



~~SECRET~~

MINDANAO  
10TH MILITARY DISTRICT  
15 APRIL 1944

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA  
Military Intelligence Section  
General Staff  
**MINDANAO**  
**AIR CENTERS**



- PROVINCIAL BOUNDARIES
- 1ST & 2ND CLASS ROADS
- MAIN TRAILS
- OPERATIONAL AIRDROMES
- AIRDROMES UNDER CONSTRUCTION
- SEAPLANE BASES (KNOWN)





SITUATION OF FRIENDLY ARMED FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES

1. Luzon, Mindoro, Marinduque and Masbate:

- a) Luzon: Pettit, Shafer free Luzon. Atwell & Ramsey have Hq near Antipolo, Rizal. Frank Johnson (Liguan Coal Mines), Rumsel (Altaco Transport, Rapu Rapu Id), Dick Wisner (Masbate Mines), all on Ticao Id.\*
- b) Ilocos-Abra: Number Americans free this area.\*
- c) Bulacan: 28 Feb: 40 men Baliuag under Lt Pacifico Cabrerias. Sev guerr leaders Bulacan, largest being under Lorenzo Villa, ex-PS, w/2000 well armed men in "77th Regt". BC co-op w/guerr thruout the prov.\*
- d) Manila: 24 Mar: FREE PHILIPPINES has excellent coverage Manila, Bataan, Corregidor, Cavite, Batangas, Pampanga, Pangasinan, Tayabas, La Union, and larger airbases & milit installations.\*
- e) Tayabas: 19 Mar: Gen Gaudencia Veyra & guerr hit 3 towns on Bondoc Penin: Catanuan, Macalelon & Genpuna & occupied them. Many BC reported killed.\*
- f) Bicol Peninsula: 30 Mar: Capt Zabat claims to have unified all 5th MD but Sorsogon.\*
- g) Masbate: 2 Apr Recd: Villajada unit killed off by Maj Tanciongco for bribe by Japs.\*

\*COMMENTS: (1a) These men, but Ramsey, not previously reported. Ramsey previously reported in Nueva Ecija. (1b) Probably attached to guerrilla forces under Gov. Ablan. (1c) These groups not previously reported. (1d) FP organized before surrender. Agent, Col. Manzano now on Mindanao has been authorized to coordinate Luzon intelligence. (1e) Veyra guerrillas active since 1942. (1f) Zabat is a Peralta protege, details of unit not known, but believed to operate north of Legaspi. (1g) Masbate situation not clear. Apparently conflict between groups over command authority.

2. Palawan and Visayas:

- a) Panay: 14 Mar: Guerr patrols raided Tiring landing field captured Jap & maps.
- b) Leyte: 11 Mar: Strong patrol ambushed Jap landing party Liloan, Panaon Id killing 96!
- c) Samar: 10 Mar: Merritt guerr raided Catarman. Food shortage serious. 4 Apr: Men of 98th Regt under Merritt in W Samar surrendered to the Japs.

3. Mindanao and Sulu:

- a) Zamboanga: 27 Mar: Successful guerr ambush Jap patrol 6 km N, & at San Ramon Penal Colony.
- b) Agusan: 11 Apr: Guerr constr 2 new airfields, one to be ready by June, w/out surface but o.k. for use until late Sept.
- c) Surigao: 2 Apr: Guerr launch shot down Type "O" Navy float plane, Dinagat Id.



~~SECRET~~  
 ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE  
 PHILIPPINES  
 15 April 1944

**UNCLASSIFIED**

The following is a preliminary list of units last identified in the Philippines; re-examination and re-evaluation of sources may result in some changes.

