again and attention invited to the fact that they were essential in certain sections of the Branch to prevent the leakage of information for which Philippine Army personnel, being subjected to outside influence or threats from their own countrymen, were suspected.

A War Department radiogram, received on December 18, 1946, requested an estimate of additional officers, enlisted and civilian personnel which could be employed to maximum advantage in expediting the task of guerrilla recognition. This radiogram resulted from the findings of the Livesay Board. A study of the situation was prepared by GAD on December 20, 1946, presented to the Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff, which called for an additional 87 officers, 3 civil service, 27 enlisted men, and 75 civilian employees, thereby bringing the total strength to 128 officers, 4 civil service, 27 enlisted men,

and 75 civilians, making a grand total of 234. A radiogram dispatched on December 21, 1946, however, requested 150 civilians instead of 75, making the total strength 309. No reply was ever received.

On January 1, 1947, coincident with the redesignation of AFWESPAC as PHILRYCOM, the GAB became the Guerrilla Affairs Division (GAD). In consonance with the anticipated approval by the War Department of the newly proposed table of organization a slight reorganization commenced. As reorganized, the GAD consisted of the Director; a small Executive Section; a Unit Branch with an Investigation Section and a Revision Section; and Administrative Branch consisting of Interview, Supply, Message Center and Records Sections; an Individual Branch consisting of a Non-Casualty Section and a Casualty Section. In October 1947 unit investigations had been completed, the section redesignated as the Reconsideration Section, and personnel shifted. By December 1947, the Reconsideration Section had completed its work as had the Revision Section, except for loose odds and ends. On January 1, 1948, the majority of the personnel, except for a small staff, were shifted to the newly formed Roster Reconstruction Branch, consisting of a Construction Section and an Authentication Section.

Notwithstanding the authorization of the Commanding General on October 10, 1946 to raise the total to 41 American officers in the GAB, the officer strength did not reach this figure until January 28, 1947 and insofar as training of new officers was not expected to be completed until March 1, 1947, it was decided that final determination

of all types of claims could not be expected until June 1, 1948. In consideration of the foregoing a request was made that the officer strength be consistently maintained. Even with the above situation the personnel situation throughout the command was so acute that G-1 requested a reduction in officer and EM strengths. The continued use of PA officers was not completely desirable nor satisfactory and a reiteration for the necessity of placing American enlisted personnel in certain sections of the GAD to prevent the leakage of information was made. Hand in hand with the shortage of military personnel and equally consistent went the shortage of civilian employees, allocations of funds consistently having been reduced to a point impairing the efficient operation of the GAD. Again in December 1947 it was considered necessary, in view of the pending establishment of the Roster Reconstruction Branch, to hire additional employees.

It can readily be seen that throughout the entire existence of the division, the lack of personnel, both military and civilian, impeded the settlement of guerrilla claims. Were it not for the fact that certain sections of the RPD and Claims Service were entirely dependent upon a rapid solution of the problem because their funds, too, ran out on June 30, 1948, the situation would not have been serious. However, because both requested at least six months to settle all claims resulting from recognitions extended by the GAD, the division was exceedingly hard pressed to meet necessary deadlines.

In summary, cognizant of the related agencies influenced by the accomplishment of the GAD, the personnel problem remained for almost the entire period of the mission as the most critical problem. It was unfortunate that the need throughout the command was so acute as, had sufficient personnel been available for assignment to this mission, it could have been completed prior to its assuming a major item of public discussion and controversy and, perhaps, precluded many recognitions. (Roster and Organization Charts - Appendix 40)

## II. Public Relations

Starting in the fall of 1945, the question of guerrilla recognition became a predominant one affecting not only the economic, social, and political life of the Philippine Islands but also relations between the American people and the Filipino people. In a large measure the current pay, arrears in pay, and veterans benefits expected by the guerrillas would go far to alleviate the economic distress in which many Filipinos found themselves. The settlement of claims for food supplies and other material requisitioned as well as the settlement of property damaged by the guerrillas likewise would possess an alleviating effect. In the political field a great rift had developed between those who served in the guerrilla forces and those who served the Japanese, the latter situation receiving no settlement after the Liberation despite General MacArthur's pledge to bring to the bar of justice all those who gave aid and comfort to the enemy during the course of the war. As a result of this failure to act drastically,

the collaborators banded together for mutual protection and fought to reinstate themselves in public office and to control the government so that they could never be punished for their treason. The guerrillas, on the other hand, were equally determined that they should not lose the fruits of their struggles and prepared to back loyal candidates for government or put up their own. It therefore became a matter of political necessity, not to mention personal pride, that those who served the guerrillas in any capacity strongly desired recognition of their services. Not to be overlooked, on the other hand, was the desire of some guerrilla leaders to build up larger organizations than they actually commanded during the Liberation in order to enhance their prestige as well as their political backing. With that state of affairs existing, it was inevitable that the matter of guerrilla recognition would become, particularly as recognitions were held to a minimum, a political football.

#### Political

Previously explained was the situation involving the demobilization of the Philippine Army in which Secretary Montelibano's insistence that no soldier be discharged until his arrears in pay was settled in full precipitated the study of revision of dates and embarked the GAB upon that new field of effort. In addition to indorsing in rather strong terms on occasions certain individuals and units for recognition, Secretary Montelibano also sought an "in," hence, a source of information, to the GAB in November 1945 by requesting that

that liaison officers from his department be assigned for duty with the GAB. This request was denied.

In an effort to expedite the payment of veterans benefits, pensions, etc., President Osmena dispatched a mission to the United States headed by Major General Basilio Valdez. Included in the party was the then Deputy Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army, Brigadier General Macario Peralta, Jr., who, during the course of his stay in Washington, drummed heavily against the recognition policy of AFWESPAC.

During the presidential campaign of March 1946, both parties made a strong issue of the guerrilla question, both promising to apply pressure for more recognitions in a bid for the not inconsiderable guerrilla vote. As was expected, Headquarters AFWESPAC, in general and the GAB in particular came in for a severe castigation by all candidates first for the recognition of "phony" guerrillas and second for the failure to recognize more genuine guerrillas. The election over, pressure eased off a bit.

The next step in political pressure took place in Manila on June 28, 1946 when Marking's Fil-Americans, headed by Marcos V. Agustin, popularly known as Marking, staged a large demonstration of some eight to ten thousand alleged unrecognized members of his organization. This demonstration consisted of a mass meeting followed by a march upon the Malacanan Palace and the United States Commissioner's residence, and the presentation of petitions to President Roxas and Commissioner McNutt. Both promised to do what they could to alleviate

the situation. (It was shortly after this that President Roxas' recommendation for the recognition of all those who turned in weapons was received.)

Pressure again eased off somewhat after this demonstration and continued at intermittent intervals with varying intensities. It began again in 1947 with a number of requests for special consideration arriving from the Secretary of National Defense, Ruperto K. Kangleon, and the Chairman of the Philippine Veterans Board, Marcario Peralta, Jr. The requests were construed by the GAD as a systematic attempt to "smoke out" policy and to force this headquarters to adopt policy more in line with the desires of the guerrilla leaders. The fact that several of the letters received had been mimeographed and published in newspapers and that the guerrilla leaders were quoting them at guerrilla gatherings was further construed by this headquarters as a political move for the elections pending in November 1947.

By August 1947 another mission had gone to the United States headed this time by Colonel Angel Tuason to protest the exclusion of Philippine Veterans from the provisions of the GI Bill of Rights, the settlement of arrears in pay and a more lenient recognition policy for guerrillas.

The departure of Ambassador McNutt and the arrival of a new ambassador, Emmet O'Neal, signaled a new attempt on the part of the guerrillas, both recognized and unrecognized, to force into the open the guerrilla question and attempt to ease the recognition requirements.



Mass meetings were held by some guerrilla factions and petitions submitted to Ambassador O'Neal.

Next in line were the off-term elections held in November 1947 and again the question of guerrilla recognition held a prominent place in the promises made by all candidates.

Through open threats hurled at the personnel of the GAD by Marking to force additional recognition for his unit and a threat that his guerrillas would be ordered to the mountains to secure their arms and kill every American encountered, President Roxas deemed it advisable to intercede. Marking held an office in Malacanan Palace as Chief of the Secret Service and Roxas was informed that his official position and attitude was embarrassing to this headquarters.

The intercession of Congressman Ramon Magsaysay on behalf of the revision of dates of his Zambales Military District caused considerable trouble to the GAD. He employed outright delaying tactics and attempted to secure the return of Colonel Gyles Merrill (USA) (Ret) by the War Department. He later returned this officer to the Philippines at his own expense and whose return in no way affected the decision rendered his unit.

Numerous other examples of attempts being made to exert political pressure can be found in the intercession by Salipada Pendatum in behalf of the Moros; of the Military Aide to the House of Representatives, Captain Manuel O. Donato, in behalf of the LGF; and the innumerable petitions and resolutions arriving from municipal councils

throughout the entire Philippine Islands, many addressed not only to President Roxas but to President Truman as well.

### Personal

At times, akin to political pressure, but not always, numerous guerrillas have attempted to push the recognition of their unit by resorting to tactics described below. As in all previous paragraphs, this represents but a few of the more prominent examples.

Letters have been specifically directed to such prominent military and political figures as General MacArthur, President Truman, and Ambassador O'Neal. When so addressed these letters have contained only generalities, invariably recounting the sacrifices of the individuals concerned, their loyalty towards the United States of America maintained throughout the Occupation, the injustice being perpetrated by the American officers in charge of guerrilla affairs which were damaging relations between the two republics and that, because of the first two items, the American people should give to the Filipino people the justice due them.

Many guerrillas have written to American officers or former American officers with whom they served during the Occupation or the Liberation requesting certifications as to the nature of their services rendered. Failing to inform them of the specific reasons for the request, their men already recognized, the additional men they wanted recognized, the amount of revision desired, nor the requirements of this headquarters, they frequently received excellent recommendations which embarrassed the GAD.

A number of former American military and naval officers who had served with the guerrillas or had been connected with them during the course of the Occupation and Liberation, now engaged in private business in the Philippines, have consistently submitted recommendations in favor of their own guerrillas or for guerrillas who worked with them during the Occupation or the Liberation. In some cases, these recommendations have not been questioned, having been given in full sincerity. In other cases, on the other hand, certain individuals, for reasons best known to themselves, have consistently submitted recommendations which were later determined to have been not based upon facts (Ramsey, Folsom, Tuggle, Rowe). The word of the latter category of Americans has been completely discredited, yet they continued, by virtue of their presence in the Philippine Islands during the stated times, recommending for recognition undeserving guerrilla units and individuals.

Likewise, many more Filipinos, highly placed in the government or the Philippine Army, some former guerrillas and some not, the latter category including a few who escaped from the Philippine Islands before the Japanese conquest and did not return until the Liberation, have sought to use their personal positions to influence the recognition of personal friends or potentially politically powerful guerrilla organizations.

In order to influence a decision many direct and indirect threats have been made against American officers and against the United States

of America. In the first case, these have consisted of threats of personal violence against individual American officers and against American military personnel in general; in the latter case, and not restricted to any one particular province, impetuous threats have taken the form of vows to fight for Russia in the next war.

In November 1946 a board of officers headed by Major General William J. Livesay proceeded by War Department order to the Philippine Islands to study and investigate the pay status of Filipino military personnel including guerrillas. During the course of this board's stay in Manila, open hearings were held at which guerrilla leaders were encouraged to present their complaints on numerous subjects, that pertaining to recognition of guerrillas concerning the GAB only. These complaints consisted in the main of the failure to consult top guerrilla leaders, the recognition of "fraud guerrillas" and the failure to recognize more genuine guerrillas.

In certain cases some guerrilla leaders have employed lawyers in an attempt to question the legality of the policies or procedures adopted and employed by this headquarters relative to guerrilla recognition.

Another form of personal pressure consisted of the appearance and continued reappearance in the GAB or GAD of guerrillas, particularly from units not favorably considered, submitting "new" evidence not previously submitted, requesting continued extension of time for the gathering and submission of "additional" evidence.

On at least one occasion, accusations made by former American officers serving in the Philippines that officers of the GAB had accepted bribes and were unduly harsh on genuine guerrillas prompted a War Department query. Subsequent investigation revealed that the complaining individuals had never been associated with the GAB and could have had no knowledge of the policies governing recognition. Complaints such as the foregoing as well as similar complaints in the press have resulted in investigations of GAB and GAD personnel by the IG and the CID. No accusations have been substantiated.

On numerous occasions in late 1945 and early 1946, pressure was brought to bear, mostly by Filipino guerrilla leaders, for the establishment of a board of American and Filipino guerrilla leaders to assist the GAB in recognizing genuine guerrillas. They reasoned that their assistance would prevent the recognition of phony guerrillas such as had gotten through in December 1945 and also give a clear and true picture of the guerrilla movement. This move got nowhere since it was feared that, with guerrilla recognition becoming a political football, any such board would become but a pressure group to extract more recognition irrespective of their worth.

In addition, the recognized as well as the unrecognized guerrillas have banded together in associations similar to the American Legion for the purpose of obtaining maximum benefits for guerrilla veterans.

#### Press

Ever since the existence of the GAD, in November 1945 press campaigns have been carried out intermittently and with varying intensities against

the division, both for recognizing fraudulent guerrillas and failing to recognize more genuine guerrillas. In point of fact, this form of pressure has been a combination of political and personal as, for political expediency, the politicians took to the press or, for personal aggrandizement, the guerrilla leaders did likewise. Also the large, international press agencies have frequently furnished items concerning the guerrilla situation to the American press where, particularly in Washington, the reaction has been mixed. In addition, certain feature article writers for several American weekly magazines have published articles or have made statements on the guerrilla situation in the Philippine Islands. As a general rule, these articles have been based upon faulty information and have resulted in giving to the American public a distorted view of the situation.

### III. Irregularities

With the commencement of recognition of Luzon guerrillas on February 16, 1945, the problem of irregularities likewise commenced and grew in magnitude and in finesse with each passing year. As recognition continued and benefits flowed therefrom, the desire to receive such benefits prompted hundreds of thousands of Filipinos to seek recognition as guerrillas. An additional reason for desiring recognition on the part of not a few individuals was to cloak collaborationist activities under the guise of participation in the Liberation as genuine guerrillas. On the surface the fact of recognition was prima facie evidence of loyalty to the Commonwealth and to the United States and would be difficult to overcome in the People's Court. Hence the strong desire for

recognition and, preferably, with as high rank as possible.

Although the GAS was aware in mid-1945 of the existence of guerrilla units with no genuine claim to recognition, not until late 1945 was cognizance taken of definite attempts to defraud the US Army by means of false representations. From the first indication of such attempts, the GAD became in actuality and in addition to its other duties a quasi-criminal investigation division. Not only did investigating officers have to be continuously on the alert to detect written and verbal falsehoods, but also to detect frauds among submitted documents in order to present them to the CID laboratory for standard tests. In spite of all care exercised, a few units slipped through and received recognition, thereby forcing the branch into an even more critical attitude which in turn was erroneously claimed by the Manila press as undue harshness in recognizing guerrillas.

Listed below, in succinct form, is a cross-sectional summary of the types of irregularities uncovered during the course of two and one-half years of investigations. These irregularities are broken down into four general groups:

- (1) Attempts at bribery
- (2) The manipulation of documents
- (3) Unsworn statements
- (4) Miscellaneous

### Attempts at Bribery

In attempting to gain recognition and realizing that no basis for recognition existed, a number of guerrilla leaders, some of them having received guerrilla recognition, attempted to influence the decision to be rendered by offering to investigating officers bribes of money ranging into hundreds of thousands of pesos, by extending such commercial advantages as lumber or mining concessions, by offering gifts both inexpensive and expensive, by furnishing investigating officers with their own homes, automobiles and women, or by throwing huge parties. All investigating officers were required, upon receiving such offers, to decline as gracefully as possible but to prepare a written report on the circumstances involved to be included in the unit file and given due consideration upon the investigation of the unit.

### Manipulation of Documents

For better clarification this particular type of irregularity has been further broken down into three groups: (1) forged (2) perjured (3) altered.

#### (1) Forged Documents

Forgery followed the normal course of such attempts at fraud. In one instance, the signature of the Chief, GAB, Lieutenant Colonel H. L. Shaftoe, was crudely forged to a letter supposedly directing the commanding officer of a unit to report at the GAB to discuss its forthcoming recognition. In another instance, a complete recommendation



for the recognition of a certain unit was written on the stationery of the 198th Regimental Combat Team and signed with the signature of the commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Boise E. Day. The Victoria Unit submitted excellent attachment papers, but the fact that they were all written on the same type of paper, with the same typewriter, dated within the same month, signed with the same pen and same ink, aroused suspicion. An examination by a handwriting expert of the CID declared them to be tracings, but the lack of authentic signatures to make a comparison prevented their being declared forgeries. In connection with the Chinese Volunteers in the Philippines (CVP), a crude attempt to gain recognition by the submission to HAP of a forged true copy of a letter of recognition from this headquarters led to immediate and drastic action on the part of this headquarters. An attempt by the unit commander, Vincent Lopez, to secure additional pay as a major general was thwarted when this headquarters revealed to HAP that no guerrillas had ever been recognized in General rank. It appeared from incomplete evidence that Lopez received an honorary appointment as major general from the Chinese Government in recognition of his guerrilla services in the Philippines during the war and that his request for the differential in pay between a guerrilla colonel and a major general was based upon this promotion. Numerous examples have been uncovered of papers treated to create the impression of age. Fortunately a number of such papers were signed with ball point pens, which did not arrive in the Philippines until 1946, thereby making detection easy.

## (2) Perjured Documents

Most of the questionable guerrilla organizations unfortunately recognized in 1945 had their recognitions revoked. Exhaustive investigations uncovered the fact that these units never existed and consequently all rosters certified to as being correct and all sworn statements, written and verbal, presented by the commanding officers became, upon revocation, perjuries and the guerrilla units were considered as having perpetrated frauds. The Mount Sierra Regiment was guilty of committing several variations of fraud, that of padding a complete roster of one battalion and of crudely creating two additional battalions by switching Christian names with surnames and vice versa of persons both living and dead. In the case of two other units, not recognized, the Army of the Agno and the Fighting Blade Weapons Division, an attempt to perpetrate a fraud existed when both units submitted supporting evidence, affidavits, etc., seeking to justify the recognition of approximately 50,000 members each, when they never existed as a unit until late 1945 and early 1946. Perjured affidavits exist in the files by the thousands. Other variations of perjury can be found where aliases were included in rosters duly certified to by the commanding officer, the inclusion of non-guerrillas and even collaborators on rosters duly certified to, and affidavits of highly placed government and military personnel certifying to certain facts and figures relative to guerrilla units.

## (3) Altered Documents

Another type of irregularity coming under the manipulation of

documents but actually forgeries are the many alterations found upon documents submitted. As a general rule, these alterations consist of erasures, strike-overs and additions to definitely genuine documents. Detection in most cases has been extremely simple since the culprits failed to take cognizance that the typewriters did not contain the same size type as those used in preparing the originals; that they failed to take cognizance of the different texture, color, or age of the typewriter ribbon; or that, even if they succeeded in completely erasing the original lettering, the damage to the surface of the paper could not escape the eye. Additions were detected by differences in type and ribbon. The intent of the guerrillas in manipulating documents as explained above was to gain additional recognitions to those already gained from the original unaltered documents, to increase the lengths of recognition periods, to increase ranks or to alter the names of those recognized.

#### Unsworn Statements

In attempting to gain recognition, guerrilla leaders have submitted a mass of unsworn documents which, even though signed, cannot be considered fraudulent because of the interpretation or the distinction made by civil and criminal law between sworn and unsworn statements. Where such statements came to light and were proven to be misleading, grossly exaggerated or patently false, no action was taken other than to consider those statements when preparing the recommendation for the non-recognition of the unit. Such statements,

both written and verbal, were received not only from claimant guerrillas but also from other persons, oftentimes highly placed in the government or the Army of the Philippines, alleging to have personal knowledge of the guerrilla organization for which they recommended recognition, verbally or in writing.

With reference to the units whose recognition was revoked, all unsworn claims submitted by them are considered to be in this category. Of all units claiming recognition but not favorably considered, approximately fifty per cent had no basis to claim for recognition and consequently the alleged documents so submitted were considered in the category of untrue but unsworn statements.

Of considerable interest was a statement signed by six reputable, recognized leaders on behalf of a Hukbalahap organization, the Banal Regiment. Notwithstanding the fact that several of the six individuals mentioned fought the Huks throughout the occupation period and that the remainder could have had nothing but hearsay knowledge of the organization, they nevertheless proceeded to sign a document alleging that they had personal knowledge of the Banal Regiment during the Occupation, that it actively fought the Japanese and that it staunchly upheld the democratic way of life. Four of the signatories, upon being questioned concerning their motives in signing such a document, admitted that they had done so without having carefully read the contents, considering the contents too general to be of any harm or signed during the course of a party when conviviality reigned.

A similar instance occurred when an extremely highly placed member of the government of the Republic of the Philippines, submitted recommendations favorable to the recognition of six units, one of which was never recognized, one revoked, two highly questionable in the strengths recognized, another originally earmarked for revocation, and a sixth located in such a part of Luzon as to have precluded the individual having personal knowledge of its activities.

#### Miscellaneous

In a number of cases, guerrillas have attempted to compromise American investigating officers by luring them to previously designated localities and either offering them gifts or beguiling them into committing themselves in the presence of witnesses. Their intent was unknown unless it was to blackmail the officers compromised into granting recognition. At the same time, certain guerrillas took advantage of the presence of American investigating officers who frequented their offices for the purpose of obtaining information by pointing out to claimant guerrillas that they were "on the in" with those particular officers and that, for certain sums of money or entertainment, those officers would extend recognition. The claimant guerrillas, being impressed, returned to their organizations to secure donations from their subordinates allegedly to be paid eventually to the American officers. Actually, the funds so collected were converted to personal use by the leader or leaders.

Cases arose where Filipinos and Americans not members of the GAD and possibly members of the Philippine and American Armies impersonated investigating officers of the GAD and secured original attachment papers for their own use or collected money on the premise of recognizing the unit.

In staffing the GAD with the large number of civilian personnel required, it was impossible to employ American and Australian personnel because they were not available in large enough numbers. Consequently, local civilians were employed. Among these civilians, and some of the Philippine Army officers assigned on temporary duty, were a number of former members of guerrilla organizations. Whether or not these people were deliberately planted is a moot question, but the fact remained that every guerrilla organization of any consequence, recognized or unrecognized, was kept posted on the most recent developments pertaining to their units as well as to the policy employed by the GAB and GAD. In all fairness to these employees, the majority of whom were extremely loyal and devoted to their duties, it should be pointed out and not underemphasized that certain guerrilla units have employed ruthless means in obtaining their ends and may have forced some employees to furnish the information desired under threat of violence to themselves or to their families. Entire reports were purloined from the GAB and confidential testimony revealed to those affected by that testimony, thereby making many guerrillas and many civilians extremely skeptical of giving testimony,

written or verbal, to investigating officers. This situation was eventually corrected and held to an absolute nuance of theft.

Without actually altering original attachment papers or letters of commendation, a number of partially recognized units have requested additional recognition based upon the same papers used to secure initial recognition. A few cases have arisen where the same attachment papers were passed either to completely unrecognized guerrilla units and promptly presented by them to gain initial recognition or to those partially recognized.

Another practice was uncovered in which guerrilla organizations which had never existed either during the Occupation or the Liberation period organized in late 1945 or early 1946 for the prime purpose of receiving recognition. Investigation proved that the commanding officers and their subordinates deliberately sought out individuals who had received attachment papers, commendations, or certificates of appreciation for the work that they had done by themselves or as members of another unit. With these men as a nucleus, fraudulent organizations were constructed and presented to the GAB and GAD for recognition. The most outstanding examples of this type of irregularity were Lawin's Patriot and Suicide Forces and some seven Folsom regiments, two of the organizations so roundly condemned in the newspapers. Not until they had submitted for recognition additional rosters of approximately 2,000 and 15,000 members each did a careful examination of the aforementioned papers reveal the manner in which

the original number were recognized.

As previously explained, hundreds of units involving hundreds of thousands of Filipinos were organized by recruiting long after the termination of the war. Several instances of recruiting, in which the recruiting booths were spotted or complaint letters received, involved Barrion's Manila Division, The American Dominion Forces in the Philippines, the Army of the Agno, and the Fighting Blade Weapons Division.

In direct disobedience of President Osmena's Executive Order No. 68, a number of guerrilla organizations, partially recognized or completely unrecognized, refused to disband and sought employment from the United States Army in any capacity in order to obtain attachment papers of any sort. Consequently, when they were eventually discovered and denied recognition as guerrillas but were offered pay as laborers, they refused to abide by the decision of Headquarters, AFWESPAC, and sought to apply pressure through politics and through the President to gain recognition. Several outstanding examples were those of elements of the 1st and 11th Regiments and the Nakar Division, MMD, ECLGA.

By means of sample questionnaires, employed by investigating officers in interrogating members of unrecognized units, which were purloined from the division, some guerrilla units prepared mimeographed replies and distributed them to all members of the organization so that, when interrogated, all answers would be alike. This practice was detected when less intelligent members broke down under cross



questioning and had to reveal their mimeographs to the interrogators during the course of questioning. An outstanding example is the Walter Cushing Regiment of northern Luzon, a non-existent unit during the Occupation and the Liberation.

Another practice was that of certain guerrillas who managed to have their names included on two or more rosters to insure recognition should one or more of the units be not favorably considered.

Similar to the above irregularity was the inclusion by certain guerrillas on two or more rosters to gain higher ranks.

Likewise, to insure higher rank many guerrilla leaders padded their rosters with non-guerrillas.

Certain guerrilla leaders solicited perjured attachment papers or certifications from American officers who were on duty during the Liberation.

One of the largest rackets was that of soliciting money from civilians who may or may not have been guerrillas with the promise of assuring recognition insofar as money so collected was to be used in bribing American investigating officers. This practice came to light when numbers of irate civilians who, having contributed substantial sums of money but having received no recognition, wrote to the GAB or GAD or presented themselves personally to inquire why they had not been recognized. This practice was brought to the attention of the President of the Republic of the Philippines.

Not specifically connected with guerrilla recognition but indicative of the possible inclusion of non-guerrillas in the recognized

rosters was the practice on the part of certain guerrilla leaders of deducting stated amounts from the pay due members of the unit after recognition. (Appendix 41)

Records reveal that several units not favorably considered for recognition under one name turned around and resubmitted the same unit rosters under a different unit name.

PART SIX

Total number claims received . . . . .	1,277,767
Total number claims approved . . . . .	260,715
Total number requesting reconsideration . . . . .	479,319
Total number accepted for reconsideration . . . . .	266,570
Total number favorably reconsidered . . . . .	2,129
Total number of individuals receiving revocation of recognition . . . . .	37,190
Total number of individuals receiving revocation of revision of dates . . . . .	35,479
Total number of individuals receiving revision of recognition dates . . . . .	149,187

Number Who Filed Claims:

Luzon	-	<u>one</u> individual out of 9	(11% of Pop.)
Southern Islands	-	<u>one</u> individual out of <u>25</u>	( 4% of Pop.)

Number of Claims Favorably Considered:

Luzon	-	<u>one</u> out of 6	(17% of Claims)
Southern Islands	-	<u>one</u> out of <u>4</u>	(23% of Claims)

Persons Recognized:

Luzon	-	<u>two</u> out of 100	(2%)
Southern Islands	-	<u>one</u> out of <u>100</u>	(1%)

Persons Receiving Revision of Recognition Dates:

Luzon	-	<u>two</u> individuals out of 5	(43% of Recognized Guer.)
Southern Islands	-	<u>three</u> individuals out of <u>4</u>	(76% of Recognized Guer.)

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This program, though in congruence with the many rhetorical promises by the late President Roosevelt to the Philippine people that the American nation would rebuild the Philippines "brick by brick" and that payment of losses would be made "to the last carabao", which received liberal magnification of interpretation by the Filipinos, was constantly hindered not only by chaotic conditions incident to a total war but also by such selfish acts of machination and to a degree that makes most questionable the possible value of such a program (Appendix 42). Under the most favorable reception the granting of guerrilla recognition to deserving Filipinos would have been extremely difficult to accomplish and hold the degree of error and injustice to an absolute nuance. Upon realization of the benefits to be derived from official recognition, the program became the constant target of persons most accomplished in artifice and chicanery. Detection by the division of each anomaly shattered the many vicarious plans of the unfortunate and gullible many, who in most instances had contributed monies to the personal aggrandizement of their more enterprising leaders or risk the probable fate of retribution by exclusion from the unit rosters. While many who were involved in such practices contributed to a cause that should it have resulted in personal benefit, knew they were not entitled to all that was claimed; nevertheless, many who had performed various sporadic patriotic services honestly reasoned that they were deserving of some form of remuneration. The shattered hopes of all these individuals who failed to receive favorable decision drew instant wrathful indignation

against the U. S. Army. This was capitalized to the fullest by the more gifted and tenacious aspirants by fuelling the public clamor through mass meetings, distorted press presentations, political pressure, etc. Add to this the fact that it was impossible to exclude error in recognitions, thereby exciting the deserving and spurring the undeserving to greater and more involved endeavor, and there is presented such a constant unsavory public issue as to tax the sagacious and strain to the utmost amicable relations.

Many responsible persons originally considered their patriotic efforts did not warrant remuneration, admitting that the turn of events occasioned by the length of the recognition program was most unfortunate and that a more tangible and permanent means of expression of appreciation for services rendered would have been in the construction of veterans' hospitals, libraries, and other permanent public benefits.

The magnitude of the task of recognition and the extreme care necessary in the execution of this mission may be derived from a statistical comparison of the total number of persons on the island of Luzon alone, according to the last census 8,542,000, as against the approximate number of persons on Luzon who requested guerrilla recognition, nearly 1,000,000, and the approximate number recognized, 200,000. Further consideration of the number of male personnel in the census subdivided into a military age group signalizes the hazards involved.

In the final analysis, if personnel were to be extended official recognition, it should have involved only those who were automatically

divided, i. e., those persons who were actually attached to American  
using units during the combat phase only, thus obviating the unpleas-  
ant and questionable task of dividing patriotic endeavor.

ADDENDUM

I. Records

A. 222 Boxes of official guerrilla records were delivered to the Chief, Organizational Records Branch, Records Administration Center, St. Louis, Missouri, in October 1948. The records are composed of four parts as follows:

(1) Part 1 are Individual Non-Casualty case files and includes boxes numbered 1 through 144. These files consist entirely of 201 files of individuals, arranged alphabetically. In these files are requests for recognition, with supporting papers, submitted by claimant and of the action taken on the requests by Guerrilla Affairs Division, this headquarters.

(2) Part 2 are Individual Casualty Case files and include boxes numbered 145 through 180. These files are essentially 201 files as above except that each one is a claim of a Guerrilla Casualty.

(3) Part 3 are Guerrilla Unit Case files and includes boxes numbered 181 through 221. These files consist of the requests for recognition, all submitted papers, affidavits, correspondence, etc., and the action taken by the Guerrilla Affairs Division on the Guerrilla Unit. These files are arranged chronologically and indexed in each folder.

(4) Part 4 are miscellaneous Files and are in box numbered 222. These files consist of reference material, special and general orders of Philippine Army affecting Guerrilla Units.

B. The following procedure has been used by this headquarters in the utilization of these records:

All records were handled by officers working in the Guerrilla Affairs Division as if they were classified SECRET. These records were not permitted to be taken out of the Guerrilla Affairs Division.



BABUYAN CHANNEL

# MILITARY DISTRICTS OF THE PHILIPPINES

## LUZON

1ST DISTRICT

1 XX  
2

1 XX  
5

2ND DISTRICT

2 XX  
3

3RD DISTRICT

3 XX  
4

5TH DISTRICT

4TH DISTRICT

## MINDORO

4 X  
6

6TH DISTRICT

6 X  
5

7TH DISTRICT

6 X  
7

8TH DISTRICT

6 X  
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7TH DISTRICT

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7TH DISTRICT

## PALAWAN

BALABAC I. O.

## BORNEO

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











PHILIPPINE ISLANDS  
LUZON

Scale: 1:1,000,000

GUERRILLA FORCES


OVERALL COMMAND

	USAFIP-ML	VOJKMANN
	EGLGA	RANSEY
	LGAF	LAPHAN
	LGF	MERRILL
	SMA	SARTOS
	ANDERSON'S COMMAND	
	FAIT	STRAUGHN
	MFA	MARRING
	ROTC	ADENSO
	POOG	UNALI

220


SIJOL AREA

- 1. CAMARINES NORTE
- 2. CAMARINES SUR
- 3. ALBAY
- 4. SORSOGON
- 5. CATANDUANES ISLAND



# SOUTHERN ISLANDS PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

SCALE: 1:1,000,000



## ISLAND COMMANDS

- |                  |                       |  |
|------------------|-----------------------|--|
| 1. SUAREZ        | SULU AREA             |  |
| 2. FERTIG        | 10TH MD<br>(MINDANAO) |  |
| 3. MUYCO         | PALAWAN               |  |
| 4. ABCEDE        | 7TH MD<br>(NEGROS)    |  |
| 5. PERALTA       | 6TH MD<br>(PANAY)     |  |
| 6. JAMES CUSHING | CEBU AREA             |  |
| 7. KANGLEON      | LEYTE AREA            |  |
| 8. INGENIERO     | BOHOL AREA            |  |
| 9. SMITH         | SAMAR AREA            |  |
| 10. DONATO       | MASBATE AREA          |  |
| 11. RUFFY        | MINDORO AREA          |  |

SOUTHERN ISLANDS  
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

SCALE: 1:1,000,000

221

ISLAND COMMANDS

1. SUAREZ	SULU AREA	
2. FERTIS	10TH MD (BICOLAGO)	
3. MUYO	PAJAWAN	
4. ARCEDE	7TH MD (MINDORO)	
5. PERALTA	6TH MD (BATAVIA)	
6. JAMES O'NEILL	CEBU AREA	
7. KARRISON	LEYTE AREA	
8. INGENIERO	BOHOL AREA	
9. SMITH	SAMAR AREA	
10. DONATO	MASBATE AREA	
11. RUFFY	MINDORO AREA	

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFPAC - (US) Army Forces Pacific  
AFWESPAC - (US) Army Forces Western Pacific  
AIB - Allied Intelligence Bureau  
BAC - Bohol Area Command  
BMA - Bulacan Military Area  
CAC - Cebu Area Command  
CID - Criminal Investigation Division  
DILD - Died in Line of Duty  
ECLGA - East Central Luzon Guerrilla Area  
FAIT - Fil-American Irregular Troops  
GAB - Guerrilla Affairs Branch  
GAD - Guerrilla Affairs Division  
GAS - Guerrilla Affairs Section  
GHQ AFPAC - General Headquarters, U. S. Army  
Forces, Pacific  
GHQ SWPA - General Headquarters, Southwest  
Pacific Area  
HAP - Headquarters, Army of the Philippines  
HPA - Headquarters, Philippine Army  
IG - Inspector General  
IILD - Illness in Line of Duty  
KIA - Killed in Action  
KILD - Killed in Line of Duty  
LAC - Luzon Area Command (US Army)  
LAC - Leyte Area Command (Guerrilla)  
LGAF - Luzon Guerrilla Army Forces  
LGF - Luzon Guerrilla Forces  
MD - Military District  
MFA - Markings Fil-Americans  
MIA - Missing in Action  
MMD - Manila Military District  
PA - Philippine Army  
PC - Philippine Constabulary  
PCAU - Philippine Civil Affairs Unit  
PGF - Philippine Ground Forces  
PHILRYCOM - Philippines-Ryukyus Command  
PQOG - President Quezon's Own Guerrillas  
PS - Philippine Scouts  
ROTC - Reserve Officers' Training Corps

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(LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS - Continued)

SAC - Samar Area Command  
Sulu Area Command  
SISAC - Southern Islands Area Command  
SWPA - Southwest Pacific Area  
USAFFE - United States Army Forces in the  
Far East  
USAFFE LGAF - United States Army Forces in the  
Far East, Luzon Guerrilla Army Forces  
USAFIP - United States Army Forces in the Philippines  
USAFIP NL - United States Army Forces in the  
Philippines, Northern Luzon  
USASOS - United States Army Services of Supply  
USATG - United States Army Training Group  
WIA - Wounded in Action  
ZMD - Zambales Military District

of VTB memo: INFORMATION FURNISHED BY G-2, GHQ, CINCPAC

I. Allied Intelligence Bureau, G-2, GHQ, SWPA.

a. AIB was organized 6 July 1942 to train, equip, and dispatch agents for the procurement of intelligence in the Southwest Pacific Area, thru clandestine operations behind the enemy lines. It was established under the terms of a directive agreed to by the United States, the Commonwealth of Australia, and the Netherlands East Indies. As an inter-Allied agency, AIB's costs were shared equally, agents were centrally trained, and parties were equipped and dispatched with the combined means at the disposal of the Allies. The trilateral nature of the organization was evidenced by the geographical subdivisions initially established for the operations of AIB's combined field intelligence. Chiefly to accommodate pre-war political sovereignties, the SWPA theater was divided into the North East Area (east of the east boundary of the SWPA), the Netherlands East Indies Area, and the Philippine Archipelago Area. This division took cognizance of the fact that the paramount interests were, respectively, Australian, Dutch, and American. (Note: The combined field intelligence in these areas comprised only a part of AIB's over-all mission, for the agency was divided functionally into four separate sections - A, special operations; B, secret intelligence; C, combined field intelligence; and D, propaganda. But since AIB's activities in the Philippines were handled by Section C, that is the only one discussed here.)

b. From its beginning, AIB began planning for Philippine intelligence penetration. As a result of GHQ's desire to retain a direct and personal relationship with Philippine planning and operations, a special Philippine Sub-section of AIB was formally set up on 21 October 1942. A directive stated the section's mission and the methods it should use.

(1) MISSION - To:

- a. Reestablish a net for military intelligence and secret service throughout the Islands.
- b. Establish a chain of communication, both local and to Australia.
- c. Establish an eventual "escape route" to serve those it is desired to evacuate in the interest of future planning, etc.
- d. Develop an organization for covert subversive activities and propaganda for use at the appropriate time.

(2) METHOD - To inaugurate operations through:

- a. The medium of an initial picked reconnaissance party, which shall be transported to the Islands by air or submarine.

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b. The formation of and penetration by successive parties organized and operated on the basis of the findings of the "Preliminary Party."

The Preliminary Party shall consist of Capt. J. A. Villamor, leader, and two or three very carefully chosen men whose task will involve the most covert type of survey operations, to:

a. Locate and contact certain individuals known, or strongly considered to be loyal and desirous of giving assistance, immediate or eventual.

b. Establish through these the rudiments of the intelligence net, which shall be formulated upon the "cell" system for the mutual protection of Capt. Villamor and party against possible betrayal, and of loyal assistants in the Islands against betrayal by unfortunate contacts.

c. Determine means of obtaining such essentials as: aviation fuel, food, small boats, small boat supplies, passes and identifications, etc., for subsequent parties.

d. Locate radio equipment and listening stations.

e. Locate Bureaux of Posts and old Philippine Army transmitters and their operating frequencies.

f. Obtain general information on: Japanese political intentions, military intentions, civil intentions, military strength, dispositions, quality, equipment, morale, etc., and Japanese operations of future significance.

g. Arrange the channel through which this information is to be passed for compilation by Capt. Villamor.

h. Establish a portable radio transmitter for contacting Darwin on matters of arranging transportation rendezvous only.

i. Establish Capt. Villamor's assistant agents in suitable location of maximum value consistent with security.

j. Return Capt. Villamor to Australia with full report and recommendation for future parties.

c. AIB had no jurisdiction over guerrillas in the matter of recognition; as stated in 4, above, recognized guerrilla groups were under the direct control of GHQ, SWPA. However, AIB as GHQ's "mouth piece" did inform guerrilla leaders of specific intelligence missions assigned to them. For instance, when Col. Fertig was appointed commander of the 10th MD (Mindanao) in February 1943, the 9th MD (Leyte - Samar) was also assigned to him for intelligence purposes, with the understanding that a commander would be appointed to that district as soon as sufficient information regarding local leadership was available to justify an appointment. Fertig's instructions directed him to perfect his organization on Mindanao and then to develop his intelligence net there and in the Leyte-Samar area.

d. Penetration parties sent to the Philippines under the auspices of AIB were:

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Party	Personnel	Date	Area Landed
Planet	Maj J A Villamor 1st Lt R C Ignacio 2d Lt E F Quinto 2d Lt D O YuHico Sgt P Jorge Sgt D Malic	27 Dec 42	Negros
Fifty	Lt Comdr C Parsons Lt Col C M Smith Pvt E S Catalina Pvt H H Bairulla Pvt S H Bairulla	14 Feb 43	Mindanao (Parsons also made a side trip to Leyte and Panaon Island)
Peleven	Lt T Crespo Sgt O Alfabeto Pvt A Lajahasan Pvt M Lajahasan	12 Apr 43	Panay
Tenwest	Capt J A Hamner Lt Frank Young Pvt S M Aliacbar Pvt J H Lajahasan Pvt L P Nastail	27 May 43	Mindanao (Hamner and Young went on to Tawi Tawi)
Peleven Relief	Lt I O Ames Sgt J J Ramos Sgt F R Gingobiagon	31 Jul 43	Panay

These parties were landed by operational submarines and were therefore limited in the amount of supplies they could take. Top priority was given to radio equipment for establishing contact between GHQ and the Philippines. Operating under the directives provided by G-2, these parties accomplished the difficult groundwork which smoothed the way for all future penetrations. Not the least of their accomplishments was to show the Filipinos that GHQ had not forgotten their plight. This reminder, made tangible by token supplies and by direction via radio and personal contact, gave heart to the guerrilla resistance groups and

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fanned a flame that spread throughout the Islands, far beyond the initial point of landing of the parties. In many cases, networks and contacts developed by these pioneers of Philippine penetration were still in existence and ready for use when the American invasion forces returned to the Philippines. The success achieved by these pathfinding parties gave great impetus to further development of Philippine penetration, and the lessons learned and recommendations made by them established the pattern which was followed in all future planning. During the period July 1942/June 1943, AIB under the operational control of G-2 directed the dispatch of coast watchers, the formation of radio networks, the establishment of island commands on the basis of pre-war Military Districts, and in general, formulated the basic policies which made possible the upsurge of intelligence activities which took place in the Philippines in the following year.

e. Lt Comdr Charles Parsons ably served first with AIB and as chief of its supply service. He was instrumental in developing naval support by the 7th Fleet and later served with PRS (see 6, below). The technical background and practical experience acquired from his Luzon Stevedoring Company made him particularly valuable in organizing submarine supply shipments, which expanded rapidly and enormously after two cargo submarines were assigned to GHQ for use of Philippine supply missions. Comdr Parsons' services were of the highest order and achievement in managing the guerrilla "lifeline." (Narwhal, first trip 23 Oct 43; Nautilus, first trip 29 May 44). A cargo submarine could carry in one trip the equivalent of what would require two years to deliver by infrequent operational submarines; and shipments jumped from 5 or 10 tons of supplies per trip to 50, 75, or 100 tons. In the early days of token supply shipments, GHQ tried to fulfill requests made by guerrillas, who stressed the need for medical supplies, signal equipment, money, and ammunition. GHQ also sent clothing, miscellaneous personal comforts, and other morale items. As these basic needs were filled, emphasis shifted preponderantly to supplying arms and ammunition. In March 1944, a breakdown of supply shipments showed the following distribution by type, listed in order of priority:

60% Ordnance (arms and ammo)  
 8% Medical  
 10% Signal and engineering  
 5% Currency requirements (paper, ink, etc.)  
 10% Sundry (per specific requisitions)  
 7% QM and morale building supplies (propaganda, etc.)

f. AIB per se was not finally dissolved until 30 Nov 1945, but its practical connection with Philippine activities ceased soon after the establishment of the Philippine Regional Section (see 6, below).

## II. The Philippine Regional Section

a. The Philippine Regional Section (PRS) was established 16 Apr

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1943, in an AIB reorganization of which one objective was "to emphasize responsibility of the regional sections." Accordingly, three geographical subdivisions of Section C (see Ia above) were redesignated as the Northeast Regional Section, the NEI Regional Section, and the Philippine Regional Section. Mission of the Section remained unchanged, but the time was ripe for great expansion of its activities, which would require specialized operational control. The attention of G-2 was heavily oriented toward the active Japanese fronts. Col. Whitney, a pre-war resident of Manila, formerly an officer in the Air Corps, resigned to develop an important law practice in Manila. Col. (later General) Courtney Whitney assumed the direction of PRS on 24 May 1943; the section's responsibility underwent a marked change. Although nominally a part of AIB, and still depending largely on AIB for procurement and supply functions, PRS achieved a semi-independent status, reporting direct to the Chief of Staff, but coordinating through G-2. General Whitney's service and administration were of the highest order and achievement.

PRS was in charge of Philippine intelligence activities during the peak year, July 1943/June 1944. During the same period, G-2 carried on its own specialized participation in Philippine affairs -- preparation of staff studies for planning and orientation purposes, compilation of a Philippine Intelligence Guide for agents and guerrillas, and dissemination to interested staff sections of daily, weekly, and monthly publications containing evaluated operational information obtained from guerrilla intelligence reports.

By mid-1944 the scope and scale of Philippine activities had expanded to the point that closer participation by staff sections was desirable in order to secure proper coordination with other SWPA operations. An order effecting the dissolution of PRS as it was then organized was issued on GHQ Staff Memo No 18, dated 2 June 1944. Under this order PRS was split into the Philippines Special Section of G-3, GHQ, and the Philippine Special Section of G-4, GHQ. Direction of guerrilla activities and movements of intelligence personnel passed to G-3; intelligence matters were more closely supervised by G-2; and supply became the responsibility of G-4. Col. Whitney, whose talent, energy and ability were recognized, was retained as the active head of PRS, although he was assigned specifically to G-3. PRS activities continued on an ever-increasing scale until the time immediately preceding the invasion of Leyte.

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APPENDIX 1

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

APO 500  
1 November 1945

AG 323.361 (1 Nov 45) DSSO

SUBJECT: Matters Pertaining to the Philippine Army

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Forces,  
Western Pacific, APO 707

1. Effective 5 November 1945 you are charged with the responsibility for, and authorized to act on, all United States Army matters pertaining to the Philippine Army and the Philippine Commonwealth Government. The following tasks are included among these matters:

a. Execution of Philippine Army demobilization plans as set forth in the revised Plan for Demobilization of Philippine Army, attached.

b. Preparation and conclusion of arrangements for the release of units to be turned over to the Philippine Government on 30 June 1946. In this connection you will be guided by policies set forth in the revised Plan for Post-War Philippine Army, attached.

c. Arrangements of details in connection with the enlistment of Philippine Army personnel in the Philippine Scouts under the 50,000 Scout project now being developed by the War Department.

d. Recognition of additional guerrilla units or individuals for the purpose of entitling them to benefits for service rendered.

e. Handling of finance matters pertaining to the Philippine Army. In this connection, authority is being delegated to you by separate communication to approve the allocation of funds from United States appropriations for use by the Philippine Army.

2. In order to assist you in the accomplishment of the above tasks, orders will be issued without delay to transfer to your command such personnel of the Philippine Army Section, United States Army Forces, Pacific as you may desire, and the United States Army Training Group.

3. Action is also being initiated to transfer to you authority to make final determinations under the Missing Persons Act, in cases involving personnel of the Philippine Army. When this action is completed, it is contemplated that the Recovered Personnel Division, Adjutant General Section this headquarters and the Recovered Personnel Detachment, United States Army Forces, Pacific will be transferred to your command.

By command of General MacARTHUR:

2 incls:

Incl 1 - Revised Plan for demobilization of P.A.

Incl 2 - Revised Plan for Post-War Philippine Army.

B. M. FITCH,  
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,  
Adjutant General.

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APPENDIX 2

HEADQUARTERS  
USAFFE LUZON GUERRILLA ARMY FORCES

GENERAL ORDER :

15 May 1942

NO . . . . 1 :

1. The undersigned hereby assumes the responsibility of Commanding Officer of all U. S. Guerrilla forces in the island of Luzon and that of personal representative of General Douglas MacArthur, for the conduct of guerrilla operations and incident affairs. This is in accordance with verbal instructions from Gen. MacArthur on January 20, 1942.

2. All guerrilla leaders on the island shall derive their authority to operate from this Headquarters and shall be duly appointed by the undersigned or his representatives having such authority in writing from the Headquarters.

3. Any person or persons operating as guerrilla in the name of the U. S. A. without the required authority in Par. 2, Supra, will be considered as enemy of the U. S. Government.

4. Any person belonging to the armed forces of the U. S. Government entering into such unlawful operations shall be punishable as provided for under the articles of War of the U. S. A.

5. All persons guilty of looting private property, confiscating supplies or otherwise disturbing the peace of civilians unlawfully by misrepresenting themselves as a part of the Guerrilla forces of the U. S. A., will be treated as enemies of the U. S.

6. All guerrilla units bearing proper authority to operate as such are authorized to collect arms and equipments belonging to the U. S. Government from persons unlawfully possessing such arms and equipments.

7. All guerrilla units authorized to operate will be directly responsible thru the district and are under the command of this headquarters.

8. Each area and District Commander receiving this order will be responsible that true copies of this order shall be distributed to all leaders.

FOR GENERAL MACARTHUR:

C. A. THORP  
Lt Col, U. S. A.  
Guerrilla Representative USAFFE

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121# INFANTRY

1 WVAH V 20X WD APRIL NINTH  
COL HORAN

5 DASH TWENTY FOUR SPECIAL A NINTH  
THE ONE HUNDRED TWENTY FIRST INFANTRY PA IS CONSTITUTED EFFECTIVE  
APRIL EIGHTH BY GO NINETEEN HQ USAFIP APRIL EIGHTH AND YOU ARE AN-  
NOUNCED AS COMMANDING OFFICER STOP PERSONNEL TO BE ASSIGNED ARE PA  
TRAINEES AUTHORIZED TO BE RETAINED IN THE SERVICE BY RADIO HQ USAFFE  
MARCH TWENTY SECOND NINETEEN FORTY TWO

WAINWRIGHT

s/ Manuel P Bides  
t/ MANUEL P BIDES  
Captain, Inf, PA  
Asst Adj General

\* \* \* \*

1 WVAH V 42 Mar 22  
COL HORAN

TWENTY SECOND H DASH ELEVEN SPECIAL  
REURAD NINETEEN MARCH FOUR YOUR AUTHORIZED STRENGTH NOT REPEAT NOT TO  
EXCEED NUMBER THAT YOU CAN EQUIP PRESENT TIME WITH WEAPONS STOP  
MULTIPLY FIRST DIGIT YOUR ASN AND RADIO TOTAL THIS HEADQUARTERS

WAINWRIGHT

\* \* \* \*

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APPENDIX 4

PKIJC

VNDN

L

JUNE 30 1942

1230Z

LT COL NAKAR

THE COURAGEOUS AND SPLENDID RESISTANCE MAINTAINED BY YOU AND YOUR COMMAND FILLS ME WITH PRIDE AND SATISFACTION STOP IT WILL BE MY PRIVILEGE TO SEE THAT YOU AND YOUR OFFICERS AND MEN ARE PROPERLY REWARDED AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME STOP MY AFFECTION AND BEST WISHES

MACARTHUR

REC'D JULY 1 1942 - 1245 AM

ML

OFFICIAL:

(SGD) FERMIN L OBINA  
1st Lieutenant, 14th Inf  
Executive Officer  
dt-

EM-10626000-  
10626999

OFF-O-888070  
O-888169

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APPENDIX 5



JANUARY 23RD, 1943.