Units	Date	Mobile Combat	Base Defense	Service	Total
14 Army Hq	3/44			?	
2 Area Army Hq	3/44			?	
Poss El 14 Div	2/44				
16 Div	1/44	16000			16000
El 32 Div	?	?			?
El 36 Div	2/44	4000?			4000?
30 IMB	2/44	7000			7000
31 IMB	?	7000			7000
32 IMB	3/44	7000			7000
33 IMB	3/44	7000			7000
142 Inf Regt & Misc Att's	11/43	4000			4000
13 Ind Inf Regt?*	8/43	4000			4000
10 Ind Gar Unit	7/42	1500			1500
11 Ind Gar Unit (Cebu)	1/44	1500			1500
17 Ind Gar Unit	7/43	1500			1500
1 Hvy Arty Regt	1/42	1000			1000
3 Ind Mtn Arty Regt	4/42	1300			1300
8 Med Arty Regt	12/41	1000			1000
2 Ind Hvy Arty Bbry	1/42	175			175
1 Fd Rcp1 Regt	9/43	3000			3000
2 Ind Engr Regt	11/43		850		850
21 Ind Engr Regt	2/44		850		850
34 Ind Engr Regt	11/43		704		704
35 Ind Engr Regt	3/43		850		850
56 Ind Engr Regt	12/43		850		850
58 Ind Engr Regt	12/43		850		850
El 56 Ind Engr Bn	12/43		500		500
El 58 Ind Engr Bn	12/43		500		500
4 Ship Engr Regt	1/44		1200		1200
6 Ship Engr Regt			1200		1200
11 Ship Engr Regt	1/44		1200		1200
18 Ship Engr Regt	2/44		1200		1200
43 Ind Fd A/A Co	1/44		161		161
44 Ind Fd A/A Co	1/44		162		162
51 Ind Fd A/A Co	1/44		160		160
El 3 Drome Bn	3/44		200		200
32 Drome Bn	10/42		400		400
61 L of C Area Unit	10/42			200	200
63 L of C Area Unit	3/42			200	200
299 L of C Unit	9/42			200	200
6 Fd Well Const Co	3/42			150	150
101 Land Duty Co	3/42			300	300
103 Land Duty Co	10/42?			300	300
104 Land Duty Co	7/43			300	300
110 Land Duty Co	10/42			300	300
111 Land Duty Co	1/42			300	300
124 Land Duty Co	3/42			300	300
37 Const Duty Co	1/42			400	400
56 Const Duty Co	10/42			400	400
78 Bdg Const Co	3/42			500	500
51 Ind Tpt Co	3/42			175	175
62 Ind M/T Bn	1/42			550	550
63 Ind M/T Bn	5/43			550	550
210 Ind M/T Co	6/43			175	175
259 Ind M/T Co	1/42			175	175
260 Ind M/T Co	6/43			175	175
297 Ind M/T Co	1/44			175	175
23 Fd Fr Depot	8/42			600	600

**UNCLASSIFIED**

Units	Date	Mobile Combat	Base Defense	Service	Total
Main Force 3 Fd Repair Depot	2/44			50	50
Branch Force 3 Fd Repair Depot	2/44			50	50
Br 1 Ship Tpt Comd	7/43			100	100
Br 4 Ship Tpt Comd	11/43			100	100
Br 4 Ship Tpt Comd	6/43			100	100
Sub Br 4 Ship Tpt Comd	6/43			50	50
E1 5 Ship Tpt Comd	2/44			25	25
2 Ship Tpt Area Unit	2/44			100	100
36 Div Sea Tpt Unit	3/44			500	500
52 Div Sea Tpt Unit	2/44			500	500
25 Anchorage	5/43			200	200
37 Anchorage	6/42			200	200
Hq 42 Anchorage	6/42			75	75
44 Anchorage	5/43			200	200
57 Anchorage				200	200
47 Sea Duty Co	10/42			350	350
60 Sea Duty Co	6/42			350	350
101 Sea Duty Co	5/43			350	350
9 Ship A/A Regt	8/43			1200	1200
13 Fd Meteorological Unit	2/44			350	350
22 Fd Meteorological Unit	8/43			350	350
2 Telegraph Regt	10/42			500	500
3 Temp Fxd, Radio Pl	1/44			50	50
17 L of C Medic Unit	3/42			200	200
17 L of C Hospital	5/43			200	200
61 L of C Hospital	5/43			200	200
63 L of C Hospital	6/43			200	200
74 L of C Hospital	10/43			200	200
75 L of C Hospital				200	200
96 L of C Hospital	5/43			200	200
116 L of C Hospital	6/43			200	200
138 L of C Hospital	11/43			200	200
139 L of C Hospital	11/43			200	200
Manila L of C Hospital				200	200
16 L of C Sick Horse Depot	7/43			50	50
17 Vet Quarantine Hospital	3/44			50	50
12 Southern Army Hospital	9/43			400	400
14 Southern Army Hospital	8/43			400	400
<b>Total</b>		<b>66975</b>	<b>11837</b>	<b>15575</b>	<b>94387</b>

\*This unit part of 26 Div. Meager reports indicate elements of this Div may possibly be present.