TO : WYZ

NR : 11

REQUEST YOU REPORT PRESENT STATUS OF GUERRILLA UNITS IN LUZON CMA  
PAREN FOR PRAEGER FROM MACARTHUR NUMBER ELEVEN PART ONE PAREN NAMES  
OF LEADERS AND YOUR ADVICE REGARDING WAYS AND MEANS OF DEVELOPING  
UNIFIED ORGANIZATION STOP PLEASE PASS WORD TO GROUPS YOU CAN CONTACT  
THAT GENERAL POLICY AT THIS TIME IS TO LIMIT HOSTILITIES AND CONTACT  
WITH ENEMY TO MINIMUM AMOUNT NECESSARY FOR SAFETY STOP CONCENTRATE  
ON PERFECTING ORGANIZATION AND ON DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE NET  
REPORTING PROMPTLY ENEMY DISPOSITIONS MOVEMENTS AND IDENTIFICATION  
OF UNITS CMA NAMES OF SUPERIOR ENEMY OFFICERS AND OTHER MILITARY  
INTELLIGENCE ITEMS STOP UNTIL ADEQUATE SUPPLIES AND AMMUNITION  
CAN BE SENT WHICH WILL TAKE SOME MONTHS PART TWO NUMBER ELEVEN  
OFFENSIVE ACTIVITIES ARE PREMATURE AND WILL ONLY RESULT IN INCREASED  
ENEMY PRESSURE AND PROBABLE RETALIATION AGAINST INNOCENT PEOPLE  
STOP ACTING AS OUR INTELLIGENCE UNITS THE VARIOUS GROUPS CAN BE  
CURRENTLY OF UTMOST VALUE STOP NOTHING IS Surer THAN OUR ULTIMATE  
VICTORY STOP I CANNOT TELL JUST WHEN IT WILL HAPPEN BUT YOU CAN  
BE ASSURED THAT IT IS INEVITABLE STOP KEEP UP YOUR COURAGE AND  
PATIENCE STOP AN ALMIGHTY GOD WILL GUIDE US TO SUCCESS

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APPENDIX 6

TOO 190517 Z RHK/VSA  
 RECD 20 JUL 47 1230 PHILRYCOM DIST  
 FROM CINCFC (changed) ACTION G-3 (RPD)  
 TO CG PHILRYCOM INFO AG-PERS  
 INFO G-1  
 FILE  
 CITE C 54159 (G-3)

REURAD G 17692 GSXRP 9 JULY INFORMATION REQUESTED IS:  
 "FEBRUARY 8 1943 FROM WYY TO KAZNR 14S-162 FEBRUARY 6. LT MARTIN MOSES  
 016924 AND ARTHUR NOBLE 017780 ARRIVED HERE THIS DATE. THEY HAVE BEEN  
 ORGANIZING GUERRILLA UNITS IN NORTH LUZON PAST 9 MONTHS. THEY REQUEST AU-  
 THORITY TO INDUCT EQUIVALENT OF 1 INF REGT THEIR GUERRILLA UNITS HERETOFORE  
 ACTIVE NOW INACTIVE IN COMPLIANCE WITH YOUR INSTRUCTIONS. REQUEST DEPENDENTS  
 BE NOTIFIED"

"TRANSMISSION OF PLAIN TEXT OF THIS MSG AS CORRESPONDENCE OF THE  
 SAME CLASSIFICATION IS AUTHORIZED" PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED.  
 CLASSIFICATION OF REPLY OR REF TO THIS MSG WILL BE MADE IN AC-  
 CORDANCE WITH WD CIR 345 1946, PARA IV.

ROUTINE RESTRICTED  
 INCOMING

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGE

(Action changed to RPD by Lt Col Lott, AG)  
 i/hhq

\* \* \* \*

February 12, 1943

TO: WYZ

NO OBJECTION TO INDUCTING EQUIVALENT OF REGIMENT (FOR PRAEGER FROM MACARTHUR)  
 PROVIDED UNITS CAN BE ARMED AND SUPPLIED LOCALLY SUFFICIENTLY TO RENDER USEFUL  
 SERVICE STOP AT THIS TIME IMPOSSIBLE TO EQUIP AND SUPPLY FROM HERE STOP MOSES  
 AND NOBLE DEPENDENTS NOTIFIED

DECLASSIFIED  
 Authority NND 39471

HEADQUARTERS USFIP OF NORTHERN LUZON  
In the Field

March 21, 1943

C E R T I F I C A T E

1. This is to certify that, pursuant to authority granted by and contained in radiogram MacArthur to Moses, Number 20, dated February 14, 1943, I have this date administered Oath of Allegiance to the United States of America to, and announce the promotion of Major Ali Al-Raschid, PA, ASN No. 1444, Infantry, USFIP, to the grade of Lieutenant Colonel, USFIP.

2. The signature of Lieutenant Colonel Ali Al Raschid appears below.

(Signed) Martin Moses  
(Typed) MARTIN MOSES  
Lieut. Col., Infantry, USFIP  
Commanding

WITNESS:

(Signed) Arthur K. Noble  
(Typed) ARTHUR K. NOBLE  
Lieut. Col., Infantry, USFIP

(Signed) Ali Al Raschid  
(Typed) ALI AL RASCHID  
Lieut. Col., Infantry, USFIP

Note: Original of this certificate is in the possession of Saphia Mustafa Al-Raschid, widow of Ali Al-Raschid.

RE : IS (S BVBLS)  
FROM : MASCARINON  
TO : BVBVDEB

Jd 10GA 1043

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Authority NND 39471

19 JULY 1943

TO : PRAEGER  
FROM : MACARTHUR  
NR : 12 (2 PARTS)

ENLISTMENTS AUTHORIZED TO MAINTAIN C TROOP TWENTY SIXTH CAV  
AT STRENGTH ONE HUNDRED WITH ORIGINAL RATINGS USING SERIAL NUMBERS  
ONE NOUGHT SIX FOUR SEVEN NOUGHT SEVEN NOUGHT TO ONE NOUGHT SIX  
FOUR SEVEN ONE SEVEN NOUGHT RPT ONE NOUGHT SIX FOUR SEVEN NOUGHT  
SEVEN NOUGHT TO ONE NOUGHT SIX FOUR SEVEN ONE SEVEN NOUGHT INCL  
PD ENLIST IN ARMY OF UNITED STATES PD MAINTAIN RECORD NAMES CMA  
SERIAL NUMBERS AND DATED ENLISTMENT BUT OMIT RADIO REPORT THEREOF  
PD TWENTY RPT TWENTY SERGEANTS AUTHORIZED ESPIONAGE EM PD  
APPROPRIATE GRADES AUTHORIZED APAYAO CO PD PROMOTE DESERVING ATCD  
EM TO APPROPRIATE NCO GRADES OWN ORGANIZATIONS PD AS SPECIALIST  
RATINGS NOW ABOLISHED USE APPROPRIATE GRADES THROUGHOUT INCREASING  
NUMBER TO INCLUDE FORMER RATINGS

(Label) WILLIAM MOSES  
(Signed) WILLIAM MOSES

rejon  
5. The structure of personnel control will be changed to  
Grade of personnel control  
The structure of personnel control will be changed to  
to the highest grades of personnel to and maintain the promotion of  
personnel to the highest grades of personnel to and maintain the promotion of  
and conducted in accordance with the provisions of the personnel control  
I. This is to certify that personnel to and maintain the promotion of

CONFIDENTIAL

March 31, 1943

in the field  
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHWESTERN AUSTRALIA

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 39471

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY  
Office of the Commanding General  
APO 442

20 December 1944

Subject: Official Recognition of Guerrillas.

To : Commander-in-Chief, South West Pacific Area, APO 500.

1. Request that a directive be published clarifying the policy to be followed in extending official recognition to guerrilla units.
2. It is understood that to date no guerrilla forces on LUZON have been officially recognized by this Theater.
3. Guerrilla groups on MINDANAO, LEYTE and PANAY have been extended such recognition with consequent emolument in rank and pay. It is believed that unless some similar recognition is extended to a certain group or groups on LUZON it may cause resentment and handicap the unification of the guerrilla forces there.

For the Commanding General:

s/ G. H. Decker  
t/ G. H. DECKER,  
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,  
Chief of Staff

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APPENDIX 9

BASIC: Ltr, CG 6th Army to CinC SWPA, 20 Dec 44, subj: Official Recognition of Guerrillas.

AG 370.64 (20 Dec 44)C 1st Ind.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA, APO 500, 27 December 44

TO: Commanding General, SIXTH U.S. Army, APO 442

1. The formal recognition of guerrilla units operating in LUZON presents a very different problem than that prevailing on major Islands to the South. Such action in the South resulted from an entirely different military situation than has existed under enemy occupation in LUZON. Thus vast areas, never under the physical occupation and control of the enemy in MINDANAO, PANAY and NEGROS, for example, permitted the organization and arming of regularized military forces and their commitment to guerrilla warfare, military intelligence and other interior activity under the direction of this Headquarters.

2. This was not possible in LUZON due to the widespread garrisoning of the area by vastly greater enemy occupying forces. As a consequence the resistance movement in LUZON has been confined to the classic type of underground operations in which an entire population, with little exception, has participated with patriotic fervor. These operations have extended into every center of enemy activity and have resulted in providing information in most precise and detailed form on enemy dispositions throughout the Island.

3. It is anticipated that this great patriotic movement among the people of LUZON will reach its maximum strength and utility after the battle for LUZON has been joined and it is the desire of the Commander-in-Chief that it be utilized to maximum advantage.

4. The service, past and future, of unsundered, escaped or released members of USAFFE, will certainly ultimately be recognized on the merits of each case, as will the service of civilian patriotic secret societies, groups and individuals, but it is desired that for the purpose of the campaign the movement in so far as practicable be treated and directed as a spontaneous patriotic effort on the part of the whole people.

By command of General MacARTHUR:

s/ B. M. Fitch  
t/ B. M. FITCH  
Brigadier General, U. S. Army  
Adjutant General

Office of the Commanding General  
Sixth Army

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Authority NND 39471

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

UNCLASSIFIED

February 13, 1943.

SUBJECT: Directive.

TO : District Commanders, P.I.

1. It is the intention to progressively establish territorial command areas based on the Military Districts, in force on December 7th, 1940, for the mobilization of the Philippine Army.
2. Lieutenant Colonel Macario Peralta, Jr., P.A., is designated Commanding Officer, 6th Military District.
3. Lieutenant Colonel W. W. Fertig, C.E., A.U.S., is designated Commanding Officer, 10th Military District.
4. It is directed that there will be maximum co-operation, mutual support and the avoidance of friction between Commanding Officers of Military Districts operating in a common cause.
5. The assignment of command over other Military Districts, will be made from time to time, as conditions warrant.
6. Until otherwise directed, the Commanding Officers of Military Districts will function under direct control of this Headquarters.
7. These command assignments are made on a tentative basis, and may be reviewed upon further information and individual record of performance.
8. The District Commanders, 6th and 10th Districts, will continue to perfect their intelligence nets, in their districts, and establish liaison with organized forces in adjacent Districts. In order to prevent uneconomic duplication, Colonel Peralta and Fertig will develop a co-operative scheme of operations in the establishment of military intelligence net as follows:

Lieut. Colonel Peralta: 6th, 7th and 8th Districts.  
Lieut. Colonel Fertig : 9th and 10th Districts.

9. These intelligence nets constitute at this time the main mission of our Commanders; their installation and personnel should receive the greatest care; the organization should be based on the P.A. Military District and Provincial Areas therein, utilizing loyal Army and P.C. personnel, if practicable.

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Information is generally desired in the following

order of priority:

1. Enemy strength and dispositions:
  - a. Occupied seaports.
  - b. Occupied cities, towns and villages.
2. Enemy identifications: captured documents, etc.
3. Enemy operational air-fields.
  - a. Number and type of planes hangars, fuel tanks, etc.
  - b. Disposition of guard troops and A/A defenses.
4. Enemy movements, transfer of troops, etc.
5. Enemy naval dispositions.
6. Enemy treatment of civilians.
7. Enemy civil administration.

By command of General MacARTHUR:

R. K. SUTHERLAND  
Major General, U.S.A.,  
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

VAN S. MERLE-SMITH,  
Colonel, G. S. C.,  
Acting A. C. of S., G-2.

DISTRIBUTION:

- C. O. 6th Military District.
- C. O. 10th Military District.
- G. H. Q., S. W. P. A.

SUBJECT: DIVERGENCE

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 39471



RADIO MESSAGE RECEIVED - TUT

NR 40

August 28, 1943

TIME: 5:45 PM

TO : Col. Kangleon

TO COL KANGLEON FROM GEN MACARTHUR QUOTE ... THE PROGRESS THAT HAS BEEN MADE YOUR LEADERSHIP IN MAINTAINING LAW AND ORDER IN AREA OF NINTH MILITARY DIST. HAS BEEN NOTED WITH GREAT SATISFACTION. WHEN DECISION TO REACTIVATE THE NINTH MILITARY DIST. HQ HAS BEEN REACHED, YOUR FINE EFFORTS WILL BE GIVEN FULL CONSIDERATION (Part Two) IN APPOINTING ITS COMMANDER. UNTIL THE TIME THAT I SHALL RETURN AND REQUIRE ACTIVE SUPPORT YOU WILL CONTINUE TO QUIETLY ORGANIZE AND GIVE PROTECTION AND ENCOURAGEMENT TO THE PEOPLE. MAINTAIN A MOBILE DEFENSE BUT YOU SHOULD EXERCISE EVERY PRECAUTION TO AVOID EVERY EMPLOYMENT OF YOUR FORCE. (Part Three) THAT WOULD TEND TO DISTURB THE PRESENT QUIESCENT STATE OF ENEMY ACTIVITY WITHIN SAMAR AND LEYTE. I SHALL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO FORWARD SUPPLIES REQUESTED IN YOUR MEMORANDUM TO COMDR. PARSONS. THE UNSWERVING AND STEADFAST DEVOTION OF THE GOOD PEOPLE OF LEYTE AND SAMAR TO THE PRINCIPLES AND IDEALS TO WHICH WE ALL OWE COMMON (Part Four) ALLEGIANCE MAINTAINED IN SPITE OF EXISTING ADVERSITIES OF WHICH I AM FULLY CONSCIOUS AND WHICH COMMANDS MY DEEP ADMIRATION AND IS AN INSPIRATION FOR ALL OPPRESSED PEOPLES EVERYWHERE. END.

GEN. MACARTHUR

A TRUE COPY:

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APPENDIX 11

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

21 October 1943

SUBJECT: Appointment

TO : Major Ismael Inginiero, P. A.

1. This will confirm your appointment by me as Commander, BOHOL Area Command, embracing all loyal forces on the Island of BOHOL.

2. I desire that you establish and maintain direct communication with this headquarters at your earliest opportunity and that thereafter you keep me informed of major developments involving enemy movement, dispositions and other activity within your area and observation.

3. This letter will be presented to you by an officer representing me who will, at the same time, hand you signal operating and cryptographic instructions under seal, and outline to you my general policies with respect to the future exercise of the command to which I have appointed you. He will further arrange for delivery to you of signal equipment, ordnance, medical and other supplies of which your command is in urgent need and discuss with you my plans for future supply.

4. I desire that in your area the immediate future be dedicated to quiet organization and intelligence activity, exercising all possible precautions against unnecessarily provoking the reinforcement of enemy garrisons and retaliations upon the people. You will, as far as possible, harmonize your acts as military commander with my other commanders in the Philippine area, whose identities will be made known to you by my representative, to the end that all may work in cooperative effort toward the common goal, and you will reinforce and safeguard the integrity of the loyal civil government functioning in BOHOL and work in complete harmony and cooperation therewith.

5. Needless to say, the success of your mission will depend in large measure upon farsighted and aggressive leadership on your part and the maintenance of absolute secrecy surrounding your dispositions and the interchange of communication with this headquarters.

6. In the discharge of your responsibilities of command, do not hesitate to call upon me at any time for counsel and direction.

/s/ Douglas MacArthur  
/t/ DOUGLAS MacARTHUR,  
General, U.S. Army,  
Commander in Chief.

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APPENDIX 12

HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST

CIRCULAR )	3'000	A.P.O. 501
NO. 100 )	4'000	17 November 1944
	5'000	Section
Executive Order No. 21 by the President of the Philippines.....	8'000	I 300
Executive Order No. 22 by the President of the Philippines.....	9'000	II 300

I. EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 21 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES. The following Executive Order No. 21 by the President of the Philippines is published for the information and guidance of all concerned:

Executive Order No. 21

DECLARING TO BE ON ACTIVE SERVICE IN THE PHILIPPINE ARMY  
ALL PERSONS NOW ACTIVELY SERVING IN RECOGNIZED MILITARY  
FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES

WHEREAS, many civilians residing in the Philippines of Filipino, American and other foreign citizenships, and Officers and Enlisted Men of the Philippine Army, of the armed forces of the United States and of Allied nations, have continued armed resistance against the Imperial Japanese Government since the sixth of May 1942;

WHEREAS, these military forces have contributed in a large measure to the Allied military effort and to the liberation of the Filipino people from the yoke of the Japanese invader;

WHEREAS, it is the desire of the Government of the Philippines to recognize this allegiance;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, SERGIO OSMEÑA, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Emergency Powers Law, Section 22 a and Section 27 of Commonwealth Act Numbered One notwithstanding, do hereby ordain and promulgate the following:

1. All persons, of any nationality or citizenship, who are actively serving in recognized military forces in the Philippines, are hereby considered to be on active service in the Philippine Army.
2. The temporary grades of Enlisted Men, enlisted or promoted in the field by Commanders of recognized military forces or by their delegated authority, are hereby confirmed.
3. The temporary ranks of all officers, appointed or promoted in the field prior to this date by Commanders of recognized military forces, are hereby confirmed.
4. The date of entry into active service in the Philippine Army will be that of joining a recognized military force.

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APPENDIX 13

(GIR. NO 100)

RESTRICTED

5. The effective date of rank for commissioned Officers and Enlisted Men will be the date on which they were appointed or promoted to such rank by the Commanders of recognized military forces.

6. A recognized military force, as used herein, is defined as a force under a commander who has appointed, designated or recognized by the Commander-in-Chief Southwest Pacific Area.

Done at the seat of Government in the Field, this 28th day of October, in the year of our Lord, Nineteen Hundred and Forty-Four, and of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, the Ninth.

SERGIO OSMENA

President of the Philippines.

By the President:

ARTURO B. ROTOR

Secretary to the President

II. EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 22 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES. The following Executive Order No. 22 by the President of the Philippines is published for the information and guidance of all concerned:

Executive Order No. 22

FIXING THE SALARIES OF THE OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN OF THE PHILIPPINE ARMY

Pursuant to the provisions of Section No. 90 of the National Defense Act and of the Emergency Powers Law, I, Sergio Osmena, President of the Philippines, do hereby prescribe the following schedule of salary rates and quarters allowances for officers and enlisted men of the Philippine Army, effective on dates as indicated herein, and extending for the duration of the war and for six months thereafter unless sooner terminated by competent authority.

OFFICERS

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Annual Pay</u>	<u>Monthly Quarters Allowance</u>
Major General	₱16,000	₱200
Brigadier General	12,000	200
Colonel	8,000	200
Lieutenant Colonel	7,000	200
Major	6,000	160
Captain	4,800	140
First Lieutenant	4,000	100
Second Lieutenant	3,000	80
Third Lieutenant	2,400	60

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<u>Grade</u>	<u>Monthly Pay</u>
Master Sergeant	P276
First Sergeant	276
Technical Sergeant	228
Staff Sergeant	192
Sergeant	156
Corporal	132
Private First Class	108
Private	100

The rates of pay and allowances prescribed herein shall become effective for officers and enlisted men of any unit upon the date on which the unit is returned to or constituted under organized military control, and for any individual officer or enlisted man upon the date on which he reports to a unit under organized military control after having been called or recalled to active duty or after having been enlisted for such a unit. A unit shall be considered as being returned to or constituted under organized military control on the date of announcement thereof is made by the Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Area.

No increase of pay or allowances shall accrue because of foreign service.

During the period that the rates of pay herein prescribed are effective, there shall not be paid to any person an increase of pay or allowance by reason of length of service.

During the period that the rates of pay herein prescribed are effective, there shall not be paid to any person an increase of pay for duty requiring regular and frequent aerial flights.

Any provisions of existing Executive Orders in conflict herewith are hereby superseded.

Done at the seat of Government in the Field, this 28th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, Nineteen Hundred and Forty-Four, and of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, the Ninth.

SERGIO OSMENA  
President of the Philippines

By the President:  
ARTURO B. ROTOR  
Secretary to the President

\* \* \* \*

By command of General MacARTHUR:

R. K. SUTHERLAND,  
Lieutenant General, United States Army,  
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Robert D. McClear,  
/t/ ROBERT D. MCCLEAR  
Lt. Col, A. G. D.,  
Asst. Adj. Gen.

- 3 -  
RESTRICTED

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VALLENTIN 74

HEADQUARTERS  
WESTERN VISAYAN TASK FORCE  
APO 321

29 December 1944

SUBJECT: Recognition of Guerrilla Leader on Mindoro.

TO : Commanding General, Eighth Army, APO 442.

(10 004 74)  
1. Reference is made to Annex 9 to FO 33, Hq, Sixth Army, dated 20 Nov 1944. Under provisions of the above, Commander, Western Visayan Task Force, is authorized to utilize existing guerrilla forces to conduct certain tactical operations. However, no specific authority is granted to recognize or temporarily appoint a guerrilla leader nor is provision made to issue to guerrilla forces such weapons as may be required for the conduct of assigned missions.

2. I have found two factions of guerrillas in Mindoro. A group commanded by Major Ruffy, PC, has been operating in the northeastern portion of the island. This group is regarded highly by all inhabitants. Major Ruffy, former Constabulary Inspector at Mindoro, is highly respected for his honesty and trustworthiness. Small detachments under Colonel Peralta's command in Panay have been operating around the San Jose area. These detachments have not been overly popular with the inhabitants. As a result of previous clash between these two forces they are at present operating within their own defined zones of actions. My investigations indicate that Major Ruffy's force is the most capable and trustworthy of the two factions and I believe there could be no better course of action than to appoint Major Ruffy in command of guerrilla forces on Mindoro. However, I have made no announcement or statement as to present or eventual appointment of a guerrilla leader on this island.

3. It is my desire to utilize to the maximum all guerrilla forces on this island. In order to do this efficiently, control of guerrilla forces should be centralized under one dependable leader; arms and ammunition should be made available to equip his forces as required, and a specific policy be adopted as to their military status in order that pay may be effected on some definite basis.

4. It is therefore requested:

a. That I be authorized to appoint Major Ramon Ruffy, 01128 PC (USAFFE) as commander of guerrilla forces in Mindoro.

b. That I be authorized to requisition arms to issue to guerrilla forces, or I be directed to a specific source for immediate requisition and supply of weapons needed.

c. That I be given a definite policy as to the payment of guerrilla forces that I employ on tactical missions.

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of Guerrilla forces that I employ on respective missions\*  
5. Please advise at the earliest practicable date the action  
to be taken on the above question.  
LTTJG forces' of I re directed to a specific source for immediate re-  
p' that I re authorized to retransmit this to insure to final-

LC (124522) re command of Guerrilla forces in MINDORO\*  
W. C. DUNCKEL,  
Brig Gen, USA,  
Commanding.

SUBJECT: Recognition of Guerrilla Leader on Mindoro.  
AG 370.65 (D) 1st Ind  
(29 Dec 44)  
HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH ARMY, United States Army, APO 343.

TO: Commander-in-Chief, General Headquarters, Southwest  
Pacific Area, APO 500.

The recommendations of General Dunkel are approved. The present  
situation of MINDORO makes it desirable to recognize immediately Major  
Ramon Ruffy in order that supplies may be requisitioned, that the guer-  
rilla troops be paid, and that law and order on the island be safe-  
guarded.

R. L. EICHELBERGER  
Lieutenant General, United States Army,  
Commanding.

certified for the conduct of warlike operations\*  
broadly made reference to Guerrilla forces and members as well as re-

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:  
DOUGLAS C. MURRAY  
Major Infantry  
(10 Oct 47)

TO : Commanding General, Eighth Army, APO 343\*  
SUBJECT: Recognition of Guerrilla Leader on Mindoro\*

30 December 1947

AG 370  
MESSAGE ALPHANUMERIC FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS

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AG 370.64 (29 Dec 44)C

2nd Ind.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA, APO 500, 25 Jan 45

TO: Commanding General, EIGHTH US Army, A.P.O. 343.

1. The recognition of the guerrilla forces on MINDORO and their employment as such by the Commanding General, Western VISAYAN Task Force is not favorably considered.

2. Following established policy, however, there is no objection to the calling upon Major Ruffy and any other officers and men on the island who are in the Philippine Army, Philippine Scouts or Philippine Constabulary for such active service as may be required of them.

By command of General MacARTHUR:

B. M. FITCH  
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,  
Adjutant General.

SUBJECT: Recognition of Guerrilla Leader on Mindoro.

AG 370.64 (D)  
(29 Dec 44)

3d Ind.

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH ARMY, U. S. ARMY, APO 343.

TO: Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, APO 500.

1. Request clarification of 2nd Indorsement.
2. Paragraph 3 a (3), GHQ Operations Instructions No. 74, dated 13 October 1944, directs Commanding General, Sixth Army, to "assume control of and direct the operations of the PHILIPPINE Forces in MINDORO." Operations Instructions No. 82, dated 17 December 1944, directs Eighth Army to assume duties and missions assigned to Sixth Army by Operations Instructions Nos. 74 and 80.
3. GHQ Staff study GEORGE states that the Army Commander or the designated Task Force Commander shall assume control of and direct operations of all guerrilla forces and friendly groups in operations in the Philippines. Paragraph 2, 2d Indorsement, apparently limits the personnel which can be employed to members of the Philippine Army, Philippine Scouts, or Philippine Constabulary.
4. The references cited above appear to conflict with paragraph 2 2d Indorsement. Request clarification as to the policy to be followed in MINDORO and in other areas under jurisdiction of Eighth Army.

For the Commanding General:

C. E. BYERS,  
Brigadier General, General Staff Corps,  
Chief of Staff.

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APPENDIX 14



BASIC: Ltr from Hq Western Visayan Task Force, APO 321, dtd 29 Dec 44.  
subject: Recognition of guerrilla Leader on Mindoro, to CG 8th Army.

AG 370.64 (29 Dec 44) C 4th Ind.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA, APO 500, 12 February 1945.

TO: Commanding General, EIGHTH, U. S. Army, APO 343.

1. The instructions contained in Paragraph 3a (3) GHQ O.I. No. 74 were identical to those incorporated in all other operations instructions intended to clothe army or task force commanders with control over all elements of the Philippine Army, guerrilla forces and resistance groups within the respective objective areas.

2. On the Island of MINDORO this headquarters has neither recognized nor employed any guerrilla forces as such, as being inimical to the maintenance of the Island as a base for secret communications and intelligence into LUZON. Furthermore enemy interest in the area has never been such as to justify guerrilla action -- the effect of such action being to challenge reinforcement and atrocities against the people. Early investigation of the matter disclosed that guerrilla forces there operating were composed for the most part of civilians with no previous army affiliation, living upon rather than serving the interest of the people.

3. For the reasons stated it is not desired to formally recognize the guerrilla groups on the Island of MINDORO in such manner as to bring them under the structure of the Philippine Army within the purview of Executive Order No. 21 of the Philippine Commonwealth.

By command of General MacARTHUR:

HAROLD FAIR  
Lt. Col., A.G.D.  
Asst. Adjutant General

HAROLD FAIR

Lt. Col., A.G.D.

Asst. Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH ARMY  
UNITED STATES ARMY  
Office of the Commanding General  
APO 343

In reply refer to:  
AG 370.64 (D)

SUBJECT: Reorganization of Guerrilla Forces into Units of  
the Philippine Army.

TO : Commanding General, United States Army Forces in  
the Far East, APO 501.

1. Reference USAFFE letter, 26 October 1944, AG 322.2  
(26 Oct 44), subject: "Reorganization of Guerrilla Forces".

2. In accordance with the above mentioned general direc-  
tive, and pursuant to verbal discussions with representatives  
of the Philippine Army Section, USAFFE, this headquarters recom-  
mends that the 92nd Philippine Division, the recognized guerrilla  
forces on LEYTE, be reorganized into standard units of the Phi-  
lippine Army under approved Philippine Army T/O & E's. This  
Division presently consists of three understrength regiments,  
in addition to a Division Headquarters, a Signal Company, and  
a provisional Quartermaster unit. The total strength of the  
Division is approximately 236 officers and 3717 enlisted men.

3. To accomplish the reorganization of the 92nd Philippine  
Division, as well as the reorganization of recognized guerrilla  
forces in other occupied areas, this headquarters recommends the  
following policies and procedures:

a. That USAFFE approve the reorganization of the 92nd  
Philippine Division into the standard units of the Philippine  
Army as specified in Inclosure 1, and that USAFFE request Head-  
quarters Philippine Army to issue the necessary activation orders  
for such purpose. In recommending the standard units thus spe-  
cified, as well as future reorganizations, this headquarters  
will be guided by the following considerations:

- (1) Organize a unit, intact, insofar as possible,  
from officer and enlisted personnel already  
constituted as a fighting guerrilla force,  
with a minimum of transfer of personnel from  
one unit to another.

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(2) Organize combat units, and the minimum number of service units necessary to support combat forces within the limits of available personnel.

b. That existing leadership, including commanding officers of the guerrilla forces to be reorganized into the standard units set forth in Inclosure 1, be retained in the reorganized units. This policy will result in a continuity of leadership, and will avoid the complexities which would accompany a change. This policy is believed to be within the purview of Executive Order No. 21 of the President of the Philippines, dated 28 October 1944. After the reorganization is completed, the retention of all assigned personnel will become an internal Philippine Army problem.

c. That, prior to the assignment to a reorganized standard Philippine Army unit, each individual guerrilla will undergo a processing by mobile processing teams. The purpose of processing is to obtain permanent records of essential information on each individual, such information to be utilized in the proper selection or elimination of personnel for reorganized units. The subjects to be covered by processing are outlined in paragraph 4 below. The manner in which the processing teams will conduct their activities is outlined in paragraph 5 below.

d. That the grade or rank to be retained by each individual as provided for in Executive Order No. 21, of the President of the Philippines, dated 28 October 1944, be established by evidence in writing from the commanding officer of the unit in which he received his grade or rank, and that in doubtful cases pertaining to enlisted men, this final determination thereof be reserved to the commanding officer of the reorganized unit: for officers, Headquarters, Philippine Army.

e. That in the final determination by Headquarters Philippine Army of what processes will be retained in active military service in a duly constituted Philippine Army T/O & E unit, the following qualifying standards be adhered to:

(1) Minimum physical standards as set forth in Inclosure #3.

(2) Age limitations be fixed as follows:

- Minimum age - 16 years.
- Maximum age - 45 years.

f. That women guerrillas be excluded.

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4. The processing of each member of the guerrilla forces as recommended in paragraph 3 e above, will consist of the following:

a. The determination of the military status of each individual. Executive Order No. 21, dated 28 October 1944, by the President of the Philippines, recognizes the following categories of personnel as now constituting existing guerrilla forces:

".....civilians residing in the Philippines of Filipino, American, and other foreign citizenships, and officers and enlisted men of the Philippine Army, of the armed forces of the United States and of allied nations"

(1) Philippine Scouts, being members of the United States Army, will not be processed but will be directed to report to the 4th Replacement Depot for disposition as directed in USAFFE Letter file A-FEGA 321, subject: "Disposition of Philippine Scouts Personnel," dated 12 January 1945.

(2) American personnel serving with guerrilla units, will be processed with such units in accordance with USAFFE Letter, file AG 322.2, subject: "Disposition of American Personnel Serving with Guerrilla Forces," dated 3 November 1944.

(3) Individual officers and enlisted men of the Philippine Army (both regular and reserve forces) will be processed with their recognized units in accordance with USAFFE letter, AG 322.2, subject: "Disposition of Casual Philippine Army Personnel."

(4) Civilians of Filipino, and non-American citizenship with no previous military status other than that as members of guerrilla forces, will be processed with the recognized guerrilla units.

b. A physical examination of each individual. The examination will be as provided for in WD AGO Form 22.

c. The preparation and execution of basic personnel forms as listed in Inclosure 2.

d. A temporary serial number, temporary, because all

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processes may not ultimately be accepted for continued military service.

e. Inventory of individual clothing and equipment.

f. Problems regarding pay of any processee will not be a processing problem. All pay problems will be administered by the Philippine Army, in accordance with directives of USAFFE, the Philippine Commonwealth, and the Philippine Army.

5. The processing teams recommended in paragraph 3 c above, will function in the following manner:

a. Mobile processing teams will be organized by Eighth Army Headquarters to perform the processing functions outlined in paragraph 4 above. The processing teams will be composed principally of Philippine Army personnel. Accordingly, it is requested that trained Philippine Army, be made available to this headquarters upon request. Already six (6) Officers and eighteen (18) enlisted men have been thus secured by this headquarters from the 1st Replacement Battalion to form the nucleus of the processing teams, U. S. Army personnel will be used only in specialized positions, and in supervisory capacities.

b. There will be organized in Eighth Army Headquarters, a processing control section, which will train processing teams, and supervise their activities in the field.

c. Processing teams will conduct their activities at designated concentration points as agreed upon by representatives of this headquarters and the guerrilla commanders.

d. The guerrilla commanders will be responsible for assembling daily a specified number of individuals to be processed, the number to be processed will be only the number which can be processed during one day. It is not contemplated to house or mess processees.

e. It is planned to start with the processing of personnel of administrative headquarters. As the headquarters of recognized guerrilla forces thus become reorganized into a Philippine Army unit, Personnel and equipment of these reorganized headquarters will be utilized to the maximum extent possible, in processing personnel of subordinate guerrilla units.

f. Whenever possible, in order to expedite processing, commanding officers of guerrilla units will be required to have the personnel forms listed in Inclosure #2 completed in advance

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of the arrival of a processing team. Such a procedure is contemplated in processing the 92d Philippine Division.

6. It is assumed that upon the reorganization of Philippine guerrilla forces into standard Philippine Army T/O & E units, all administrative matters pertaining to personnel, supply and similar subjects will become internal Philippine Army problems.

7. The processing of the 92nd Philippine Division on LEYTE can begin immediately upon receipt of USAFFE approval of the procedures and policies outlined in this memorandum. On SAMAR and MINDORO Islands, reorganization of the guerrilla forces there deployed will have to await a solution of the difficulties now existing on these two islands.

- (3) [illegible]
- (5) [illegible] R. L. EICHELBERGER;  
Lieutenant General, United States Army,
- (1) [illegible] Commanding.

3 Inclosures:

- #1 - Recommended Units to be activated.
- #2 - Personnel Forms.
- #3 - Minimum Physical Standards.

[illegible text]

[illegible text]

[illegible text]

[illegible text]

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REF ID: A66666

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FEPA 370.64

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST, APO 501,  
7 February 45.

TO: Commanding General, Eighth Army, APO 343

1. a. The recommendations appearing in paragraph 3 a, b, and c, basic letter, are approved.

b. In re paragraph 3 d, attention is invited to indorsement by the organization commander at the end of PAAGO Form 23 1-31-45 attached as Incl No. 6, basic letter

c. In reference to paragraph 3 e (1), the physical standards for retention in active service of male personnel now in the Philippine Army are attached as inclosure 4.

d. In reference to paragraph 3 e (2), processes will not be disqualified by a processing team because of age. Age limits will be established at a later date by the Philippine Army and those disqualified for age will be released by due administrative process.

e. In reference to paragraph 3 f, it is desired that women guerrillas be processed. After processing, women will be retained on present status pending disposition by Hq Philippine Army. Processing forms 22-A and 23 should indicate at the beginning:

(1) That processee is female.

(2) Duty performed.

(3) If processee has experience as a nurse, a detailed statement of such experience.

2. a. With the exceptions noted below the processing procedure outlined in paragraph 4, basic letter, is approved.

b. In reference to paragraph 1 of the directive referred to in paragraph 4 a (2) basic letter, it is now considered no longer necessary to retain American personnel with the 92nd Philippine Division. American personnel claiming status in the U.S. armed forces will be forwarded to the 4th Replacement Depot, APO 703, for processing. American personnel not claiming such status will be forwarded to the 6th Camp Hq and Camp Co, APO 72, for processing.

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APPENDIX

c. In reference to paragraph 4 a (4) basic letter, if Allied Nationals other than Philippine or American desire repatriation, they will be forwarded to the 6th Camp H2 & Camp Co, APO 72 for processing. All other Nationals now serving in the Philippine Army will be retained with their units and will be processed in the usual manner.

d. In reference to paragraph 4 c, attention is invited to PA AGO Form 22-A 31 January 1945, added as Inclosure 5, basic letter, to be substituted for WS AGO Form 22. Another form PA AGO Form 23, 31 January 1945, is added to the list of required forms and is attached as Inclosure 6, basic letter.

e. In reference to paragraph 4 d, it is desired that a permanent serial number be assigned each processee. Blocks of serial numbers have already been allotted to your headquarters for this purpose.

f. In reference to paragraph 4 e, it is desired that the inventory of clothing and equipment be accomplished thru the usual channels and that the processing teams be relieved of this duty.

3. a. The procedure outlined in paragraph 5, basic letter is approved.

b. In reference to paragraph 5 a, trained personnel from the 1st Replacement Battalion, Philippine Army, will be made available to the Commanding General, Eighth Army, as requested. Philippine Army orders will issue attaching such personnel to Headquarters, Eighth Army, on temporary duty.

c. In reference to paragraph 5 b, all requests for information made to processing teams by various agencies will be routed through Hq, Eighth Army.

d. In reference to paragraph 5 f, in view of the difficulties involved it is considered desirable that processing teams be required to supervise the accomplishments of all processing forms. However, unit commanders should furnish in roster form all information in their possession on the following:

- Name of processee
- Dates of rank or grade
- Date of joining unit

4. The assumption appearing in paragraph 6, basic letter, "that all administrative matters pertaining to personnel, supply and similar subjects will become internal Philippine Army problems" is correct. However, it will not be practicable for the Philippine Army to assume all these duties until there has been

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established an adequate staff to perform the duties mentioned. It is desired that the Commanding General, Eighth Army, in the meantime, render such assistance as is necessary to insure proper accomplishment of all administrative matters.

5. It is desired that the Commanding General, Eighth Army, prepare a standard operating procedure for processing teams based on the policies approved in this correspondence and furnish a copy of such SOP to this headquarters.

6. It is desired that the processing of the 92nd Philippine Division on Leyte begin as early as practicable. Instructions pertaining to the processing of other units will be issued later.

By command of General MacARTHUR:

6 Incls. /s/ Leonard S. Carroll  
3 Incls added LEONARD S. CARROLL  
Incl 3 w/d Lt Col, AGD  
Incl 4 - PA Reg 40-1010 Asst Adj Gen  
Incl 5 - Form 20-A, PA  
Incl 6 - PA AGO Form 23

INFORMATION COPIES TO:

- PA Army 3
- 6th Army 1
- 4th Replacement Depot 1
- 14th Replacement 1
- G-1, USAFFE 25
- Fiscal Director, USAFFE 4
- Theater Surgeon 2
- 8th Army 5

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S E C R E T

USAFFE

AG 322.2 (26 Oct 44) A

A. P. O. 500  
26 October 1944

SUBJECT: Reorganization of Guerrilla Forces.

TO : Commanding General, Sixth Army.  
Commanding General, Eighth Army.

1. As units of recognized guerrilla forces operating in the Philippine Islands become available for such action, it is planned to reorganize and re-equip them as standard units of the Philippine Army, under T/O and E being prepared and to prepare them for appropriate offensive, defensive and reconnaissance missions, the maintenance of order in any disaffected areas, providing defense commands for bases, and for guarding installations and prisoners.

2. When such units, within your objective areas, have gained contact with your forces and there is no longer an immediate requirement for their use on combat missions, it is desired:

a. That units be assembled in a suitable area, readily accessible to base facilities.

b. That arrangements be made for furnishing them with rations, essential clothing, medical supplies, hospital facilities, and such minimum equipment as is necessary for housing, cooking, etc.

c. That report be made to the nearest echelon of this headquarters of the location and approximate strength of such units.

3. The reorganization, equipment and training of such units will be governed by directives to be issued by this headquarters.

By command of General MacARTHUR:

R. W. BOLLING  
Capt., AGD  
Asst. Adjutant General

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APPENDIX 16

H I S T O R Y  
of  
UNITED STATES ARMY TRAINING GROUP  
AFWESPAC  
20 April 1945 - 30 June 1946

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PART II

GUERRILLA AFFAIRS SECTION

x x x x x x x x

2. Background

a. In the process of the Luzon operations, Sixth Army recovered and utilized the services of some 150 guerrilla units representing approximately 75,000 officers and men. Under Executive Order No. 21, issued by the President of the Philippines on 23 October 1944, these guerrilla units could have no status as units of the Philippine Army unless formally recognized by the Commander-in-Chief. To expedite such recognition the following instructions were issued by Commanding General, Advanced Detachment, USAFFE, to Commanding General, Sixth Army, on 16 February, 1945 (Msg Cen NR UAD X 62592):

"It is desired as rapidly as practicable to induct into the Philippine Army those Guerrilla elements who have been or are being employed or whom you believe it is desirable to employ in support of our combat operations on Luzon. They may be inducted into service as groups or individually as you deem expedient....."

x x x x x x x x

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Authority NND 39471

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HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY  
APO 442

AG 384 A-2

25 February 1945

SUBJECT: Recognition of Guerrilla Units.

TO : Commanding General, XI Corps, APO 471.

1. Under the provisions of Executive Order #21, dated 28 October 1944, issued by the President of the Philippine Commonwealth, guerrilla units when recognized by the Commander-in-Chief become an element of the Philippine Army and will be called into the service of the United States Army Forces in the Far East.

2. In order to initiate the process of determination of those guerrilla units in Luzon to be recognized by the Commander-in-Chief, it is desired that you furnish this headquarters without delay the following information on each of those guerrilla units which have been actually employed or which are actually being employed in support of your combat operations and which are recommended by you for recognition by the Commander-in-Chief.

a. A specific and precise designation of the unit; as for example, Company H, 999th Inf; 2d Squadron, Guerrillas; 1st (Ramirez's) Battalion, 12th (Garcia's) Infantry of Santiago's Guerrillas; and its location. In units larger than a company, indicate the component elements thereof actually engaged in support of operations.

b. The strength of the unit to include only those individuals who have been or who were with the unit during its support of your operations. The strength will not include those persons on the rolls of the unit who have not actively participated in your combat operations.

c. Date unit first began operating with your command and a brief summary of its activities in your support since that date, to include for those units no longer supporting you the last date of such support.

3. It further is desired that as soon as practicable you submit to this headquarters a report in quadruplicate on each of the units referred to in paragraph 2 above in the following form:

a. Designation of the unit (same as 2 a above) and its location.

b. Name and guerrilla rank of commander.

c. A roster of the unit, in strength as reported in 2b above, arranged in status classifications shown in (3) below, to include for each individual:

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SUBJECT: Recognition of Guerrilla Units. (cont'd)

(1) Name and guerrilla rank.

(2) Periods (by dates) served actively on full-time status with the element.

(3) Status:

(a) United States Army or Navy.

(b) Philippine Scouts.

(c) Philippine Army or Constabulary.

(d) Guerrillas without previous military status.

(4) If individual is of category (a), (b), or (c) next above, his rank and serial number (if known), previous organization, date of last service with appropriate service, and dates surrendered to or escaped from Japanese control if applicable.

(5) If the individual is a female, notation to that effect and a statement of duties being performed by her.

By command of Lieutenant General KRUEGER:

W. A. MIXTACKI,  
Major, AGD  
Asst. Adj. Gen.

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Memo to Chief of Staff, Eighth Army

Subject: Summary of conference on Philippine Army Matters in Manila.

GENERAL:

By order of the Commanding General USAFFE, representatives of USAFFE, Philippine Army, Sixth and Eighth Armies, met in Manila at 1400, 18 March 1945, to discuss problems toward the reorganization of the Philippine Army. Major General Stivers, D C/S of USAFFE presided. Major General Valdes, C/S of the Philippine Army, represented the Philippine Army.

PURPOSE:

The primary purpose of the conference was to discuss the guerrilla problems now existing on LUZON, specifically (1) what guerrilla forces to recognize, and (2) what to do with these units after their military usefulness has passed.

DISCUSSION:

South of LUZON, Eighth Army's area of responsibility, large unoccupied areas permitted the organization and arming of regularized guerrilla military forces and the "recognition" of such forces by GHQ. On LUZON, due to widespread Japanese garrisoning, the resistance movement was confined to the classic type of underground operation, preventing the formal "recognition" of any guerrilla force. Thus the two situations are not comparable, and accordingly present different problems in the mission of reorganization. This fact, plus the lack of directives from higher headquarters, and Sixth Army's failure itself to formulate any plan of reorganization, have resulted in a confused situation. Moreover, although there are an estimated 200,000 guerrillas on LUZON, only a small portion of these will be recognized as having any military value.

DECISIONS ON HANDLING GUERRILLA FORCES ON LUZON:

After lengthy discussions, Sixth Army advocated, and General Stivers approved the following procedures:

1. Sixth Army would recommend to USAFFE the guerrilla forces to be recognized. Recognition is to be based on the military usefulness of the force to Sixth Army in LUZON operations.
2. As soon as military usefulness of the recognized guerrilla forces has passed, the forces will be transported to designated concentration areas, at which point Sixth Army's responsibility ends, and all further responsibilities become USAFFE's.
3. Unrecognized forces will be given no help, and will be encouraged to disintegrate. Former Philippine Army personnel serving with unrecognized guerrilla forces will be instructed to report to depots for processing and subsequent assignment. All civilian guerrillas will be turned loose to return to their homes.

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CONCLUSION:

There is complete diversity of mission for Sixth and Eighth Armies in the project of reconstituting the Philippine Army. Aside from recommending guerrilla forces for recognition, Sixth Army has no mission except to transport recognized guerrilla personnel to Replacement Depots. On the other hand Eighth Army has been entrusted with the mission of reorganizing into standard Philippine Army units all guerrillas south of Luzon. In undertaking this mission Eighth Army has been given full authority to determine what, when and where Philippine Army units will be reconstituted and full power to process all guerrillas, induct or refuse to induct personnel in accordance with its own standards, assign inducted personnel among the reorganized units, and train and employ such personnel as it sees fit. In the case of supplies and equipment, Eighth Army will adhere to existing USAFFE DIRECTIVES.

OTHER PA MATTERS DISPOSED OF WHILE IN MANILA:

1. Partial pay, based on Philippine Scout pay rates, is authorized to be paid to all recognized forces at any time, even before processing if the tactical situation permits. The subject of back pay is still unsettled. All pay disbursements are made by PA finance personnel.
2. Supplies and equipment are still not available in sufficient quantities to help materially the new PA units now being organized. A ship is believed to be enroute from New Guinea to Manila with mostly salvaged clothing.
3. Inquired what training policies would be in effect for the newly organized PA units which Eighth Army is organizing. Apparently, neither USAFFE nor the PA plans to publish training directives, and the responsibility of a training program rests with Eighth Army. USAFFE plans for Eighth Army to carry on a training program for Medical units. A draft of USAFFE's directive is attached. (The draft sent to Surgeon).
4. USAFFE representatives recommended that we assign to each PA unit which we reorganize, an American officer as liaison.
5. G-3 Section of USAFFE stated that an officer of Eighth Army must accept in behalf of USAFFE each newly reorganized PA unit ordered into the service of USAFFE. The first such instance of this will be in the case of the newly activated PA regiment on Mindoro, which will be called into service of USAFFE on 1 April 1945. Activation orders for this regiment have been published.
6. USAFFE approved our requisition for equipment and supplies for Eighth Army processing teams.
7. Only one copy of the affidavit form completed by the processing teams is required.
8. USAFFE is anxious to assign Filipino replacements now in PA Replacement Battalions to newly reorganized PA units. There are at the present time approximately 1,000 immediately available.

s/ Franklin S. Kimbrough,  
t/ Franklin S. Kimbrough,  
Lt Col, GSC

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HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST

APPENDIX 30

FEGA(PA) 370.64

APO 501  
24 April 1945

SUBJECT: Recognition of Guerrilla Forces.

TO : The Commanding General, United States Army Services  
of Supply, APO 707.

1. It has come to the attention of this headquarters that United States Army units formerly attached to or under the control of the Commanding General, Sixth Army, have utilized personnel of guerrilla units during that period. Subsequently the above mentioned United States Army units have been attached to your headquarters and have retained the guerrilla personnel in their service.

2. The Commanding General, Sixth Army, is charged with the control of all guerrilla forces on Luzon, and the Commanding General, Eighth Army, with the control of all others. Therefore it is desired that you submit a report to the Army commander concerned containing the following information:

a. Designation of guerrilla units utilized by United States Army units under your control. Those units which in your opinion warrant recommendation for recognition by the Commander-in-Chief as authorized elements of United States Army Forces in the Far East should be indicated.

b. Rosters of all personnel designated under 2a above.

c. Inclusive dates that the guerrilla unit was actually attached to or employed by United States Army units under your control.

3. Individuals now attached to or in the service of United States Army Service of Supply units who are United States Army Forces in the Far East personnel but who are not members of guerrilla units recommended for recognition, will be furnished transportation to the nearest Philippine Army Replacement Battalion for processing. Guerrilla personnel of units designated under par. 2a above and not recommended for recognition, and who do not belong to the Armed Forces of the United States will revert to civilian status. When paid, the rate of pay for those reverting to civilian status will not exceed rates set for the Philippine Army.

4. In instances where services of personnel of a guerrilla unit recommended for recognition are no longer required, such

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APPENDIX 20



personnel will be quartered and rationed by the United States Army unit until action is taken by this headquarters on the recommendation for recognition. When action is taken by this headquarters recognizing the recommended guerrilla unit, the United States Army unit to which it has been attached will take action to dispose of the guerrilla personnel of the recognized unit in accordance with the provisions of letter, Headquarters, USAFFE, File FECA 370.64, dated 8 April 1945, Subject: "Relief from Active Duty or Discharge of Guerrilla Personnel," copy attached.

5. Inclosed for your information is copy of letter to the Commanding Generals, Sixth and Eighth Armies, Subject: "Recognition of Guerrilla Forces."

By command of General MacARTHUR:

JAMES A. CALLENDER

Capt. A.G.D.

Asst. Adj. General

2 Incls. As indicated

concerned containing the following information: The commanding general, Sixth Army, is requested to advise the commanding general, Eighth Army, of the disposition of the guerrilla forces on which the recommendation for recognition is based.

The commanding general, Sixth Army, is requested to advise the commanding general, Eighth Army, of the disposition of the guerrilla forces on which the recommendation for recognition is based.

The commanding general, Sixth Army, is requested to advise the commanding general, Eighth Army, of the disposition of the guerrilla forces on which the recommendation for recognition is based.

SUBJECT: Recognition of Guerrilla Forces

REC'D (AV) 330.64

AV 330.64

UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 39471

DATA TO BE FURNISHED ON GUERRILLA UNITS  
RECOMMENDED FOR RECOGNITION

1. a. A specific and precise designation of the unit; as for example, Company H, 999th Inf; 2d Squadron, \_\_\_\_\_ Guerrillas; 1st (Ramirez's Battalion, 12th (Garcia's) Infantry of Santiago's Guerrillas; and its location. In units larger than a company, indicate the component elements thereof actually engaged in support of operations.

b. The strength of the unit to include only those individuals who have been or who were with the unit during its support of your operations. The strength will not include those persons on the rolls of the unit who have not actively participated in your combat operations.

c. Date unit first began operating with your command and a brief summary of its activities in your support since that date, to include for those units no longer supporting you the last date of such support.

2. As soon as practicable submit a report to this headquarters in quadruplicate on each of the units referred to in paragraph 1 above in the following form:

a. Designation of the unit (same as 1 a above) and its location.

b. Name and guerrilla rank of commander.

c. A roster of the unit, in strength as reported in 1 b above, arranged on status classifications shown in (3) below, to include for each individual:

- (1) Name and guerrilla rank.
- (2) Periods (by dates) served actively on full-time status with the element.
- (3) Status.

- (a) United States Army or Navy.
- (b) Philippine Scouts.
- (c) Philippine Army or Constabulary.

(d) Guerrillas without previous military status.

(4) If individual is of category (a), (b), or (c) next above, his rank and serial number (if known), previous organization, date of last service with appropriate service, and dates surrendered to or escaped from Japanese control, if applicable.

NOTE:

INCLOSURE #2

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INCLOSURE 45

Subject: Data to be Furnished on Guerrilla Units Recommended for Recognition (Cont'd).