~~SECRET~~

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
 SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA  
 Military Intelligence Section  
 General Staff


**ENEMY GROUND DISPOSITIONS**

15 APRIL 1944



SUMMARY:

	APRIL	MARCH
LUZON, MINDORO, MASBATE	46000	46000
PALAWAN	300	300
PANAY	3000	3000
NEGROS	4000	4000
CEBU, BOHOL	20400	20400
LEYETE, SAMAR	2000	4000
MINDANAO, JOLO	24300	22300
	100,000	100,000





~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

JAPANESE ARMY AIR ORDER OF BATTLE  
31 March 1944

Initial  
Establishment

Units	Trans- lation	Fs	Bs	Rs	Ttl	Location
FOURTH Koku-gun	Air Army					Philippines- NEI*
7th Hiko-shidan (-)	Air Div					P.I. - NEI
8th						P.I. - NEI(?)
3 Hiko-dan	Air Brig					P.I. - NEI
22						P.I. - NEI
5th Hiko-sentai	Air Regt	27			27	P.I. - NEI
13th		36			36	P.I. - NEI
14th			27		27	P.I. - NEI
38th			9		9	P.I. - NEI(?)
58th (-)			9		9	P.I. - NEI(?)
75th (-)			9		9	P.I. - NEI
50 Dokuritsu Chutai	Ind Sq			9	9	P.I. - NEI(?)
52				9	9	P.I. - NEI(?)
70				9	9	P.I. - NEI
73				9	9	P.I. - NEI
93				9	9	P.I. - NEI

\*Note: Philippines - NEI (Excluding Sumatra).

(?) Denotes location of unit is doubtful.

JAPANESE NAVAL AIR ORDER OF BATTLE  
31 March 1944

Initial  
Establishment

Units	Trans- lation	Fs	Bs	Rs	Ttl	Location
23 Koku-sentai	Air Flot					P.I. - NEI*
153 Koku-Tai	Air Group			9	9	P.I. - NEI
269		36			36	P.I. - NEI
381		54			54	P.I. - NEI
732			36		36	P.I. - NEI
932				18	18	P.I. - NEI
934				30	30	P.I. - NEI
936 (-)				4	4	P.I. - NEI
954				18	18	P.I. - NEI

\*Note: Philippines - NEI (Excluding Sumatra).

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED




~~SECRET~~


PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA  
Military Intelligence Section  
General Staff

ENEMY AIR BASES  
15 APRIL 1944



- OPERATIONAL AIRDROMES
- AIRDROMES UNDER CONSTRUCTION
- SEAPLANE BASES



~~SECRET~~





UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

# MINDANAO

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA  
Military Intelligence Section  
General Staff  
**PATTERN OF ENEMY  
GROUND DISPOSITIONS**

15 APRIL 1944



UNCLASSIFIED







UNCLASSIFIED

1. Luzon, Mindoro, Marinduque and Masbate:
  - a) Manila: 20 Mar: Pasig R docks shallow; only sml boats can get in.
  - b) Cavite: 9 Feb: Undamaged parts of yard in use, lightly garr. Oil & gasoline stores Sangley Pt.
  - c) Batangas: 20 Mar: W coastal waters mined?
  - d) Tayabas: 15 Mar-15 Apr: Monpog Pass: 14 cargo vsls (2700/4200T) crs N; 63 cargo vsls (1250/2100T) & 1 war vsl crs S.
  - e) Sorsogon: 15 Mar-15 Apr: San Bernardino Str: 3 cargo vsls (2000/4500T) crs S.
  - f) Masbate: 15 Mar-15 Apr: 6 cargo vsls (2000/4500T) & 1 war vsl crs S; 10 cargo vsls (1200/2050T) crs N, Masbate Psg.
  