- (5) If the individual is a female, (notation to that effect and a statement of duties being performed by her.

NOTE: Under the provisions of Executive Order #21 dated 28 October 1944, issued by the President of the Philippine Commonwealth, guerrilla units when recognized by the Commander-in-Chief become an element of the Philippine Army and will be called into the service of the U.S. Army Forces in the Far East.

- (3) Name of the element
- (5) Periods (by dates) served voluntarily on full-time status with
- (7) Name and military rank

Labels:
- a. A roster of the unit, in accordance as reported in I F above, with name and military rank of commander.
- b. Designation of the unit (same as I F above) and its location.

Labels:
- 5. As soon as practicable submit a report to this headquarters in which

units no longer subsisting from the last date of such reports. Summary of its activities in last reports since that date, to include for those
- c. Date unit first began operating with local command and a brief

activity participated in local combat operations.
- d. The strength of the unit to include only those individuals who

Refer in reports of operations.
- 1. A specific and precise designation of the unit; as for example,

RECOMMENDED FOR RECOGNITION
DATE TO BE FURNISHED ON CASE

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HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY  
APO 442

AG 384 A-2

3 May 1945

SUBJECT: Procurement, recognition, supply, use and disposition of Guerrilla Units.

TO : See Distribution.

1. Numerous guerrilla units are in existence throughout the Philippine Islands. The organization of these units varies greatly; in some districts all units are banded together under a single overall leader and in other districts local and independent guerrilla units, usually small, acknowledge no overall commander. The Commanding General, Sixth Army, has been authorized by Commanding General, USAFFE, to assume control of and make use of guerrilla units in support of his operations.

2. a. Normally little difficulty is entailed in securing the support of local guerrilla forces. Commanders of Army forces advancing into newly recovered territory ordinarily will be contacted by the leader or leaders of the local guerrilla forces. They are authorized to make use of guerrilla forces in support of their operation and should make requests for guerrilla assistance, if possible, on the senior guerrilla leader in the particular area of operations. Normally it is preferable fully to utilize all the personnel of guerrilla units already employed before employing personnel of other guerrilla units. As soon as the tactical situation permits when use is being made of a guerrilla unit, the using unit commander will report to the appropriate commander (Army, Corps, Division, or separate RCT (or Task Force) operating independently) the designation of the guerrilla unit, the name and guerrilla rank of the senior commander, the approximate strength employed, and the initial date the unit rendered support. In reporting the designation of a unit, the company, or smaller separate unit will be the lowest unit reported, but will be shown as a part of all higher echelons, as Co "A", 99th Infantry of Quixotes Division.

b. Commanders of Corps, Divisions, or Separate RCT's (or Task Forces) operating independently will

- (1) Determine the loyalty of the unit.
- (2) Attach the guerrilla units to their command by issuance of orders similar to form attached (Incl 1).
- (3) Submit any recommendation for recognition of units and rosters in accordance with procedure outlined in inclosure 2 hereto.
- (4) Submit report on any unit not recommended for recognition, with reasons therefor, to include data substantially as required for those units recommended for recognition, except that rosters will not be included.

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APPENDIX B

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Procurement, recognition, supply, use and disposition of Guerrilla Units. (Cont'd)

- (5) The headquarters next below this headquarters (Corps, Divisions, Separate RCT's and independent Forces) will consolidate recommendations and reports submitted in compliance with paragraph (3) and (4) above, and submit to this headquarters with their recommendations in the premise.
- (6) Commanders will inform Philippine Army Finance Officers who may be present with their commands of all changes in guerrilla units in their area of operations.

c. Sixth Army units which require the services of guerrilla units, when such guerrilla units are not immediately available within the area, may submit request for same, thru channels. Such request will state the number of guerrilla required and the duties for which intended. Any intermediate commander who has guerrilla units available may provide such if he deems request justified. All forwarding indorsements will indicate approval or disapproval and the non-availability of guerrilla units within the forwarding units zone of action.

### 3. Use of guerrillas.

a. Guerrilla units are military organizations; after recognition they are elements of the Philippine Army, and their members are soldiers. No member of a guerrilla unit will be used in a capacity that would tend to discredit the military profession. They will not be attached for performing only such duties as mess attendants, KP's, housekeeping, and individual orderlies.

b. Guerrillas and guerrilla units may be used in any military capacity to the limit of their capabilities and equipment. They may be used as scouts, as guides, for patrolling and combat, in carrying parties and in guarding rear installations.

4. Supply of Guerrilla Units. Any guerrilla unit being used by a U.S. Army unit in accordance with paragraph 3 b above will be supplied by that U.S. Army unit with rations and the clothing and equipment necessary for it to perform its assigned missions. In this connection see letter, this headquarters, file AG 400 D-3, subject: "Supplies for Guerrillas", dated 29 April 1945.

### 5. Disposition of Guerrilla units.

a. Guerrilla units may be moved from one sector to another with the U.S. Army unit to which attached, if deemed desirable. If a guerrilla unit is not to accompany the U.S. Army unit to which it is attached on any move, that fact will be reported to the next higher commander who will make proper disposition of the unit by attaching to another subordinate unit or by taking action prescribed in b below.

b. Whenever the service of a guerrilla unit or elements thereof is no longer required, that fact will be reported thru channels to this headquarters. Any intermediate commander may attach any such reported guerrilla unit to any other of his subordinate units. Under no condition will a guerrilla

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Subject: Procurement, recognition, supply, use and disposition of Guerrilla Units. (Cont'd)

unit, once used by a U.S. Army unit, be "abandoned" or directed to "shift for itself". They will remain attached until disposition is made known by this headquarters.

c. In all cases when guerrilla units are reattached or are released for final disposition, that fact will be announced in orders similar to those used in attaching. One copy of all such orders will be furnished this headquarters marked: Attention: G-2 (Special Intelligence).

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL KRUEGER:

2 Incls  
Incl 1 - Copy Attachment Orders.  
Incl 2 - Data furnished on Guer Units.

s/ W. A. Mixtacki  
t/ W. A. MIXTACKI  
Major, A.G.D.  
Asst. Adj. Gen.

DISTRIBUTION  
"A" & "D"

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to : commanding officer (units)

SUBJECT: Attachment orders

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SUBJECT: Attachment orders.

TO : Commanding Officer, (Guerrilla Unit)

Pursuant to authority contained in letter Headquarters Sixth Army, Subject: "Procurement, recognition, use, supply and disposition of guerrilla Units," dated 3 May 1945, the (guerrilla unit) is placed under the control of (using unit).

By command (order) of

Note: The above orders may be issued by the using unit or any higher headquarters that attaches a guerrilla unit to a lower unit. Two copies will be furnished the guerrilla unit, one to using unit and one to next higher command of issuing unit.

DISSEMINATION

3 copies - copy 1 - copy 2 - copy 3

M. V. WILKINSKI

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL KLECK

These orders are to be used in accordance with the instructions...

These orders are to be used in accordance with the instructions...

Subject: Procurement, recognition, use, supply and disposition of guerrilla units.

DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 39471

APPENDIX 22  
REF ID: A66812 55

GUERRILLA AFFAIRS SECTION  
USAFFE TRAINING GROUP  
APO 501

12 May 1945

MEMORANDUM for: Unrecognized Guerrilla Unit Commanders.

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to explain to commanders of unrecognized guerrilla units the methods of which this section will contact screen and process into the Phil Army, guerrilla units which are not now recognized.

2. Following completion of your questionnaire a contact team from this section will go into more detail with you, studying the unit composition, history, efficiency and desirability as a part of the Phil Army.

3. Initially you will be required to fill out a questionnaire concerning your unit to complete our records.

4. If recommendation for recognition is indicated for your unit the team leader will direct you to do the following:

a. "Screen" and alter your organization of necessary to generally conform to a similar type of unit of the Phil Army.

b. Change grades and ratings of your officers and enlisted men to conform to the similar type to the Phil Army tables of organizations per Par 4 a above.

c. Prepare a detailed roster of your new organization. (Proper forms, copies, etc, will be explained to you by contact team).

d. Prepare a letter "Request for recognition" to "Commanding General, USAFFE, APO 501." (Form for this letter will be provided by contact team).

5. Processing will be accomplished if the unit is officially recognized by processing units of the Phil Army coordinated by the contact team which met with you earlier).

6. It is not contemplated that those who desire to return to civilian life will be required to remain in active service in the Phil Army, to return those members who so desire to civilian life, you will be provided with necessary letters and forms on "Relief from active duty members of your unit may thus become civilians, but are recognized as members of the Phil Army during this period of active guerrilla service. It must be pointed out that provisions of this paragraph do not apply to USAFFE members of your unit, but only to civilian volunteers, USAFFE personnel are automatically on active service for the duration of the emergency plus (6) months.

7. The remaining guerrilla groups if any, when we are unable to recognize for any reason will be directed by proper authority to

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APPENDIX 22



turn in their arms, rosters and histories to the nearest U. S. or PA Unit; disband and return to civilian life.

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/s/ George Miller  
/t/ GEORGE MILLER  
Captain, Inf  
Section Chief

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: AUTH CG EIGHTH ARMY :  
: INITIALS W MC :  
: DATE 14 May 1945 :  
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HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH ARMY  
United States Army  
(S) Office of the Commanding General  
APO 343

CIRCULAR  
NUMBER 142

14 May 1945

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF LOCAL UNITED STATES  
ARMY COMMANDING GENERALS CONCERNING GUERRILLA  
FORCES AND PHILIPPINE ARMY UNITS

- SECTION I - GUERRILLA FORCES
- SECTION II - PHILIPPINE ARMY UNITS

The following instructions are published for the information and guidance of all local United States Army Commanding Generals in their relationships with guerrilla forces and Philippine Army units:

Section I - Guerrilla Forces.

The location, leadership and strength of guerrilla forces in areas under the control of this Headquarters are set forth in Inclosure 1.

1. CONTROL

The local U. S. Army Commanding General will have complete operational control of all friendly guerrilla forces in the objective area, employing these forces in such manner as he deems advisable.

2. MAINTENANCE OF ORDER

The local U. S. Army Commanding General may arrest and temporarily detain members of the guerrilla forces for cause. This power does not extend to the exercise of general courts-martial jurisdiction, or authorize the taking of other disciplinary action. In the event of arrest of a group or a member of guerrilla forces, the immediate higher headquarters shall be notified by the fastest means of communication available. It is likewise within the power of the local U. S. Army Commanding General to direct investigation by the CIC of any guerrilla so arrested and detained. However, the power to intern for the duration upon recommendation of the CIC, is vested solely in the Commanding General, Eighth United States Army.

3. PERSONNEL

a. General:

All members of a recognized guerrilla force are considered to be on active service in the Philippine Army. A "recognized" guerrilla-

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Cir No. 142, Hq 8th Army, 14 May 45, contd.

force is one "under a commander who has been appointed, designated or recognized by the Commander-in-Chief of the Southwest Pacific Area."

**b. Processing:**

(1) When the tactical situation permits, all members of recognized guerrilla forces who present themselves for the purpose will be processed. The purpose of processing is to obtain permanent records of essential information on each individual. Such information will be utilized in determining what guerrilla personnel will be retained on active service and what guerrilla personnel will be relieved from active duty, or discharged. Processing will be accomplished by mobile processing teams organized and directed by Eighth Army Headquarters.

(2) Each processing team consists of eight (8) enlisted men and two (2) officers of the Philippine Army and one (1) U. S. Army enlisted man. Teams are sent out in pairs, in the charge of a U. S. Army officer, and an officer from the Surgeon's office to pass upon the qualifications of guerrilla doctors to conduct and evaluate physical examinations of guerrillas in the course of processing. Each team will process an average of from 100 to 150 guerrillas per day. Each team is self-sufficient in supplies, equipment and rations.

**c. Reduction in Strength of Guerrilla Forces:**

(1) Not all guerrillas will be found to meet the minimum physical standards of induction. Under normal conditions, guerrilla forces will consist of more personnel than is needed by the local U. S. Army Commanding General for tactical employment. Personnel must be processed before they can be relieved from active duty or discharged in order that their exact military status may be established. Upon completion of processing, the categories of personnel to be relieved from active duty or discharged from guerrilla forces and the procedure therefor will be in accordance with paragraphs 3 to 6, inclusive, of the attached letter, Headquarters USAFFE, file FEGA 370.64, subject: "Relief from Active Duty or Discharge of Guerrilla Personnel," dated 8 April 1945, Inclosure 2.

(2) Local U. S. Army Commanding Generals may use excess guerrilla forces on noncombat activities, until the administrative procedures incident to relieving personnel have been accomplished.

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Cir No. 142, Hq 8th Army, 14 May 45, contd.

- (3) All personnel relieved from active duty or discharged in accordance with the provisions of Inclosure 2, will turn in their arms, be given a certificate of discharge or relief from active duty, paid current pay accrued, and returned to civilian status. The local PCAU representative, within the means available to him, will assist such personnel in their adjustment back to civilian pursuits. Every effort will be made to transport such personnel to their homes.

d. Recruiting:

No guerrilla leader is now authorized to recruit or accept volunteer enlistment of personnel for his guerrilla force.

e. Leaves of absence and Passes:

The following excerpts from Circular Number 10, Philippine Army Headquarters, dated 17 April 1945, are quoted for guidance of all concerned:

"2. Hereafter leaves of absence will be granted in cases of emergency or sickness only.

"3. Leave of absence for the purpose of attending to family or other personal matters will be granted only:

a. When the applicant's services can be dispensed with:

b. And when the purpose is very important and urgent.

"4. Passes of less than 48 hours duration are authorized at the discretion of organization commanders."

4. PAY

a. Payment of recognized guerrilla units who are operating under the direction of the Commanding General, Eighth Army, is the responsibility of the Philippine Army and will be made by the Philippine Army Disbursing officers. All individuals regardless of previous status, including members of the United States armed forces who have not been returned to full military control, who are in guerrilla units, will be paid the pay and allowances of their guerrilla grade as prescribed for the Philippine Army.

- (1) Current pay will be effective from the date announced in orders by the Commanding General, Eighth Army, as confirmed by the Commanding General, USAFFE, as that on which the unit began actual operations under the Commanding General, Eighth Army, at pay scale prescribed for the Philippine Army.

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APPENDIX 23

Cir No. 142, Hq 8th Army, 14 May 45, contd.

- (2) Guerrilla unit commanders will be instructed to prepare payrolls for officers and enlisted men, stating name, rank or grade with effective dates thereof. Payrolls will be approved by the local guerrilla leader and then forwarded to the nearest Philippine Army Disbursing officer charged with the payment. Payroll forms may be reproduced locally.

(3) Payment of arrears in pay, that is, pay due to the individual for periods prior to the date upon which the Eighth Army assumed actual operational control, will be covered in future instructions to be issued by the Commanding General, USAFFE.

b. No payments to guerrilla personnel will be made by United States Army Disbursing officers.

5. MAIL:

Guerrilla units should make definite arrangements for receipt and dispatch of both official and personal mail:

a. Official Mail:

(1) Incoming. Each unit should report its existence and identity to the nearest Army Post Office and request that it be listed in the USAFFE APO scheme. Movements necessitating a change in APOs should be immediately reported to both APOs concerned. Any mail, official or personal, reaching U. S. Army Postal Service channels will then be routed to the designated APO. Unit commanders are responsible for obtaining such mail from APOs and effecting prompt delivery to addressees.

(2) All outgoing mail must be clearly addressed. Return addresses must be completed to include name, rank, serial number, official designation of the unit to which the sender belongs, and APO number. United States postage will not be used on mail addressed to destinations in the Philippines. Philippine postage is chargeable on letter mail exchanged between Philippine nationals. The rate is two centavos, if such stamps are available. If stamps are not available, the sender should so indorse his letter in the space ordinarily used for stamps.

(3) All mail exchanged between military personnel and civilians in the Philippines is subject to censorship. Unit mail clerks should tie all outgoing mail in bundles and place a label on each bundle reading: "Philippine Mail. Base Censor, APO 72 or APO 75, whichever is nearest." Unit censorship will be effected on mail exchanged between persons in military service.

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Cir No. 142, Hq 8th Army, 14 May 45, contd.

## 6. HOSPITALIZATION

Guerrilla personnel may be treated in U. S. Army Hospitals. No such personnel will be evacuated to New Guinea or to the U. S., except by order of the Commanding General, USAFFE. Civilians will be admitted to U. S. Army Hospitals only to save life or to prevent undue suffering. They will be transferred to civilian hospitals or otherwise released as soon as movement no longer constitutes a hazard to their condition.

## 7. AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

Recommendations for the award of U. S. Army decorations available to guerrilla personnel will be made through channels under the provisions of AR 600-45. Instructions pertaining to the awarding of Philippine Army decorations to guerrillas will be published by Philippine Army Headquarters.

## 8. SUPPLY

a. Local U. S. Army Commanding Generals will be responsible for supply of guerrilla forces under their operational control.

b. Guerrilla forces do not operate under a T/O & E.

(1) Class I supplies will be issued on the basis of actual guerrilla troops present for duty. Excess guerrilla troops not intended for future tactical employment will continue to be rationed until such time as they can be returned to gainful civilian employment.

(a) Strength of guerrilla troops being rationed will be reported as a separate figure from U. S. troops strength on G-4 periodic report.

1. Filipino rations will be furnished in lieu of U. S. Army rations when possible. In any case rations for U. S. troops will not be jeopardized by issue to guerrillas.

2. Rations will not be issued directly to guerrilla representatives but will be distributed under the supervision of U. S. troops with the same regularity as for U. S. troops.

(2) Class II supplies for guerrilla troops will be furnished from salvage stocks. Those items not available from salvage stocks and necessary for tactical missions and maintenance will be obtained by requisitions. Requisitions will be initiated by the local U. S. Army Commanding General and not by the guerrilla unit. All requisitions will be addressed to Commanding General, USASOS, with an explanation of the need and forwarded to this Headquarters for editing.

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S E C R E T

APPENDIX 23

**SECRET**

APPENDIX 53

Cir No. 142, Hq 8th Army, 14 May 45, contd.

- (a) Medical supplies and minor items of medical equipment, all of which are in Class II, may be issued in emergency in minimum quantities from available stocks without further approval from this Headquarters.
- (3) Issue of Class III and IV supplies will be restricted to operational needs.
- (4) Ammunition will be distributed to guerrilla forces for specific missions only. Guerrilla forces will not maintain ammunition dumps separate from the task force.

Section II - Philippine Army Units.

1. ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVATION OF PHILIPPINE ARMY UNITS

a. A guerrilla force is not considered a Philippine Army unit, even though the members of a recognized force have the status of Philippine Army personnel. To become a standard Philippine Army unit, the recognized guerrilla force must first be organized and activated into a standard Philippine Army unit.

b. The local U.S. Army Commanding General as soon as possible, will recommend to this Headquarters what standard T/O & E units of the Philippine Army should be activated from guerrilla forces. He will consider the number and quality of guerrillas available as well as the estimated minimum force necessary to meet the military requirements of the area under his command. In deciding what standard T/O & E units of the Philippine Army should be activated, consideration will be given to the fact that tactical and service units of the Philippine Army are of the same strength as corresponding units in the U. S. Army. Activation orders will be published by Headquarters Philippine Army, upon the recommendation of this Headquarters and approval of the Commanding General, USAFFE. The Philippine Army units approved by the Commanding General, USAFFE, for activation are set forth in Inclosure 1. The attachment of these Philippine Army units to U. S. Army units will be included in Eighth Army Status of Units.

2. CONTROL

The provisions of paragraph 1 above under "Guerrilla Forces" will be applicable to Philippine Army units. The local U. S. Army Commanding General will notify this Headquarters when Philippine Army units are no longer required for operational purposes.

3. PERSONNEL

All personnel not discharged or relieved from active duty in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3 c above, under "Guerrilla Forces" are available for assignment to the newly reorganized and activated Philippine Army unit.

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APPENDIX 23

Cir No. 142, Hq 8th Army, 14 May 45, contd.

a. Disposition of Surplus Personnel:

(1) Under normal conditions there will be a surplus of personnel available for assignment to the newly activated Philippine Army unit. The determination of what personnel is to be considered surplus and the disposition thereof will be in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 7 (a)(b) and (c) of the attached letter, Headquarters USAFFE, Inclosure 2.

(2) Local U. S. Army Commanding Generals may use surplus personnel on noncombat activities, until the administrative procedures incident to the disposition of such personnel have been accomplished.

b. Replacements:

After the guerrilla force has been reorganized and activated into a standard Philippine Army unit, the local U. S. Army Commanding General may, if he deems it advisable, request through this Headquarters Philippine Army replacements to bring up to authorized strength the newly activated unit. Such replacements will be furnished by Philippine Army replacement battalions, where processed casual Philippine Army personnel are awaiting assignment. The arming of such replacements will be the function of the local U. S. Army Commanding General.

c. Leaves of Absence and Passes:

The provisions of paragraph 3 e, above, under "Guerrilla Forces" will be applicable to Philippine Army units.

d. Assumption of Command of Newly Activated Philippine Army Unit:

Upon the reorganization and activation of the guerrilla force into a standard Philippine Army unit, the Philippine Army leader of the guerrilla force thus activated will become the Commanding Officer of the newly activated unit, and he will issue the appropriate general order announcing his assumption of command.

e. Philippine Army Shoulder Patches:

Upon reorganization and activation of Philippine Army units, Philippine Army shoulder patches will be distributed to all personnel retained on active duty. Request for such shoulder patches will be made by the Commanding Officer of the newly activated unit to Headquarters Philippine Army.

4. ADMINISTRATION

Philippine Army Headquarters will furnish newly activated units with all published instructions pertaining to administration. The following

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Cir No. 142, Hq 8th Army, 14 May 45, contd.

personnel administrative matters will be routed through U. S. Army channels to this Headquarters:

- a. All requests for officer and enlisted replacements.
- b. Request for and approval of transfer, assignment and relief of field grade officers.
- c. Requests for and approval of travel orders for personnel.

5. MAINTENANCE OF ORDER

The provisions of paragraph 2 above under "Guerrilla Forces" will be applicable to Philippine Army units.

6. PAY

a. Upon activation of Philippine Army units, Headquarters Philippine Army is charged with the responsibility of payment of all personnel, and necessary measures will be taken to effect such payment as early as practicable.

b. No payments to Philippine Army personnel will be made by United States Army Disbursing officers.

7. MAIL

The provisions of paragraph 5 above under "Guerrilla Forces" will be applicable to Philippine Army units.

8. HOSPITALIZATION

The provisions of paragraph 6 above under "Guerrilla Forces" will be applicable to Philippine Army units.

9. AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

The provisions of paragraph 7 above under "Guerrilla Forces" will be applicable to Philippine Army units.

10. SUPPLY

a. Philippine Army strength has been included in the overall theater strength for procurement of maintenance supplies and equipment.

b. Upon organization of guerrilla forces into an activated Philippine Army unit, the following procedure will govern the issue of supplies:

(1) Proper military conditions shall be maintained.

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# SECRET

Cir No. 142, Hq 8th Army, 14 May 45, contd.

- (1) Ration strength will be submitted to the army supply point or base in the form of a daily telegram and/or ration return.
- (2) A status of equipment report will be prepared in accordance with Eighth Army Circulars 84 and 104, cs, listing all the equipment on hand which has been transferred from the guerrilla unit.
- (3) Requisitions will be prepared using the applicable T/O & E as a basis and submitted in accordance with Eighth Army Circulars 65, 77 and 132, cs.
- (4) Requisitions for major items and critical and controlled equipment will be forwarded to this Headquarters through channels for approval.

c. Where supplies and equipment are limited issue to United States Army troops will take precedence. (AG 370.64)(D)

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL EICHELBERGER:

OFFICIAL:

CLOVIS E. BYERS  
Brigadier General, GSC  
Chief of Staff

*Ward W. Conquest*  
 WARD W. CONQUEST  
 Colonel, AGD  
 Adjutant General

2 Incls:

- 1. Reorganization of Guerrilla Forces into PA Units
- 2. Ltr Hq USAFFE, FECA 370.64, 8 Apr 45, subj: "Relief from AD or Discharge of Guerrilla Pers"

DISTRIBUTION: "Z" plus

- "B" - 20 copies
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- "H" - 10 copies

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# SECRET

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH ARMY  
 United States Army  
 Office of the Commanding General  
 APO 343

CIRCULAR  
 NUMBER 185

27 June 1945

LIMITING DATES FOR PROCESSING AND PAYMENT OF GUERRILLAS

1. In order to limit further processing and payment of guerrillas, final processing dates are established as follows:

<u>PA UNIT</u>	<u>AREA</u>	<u>LIMITING DATE</u>
52d Inf (less AT & Can Co) 5th Signal Co Co A; 5th Med Bn Co A, 5th Engr C Bn 5th QM Co 5th Ord IM Co	Panay	30 June 45
43d Inf (less 3d Bn, AT Co & Can Co)	Cebu	31 Aug 45
53d Inf	Negros Occidental	15 July 45
53d Inf* (VO 531*72) (1)	Negros Oriental	31 July 45
3d Bn, 42d Inf	Masbate	31 May 45
51st Inf (less 3d Bn)	Mindoro	30 June 45
3d Bn, 51st Inf	Palawan	31 May 45
3d Bn, 43d Inf	Bohol	30 June 45
61st Inf (less 3d Bn, AT Co & Can Co)	Zamboanga (Area)	30 June 45
62d & 63d Inf	Mindanao (Area)	30 Sep 45
42d Inf (less 3d Bn, AT Co & Can Co)	Samar	31 May 45
41st Inf (less AT & Can Co)	Leyte	31 May 45
3d Bn, 61st Inf	Sulu Archipelago	30 June 45

2. No guerrillas will be processed after these dates, except as provided in paragraph 3 below:

3. a. In the event that any individual of the recognized guerrilla force from which the Philippine Army unit was organized may not have been processed by the limiting dates, he may initiate a written request for processing to the Commanding Officer of the Philippine Army unit concerned setting forth in the request:

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Cir No. 185, Hq Eighth Army, 27 June 1945, contd.

1. (1) His desire to be processed.

(2) Whether he desires to be assigned to the Philippine Army unit.

(3) An explanation of the circumstances for not having been processed prior to the limiting date.

b. Such request will be forwarded by the Commanding Officer of the newly organized unit through channels to this Headquarters, for transmission to the Chief of Staff, Philippine Army, APO 501.

4. Subsequent to the limiting dates established above, only personnel who have been duly processed will be included on payrolls. Unprocessed guerrillas will be dropped from payrolls as of these dates and will not thereafter be eligible for pay. (See par. 3 above).

5. Initial rosters will be prepared in quadruplicate as of the limiting dates by the Commanding Officer of each newly organized unit. Such rosters will be distributed as follows:

a. The original and one copy to the Adjutant General, Philippine Army, APO 501.

b. One copy to the Commanding General, Eighth Army, APO 343, Attention G-1.

c. One copy to be retained by the commanding officer of each newly organized unit for his own purposes and for the use of Philippine Army finance officers. (AG 231.45) (U)

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL EICHELBERGER:

OFFICIAL:

CLOVIS E. BYERS  
Brigadier General, GSC  
Chief of Staff

*Ward W. Conquest*  
WARD W. CONQUEST  
Colonel, AGD  
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION: "Z" plus

- "B"
- "C"
- "D"
- "E"
- "H"
- "K"

- 2 - CinC, AFPAC (Air Mail)
- 2 - CG, Philippine Army
- 1 - Each Philippine Army unit
- 15 - Regional Finance Off
- 1 - CO, 61st MRU

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FORM 57

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH ARMY  
United States Army  
Office of the Commanding General  
APO 343

16 July 1945

AG 210.2 (Gen) (D)

SUBJECT: Cessation of Appointments and Promotions (PA)

TO : Commanding General, X Corps, APO 310  
Commanding General, XIV Corps, APO 453  
Commanding General, Eighth Army Area Command, APO 343.

Radiogram from CINC AFPAC, cite L-24974, received by this headquarters, is quoted for your information and appropriate action:

"Inform all commanders of recognized guerrilla units that no further appointments or promotions may be made by them. Recommendations for promotion of Americans released for reassignment may be submitted to this headquarters. Promotions of Philippine Army personnel including volunteers in recognized units will be resumed in accordance with Philippine Army directives after units are processed and reorganized into activated standard units. Cite (Project J)."

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL EICHELBERGER:

s/ D. D. Courtright  
t/ D. D. COURTRIGHT  
Major, A. G. D.  
Asst. Adjutant General

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MALACANAN PALACE  
MANILA

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 68

DEMOBILIZATION OF ELEMENTS OF THE PHILIPPINE ARMY AND OTHER  
GUERRILLA UNITS, IN THE FIELD.

WHEREAS, the Commonwealth Government has been advised by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, of the termination of hostilities and the surrender of Japanese forces;

WHEREAS, the Government has further been advised by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, that this termination of hostilities and surrender of the Japanese forces has rendered unnecessary the maintenance for further field service of elements of the Army of the Philippines in addition to regularly activated units and of those guerrilla units already recognized;

WHEREAS, continued assembly and maintenance of headquarters is not a prerequisite to recognition of guerrilla units; and

WHEREAS, the demobilization of guerrilla units in the field will not prejudice the continuance of recognition of such guerrilla units as can produce evidence showing that they have maintained organized military forces in the field in effective opposition to the Japanese, which will be the basis for award of such benefits as may be authorized to members of such units;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, SERGIO OSMENA, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the Philippines, do hereby order:

1. That all unrecognized guerrilla units be disbanded and that all members thereof return to their homes and engage in their normal civilian pursuits.
2. That all arms, ammunitions, and military supplies and equipment in the possession of unrecognized guerrilla units or of individual members of such units be immediately turned in to the Commander of the nearest unit of the United States Army or of the Army of the Philippines.
3. That all records of unrecognized guerrilla units disbanded in conformity herewith, together with any request for recognition and evidence in support of such request, be assembled and turned in to the

Incl #4  
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Authority NND 39471

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Commander of the nearest unit of the United States Army or of the Army of the Philippines for forwarding to Headquarters, Philippine Army.

Done at the City of Manila, this 26th day of September, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and forty-five, and of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, the tenth.

(SGD) SERGIO OSMENA  
President of the Philippines

By the President:  
(SGD) JOSE S. REYES

Secretary to the President

E. O. NO. 68

P. 2

Lo

the Philippines in addition to regular armed units and of those the maintenance for further field service of elements of the Army of the Philippines and members of the Japanese forces was rendered unnecessary insofar as United States Army forces, Pacific, and the reorganization of the government has further been adapted by the Commander-

tion of hostilities and the surrender of Japanese forces: Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, of the reorganization of the government has been adapted by the

GENERAL ORDER NO. 68  
DEMobilIZATION OF ELEMENTS OF THE PHILIPPINE ARMY AND OTHER

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 68

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

WILLIAM

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

GENERAL ORDER NO. 68

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Authority NND 39471

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

O91.711  
AG (10 Sept 45)PA

CPS/dja  
APO 500  
10 September 1945

SUBJECT: Demobilization of Philippine Army

TO: Chief of Staff, Philippine Army, APO 501.

1. Due to the termination of hostilities with Japan and the surrender of the Japanese forces in the Philippines, the maintenance of the strength of the Philippine Army at the figures established in the Activation Plan for Philippine Army Units (Revised) dated 1 July, 1945, is no longer essential. The President of the United States has issued a directive to the Secretary of War emphasizing the necessity of extreme care in the expenditure of government funds. The Secretary of War has, in turn, directed a review of the foregoing Activation Plan in the light of present requirements for the employment of the Philippine Army for the major purposes of keeping internal order in the Philippines and providing a basis for a post-war Philippine Army.

2. The Activation Plan is being reviewed in this headquarters with a view to the immediate deletion of all units not yet activated, other than a few units absolutely essential to the revised mission, and to the gradual reduction in the number of units already activated, in accordance with the situation with respect to internal order in the Philippines as it develops.

3. The number of officers and enlisted men in activated units of the Philippine Army, in recognized guerrilla units and in replacement battalions is well in excess of the number required for units to be retained initially. In consequence, early action to reduce this number is mandatory.

4. It is desired that fifty percent of the officers and enlisted men now casuals unassigned in replacement battalions of the Philippine Army be discharged or relieved from further active duty at the earliest practicable date. In general, one half of this personnel in each grade should be released, with preference given to those who desire release. If sufficient personnel do not desire release the required numbers should be made up from those least qualified for retention on active duty.

5. In all cases, determination of loyalty status should be completed before discharge or relief from active duty, so

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that any necessity for recall of personnel for this purpose will be obviated. To this end it is believed desirable to provide Loyalty Status Boards at each replacement battalion to expedite such determinations.

By command of General MacARTHUR:

H. W. ALLEN  
Colonel, A.G.D.  
Asst. Adjutant General

to reduce this number to minimum:  
1. In consequence, early action in replacement battalions is well in excess of the number required units of the Philippine Army, to recognized elements units and  
2. The number of officers and enlisted men in activated

to internal order in the Philippines as it develops.  
3. The activation plan is being reviewed in this regard  
4. The activation plan is being reviewed in this regard

in the Philippines and providing a basis for a post-war Philippine Army for the major purposes of keeping internal order the staff of present requirements for the employment of the in this respect a letter of the foregoing activation plan in the expenditure of Government funds. The Secretary of War has Secretary of War emphasizing the necessity of extreme care in student of the United States has issued a directive to the (revised) dated 1 July 1942, is no longer essential. The pre- established in the activation plan for Philippine Army units maintenance of the strength of the Philippine Army at the present the surrender of the Japanese forces in the Philippines, the  
1. Due to the termination of hostilities with Japan and

TO: Chief of Staff, Philippine Army, APO SOF

SUBJECT: Demobilization of Philippine Army

VO (JO 2884)BA  
ODI'JIT

10 September 1942  
APO SOF  
CS2/973

UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

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Authority NND 39471

**SECRET**

LD/SHA/arj  
12 September 1945

MEMORANDUM TO: Colonel Parmly.

SUBJECT: AFPAC Conference re Demobilization of Philippine Army  
and Guerrillas.

1. A conference was held at AFPAC on 11 September 1945 attended by the following:

Col	Paschal	of the Philippine Army Section AFPAC
Col	Kreuger	of the Philippine Army Section AFPAC
Lt Col	Cheston	of the Philippine Army Section AFPAC
Lt Col	Mueller	of the Philippine Army Section AFPAC
Major	Werngren	of the Philippine Army Section AFPAC
Col	Lillard	Chief Philippine Army Branch, G-3 AFWESPAC
Lt	Aarons	Philippine Army Branch, G-3 AFWESPAC

2. We were told that the Philippine Army and all recognized guerrillas will be demobilized by July 4, 1946 leaving only the MP Command and a cadre of former regular Philippine Army Troops. Even the MP Command will probably be reduced, because only 20,000,000 pesos will be allocated by the Commonwealth for its military needs, and no contribution will be made by the United States Government. We were further advised that the demobilization task would be given to WESPAC. We then were asked what directives we wanted from AFPAC.

3. We told them that USAFFE's (Now AFPAC) letter of 8 April listing limited categories for the discharge of recognized guerrillas should be amended to embrace every category to effectuate complete demobilization. They agreed they would do this.

4. We stated that we believed we should have a free hand in the mechanics of demobilization. In this connection we advised them that we would use our mobile processing teams in LUZON to do the job, and in the VISAYAS and MINDANAO, we would use the organized Philippine Army units under U. S. Army officer supervision to effectuate the demobilization. We would also, to some extent, use the facilities of Philippine Army replacement battalions. We stated that we would get together with HPA on this question and would probably augment the teams to include an additional PA officer familiar with loyalty board policy, to detect those individuals who would be fit subjects for loyalty board proceedings. (HPA Circular #135).

5. Discussion was also had on various problems to be encountered. It was stated that the demobilization would have to be gradual and as "painless" as possible. In this connection, the following target dates were tentatively set: 31 December 1945, 31 March 1946, and 30 June 1946, with demobilization quotas for each date. Within reason, however, we can demobilize as quickly as possible. WESPAC in turn would have a free hand in

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APPENDIX 28

setting priorities, and the sequence of units to be demobilized. As soon as we are given the "go" signal, we shall demobilize at least 50% of the personnel in Philippine Army replacement battalions. Simultaneously, our LUZON processing teams will demobilize the LUZON recognized guerrillas, leaving the best organized units, such as Volckmann's until the end. In the VISAYAS and MINDANAO we can commence the demobilization of those units only partially organized. Useful non-divisional service units will probably be the last of the units to be demobilized. Very careful attention would have to be given to relieving all demobilized personnel of their arms.

6. We also advised AFPAC that prompt and adequate supplies, equipment, and transportation for our processing teams would bear a direct relation to the speed in accomplishing the demobilization. AFPAC stated it would arrange with its G-4 to get adequate priority for us in this connection.

7. We were also advised that orders would soon be issued disbanding all non-recognized guerrillas, and that no further recognitions would be granted.

8. AFPAC will also consult its Surgeon on the time lag permissible for physical examinations of personnel to be demobilized. The reason for the inquiry is that personnel already processed have had a physical and it would facilitate demobilization if another examination were not required.

9. By the first of the coming week, the firm draft of the promised AFPAC directives should be received. Upon their receipt, this branch proposes to call a conference here of interested representatives of IAC and SISAC to outline their duties and responsibilities in this program.

10. In the interim, further organization of standard Philippine Army units will cease, except units of the MP Command, which will be pushed.

FC	VLONE	of the BRITISH VMAJ SECTION VLBVC
COJ	VTJVLQ	of the BRITISH VMAJ SECTION VLBVC
WJOL	WJOL	of the BRITISH VMAJ SECTION VLBVC
FC COJ	WJOL	of the BRITISH VMAJ SECTION VLBVC
FC COJ	WJOL	of the BRITISH VMAJ SECTION VLBVC
COJ	WJOL	of the BRITISH VMAJ SECTION VLBVC
COJ	WJOL	of the BRITISH VMAJ SECTION VLBVC

LILLARD

THE FOLLOWING:

1. A conference was held at VLBVC on 11 September 1952 attended by

and participants:

SUBJECT: VLBVC CONFERENCE RE DEMOBILIZATION OF BRITISH VMAJ

MEMORANDUM TO: COMMANDER, VMAJ SECTION, VLBVC

11 September 1952  
ID/SHV/wl?

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Authority NND 39471

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VALUED

HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, WESTERN PACIFIC  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL

GSCP 248

APO 707  
1 February 1946.

SUBJECT: Payment of Members of Recognized Guerrilla Forces.

TO: Chief of Staff, Philippine Army, APO 501.

1. Reference is made to letter, General Headquarters, Army Forces, Pacific, 8 July 1945, to Chief of Staff, Philippine Army, file AG 242, subject: "Payment of Members of Recognized Guerrilla Forces".

2. Pursuant to authority delegated to the Commanding General, Army Forces, Western Pacific, by letter AG 323.361, "Matters Pertaining to the Philippine Army", dated 1 November 1945, (copy attached) the instructions appearing in letter referred to in paragraph 1 above are modified by substituting therefor the following:

a. Paragraph 4 of Executive Order No. 21, 28 October 1944, by the President of the Philippines reads: "The date of entry into active service in the Philippine Army will be that of joining a recognized military force". The intent of this paragraph is interpreted to be that members of recognized guerrilla units should be paid from date of recognition of the unit or from the date of joining a recognized guerrilla force whichever is later. It is not contemplated that any payment should be made to guerrilla forces for service rendered prior to date of recognition unless individuals concerned were in the service of the Armed Forces of the United States when those forces surrendered in the Philippines in 1942.

b. All guerrilla units now on active service in the Philippine Army have been recognized. Units and individuals that have been recognized since disbandment of their units have had limiting dates of service announced, and are not considered to be currently on active service. Such units are not entitled to current pay, but will be entitled to arrears in pay based on the specified period of service recognized.

c. Payment of all arrears in pay necessarily must await formal processing of such individual concerned and final determination of his status and computation of the amount of pay due. Because of the great volume of claims to be settled, it will be impracticable to make partial payments. The entire claim for arrears in pay and allowances will be settled in one payment.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL STYER:

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APPENDIX 29

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

CPS/dja  
APO 500  
2 October 1945

AG 370.64 (2 Oct 45) PA

SUBJECT: Disbandment of Unrecognized Guerrilla Forces.

TO : Commanding General, Sixth Army, APO 442.  
Commanding General, Eighth Army, APO 343.  
Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, APO 925  
Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces, Western Pacific, APO 707.  
Chief of Staff, Philippine Army, APO 501.

1. In view of the termination of hostilities, decision has been made to recognize no more guerrilla forces for continuation in service in the Philippine Army. All unrecognized guerrilla forces have been directed by Executive Order No 68, by the President of the Philippines, dated 26 September 1945, to disband and to turn in any arms, ammunition, and military supplies and equipment to the nearest unit of the United States Army or of the Philippine Army.

2. It is desired that any employment of unrecognized guerrilla units as military units by any element of this command be discontinued, effective at once. All recognized guerrilla units have already been attached to, specified United States Army commands or are under the direct control of Headquarters Philippine Army. No further issue of supplies or equipment of any nature will be made to unrecognized guerrilla units. If desired, members of such units may be employed individually as civilians in accordance with existing directives.

3. Military property and supplies turned in to units of the United States Army will be forwarded to the nearest United States Army base or supply point for disposition. Military property and supplies turned in to units of the Philippine Army may be used to complete the authorized equipment of such units to the extent practicable, property to be taken up on the equipment records of the unit. Surplus and unserviceable property will be turned in to the nearest United States Army base or supply point for disposition. Appropriate receipts for military property turned in by guerrilla units or by individual members thereof will be issued by the unit receiving such property.

4. Unrecognized guerrilla units have also been directed to turn in all records to the nearest unit of the United States Army or of the Philippine Army. All such records will be forwarded by the most direct practicable means to Headquarters, Philippine Army, APO 501. Appropriate receipts will be given by units receiving such records.

By command of General MacARTHUR:

B. M. FITCH,  
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,  
Adjutant General.

1 Incl - Executive Order No 68  
President of the Philippines.

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Authority NND 39471

APPENDIX 30

HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL

GSCP 091 PI

APO 707

SUBJECT: Disbandment of Unrecognized Guerrilla Forces.

TO : Commanding general, Base "X", APO 358.

1. The attached inclosure, letter General Headquarters United States Army Forces, Pacific, AG 370.64 (2 Oct 45) PA, same subject as above, is forwarded for compliance.

2. Nothing contained in paragraph 1 of the inclosure shall be construed as prohibiting the continuance of existing procedure for recommending for recognition through channels deserving guerrilla units.

3. Upon completion of disbandment of all unrecognized guerrilla units attached to your command, a report will be submitted to this headquarters. This report should include:

- a. Name of unit
- b. Date of disbandment
- c. Number of personnel disbanded
- d. Quantity of military property and supplies turned in

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL STYER:

1 Incl.

- 1 - Ltr GHQ, AFPAC, AG 370.64  
dtd 2 Oct 45, With Executive  
Order No 68

M/R: The present letter, file GSCP 091 PI, Subj: "Disbandment of Unrecognized Guerrilla Forces" submitting letter from GHQ AFPAC, regarding procedures to be followed in disbandment of such forces, and requesting that a report be made to this Hq upon completion of such disbandment - sent to:

CG Base "X" - APO 358  
CG Base "M" - APO 70  
CO Base "R" - APO 73  
CO Base "S" - APO 718

Action taken by Lt. Aarons, PA Branch, G-3.

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APPENDIX 31

**SECRET**

HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL

SECRET  
Auth: CG AFWESPAC  
Init: MACB.  
Date: 29 Nov 45

APO 707  
29 November 1945

GSCP 091 PI

SUBJECT: Inactivation and Disbandment of Philippine Army Units  
and Unrecognized Guerrillas now under Army Control

- TO : Commanding General, Military Police Command, AFWESPAC, APO 501
- Commanding General, 86th Division Area Command, APO 450
- Commanding General, 93rd Division Area Command, APO 93
- Commanding General, 96th Division Area Command, APO 96
- Commanding General, Base X, APO 358
- Commanding General, Base M, APO 70
- Commanding Officer, USAFIP Area Command, APO 198
- Commanding Officer, Base K, APO 72
- Commanding Officer, United States Army Training Group, APO 500

1. For your information and guidance copies of the following communications are inclosed:

- a. Letter GHQ AFPAC file AG 091 PI, dated 25 October 1945, subject: "Maintenance of Civil Law and Order in the Philippines." (Incl #1)
- b. Letter to "The Honorable SERGIO OSMENA," from Lieutenant General W. D. STYER, dated 7 November 1945. (Incl #2)
- c. Executive Order 68, dated 26 September 1945, subject: "Demobilization of Elements of the Philippine Army and other Guerrilla Units in the Field." This Executive Order pertains only to unrecognized guerrilla units that are now under control of the United States Army or Philippine Army. (Incl #3)
- d. Letter to the President of the Philippines dated 14 October 1945 signed by General MacArthur. (Incl #4)
- e. Letter HPA file 322 TAG, dated 18 October 1945, subject: "Disbandment of Unrecognized Guerrilla Forces." (Incl #5)

2. During the partial demobilization and reduction of the Philippine Army (inclusive of recognized guerrilla units) to the strength authorized as of 1 July 1946, you will be directed from time to time to inactivate and disband elements of that force as well as unrecognized guerrillas under your control. In the process of this demobilization there may be some instances where individuals may be

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**SECRET**

APPENDIX 25

Ltr Hq AFWESPAC file GSCP 091 PI (cont'd)

reluctant to turn in United States property, such as arms and ammunition and weapons captured from the enemy. In complying with directives mentioned above, you will be guided by instructions indicated below.

3. a. Prior to the disbandment of each unit it is desired that the matter of collecting United States property and captured enemy weapons and ammunition with which they are equipped, be considered carefully, and that a procedure be adopted that will be appropriate in each case and that will insure recovery of the maximum amount of property without employing force or measures resulting in bloodshed or violence. On separation from active service in the Philippine Army, individuals will be required to pay for lost government property on statement of charges.

4. It is understood that some unrecognized guerrilla personnel is still being employed by United States Army Forces contrary to the provisions of inclosure #3. Such unrecognized guerrillas will be disbanded at the earliest practicable date, in accordance with provisions of inclosure #3, unless recommendations for recognition have been initiated by United States Army units employing such personnel. You are authorized to pay disbanded unrecognized guerrillas as laborers in accordance with existing regulations, for the period actually employed by you. It is desired that a report be forwarded to this Headquarters indicating the designation of each unit disbanded, strength of unit, number of arms collected, estimated number of unauthorized arms retained by it, and date of disbandment.

5. The collection of unauthorized arms and other materials from personal after separation from active service is a responsibility of the agencies charged with the enforcement of civil law and order in accordance with the directive and letter referred to in subparagraphs la and d above. Collection of United States property from unrecognized guerrillas under Army control will be accomplished as far as practicable before release and will be governed by the same policy as set forth herein for Philippine Army units. Property and records turned in by unrecognized guerrilla units will be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Inclosures 3 and 5.

6. The inactivation or disbandment of Philippine Army units, including recognized guerrilla units, will be initiated only on specific direction of this headquarters. A directive setting forth a detailed procedure for inactivation of such units will follow.

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**SECRET**

Ltr Hq AFWESPAC file GSCP 091 PI (cont'd)

7. This directive is classified secret because of the nature of the inclosures. Accordingly the entire correspondence will be handled and protected as required by par 5, AR 380-5.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL STYER:

*Warren C. Edwards*  
WARREN C. EDWARDS  
Major, AGD  
Asst Adj Gen

5 Incls:

- Incl 1: Ltr GHQ AFPAC dtd 25 Oct 45 to CG AFWESPAC file AG 091.1
- 2: Ltr The Hon Sergio Osmena fr Lt Gen Styer dtd 7 Nov 45.
- 3: Exec Order 68 dtd 26 Sep 45 by Pres of Philippines.
- 4: Ltr to Pres PI dtd 14 Oct 45 fr Gen MacArthur.
- 5: Ltr HPA file 322 TAG dtd 18 Oct 45 to all unit commanders, PA.

DISTRIBUTION

As addressed - 1  
G-3 PA Div -25

**SECRET**

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Authority NND 39471

HEADQUARTERS  
 UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC  
 OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL

GSCPG 091 PI

APO 707  
 29 Nov 1945

SUBJECT: Movement of Guerrilla Units.

TO : Commanding General, 86th Division Area Command, APO  
 450.

1. This will confirm oral instructions to move the following guerrilla units from the Clark Field Area:

Co B, 51st Inf, Philippine Army Rangers

Co C, 71st Inf, Philippine Army Rangers

Hq Co, Co E and Co F, 2d Bn, 403d Inf Sqd

Philippine Guerrillas, Provisional Detachment

2. You are authorized direct communication with Commanding General, XIII Bomber Command, in this matter.

3. In the event that any of the above units is not a recognized guerrilla unit, you will forthwith proceed to disband the unit in accordance with previous directives to disband all unrecognized guerrilla units and letter, this headquarters, GSCP 091 PI, (Secret) dated 28 November 1945, subject: "Inactivation and Disbandment of Philippine Army Units and Unrecognized Guerrillas now under Army Control."

4. Those of the above units, which are recognized, will be reported by name to this headquarters, and thereupon appropriate orders will issue attaching them to your command. You will arrange for the processing of such recognized guerrillas by an AFWESPAC processing team.

5. It is also desired that you report to this headquarters on completion of action taken.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL STYER:

M/R: Request for movement of subject guerrilla units from the Clark Field area is contained in ltr from Hq XIII Bomber Comd, dtd 22 Nov 45, addressed to Lt. Gen. Styer. Units are

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no longer required at Clark Field; transfer to such other location where subject units may be more effectively utilized as requested. - Lt. Aarons, PA Div, Operations, G-3.

M/R: Request for movement of subject units from Clark Field

BY COMMAND OF FIELDING GENERAL AARONS:

on completion of action taken.

1. It is also desired that you report to this headquarters

of any changes in status.

2. All units of the subject units are to be reported to you as they are reported to the headquarters and the appropriate agencies.

3. Those of the above units which are recognized will

be reported to the appropriate agencies.

4. The subject units are to be reported to the appropriate agencies as they are reported to the headquarters and the appropriate agencies.

5. In the event that any of the above units is not a

unit of the subject units, you are to report this fact.

6. You are authorized direct communication with the appropriate agencies.

7. The subject units are to be reported to the appropriate agencies.

8. The subject units are to be reported to the appropriate agencies.

9. The subject units are to be reported to the appropriate agencies.

10. The subject units are to be reported to the appropriate agencies.

11. The subject units are to be reported to the appropriate agencies.

12. The subject units are to be reported to the appropriate agencies.

13.

14. The subject units are to be reported to the appropriate agencies.

15. The subject units are to be reported to the appropriate agencies.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20. OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL

21. UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES AUSTRIAN ZONE

HEADQUARTERS

DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 39471

AG 322

2d Ind

B/ral

(24 Apr 45)

Hq I Corps, APO 301, 6 May 1945

TO: Hq USAFFE-IGAF, Pangasinan Military Area

The following indorsement of Hq Sixth Army in a case similar to this is quoted for your information:

"There is no intention to restrict recognized guerrilla units to the initial strength reported and listed in letters announcing recognition. It is realized that the first reported strength is that being used at the time of submission of recommendations for recognition. Later, as the situation requires, additional members of the unit are called to full time active duty under US Army units. There is no need to submit additional rosters on such personnel. Their presence and duty with the unit is officially noted by the addition of their names to the unit payroll and the organization commander's certification thereto.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

1 Incl  
n/c

s/ Peter Calza  
t/ PETER CALZA  
Lt. Col., AGD  
Adjutant General

3d Indorsement

HQ., PMA, USAFFE, LGAF, 17 May 1945

TO: CO, 100th Bn., USAFFE-IGAF

1. Inviting attention to the 2nd Indorsement.
2. Men under reference may be included in the roster and payrolls.

For & In the absence of  
Lt. Col. S. M. OBANA:

s/ Juan L. Utleg  
t/ JUAN L. UTLEG  
Major, USAFFE-LGAF  
Adj. & Chief of Int'l.

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Authority NND 39471

GFL/hq  
Tel: 149 & 152

S - JWP B  
I - JWP V  
3 INFO GSCP 091 PI

C-3  
BLIS Gen's CAC  
MADAM

Recognition of Guerrillas.