2. Palawan and Visayas:
  - a) Panay: 15 Mar-15 Apr: Guimaras Str: 1 cargo vsl (2000/4500T) crs SW. San Jose: 1 cargo vsl docked (1500/2500T). Cuyo E Pass: 1 cargo vsl (9/12000T) crs N; 2 cargo vsls (1250/2750T) crs S.
  - b) Negros: 10 Apr: Cruiser N off Sipalay w/troops.
  - c) Cebu: 14 Apr: Torpedo boat & gunboat sta Cebu City. 15 Mar-15 Apr: Bohol Str: 2 cargo vsls 5/8000T) crs N fr Cebu; 14 cargo vsls(800/1400T) & 2 war vsls crs N to Cebu City; 5 cargo vsls (2300/4000T) crs E; 35 cargo vsls (1900/3300T) & 3 war vsls crs S fr Cebu City; 3 cargo vsls (2/4500T) & 1 war vsl crs W to Cebu City.
  - d) Leyte: 25 Mar: Rumor sev ships sunk off E coast.
  
3. Mindanao and Sulu:
  - a) Tawi Tawi: 6 Mar: 1 MV torpedoed & abandoned off Galupag Id. 2 SAs sunk by torpedoes betw S Ubian & Tandunas Id, 2 Apr. 10 Apr: Enemy ships always anchor Chongos Bay, 1 mi SE Bongao wharf; ships passing via Sibutu Channel pass S tip Id & back Manka Manka; ships to & fr N to Chongos Bay hug N coast; ships for S fr Chongos Bay thru Channel SW Pagabag Id to Manuk Manuka or Sibutu Channel, always come & go in dark. 15 Mar-15 Apr: 22 cargo vsls (1900/3700T) total ship sightings at Bongao anchorage.
  - b) Zamboanga: 15 Mar-15 Apr: 23 cargo vsls (3000/4600T) & 17 war vsls crs E, Basilan Str; 3 cargo vsls (3000/5250T) & 11 war vsls crs W, Basilan Str. Siari: 3 cargo vsls (850/1000T) crs S; 1 cargo vsl (500/1000T) crs N.
  - c) Misamis Or: Cagayan: 15 Mar-15 Apr: 2 cargo vsls (3000/5000T) crs NW; 3 cargo vsls (500/1000T) & 8 launches approaching fr W.
  - d) Surigao: 15 Mar-15 Apr: Lianga Bay: 1 cargo vsl (2000/4500T) & 1 war vsl crs N; Cavit Pt: 3 cargo vsls (1000/1500T) & 1 war vsl crs N; 5 cargo vsls (3200/4200T) crs S.\*
  - e) Davao: 10 Apr: Ships normally anchor in Pakiputan Str opposite Tongko or at N end Talikud Str. No indic nets, mines or use of pilot boats; all shipping passes W of Talikud to N. 15 Mar-15 Apr: 9 cargo vsls (3000/5250T) & 10 war vsls crs S; 13 cargo vsls (3000/5000T) & 31 war vsls crs N off SW Davao Gulf.\*
  - f) Cotabato: 5 Apr: Enemy naval base planned Sarangani Id but no work done on project to date. 15 Mar-15 Apr: Sarangani Bay: 9 cargo vsls (1500/3300T) crs N; 5 cargo vsls (1500/3100T) crs S.\* Kiamba: 36 cargo vsls (2800/5000T) & 1 war vsl crs NW; 9 cargo vsls (5000/6200T) & 2 war vsls crs SE. Lebak: 1 cargo vsl (9/12000T) crs N.

G-2 LIBRARY  
UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

\*COMMENTS: (ld) Increased shipping noted off east coast Mindanao, change monsoon to SW. (le) Warships sighted mainly after Palau attacks. (lf) Sharp increase shipping reported in Sarangani Bay.

#### IV G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION:

##### 1. Summary of the Enemy Situation.

###### a. Activities:

1) Luzon: Defenses northern and western Luzon being developed. Airfield construction reported near Lingayen, Floridabanca and Rosario (Rizal), and improvement of Naga and Pili Airfields.