D/C & C/S

17 July 46

(PA Div)

1. In compliance with your request, the following discussion is submitted on the recent proposal of President Roxas for recognition of guerrillas.

2. The method proposed by the President would provide for the recognition within a fixed period of time (e.g., 60 days) of any Filipino who will present himself at a designated camp and turn in at that time one useful firearm. The surrender of the firearm would alone qualify such Filipino for recognition. At the termination of the fixed period of time, all recognition of guerrillas (except casualty cases) would cease permanently.

3. The purpose of recognition has been always to determine whether a guerrilla claimant "continued armed resistance" against the Japanese, entitling him to be considered "on active service in the Philippine Army," and, therefore, in the service of the armed forces of the United States. A method of determination embodying five general requirements was developed, first by USAFFE, continued by AFPAC, and now used by AFWESPAC. The five criteria are attached as Tab A.

4. Arguments for the proposed method:

a. It would acquire for the Philippine Republic a considerable number of firearms, a desirable step in the establishment of peace and order, but no longer a responsibility of this headquarters.

b. It would speedily conclude (within 60 days) all recognitions by this headquarters, except those of individuals in the casualty category.

5. Arguments against the proposed method:

a. It utilizes a false criterion for the recognition of guerrillas, possession at this time of a firearm is no proof that the possessor continued armed resistance against the Japanese, considering the known fact that countless weapons have been lost, stolen, or sold since the liberation and used for other than patriotic purposes.

b. It would add further strong incentive to lawless elements to steal firearms and then present them to achieve military recognition.

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BASIC: Check Sheet fr G-3 (PA Div) to D/C & C/S, dtd 17 July 46, Subject: "Recognition of Guerrillas" - continued.

c. It would reward violation of Executiv Order No. 68 of the President of the Commonwealth, dated 26 September 1945, under which all firearms in the hands of unrecognized guerrillas should have been surrendered months ago. It would penalize those law-abiding, but as yet unrecognized, guerrillas who surrendered all their arms. Executive Order No. 68 is attached as Tab B.

d. The number of guerrillas thus to be recognized may be extremely large. There are presently under consideration 372,000 individuals claiming recognition. Also, any of the 412,000 guerrillas who have already been denied recognition for cause may now attain to easy recognition by presentation of firearms. Thus at least a total of 794,000 Filipinos would be interested in recognition by this method. No accurate estimate can be made as to the number of firearms these individuals might produce to gain recognition, although available sources consist of firearms captured from the Japanese, those issued by American forces before the surrender and during the occupation and liberation, and those stolen or bought from military personnel.

e. The amount of money which will become obligated by reason of both the probable application of the Missing Persons' Act and the benefits under Veterans' Administration will be large, very likely far in excess of our present estimates.

f. It would result in an unbridled trafficking in firearms.

g. It would leave unanswered and furnish no basis for determining the important inquiries as to the period of recognition and the rank to be conferred upon the individual, both aspects in which guerrilla claimants are always vitally interested.

h. It would be legally untenable since it in no way constitutes a test or measure of military service or continuance of armed resistance, an indispensable condition for recognition.

6. Conclusion. That the several disadvantages of the proposed method far outweigh the advantages. It is felt that our abandonment of a formal method of determination of the right to recognition in favor of the proposed expedient would be unjustified and illegal.

7. Recommendation. It is recommended that this proposed method of recognition be not approved.

D/C & C/S

13 1072 72

2 Incls. 08 087 BI  
1 - Tab A  
2 - Tab B

RECOGNITION OF GUERRILLAS  
E. J. McGAW  
Brig. Gen., GSC  
G-3

1071 173 123  
087/08

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Authority NND 39471

GSXRP

Corrected dates of recognition for guerrillas  
on Luzon.

(2) FROM: Director, Rec Pers Div TO: G-3 DATE: 4 Dec 45  
thru GSCL  
& GSTF

1. The proposed draft of Memorandum, this headquarters, Subject: List of Recognized Guerrilla Units, prepared by G-3, is designed to make the "Date of Recognition" as used in the AFPAC List, 23 Sept 45 and Supplement, 1 Nov 45, the "The Tentative Date of Recognition" and to now use as the "Date Unit Recognized" "the earliest date in which the organization may have operated as an organized military unit." This last mentioned date is to be considered "the date the unit became part of the Philippine Army" and will be the date from which the members or beneficiaries of deceased guerrillas will be entitled to claim "for arrears in pay and allowances" and from which "claims arising out of activities of the unit" will be recognized.

2. According to the Guerrilla Affairs Section (Capt Graham and Lt Middleton) the term "recognition date" as used in the AFPAC Lists, 23 Sept 45, denotes "the time the Commander-in-Chief appointed the leader commander of the force or unit, or the unit was attached to one of the units of the invading army." It is in this sense that the term "Recognition Date" is used hereinafter and the term "Date of Effective Operations" will be used hereinafter to denote the date, which the G-3 directive proposes to make the date of recognition.

3. Reference is made to attached Legal Study drafted in the Recovered Personnel Division, 15 Nov 1945, Subject: "Recognition of Guerrilla Status under the Missing Persons Act," (Incl 1), particularly to pars. 15, 16 and 17 a, b, and c.

4. Par 2, Ltr AFPAC (AG 242 (8 July 45) PA) 8 July 1945 (Incl 2) directs the payment of "current pay of members of recognized guerrilla units, from date of recognition" through the normal finance processes of the Philippine Army. The directive contemplates settlement of "arrears in pay", i.e., apparently from "Date of Effective Operations" to "Recognition Date," and while not designating the manner by which it may be accomplished, it is reasonable to infer that it was probably contemplated that it would be under the provisions of the Missing Persons Act.

5. It is the opinion of this office that neither the Missing Persons Act by its provisions nor the War Department by its administrative interpretation, appear to have contemplated that an individual, not otherwise within its provisions should be considered a "person" serving in the armed forces of the United States as that term is used in the Act, by virtue of service in a guerrilla force prior to its incorporation into the armed forces of the United States by recognition. In addition, entitlement of such person to the benefits of the Act is further contingent upon his meeting the other conditions precedent, namely, being in "active service" and in a "casualty status" as defined by the Act.

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APPENDIX 36

It is obvious that a person is not entitled under this or other existing law to be paid for services in the armed forces of the United States, regardless of the meritorious nature of his activities, until such time as he enters active service as a member of such forces.

6. The broad scope of the proposed chart of "Date of Effective Operations" involves serious complications. As of this date guerrilla affairs section has accorded recognition of 195,000 guerrillas and the gates are not yet closed. An article in the Manila Chronicle, 1 Dec 45, shows that at least 400,000 unrecognized guerrillas are clamoring to President Osmena for recognition and it may be expected that the pressure on this headquarters to extend further recognition will only increase when we start to pay some and not pay others.

7. This office does not have the background relative to the issuance of Executive Order No. 21. Certainly the matter must have been approved by the Commander-in-Chief and some definite standards adopted.

8. a. In view of the many factors involved, it is recommended that a conference be held between representatives of G-1, Finance, and Judge Advocate Sections, the Director, Recovered Personnel Division and any other interested sections prior to making a decision in this matter.

b. It is further recommended that after such conference, consideration be given to submitting this question to the War Department for approval of recommendations inasmuch as the resulting decision may require congressional action.

s/ M. H. M.  
t/ M. H. M.

- 2 Incls: (15 Nov 45) Recog. of Guer.
- Incl 1-Legal Study (15 Nov 45) Recog. of Guer.
- Incl 2-Ltr AFPAC (8 Jul 45)

(S) FROM: DIRECTOR, RECOVERED PERSONNEL DIVISION TO: G-3 DATE: 7 DEC 45

on prison collected dates of recognition for guerrillas

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Corrected dates of recognition for guerrillas on Luzon

FROM: Chief of Claims THRU: GSTF 8 December 1945  
TO : G-3

1. Claims Service is concerned only as to when a guerrilla unit was organized and recognized which thereby would enable it to obtain supplies and services as a part of the forces of the Philippine Army. This Service would not be directly concerned with the dates individual personnel became a part of the organization as would Recovered Personnel. Once recognized as an organized force subsequent acts in obtaining supplies and services would be recognized by this Service, even though such acts were in anticipation that additional personnel would soon join.

2. In so far as this Service is concerned recognition date based upon "the earliest date in which the organization may have operated as an organized military unit," regardless of strength, will enable the proper processing and adjudication of procurement claims, as directed by the C-in-C, AFPAC, in Ltr. 17 July 1945.

s/ J. A. Myatt  
t/ J. A. MYATT  
Colonel, JAGD,  
Chief of Claims.

...

FROM: ... TO: G-3 14 December 1945

(3) ...

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(3) GSTFS Corrected Dates of Recognition for Guer-  
091 (P) rillas on Luzon

FROM: Fiscal Director, AFWESPAC  
Phone 48513

TO: G-3

Rothel/jm  
49475  
14 December 1945

1. Prior to letter AG 323.361 (1 Nov 45) DCSO dated 1 November 1945, GHQ, AFPAC, Subject: "Matters Pertaining to the Philippine Army," pursuant to terms of the War Department plan for casualty administration upon reoccupation of the Philippine Islands, the authority to make determinations under the Missing Persons Act and to recognize or withhold recognition of units and personnel as elements and members of the armed forces of the United States rested with the Commanding General, USAFFE. The latter apparently made his determination as evidenced by paragraph 1 of the proposed memorandum which refers to a "List of Recognized Guerrilla Units" (not of record in this office) issued by Headquarters, AFPAC, APO 500 dated 23 September 1945. Such recognitions if uttered are legally firm and lawful benefits flow therefrom.

2. Executive Order No. 21, 28 October 1944, by the President of the Philippines, establishes the "date of entry into active service of the Philippine Army" as the date the individual joined a recognized military force. Legal sanction, with accrual of benefits under U.S. law and from U.S. monies, of the terms of the executive order referred to was conveyed by the publication of the executive order in USAFFE Circular No. 100, 1944. Legal sanction was further conveyed by letter AG 242 (8 Jul 45) PA, (8 Jul 45) GHQ AFPAC, which refers to the executive order and "By Command of General MacArthur," positively provides for current pay from "date of recognition," and authorizes arrears from date of joining the recognized units.

3. Subsequent to letter AG 323.361 (1 Nov 45) DCSO, GHQ, AFPAC, Subject: "Matters Pertaining to the Philippine Army," a power for administering the War Department plan for casualty administration and making determinations under the Missing Persons Act devolved upon the Commanding General, AFWESPAC, by virtue of letter AG 323.361 referred to above and letter dated 13 November 1945, Subject: "Delegation of Authority under Missing Persons Act, War Department." Nothing in the referred to delegation authorizes reversal of determination previously made by the Commanding General, USAFFE. Determination as to recognition dates of units and determination of personal benefits that flowed therefrom were made positively by the Commanding General, USAFFE, as indicated above; therefore, neither the Commanding General, AFWESPAC, nor his officers, have authority to change in any way determinations previously made by the Commanding General, USAFFE. The current attempt to view previous recognition dates as "tentative" and established new recognition dates is without legal foundation and not supportable.

4. This office concurs in the remarks of the Recovered Personnel Section as to the profound political and financial aspects here involved and warns that decisions in the premises must be made only after careful consideration of all phases.

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(3) (Cont'd)

GSTFS  
091 (P)

Corrected Dates of Recognition for Guer-  
rillas on Luzon CWS/EFP/jm

5. Decisions already made will cost the American taxpayer many millions of dollars for costs pertaining to pay, insurance benefits and claims against the United States and any attempt to qualify already legally established recognition dates will add many millions more to the American taxpayer's burden.

s/ C. W. Stonefield  
t/ C. W. STONEFIELD  
Colonel, F D  
Fiscal Director

2511 1088 400000  
Colonel J.V.C.D.  
WASH DC

3. If it is further believed that War Department approval should be obtained of the manner in which the Military Personnel Act is to be applied in cases affecting the Philippine Army, appropriate orders and

of authority be obtained from the Commander-in-Chief, AFAPC. It is recommended that a specification of the extent of his delegation be submitted, complex and of greatest importance. For this reason 5. However, the program which will emanate from such a decision

1. If the recognition dates previously established by CHD the commanding general, AFMPC, from fixing new dates of recog- this office is unable to find any legal authority which would per- by the column headings, to-wit: "tentative date of recognition," are considered to be tentative, which fact appears to be confirmed

FROM: TV

TO: C-3

16 December 1942

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FROM: JA

TO: G-3

19 December 1945

1. If the recognition dates previously established by GHQ are considered to be tentative, which fact appears to be confirmed by the column headings, to-wit: "Tentative Date of Recognition," this office is unable to find any legal authority which prohibits the Commanding General, AFWESPAC, from fixing new dates of recognition as outlined in Courier Note 1.

2. However, the problems which will emanate from such a decision are multiple, complex, and of greatest importance. For this reason it is recommended that a clarification of the extent of his delegation of authority be obtained from the Commander-in-Chief, AFPAC.

3. It is further believed that War Department approval should be obtained of the manner in which the Missing Persons Act is to be applied in cases affecting the Philippine Army, guerrilla units and allied matters.

ASHTON M. HAYNES  
Colonel J.A.G.D.  
Staff Judge Advocate

ASHTON M. HAYNES  
Colonel J.A.G.D.  
Staff Judge Advocate

recognition dates may be made more to the American soldier, a  
the United States and any attempt to change the date of recognition  
of dates for cases pertaining to his maintenance benefits and claims against  
recognition dates may be made more to the American soldier

(3) (cont'd) Odt (b) 22122 copies on hand collected dates of recognition for cases

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D/C &amp; C/S

27 Dec 45

1. The following report is submitted covering certain questions discussed at a conference of all interested staff sections on 21 December 1945:

a. Question: Can a guerrilla unit be designated as a recognized unit ordered into service of the armed forces of the US at a date prior to time when unit was actually incorporated by attachment to US Forces or recognized by C-in-C SWPA?

Answer: It was determined and decided that the Commanding General, AFWESPAC, under authority delegated to him by the Commander-in-Chief in Ltr dated 1 Nov 45, subject: Matters Pertaining to the Philippine Army, may after proper investigation, set the dates of recognition of presently recognized guerrilla units as well as guerrilla units to be recognized in the future, at such times as investigation shows to be warranted.

b. Question: Can payment be made under the MPA to persons having no former USAFFE status for periods of active service with a guerrilla unit after the date unit was incorporated by actual recognition by C-in-C or by attachment to US Forces?

Answer: It was determined that in certain cases an individual in this category may be paid under the provisions of the Missing Persons Act and therefore the overall answer is "Yes." It was further decided and directed that each case would be determined upon its own merits. (See Par 2 below)

c. Question: Can payment be made under the Missing Persons Act to persons having no former USAFFE status for periods of active service with a guerrilla unit prior to time unit was incorporated by actual recognition by C-in-C or by attachment to a US Force?

Answer: This question was determined and decided in the negative.

d. Question: Can guerrillas who became casualties prior to the recognition of their units and whose names were removed from the rosters, because of death or injury, be recognized individually, and the claims of beneficiaries be processed under the Missing Persons Act?

Answer: This question was decided in the affirmative.  
Only names of meritorious individuals who became casualties will be considered for this recognition.

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File GSCP 091 PI

SUBJECT: Report on Conf held 21 Dec 45 (cont'd)

(1) FROM G-3 TO: DC and CS 27 Dec 45

2. In further clarification of Question b above, the attached radio was dispatched to the War Department.

3. The above mentioned conference was attended by the following:

- Gen Leo Donovan G-3
- Gen C H Danielson AG
- Gen E J McGaw Asst G-3
- Col R H Kreuter G-3 PA Div
- Col H P Gard Office C/S
- Col J J Gerhardt AG
- Col W D Paschall G-1
- Col J B Rothnie Fiscal Dir, AFPAC
- Col M H Marcus Dir, Rec Pers
- Lt Col R Bumgardner Legal Adviser, Rec Personnel
- Lt Col B A Wood Exec, Claims Service
- Lt Col W P Moore Exec AG
- Major R L Otte Chief, Guerrilla Affairs Branch
- Major L J Wegman Fiscal Office
- Capt A Yturri JA
- 1st Lt H W Reezes AG, Rec Pers
- 1st Lt E F Rothel Fiscal Office

LEO DONOVAN  
Maj Gen GSC

1 Incl: Radio fr CG AFWESPAC to War Dept dtd 22 Dec 45

M/R: C/N G-3 to DC and CS dtd 27 Dec 45, subject: Report on conference held on 21 Dec 45 covers the decisions relative to recognition and payment of guerrilla units at the subject conference.

Major Randolph G-3 PA Div

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GSCS

WAW/gc

Report on conference held on 21 Dec 45

(2)

FROM: DC & C/S

TO: AG

31 December 1945

THRU: G-3 and G-1

The answers to the queries presented by the Recovered Personnel Division of AG, as resolved at conference held on 21 December and as specifically set forth in the attached check-sheet from G-3 to this office, dated 27 December, are approved.

W. A. WOOD, JR.

(3) FROM: G-3

TO: G-1

Col Kreuter 46153  
3 January 1946

Noted.

E J McGAW  
Brig Gen USA  
Asst G-3

M/R: Conference held on 21 Dec 45, Status of guerrillas under MPA, concurred in and approved as policy by Gen Wood, 31 Dec 45, and on 3 Jan 46, noted, by Brig Gen McGaw.

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HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL

27 March 1946

GSCP

PRESS AND RADIO RELEASE

1. The Commanding General AFWESPAC has announced that, in order to insure just and fair credit for all guerrilla service, revision of recognition dates for all recognized guerrilla units is now under consideration. Where properly substantiated unit histories warrant such action, recognition dates will be revised to credit additional service.

2. a. To facilitate a restudy of unit records it will be necessary that former guerrilla unit commanders, and those who served in key positions under them, cooperate with investigators from Headquarters, AFWESPAC.

b. Unless submitted previously, a detailed history of the organization and activities of the unit concerned should be prepared immediately and transmitted to this headquarters. Original documents supporting the history must be attached thereto. True copies are not entirely acceptable and failure to submit originals will make difficult the proper consideration of the history. Original documents will be filed permanently in the office of the Guerrilla Affairs Branch and will not be returned to the organization concerned. However, documents thus filed may be examined subsequently in that office by properly authorized representatives of the units concerned.

c. If sent by mail, correspondence should be addressed to the Commanding General, AFWESPAC, APO 707. If transmitted by messenger, documents should be delivered to the Guerrilla Affairs Branch located in the old Trade School Area on Ayala Blvd., between Taft Avenue and San Marcelino Street near the City Hall in Manila.

d. Unless submitted previously, it is essential that the former commander of each recognized guerrilla unit file his correct mailing address at this headquarters.

3. a. It is neither necessary nor desirable to apply for a revision of recognition date. All recognized units will be considered as soon as possible and if a recognition date is changed those concerned will be informed promptly. Submission of applications for revision of recognition dates will serve no useful purpose and will delay the decision in each case.

b. After re-investigation of a unit, requests for information regarding the outcome of the investigation should be withheld for at least six weeks. All inquiries and other business related to a recognized guerrilla unit should be handled by the same individual representative of the unit concerned, otherwise the volume of unnecessary correspondence and interviews will seriously impede the determination of all pending cases.

4. 15 March 1946 was announced previously as the limiting date for submission of applications for recognition of guerrilla organizations. Therefore, further applications for recognition of units not yet recognized will not be accepted.

/vld

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APPENDIX 38



VALERIO

HEADQUARTERS  
PHILIPPINES-RYUKYUS COMMAND  
G-3, GUERRILLA AFFAIRS DIVISION  
ROSTER BRANCH

SOP

I. Organization

1. The Roster Branch is composed of an Authentication Section and a Reconstruction Section.
2. Personnel: 1 Officer - Chief of Branch  
1 Civil Service Employee - Adm. Asst.

Authentication Section

Reconstruction Section

- |                              |                              |
|------------------------------|------------------------------|
| 1 Officer - Chief of Section | 1 Officer - Chief of Section |
| 2 EM - Proof Readers         | 8 Officers - Investigators   |
| 15 Clerk Typists*            | 6 Clerk Typists*             |

\* - Number of clerk typists will vary in proportion to the work load.

II. Mission

1. To compile complete, accurate and authentic rosters of recognized guerrilla units for distribution to various agencies concerned with this mission, i.e., Headquarters Armed Forces of the Philippines, Recovered Personnel Division, Guerrilla Affairs Division and Veterans Administration. These completed rosters will be the sole recognized guerrilla rosters and thus constitute the only permanent record of recognized non-casualty guerrillas and thus protect the U.S. Government.
2. All rosters of units recognized prior to 1 December 1947 must be recopied and authenticated from rosters presently in existence, or reconstructed from authentic records on file at Hq AFP, RPD and GAD. This action is necessary because many original rosters are in the following categories:
  - a. Incomplete
  - b. Illogible
  - c. Incorrect in strength
  - d. Altered without authority
  - e. Not on file
  - f. Two rosters of totally different personnel exist for the same recognized unit, each totaling the known unit strength recognized.
  - g. Many names in large recognized commands are duplicated and sometimes triplicated in the unit rosters.
3. Authentication of rosters will be accomplished in the following manner:

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- a. Recognized, or allegedly recognized, rosters of guerrilla units will be withdrawn from AFP files and checked against authentic letters of recognition for strength.
- b. When authenticity of an AFP recognized roster cannot be determined, or where strength listed in the roster does not agree with the strength authorized for recognition by the recognizing authority, the roster will be turned over to the Reconstruction Section for action.
- c. Rosters will be scrutinized and the following authorized corrections will be made thereon by the investigator:
  - (1) Personnel who have been deleted from the roster without authority will be restored.
  - (2) Personnel who have been added to the roster without authority will be deleted.
  - (3) An individual whose name has been lined out on the rosters and that of another substituted without authority will have his name restored and the substituted name will be deleted. If the name lined out has been rendered illegible, both the lined out name and the substituted name will be deleted.
    - (a) All restorations will be made on the roster in RED PENCIL before being forwarded to the typing pool by the officer checking the roster.
    - (b) Information of irrelevant value will be deleted by underlining in BLUE PENCIL.
  - (4) Authentication of rosters when completed and proof read will be accomplished by stamping each page with an approved Hq PHILRYCOM Stamp, marked, "Reconstructed by the Guerrilla Affairs Division Hq PHILRYCOM", and rosters will be signed by the authenticating officer. The completed rosters will constitute the only recognized roster of the unit concerned, all others being declared null and void.
  - (5) Reconstruction of Rosters will be accomplished in the following manner:
    - (a) Officer teams will reconstruct rosters of units for which no recognized rosters exist by making a thorough investigation of all authentic records concerning the unit. Authentic records are listed as follows:
      - (1) AFP finance vouchers
      - (2) Processing records in the files of AFP and RPD
      - (3) Other original pertinent documents

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- (b) Where a recognized roster does not exist it is possible that a monthly roster may exist for the period just prior to the official recognition date of the unit. A cross check of personnel listed on such a roster against the pay vouchers in the AFP files will indicate the personnel to be included on the reconstructed recognized roster.
- (c) Where a monthly roster, as indicated above, does not exist, processing records of a unit may be drawn from AFP and checked against the AFP finance vouchers. Individuals processed and paid will be listed on the reconstructed roster as recognized guerrillas.
- (d) Initial rosters of regular Philippine Army units, inducted directly into service from recognized guerrilla units, is a source from which the names of guerrillas of recognized units may be determined. This will be accomplished by cross checking the initial Philippine Army roster with the last monthly roster of the guerrilla unit to determine which members of the Philippine Army unit also appear on the monthly roster of the guerrilla unit.
- (e) Rosters reconstructed in their entirety will be compiled in one of two standard forms:
  - (1) Alphabetically by unit without regard to rank.
  - (2) Alphabetically and numbered serially throughout the command with rank, unit designation, and date or period of recognition opposite the individual's name.
- (f) In reconstruction of commands where duplication of subordinate units or duplication of names of individuals on rosters is not a factor, the method indicated in paragraph c (5) (e) (1), above, will be the simplest and most expeditious method.
- (g) In reconstruction of commands where duplication of subordinate units or names, or both, are a factor, the method indicated in paragraph c (5) (e) (2), above, will insure that duplications are deleted.
- (h) Authentication of rosters will be accomplished in the same manner as in paragraph c (4) above.

### III. Disposition of AFP Rosters

All rosters drawn from AFP files will be retained in the files of G-3, GAD, and authenticated, reconstructed copies will be furnished AFP in the place of those withdrawn.