2) Palawan and Visayas: Panay: Usual patrol activity. Tiring Airfield completed. Negros: Nil report. Cebu: Usual activity. Leyte-Samar: Indics decreased enemy strength. Airfield construction at Ormoc, Burauen and Valencia.

3) Mindanao and Sulu: Zamboanga-Misamis Occ: Usual patrol activity. Slightly decreased strength north coast. Lanao: Scattered raids. Misamis Or: Indics increased strength Cagayan. Fighter field under construction at Lumbia south of Cagayan; Cagayan pier closed to Filipinos. Bukidnon: Sayre Highway open and some traffic to Davao. Airfield improvement at Tankulan, Malaybalay and Valencia. Agusan: Occupied area not extended. Davao: 10 Airfields in area. At least 5 in operational condition. Cotabato: Sharp increase shipping in Sarangani Bay. Tawi Tawi: Airfield under construction Sanga Sanga Island.

b. Identifications: See Incl No. 4.

##### 2. Conclusions.

###### a. Enemy Capabilities:

###### Air Operations

- 1) Development and Expansion of Mindanao Air Centers.
- 2) Development of Southern Philippines Air Defenses.
- 3) Development of Central Luzon as an Air Base.

###### Ground Operations

- 4) Activity on Mindanao.
- 5) Troop Movements.

###### Shipping and Naval Activity

- 6) Current Information

###### Air Operations

###### 1) Development and Expansion of Mindanao Air Centers:

Recent intelligence reveals continued development and expansion of air bases in Mindanao by the enemy. A strategic air study map, "Mindanao Air Centers", following, reveals this development by the enemy as consisting of three air centers: Cagayan, Davao and Basilan Strait.

The strategic and tactical location of these air centers is sound. The Cagayan-Davao centers are suitably placed on his Manila-Davao air route, thus providing a corridor of mutually supporting airdromes along his principal air line of communication to both the Netherlands East Indies and the SWPA. Further, these two air centers, and particularly Davao, provide the necessary air bases to support the maintenance of Palau as a forward air center for western Caroline and New Guinea defense, affording maintenance and repair facilities, as well as air reserves, within approximately five flying hours of Palau, yet offering a high degree of security from Allied air attack. The Basilan Strait air center is effectively placed to protect enemy shipping following the main Manila-Davao shipping lane through Basilan Strait. The three centers provide good land-based aircraft defensive coverage of his fleet elements operating in the Celebes Sea and Davao Gulf.

~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

The total number of operational airdromes now known to exist on Mindanao is 15. Ten are under construction; 6 more reported to be planned in the Davao area. The principal airdrome is Sasa Field, serving Davao, with some fifty bombers estimated as currently operating therefrom. The other three operational Davao airdromes are presently being used as fighter fields with further expansion probably being rushed following our Palau strike. The aircraft dispersal capacity of Mindanao airdromes, both operational and now under construction, is estimated at 700 aircraft. Assuming completion of some fifteen additional fields within the next three months, approximately 750 additional aircraft could be added to this figure for a total dispersal capacity of 1450 aircraft.

The conclusion is that with the now proven vulnerability of Palau, conjoined with probable enemy apprehension of a further extension of our counter air force activity against western New Guinea, the enemy may be expected to accelerate his present program for the development and expansion of the Mindanao air facilities, particularly within the Davao and Cagayan air centers. (See map following page 9)

2) Development of Southern Philippines Air Defenses:

There have been indications that the Japanese intend to develop the Tawi Tawi, Jolo, Zamboanga and the Sarangani Bay areas, particularly the latter, into links in an air defense scheme.

The Japanese occupied the Tawi Tawi area before Christmas 1943 and have since been reported to be scouring Tawi Tawi Bay and surrounding waters and anchorages. Two to five Nakajima type floatplanes have been regularly observed at anchor or on patrol duty, and an increasing total of shipping has been observed at anchor in the bay, at night generally. During the past month 22 cargo vessels averaging from 1900 to 3700 tons, and several warships, mostly gunboats and a few destroyers, have been reported in the anchorage. In connection with this development, guerrilla forces on Tawi Tawi have been bombed regularly and their outside source of food has been blockaded off for several months. Recently the Japanese have begun construction of a bomber length airstrip on Sanga Sanga Island, immediately southwest of Tawi Tawi Island. Construction is being pushed with forced Chinese and native laborers, and is now supposed to be about one-third complete.

Reports from the Jolo area have been limited and generally unconfirmed. The airfield at Jolo has undoubtedly been lengthened and patrol bombers have very possibly been operating from there. There have also been reports of seaplanes operating from Jolo and from Kabongkol Bay (on southern Jolo Id), this latter entirely unconfirmed. An airfield has also been reported completed on Lapac Id. to the south of Jolo. These reports cannot be evaluated properly with the meagre information available from the area.

In the Zamboanga area, Wolfe Field has been lengthened and patrol bombers have been observed there. Capisan Field which was being constructed immediately prior to surrender cut of a rice paddy by US Army Engineers to the east of Wolfe Field has been again under construction by the Japanese. Reports on progress are confusing and the present status of the work is not clear. Seaplanes have been reported several times at Zamboanga, and recently at Port Holland and at Isabella both on Basilan Island. Basis for the latter reports is not known, but the information may be partially true.

Activity in the Sarangani Bay area has increased sharply since January. Extension work has been in progress on the airfield at Buayan and is apparently nearing completion. Improvements on the Dadjangas airfield have recently been undertaken, and are planned for the field at Makar as soon as the construction at

**UNCLASSIFIED**

~~SECRET~~

Dadjangas is completed. It appears that some naval activity is planned for Sarangani Island in the future, though no work has been started on the project to date. In connection with the development of this area the recent increase in shipping in Sarangani Bay is most significant. Previously only occasional small vessels have been reported. During the past month 9 cargo vessels averaging 1500 to 3300 tons and several warships have been observed in the bay.

The above developments have considerable significance in that planes based on the new fields are in advanced positions to attack Allied air and sea operations and detect Allied plans sufficiently early to prepare the defences of the major bases at Davao and Cagayan. The development at Sarangani Bay is particularly noteworthy since it closes a gap in defences of southern Mindanao, which have hitherto relied upon patrols from Zamboanga and Davao.

3) Development of Central Luzon as an Air Base: Since June 1943, 9 pre-war Luzon airfields have been reported placed in operational condition for the first time since surrender, without lengthening or major improvement. 14 other pre-war Luzon airfields have been reported in the same period to be extended, materially improved, or being improved. 9 new airfields have been reported on Luzon in the same period.

Of these 32 fields, 22 are in the central Luzon area. Details of these fields are generally not available. Units located there and activity in progress in this broad plain from the Lingayen Gulf to Manila are not known but from reports received the enemy must be developing a large air base area.

#### Ground Operations

4) Activity on Mindanao: Air patrols have been reported circling low recently over the central Agusan valley area. Planes have previously flown high over the area and direct to or from Davao. Some troops have been reported to have left Cebu recently, earmarked for activity in the Agusan. These, according to late reports, arrived at Cagayan 14 April. Warships have also been shelling towns along the east coast of Surigao where guerrilla forces exist, and patrols have come ashore, for short times only. The combination of the above reports suggests possible further activity against the guerrillas in the valley. On the other hand one report indicated that the raiding group in northern Agusan was to be returned to Cagayan for use against guerrillas in northern Bukidnon, and that replacements were on the way to garrison northern Agusan. These replacements might well be the troops recently arrived in Cagayan from Cebu.

The most significant ground report from a tactical point of view is the opening and keeping open of the Sayre Highway from Cagayan through Kabacan to Davao. The long and high bridges on the road have not been replaced except by ferries and at best the road is not suitable for sufficient traffic to be of great value for some time. The road has not been extensively used but the admitted failure of the guerrillas to maintain their road blocks in the face of this limited activity is important.

5) Troop Movements: Information from the islands is still too meagre and disconnected to trace these movements except by inference and guess. There have been decreased strengths reported from Samar and Leyte. Such troops supposedly going to Manila though the reason for such movement is not known. Other troops are supposed to be on the way from Manila to Cebu, and one group of 1/2000 was probably enroute to Cebu via Iloilo at the end of March. Troops continue to move mostly southwards from Iloilo but their destination can seldom be traced.