*John O. Keider*  
 JOHN O. KEIDER  
 Capt., Inf  
 Chief, Roster Branch

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ROSTER OF OFFICERS ASSIGNED AND/OR ATTACHED

\* = DIRECTORS

TO GUERRILLA MISSION

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>BRANCH</u>	<u>ASN</u>	<u>DATE OF ASSIGNMENT</u>	<u>ASSIGNMENT</u>	<u>DATE DEPARTED</u>
* LILLARD, Gerald F	Col	GSC	0-16770	13 Jun 46	Director, GAD	30 Jun 47
ANDERSON, Bernard L	Lt Col	AC	0-32466	10 Dec 46	ADVISOR	27 Sep 47
* CARNAHAN, Hugh L	Lt Col	CMP	0-122016	17 Apr 46	Chief, GAB	27 Dec 46
CLARK, Edgar A	Lt Col	FA	0-19815	4 Jan 47	Indiv Br, GAD	19 Mar 47
CUSHING, James M	Lt Col	GE	0-2027773	27 May 46	Exec O, GAB	9 Dec 46
GUHL, Robert C	Lt Col	CAC	0-241940	May 46	Exec O, GAB	9 Dec 46
* HANES, Wallace M	Lt Col	GSC	0-33384	9 Mar 47	Chief, Indiv Br	
				1 Jul 47	Director, GAD	30 Jun 48
PALOS, Stuart J	Lt Col	Inf	0-454229	18 Nov 46	Chief, Unit Br, GAD	23 Jul 47
RAMSEY, Edwin P	Lt Col	Cav	0-368746	13 Aug 46	Unit Br, GAD	Jan 47
* SHAFTOE, Herbert L	Lt Col	AGD	0-115430	22 Dec 45	Chief, GAB	20 Jul 46
COATES, Vincent K	Maj	FA	0-303815	10 Apr 46	Adm Sec, GAD	17 Mar 47
DAVIS, Allen K	Maj	Inf	0-207451	25 Apr 46	Exec O, GAB	10 Jul 46
FEUCHTER, Joseph J	Maj	CMP	0-336187	26 Jan 46	Exec Sec, GAB	15 Apr 46
FRAZIER, Sydney F	Maj	Inf	0-33540	15 Mar 46	Exec O, GAD	27 Feb 47
HUEBSCH, Blaise W	Maj	CAC	0-1041796	30 Nov 46	Inves Sec, GAB	Jan 46
LAPHAM, Robert B	Maj	Inf	0-379114	23 Apr 47	GAD	7 Sep 47
* MILLER, George	Maj			10 May 45	Chief, GAS	Nov 45
MURRAY, Douglas C	Maj	Inf	0-24899	22 Mar 46	Historical Br, GAD	4 Jan 48
* OTTI, Raymond L	Maj	Inf	0-1047711	20 Nov 45	Chief, GAB	Feb 46
SLOAN, Richard V	Maj	FA	0-258026	30 Nov 46	Chief, Indiv Br, GAD	30 Jun 48
SPIELMAN, Robert B	Maj	Inf	0-1686152	15 Mar 46	Exec O, GAB	29 Jun 46
TITUS, George W	Maj	CMP	0-480787	25 Apr 46	Chief, Adm Sec, GAB	27 Dec 46
VOORHEES, Nelson A	Maj	Inf	0-141081	4 Dec 46	Exec O, GAD	30 Jun 48
WENTZELL, Cecil H	Maj	CAC	0-349352	6 Jan 47	Chief, Unit Br, GAD	26 Aug 47

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>BRANCH</u>	<u>ASN</u>	<u>DATE OF ASSIGNMENT</u>	<u>ASSIGNMENT</u>	<u>DATE DEPARTED</u>
BOYLE, Charles T	Capt	Inf	0-33074	10 Sep 47	Chief, Adm Br, GAD	13 May 48
BRENNAN, Bruce E	Capt	CE	0-1116116	21 Jan 46	Exec Sec, GAB	7 Jun 46
BUCHANAN, Stephen C	Capt	CAC	0-39182	27 Jan 47	Chief, Cas Sec, GAD	30 Jun 48
COZENS, Bradbury B	Capt	Inf	0-1052725	19 Oct 46	Chief, Non-Cas Sec, GAD	8 Oct 47
CURFMAN, Ralph H	Capt	Inf	0-1288713	1 Feb 47	Non-Cas Sec, GAD	6 Jul 47
CURTIS, Elbert R	Capt	FA	0-36547	3 Mar 47	Chief, Unit Br, GAD	30 Jun 48
CUSHMAN, Harold M	Capt	MAC	0-2035802	1 Jul 46	Adm Sec, GAB	8 Apr 47
GRAHAM, Robert M	Capt	Cav	0-2037117	30 Jul 45	GAB	20 Mar 46
HIRSCHFELDER, George	Capt	Inf	0-1314914	15 Mar 46	Inves Sec, GAB	14 Jul 47
KEIDER, John O	Capt	Inf	0-397548	22 Nov 46	Roster Br, GAD	30 Jun 48
KELLEY, Lee W	Capt				GAB	46
IESNESKI, Stanley V	Capt	CAC	0-32053	31 May 47	Chief, Non-Cas Sec, GAD	30 Jun 48
MacFADDIN, John W	Capt	Inf	0-172582	15 Aug 47	Cas Sec, GAD	Dec 47
McBRAYER, Stewart W	Capt	CAC	0-509597	Feb 46	GAB	46
MITCHELL, Allan W	Capt	CAC	0-31704	16 Jan 47	Non-Cas Sec, GAD	30 Jun 48
MITTENTHAL, Harry H	Capt	Inf	0-890239	9 Sep 46	Chief, Supply Sec, GAD	30 Jun 48
MOREHAUSEN	Capt				GAS	10 Dec 45
MORTON, Robert L	Capt	Ord	0-539879	Nov 45	Unit Br, GAD	1 Nov 47
NEASE, Darius H	Capt	CWS	0-1036319	15 Mar 46	Adm Sec, GAB	30 Oct 46
NORTON, John H	Capt	Inf	0-1041260	19 Mar 47	Unit Br, GAD	14 Apr 47
SHAFFER, Clarence H Jr	Capt	FA	0-1179198	45	GAB	20 Mar 46
TABORA, Benigno G Jr	Capt	Inf	0-890528	30 Nov 45	Roster Br, GAD	30 Jun 48
TURNER, Frank H	Capt	Inf	0-1284430	15 Mar 46	Chief, Cas Sec, GAB	24 Jun 46
VAN OVEREN, Jack K	Capt	CAC	0-1054849	27 Jan 47	Cas Sec, GAD	30 Jun 48
WILSON, Rector C	Capt	Inf	0-382393	11 Oct 46	Chief, Cas Sec, GAD	4 Jan 48
WHITE, Harry S	Capt	CMP	0-1797401	8 Jun 46	Chief, Cas Sec, GAB	Oct 47
ALBERTINI, George E	1st Lt	CAC	0-13405153	27 Jan 46	Inves Sec, GAB	21 Apr 46
ALBRIGHT, Marion C	1st Lt	FA	0-1179758	3 Mar 47	Roster Br, GAD	30 Jun 48
AITMAN, Joseph C	1st Lt	CAC	0-1061301	27 Jan 47	Roster Br, GAD	30 Jun 48
BOSCHER, Harry W	1st Lt	Inf	0-1043873	2 Dec 46	Inves Sec, GAB	20 Dec 46
BREAZ, Pete C	1st Lt	Inf	0-1340980	10 Oct 47	Roster Br, GAD	17 Mar 48
BRITTAIN, Ronald C	1st Lt	FA	0-531824	Feb 46	GAB	Unknown
BROMLEY, Bruce Jr	1st Lt	Inf	0-1340982	10 Oct 46	Unit Br, GAD	5 Mar 48
BROWN, Jewett J B	1st Lt	Inf	0-1825739	2 Dec 46	Unit Sec, GAB	9 Dec 46
BURNETT, Harry H	1st Lt	Inf	0-26906	2 Dec 46	Unit Br, GAD	14 Mar 47

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SCHILLING, Joseph F	1st Lt	Inf	0-1330969	20 Nov 46	Gas Sec, GAD	
SCHWANDA, Benedict C	1st Lt	Inf	0-1057240	22 Jan 46	GAB	20 Mar 46
SHARP, William G Jr	1st Lt	Inf	0-1319905	27 Feb 46	GAB	15 Apr 46
SIROTNAK, Edward R	1st Lt	FA	0-11831894	27 Feb 46	GAB	22 Mar 46
SONDERS, Leon J	1st Lt	CAC	0-1062446	3 Dec 46	Unit Br, GAD	19 Jul 47
STANGE, John R	1st Lt	Inf	0-1334514	15 Mar 46	Unit Sec, GAB	27 Aug 46
VON OTTERSTEDT, Wolf D	1st Lt	Inf	0-1019417	16 Jun 47	Unit Br, GAD	47
WESTERBERG, Roy H	1st Lt	FA	0-1183215	27 Feb 46	GAB	22 Mar 46
SEXTON	Lt				GAS	10 Dec 45
WORTMANN	Lt				GAS	10 Dec 45
ALLEN, Rollie E	2nd Lt	Inf	0-1339745	15 Mar 46	Inves Sec, GAB	25 Aug 46
AUBUCHON, Leonard J	2nd Lt	Inf	0-185963	15 Mar 46	Inves Sec, GAB	20 Jul 46
BENESTAD, Torleaf H	2nd Lt	Inf	0-1340153	15 Mar 46	Chief, Indiv Sec, GAB	10 Aug 46
BENTLEY, Preston S	2nd Lt	Inf	0-1340045	15 Mar 46	Chief, Indiv Sec, GAB	21 Oct 46
BENTON, James R	2nd Lt	Inf	0-39486	2 Dec 46	Unit Br, GAD	18 Apr 47
BETTS, Peter R	2nd Lt	Inf	0-1339955	15 Mar 46	Unit Br, GAD	13 Jan 47
BOND, George R	2nd Lt	Inf	0-1330383	13 Mar 46	Inves Sec, GAB	15 Jul 46
BOOTH, John H	2nd Lt	Inf	0-1326607	2 Dec 46	Unit Br, GAD	5 Feb 47
BRABSON, Max L	2nd Lt	Inf	0-1338786	15 Mar 46	Inves Sec, GAB	16 Nov 46
BROWN, Wilmore K	2nd Lt	Inf	0-1340983	19 Oct 46	Unit Br, GAD	17 Mar 47
CANNON, George E	2nd Lt	CMP	0-1799939	15 Mar 46	Inves Sec, GAB	15 Apr 46
CARROLL, James W	2nd Lt	Inf	0-1339253	15 Mar 46	Inves Sec, GAB	12 Jun 46
DE SILVA, Howard C	2nd Lt	Inf	0-1340063	15 Mar 46	Unit Br, GAD	10 Mar 47
FLORY, Morris S	2nd Lt	Cav	0-1030463	15 Mar 46	Unit Br, GAD	29 Jan 47
HANOLD, John F Jr	2nd Lt		0-1339987	15 Mar 46	GAB	27 Mar 46
HAWFIELD, William D	2nd Lt		0-1119755	26 Apr 46	Indiv Sec, GAB	20 Jun 46
KLIE, George D	2nd Lt		0-1339728	15 Mar 46	Inves Sec, GAB	6 Jun 46
KOSTKA, Bohuslav Z	2nd Lt	Inf	0-1339883	15 Mar 46	Unit Sec, GAB	24 Nov 46
MANZANO, Jaime H	2nd Lt	Inf	0-1896939	Feb 47	Unit Br, GAD	30 Jun 48
McDONALD, Richard T	2nd Lt	Inf	0-1341023	19 Oct 46	Unit Br, GAD	17 Mar 47
MEYER, Matthewson B	2nd Lt		0-1340096	15 Mar 46	Inves Sec, GAB	25 May 46
MILLS, Avery G	2nd Lt	Cav	0-1031010	3 Dec 46	Unit Br, GAD	17 Mar 47
MURPHY, Eugene F	2nd Lt	Inf	0-1339740	15 Mar 46	Inves Sec, GAB	8 Jul 46
FERRITTE, Clyde L	2nd Lt	FA	0-2023701	27 Feb 46	GAB	20 Mar 46

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
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<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>BRANCH</u>	<u>ASN</u>	<u>DATE OF ASSIGNMENT</u>	<u>ASSIGNMENT</u>	<u>DATE DEPARTED</u>
BIBEL, Edward S	1st Lt	FA	0-1184466	2 Feb 46	GAB	20 Mar 46
CABIAO, Protacio	1st Lt	Inf	0-2032075	30 Nov 45	Records Sec, GAD	18 Jun 47
CALLAN, Howard C	1st Lt	CAC	0-1055797	Feb 46	GAB	22 Mar 46
CAMPBELL, George A	1st Lt	CE	0-1109606	30 Nov 45	Inves Sec, GAB	21 Jun 46
CARROLL, Ernest A	1st Lt	CAC	0-1059734	12 Nov 47	Non-Cas Sec, GAD	1 Nov 47
CLARK, Ridgway J II	1st Lt	CAC	0-1055290	7 Jun 47	Non-Cas Sec, GAD	30 Jun 48
DONNAN, James M	1st Lt	Inf	0-1055267	22 Jan 46	GAB	20 Mar 46
DONNELLY, Russell B	1st Lt	CAC	0-1053954	28 Jul 47	Non-Cas Sec, GAD	30 Jun 48
FONDREN, Gene N	1st Lt	Inf	0-1340995	16 Jan 47	Unit Br, GAD	12 Mar 48
EISENHOUR, John R	1st Lt	FA	0-1184813	27 Feb 46	GAB	16 Apr 46
GABRIEL, Walter T	1st Lt	CE	0-584965	16 Nov 46	Cas Sec, GAD	30 Jan 47
GAMBLE, Robert B	1st Lt	Inf	0-1314702	15 Mar 46	Cas Sec, GAB	29 Jun 46
GLAMMANN, Henry W	1st Lt	Cav	0-332012	Feb 46	GAB	20 Mar 46
GODWIN, Hollis E	1st Lt	FA	0-1171555	3 Mar 47	Unit Br, GAD	22 Jun 47
GRAVES, Max W	1st Lt	FA	0-1184832	Feb 46	GAB	20 Mar 46
HINTZ, Harold C	1st Lt	FA	0-1179892	Feb 46	GAB	20 Mar 46
HOCHE, Mervin P	1st Lt	CAC	0-1176060	10 Apr 47	Non-Cas Sec, GAD	30 Jun 48
HOMEWOOD, Charles L	1st Lt	Cav	0-1824619	14 Nov 46	Roster Br, GAD	30 Jun 48
JACKSON, Austin F	1st Lt	FA	0-1179461	Feb 46	GAB	20 Mar 46
KEMPER, George E	1st Lt	CAC	0-1043381	10 Jan 47	Unit Br, GAD	30 Jun 48
KOENIG, James R	1st Lt	FA	0-1179126	Feb 46	GAB	20 Mar 46
KOLESAR, Armand M	1st Lt	CAC	0-36783	27 Jan 47	Cas Sec, GAD	30 Jun 48
LANDGRAFF, Arthur A	1st Lt	CAC	0-155891	27 Jan 46	GAB	20 Mar 46
MacMILLAN, William D	1st Lt	Inf	0-1341021	20 Nov 46	Roster Br, GAD	30 Jun 48
MASTERS, James R	1st Lt	CAC	0-1061183	Feb 46	GAB	15 Apr 46
MEHAFFIE, Harold B	1st Lt	CAC	0-1044615	10 Apr 47	Non-Cas, GAD	30 Jun 48
MIDDLETON, Charles P	1st Lt	Inf	0-2038010	30 Nov 45	Inves Sec, GAB	21 Apr 46
MULLEN, Richard V	1st Lt	CAC	0-1081570	27 Feb 46	GAB	15 Apr 46
NEUBAUER, Kenneth H	1st Lt	CAC	0-1062031	27 Jan 47	Roster Br, GAD	30 Jun 48
NEWMAN, Nathan J	1st Lt	CAC	0-1054748	27 Feb 46	GAB	22 Mar 46
FERRIGUE, Paul A	1st Lt	CAC	0-2023587	27 Feb 46	GAB	21 Apr 46
PIERCE, Lester W Jr	1st Lt	CAC	0-1041275	18 Jan 47	Chief, Records Sec, GAD	30 Jun 48
REDDEN, R T	1st Lt	FA	0-1176471	45	Interview Sec, GAB	Feb 46
REIDY, William J	1st Lt	CAC	0-27679	20 Mar 47	Non-Cas Sec, GAD	4 Jan 48
RETTSTATT, Karl T	1st Lt	Inf	0-1341040	20 Nov 46	Non-Cas Sec, GAD	30 Jun 48
SADLER, Woodson A	1st Lt	FA	0-1168060	12 May 47	Non-Cas Sec, GAD	30 Jun 48

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>BRANCH</u>	<u>ASN</u>	<u>DATE OF ASSIGNMENT</u>	<u>ASSIGNMENT</u>	<u>DATE DEPARTED</u>
POTTER, Donald E	2nd Lt	Inf	0-1340111	15 Mar 46	Inves Sec, GAB	10 Aug 46
ROTH, Richard R	2nd Lt	Inf	0-1341042	10 Oct 46	Unit Br, GAD	10 Mar 47
SCHREIBER, Kenneth E	2nd Lt		0-1340123	15 Mar 46	GAB	8 Apr 46
SHUGARS, James E	2nd Lt	Cav	0-1019626	Feb 46	GAB	9 May 46
SKENE, George N	2nd Lt	Inf	0-1334920	26 Apr 46	Inves Sec, GAB	17 Jun 46
SMITH, Glen E	2nd Lt	Inf	0-1332003	22 Jan 46	Chief, Indiv Sec, GAB	21 Apr 46
SMOLEN, Victor	2nd Lt	Inf	0-1339119	15 Mar 46	Unit Sec, GAB	24 Nov 46
THOMPSON, Donald M	2nd Lt	Inf	0-1339927	15 Mar 46	Unit Br, GAD	12 Jun 47
WEAVER, David R	2nd Lt	Inf	0-1336154	15 Mar 46	Supply Sec, GAB	27 Aug 46
WEAVER, James E	2nd Lt	Inf	0-1340142	15 Mar 46	Indiv Sec, GAB	10 Aug 46
WEBER, Adelbert T	2nd Lt	FA	0-1186558	15 Mar 46	Unit Sec, GAB	23 Aug 46
WILCOX, Grant S	2nd Lt	Inf	0-1339330	24 Dec 46	Unit Br, GAD	20 Jan 47



APPENDIX 140

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ORGANIZATION CHART

1 January 1947  
 Guerrilla Affairs Division  
 G-3, PHILRYCOM  
 (As proposed to War Department,  
 no reply received)

**DIRECTOR**  
Proposed  
 1 Officer

CONSOLIDATION  
Proposed  
 125 Officers  
 26 EM  
 3 Civ Serv  
 150 Civ  
 304

**UNIT BRANCH**  
Proposed  
 2 Officers  
 1 EM  
 3 Civ

**UNIT BRANCH**  
Proposed  
 7 Officers  
 4 EM  
 1 Civ Serv  
 53 Civ

**ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH**  
Proposed  
 2 Officers  
 2 EM  
 1 Civ Serv  
 16 Civ

**INDIVIDUAL BRANCH**  
Proposed  
 2 Officers  
 1 Civ Serv  
 2 Civ

**INVESTIGATION SECTION**  
Proposed  
 57 Officers  
 5 EM  
 7 Civ

**REVISION SECTION**  
Proposed  
 16 Officers  
 6 Civ

**NON CASUALTY SECTION**  
Proposed  
 12 Officers  
 4 EM  
 14 Civ

**CASUALTY**  
Proposed  
 22 Officers  
 6 EM  
 28 Civ

**MESSAGE CENTER**  
Proposed  
 1 EM  
 3 Civ

**INTERVIEW**  
Proposed  
 1 Officer  
 2 Civ

**SUPPLY & MOTOR**  
Proposed  
 1 Officer  
 1 EM  
 2 Civ

**RECORDS SECTION**  
Proposed  
 2 Officers  
 2 EM  
 15 Civ

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ORGANIZATION CHART

1 January 1948 - 30 June 1948  
 Guerrilla Affairs Division  
 G-3, PHIRYCOM

<u>Director</u>		
1	1	Officer
1	1	WD Civ
1	1	Local Civ

<u>CONSOLIDATION</u>		
41	31	Officers
8	5	Officers (PA)
5	4	EM
19	19	EM (PS)
3	3	EM (PA)
2	2	Civ Serv
72	72	Local Civ
150	136	

<u>Historical Br</u>		
1	0	Officer
1	1	Local Civ

<u>Executive</u>		
1	1	Officer

<u>Roster Reconstruction Br</u>		
6	1	Officers
0	1	Local Civ

<u>Units Br</u>		
3	25	Officers
4	17	EM (PS)
1	05	EM (PA)
2	2	Local Civ

<u>Administrative Br</u>		
2	1	Officers
1	1	EM
1	0	EM (PS)
0	1	EM (PA)
5	2	Local Civ

<u>Individual Br</u>		
2	1	Officers
1	0	EM
1	1	Local Civ

<u>Construction Sec</u>		
6	3	Officers
3	1	Officers (PA)
7	6	Local Civ

<u>Authentication &amp; Copy Sec</u>		
0	1	WD Civ
0	1	EM
0	1	EM (PS)
7	3	Local Civ

<u>Casualty Sec</u>		
8	9	Officers
4	4	Officers (PA)
3	4	EM (PS)
20	24	Local Civ

<u>Non-Casualty Sec</u>		
8	9	Officers
2	1	EM (PS)
14	20	Local Civ

<u>Message Center</u>		
1	1	EM
4	3	EM (PS)
3	2	Local Civ

<u>Supply Sec</u>		
1	1	Officer
1	0	EM
4	5	EM (PS)
1	1	EM (PA)
1	1	Local Civ

<u>Records Sec</u>		
2	2	Officers
1	1	EM
1	2	EM (PS)
10	7	Local Civ

<u>Interview Sec</u>		
1	0	Officer (PA)
1	1	EM (PA)
0	2	EM (PS)

Note: Reconsideration Section and Revision Section dissolved.  
 Roster Reconstruction Branch activated 1 January 1948.


Key: 1. Black figures denote proposed.  
 2. Red figures denote actual on hand.

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











**ORGANIZATION CHART**

June 1947 to 31 Dec 47  
 Guerrilla Affairs Division,  
 G-3, PHILRYCOM

Note: Historical Branch  
 activated 10 Sep 47



CONSOLIDATION		
41	35	Officers
8	6	Officers (PA)
5	4	EM
19	19	EM (PS)
3	3	EM (PA)
2	2	Civ Serv
72	72	Civ
150	141	



Key: 1. Black figures denote proposed  
 2. Red figures denote actual on hand

APPENDIX 40

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HEADQUARTERS, HUNTERS VETERANS LEGION  
1046 Felix Huertas St., Manila

OFFICE OF THE TREASURER-GENERAL

27 March, 1947.

SUBJECT: Explanation of Non Fulfillment of  
Obligation, Asked for

TO : Hunters MAURICIO CARLOS

175 Fraternidad St., Pandacan, Manila

1. According to the records of this Office, you are carried as M A J O R in the roster of the Service Company as S-4 Miguel Ver Regiment, and as such, you are duty bound to render an obligation equivalent to two (2) months officer's base pay of ONE THOUSAND PESOS ONLY (₱ 1,000.00), and to include the corresponding quarter allowance of THREE HUNDRED TWENTY AND NO/100 PESOS ONLY (₱ 320.00), married, totalling ONE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED TWENTY AND NO/100 PESOS ONLY (₱ 1,320.00) of which you have paid N O T H I N G (₱ xxxxx) only, leaving a balance of ONE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED (₱) still due this office. TWENTY AND NO/100 PESOS ONLY (₱1,320.00)

2. Up to now, you have not even shown an intention to give what is due this Organization, considering the length of time you have been recognized, processed, paid and discharged for the period, 9 Jan - 2 Sept. '45, as a member of the MVR.

3. In view thereof, you are hereby directed to explain why drastic action should not be taken against you for willful failure to comply with the requirements called for in a resolution of the Board of Directors and executed in a Memorandum of the Commander, dated 6 February 1947.

For the Commander:

s/ Honorio Guerrero  
HONORIO GUERRERO  
Treasurer-General

DIST:  
1 person concerned  
1 file

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APPENDIX 41

15

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

*W. H. H. H. H.*

16th October, 1943

PATRIOTS OF THE PHILIPPINES!

It is with a sense of deep satisfaction that I convey to you herein a message that the President of the United States transmitted to the Congress on 6th October, 1943, recommending specific measures designed to provide for the full post-War rehabilitation and future economic and national security of the Philippines:

“To the Congress of the United States:

Since the Japanese launched their attack on the Philippine Islands, I have on several occasions addressed messages on behalf of the American People to the courageous people of the Philippines - expressing our admiration of their heroism and loyalty. I have assured them that the Government of the United States of America will see to it that their independence will be promptly established and - still more important - that it will be protected. The resources of the United States, in men and material, stand behind that pledge to the people of the Philippines. We shall keep that promise just as we have kept every promise which the United States has made to the Filipino people.

The Philippine Government, now in the United States, has been collaborating with the rest of the United Nations in the united task of destroying our common enemies in the East and in the West. As I stated on August 12, 1943, the United States in practice, regards the Philippines as having now the same status as the Governments of other independent nations - in fact all the attributes of complete and respected nationhood - and I am sure that the American people believe that the Filipino people have earned the right juridically to be free and independent. The date now set by statute and by the vote of the people and the Legislature of the Philippine Islands for independence is July 4, 1946. It is possible, however, that the fortunes of war will permit an earlier consummation of this joint will of the American and Filipino peoples and I, therefore, recommend legislation by the Congress giving the President the authority, after consultation with the President of the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands, to advance the date provided in existing law and to proclaim the legal independence of the Philippines, as a separate and self-governing nation, as soon as feasible.

If the Congress takes this action, there are several steps which, in my opinion, are necessary to make good our pledge that the independence of the Philippines will be protected in the future and to give them the opportunity of economic rehabilitation which is their due.

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I, therefore, also recommend:

1. That the Congress make provision authorizing the President of the United States and the President of the Commonwealth of the Philippines to enter into immediate negotiations and take the necessary steps to provide for full security for the Philippines, for the mutual protection of the Islands and of the United States and for the future maintenance of peace in the Pacific, and -
2. That the Congress make provisions for determining the adjustment necessary in the existing provisions of law which govern the economic relations between the United States and the Philippines, so as to assist in making the Philippines, as an independent nation, economically secure wherever possible, and -
3. That the Congress make provisions for the physical and economic rehabilitation of the Philippines made necessary by the ravages of war which the invaders have inflicted upon them. All of this is due to the Filipino people in recognition of their heroic role in this war, the political ties which have bound us together, and the bonds of friendship which will join us together in the future. Such action on the part of the Congress would assure the Philippine people again of our sincerity of purpose and of our resolution to accord them as soon as feasible the legal status of complete freedom, independence and nationhood to which, as a member of the United Nations, they are entitled.

Franklin D. Roosevelt.

The gallant manner in which you have met the issues of war and despite hardship and peril, arising from the temporary occupation of Philippine soil by a ruthless foe, have remained steadfastly true to those great principles of human liberty to which Americans and Filipinos in common subscribe, has commanded my deep admiration.

I am fully conscious of the heavy burden that is resting upon you during this trying period in Philippine history, and along with the President's proposals for your future post-War welfare and security, I take this opportunity to convey to you my personal assurances that our military operations, designed to effect your complete liberation, are proceeding successfully - and that foremost of my plans of action envisage the day that I shall return to Philippine soil to lead our combined forces in a destructive blow aimed at your permanent release from the threat of subjugation by the Japanese Empire.

*Walter S. Ashby*

General, U.S. Army,  
Commander in Chief.

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