~~SECRET~~  
**UNCLASSIFIED**

**UNCLASSIFIED**

Slight movement from Cebu to Cagayan has been indicated, and withdrawals from Lanao and northern Zamboanga, presumably for Cagayan, have been reported. No other significant movements on Mindanao have been reported. Reports of troop strengths at Davao are conflicting and apparently unreliable. The Japanese maintain close vigilance on specified security areas in Davao and little information seems to be obtained by the average Filipino on the outside.

Late reports suggest a wholesale reduction in troop strength in Cebu. There is no confirmation of this and the information conflicts with all previous reports. Shipping in the vicinity has not varied noticeably from that indicated during previous months. Another late report of the arrival of a considerable amount of shipping at Davao may be of interest in this connection.

**Shipping and Naval Activity:**

6) Current Information: On Mindanao sporadic shelling, usually of some guerrilla occupied coastal town, has taken place on the east and north coast. The pier at Cagayan, Misamis Or, has been closed to Filipinos this month. The full significance of this move is not known, but it may well be that the Japanese desire greater security regarding their activities in this area during the next few months, and equally likely that the Japanese know they can no longer trust the Filipino people.

Considerably increased sightings of warships have been noted during the past month, in connection with withdrawal of Japanese naval units from Palau before the Allied strike at that base. Insufficient information is available to determine how many units are now based in the Philippines or where these are based. They are apparently not connected with bases on Mindanao or in the Visayas, with the possible exception of Davao.

**b. Relative Probabilities:**

1) Development and Expansion of Mindanao Air Centers: Development of Cagayan and Davao into major air base areas.

2) Development of Southern Philippines Air Defenses: Development of an outer air-sea ring in the southern Philippines along the line Davao, Sarangani Bay, Zamboanga, Jolo and Tawi Tawi. Activity at Sarangani Bay has shown a sharp increase.

3) Development of Central Luzon as an Air Base: An increase in tempo of construction as evidenced by the frantic appeals for additional laborers.

4) Activity on Mindanao: Increased efforts to secure safe passage along the Sayre Highway.

5) Troop Movements: Continued movement of personnel to combat guerrilla forces.

6) Current Information: Many more warship sightings noted, but information insufficient to draw conclusions. Closing of Cagayan dock area to civilians is of possible significance as an indication of the desire for greater security.

Special care must be taken to insure the secrecy of this document. Information contained herein will not be reproduced or circulated beyond the Staff Section to which it is addressed.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

~~SECRET~~**UNCLASSIFIED**

## STATUS OF AERODROMES AND LANDING GROUNDS ON MINDANAO

15 April 1944

1. Sindangan (Unclassified)  
08.12 N, 123.00 E  
4000' x 600'. Sodded black loam.
2. Dipolog  
08.36 N, 123.21 E  
1 strip 4000' x 150'. All weather; zero approaches. Road & water transportation. Blocked October 1943.
3. Labo  
1 level strip in coconut grove, 4000' x 200'. Grass, well drained; dry weather pursuit field. Placed in operational condition Feb. 1944. Cannot be lengthened.
4. Iligan (Unclassified)  
08.16 N, 124.15 E  
1 strip 4000' x 300'. Grass, soft in wet weather.
5. Camp Overton (Unclassified)  
08.13 N, 124.12 E  
No information.
6. Dansalan (Camp Keithley-Maguire Field)  
08.01 N, 124.17 E  
2 rolling strips: N-S 2310' x 180' with 2.2% down-grade towards S; NW-SE 2295' x 159'. Sodded ground. Concrete center circle and corner markers. Road and water transportation. Reported to have been lengthened by Japanese and used occasionally. Last report April 1944.
7. Lumbia  
Pursuit field built by Japanese in 1944 between km 7 and 9 S of Cagayan, apparently on W side of W road. Further details not received.
8. Cagayan (Patag)  
08.29 N, 124.37 E  
2 level strips: 2865' x 165'; 2952' x 159'. Natural sodded surface; all weather. Road and water transportation. Lengthened to bomber length field by Japs in 1943. Last report of use April 1944.
9. Pangincan  
Bomber field under construction early 1944 about 9 km S of Cagayan. Further details not received.
10. Del Monte Area  
08.20 N, 124.47 E
  - a) No. 1: Main A/D. 1 runway 7000' x 600', all weather; all types A/Ps. Serviceable April 1944.
  - b) No. 2 (Golf Course): 2 strips: 3300' x 300'; 2200' x 300'. All weather. Serviceable as Elg March 1944.
  - c) No. 3: 1 strip N-S 6000' x 200'. Native sod; all weather. Slope to S. All types A/Ps. Serviceable as Elg March 1944.
  - d) No. 4: 1 strip 6200' x 300'. Native sod; all weather; all types A/Ps. Serviceable as Elg March 1944.
  - e) No. 5, Palais: 2 adjacent runways 5000' x 300 each. Serviceable as Elg March 1944.
  - f) No. 6, Tigiptip: 1 runway 5000' x 300'. Native turf; all weather. Serviceable as Elg March 1944.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

- g) No. 7: 1 runway 6200' x 300'. All weather; native turf; all types A/Ps; zero approaches.
- h) No. 8: 1 runway 4000' x 300'. Native sod; all weather; zero approaches. Pursuit field. Serviceable as Elg March 1944.
11. Gingoog (Elizalde)  
08.49 N, 125.06 E  
1 strip 2900' x 100'. Sodded ground; soft in wet weather. Water transportation. Serviceable as Elg Nov. 1943.
12. San Jose de Buenavista  
08.56 N, 125.21 E (approx)  
(Unclassified)  
1 strip 4500' x 200'. Grass with 75' of gravel down center of strip; soft in wet weather, used by light A/Ps.
13. Butuan
- a) Bancase, 08.57 N, 125.28 E. 4 miles W of town of Butuan. 1 paved runway 2640' x 132'. Slopes gently like a shallow saucer. All weather. Road & waterway available. Unserviceable January 1944.
- b) 08.57 N, 125.31 E. Near town of Butuan. 1 strip 1950' x 195'. Sodded clayish loam. Road and waterway. Dummy(?)
14. Badas Placer  
09.38 N, 125.33 E  
2 level landing strips: 2310' x 165' with paved runway in center; 2640' x 165'. Sodded, sandy clay. All weather. Water and road transportation. Serviceable as Elg December 1943.
15. Bilaa Pt.  
Construction begun end Feb. 1944, last report April indicated construction ceased.
16. Barobo  
08.33 N, 126.07 E  
1 strip 3240' x 198', 4 miles W of Barobo, Lianga. Smooth, grassy surface, dry weather only. Roads from Barobo to Tambis. Water transportation by launches. Strip can be lengthened 1000' but not widened. Unserviceable April 1944.
17. Impasugong  
08.17 N, 125.01 E  
(Unclassified)  
1 strip 5000' x 300'. Grass, well drained. Serviceable as Elg April 1944.
18. Dalwangan  
08.13 N, 125.03 E  
Rectangular N-S. Serviceable as Elg April 1944. Road transportation.
19. Malaybalay  
08.10 N, 125.04 E  
2 strips: 3500' x 300'; 2000' x 300' grass; excellent drainage. Suitable for light A/Ps. All weather; elevation 2050'. Road transportation. Serviceable April 1944.
20. Valencia  
07.58 N, 125.03 E  
No. 1: 2 level strips, cross-shaped: each 2640' x 165'. Sodded, clayish loam; all weather. One strip lengthened to 6000' x 1000' by Japs in 1943. Last report April 1944. Serviceable as Elg.


21. Valencia No. 2: 6000' x 1000', sodded, clay loam. Serviceable April 1944.
22. Hijo Small fighter field, grass runway. April 1944.
23. Licanan (Bunawan) Runway 3000' x 300', paved with coral but ground soft. Being prepared by Japanese in early 1944 as a pursuit field.
24. Davao  
07.07 N, 125.38 E 6 miles N of city. Was Commercial National Airport. 2 strips, T-shaped: 2640', sodded sandy loam; 3360' with paved runway for 2628', shoulders soft and slippery after rain. All weather; good approaches. Road and water transportation. Improved and in use April 1944.
25. Santa Cruz (Mindanao)  
07.09 N, 125.32 E (Unclassified) Rectangular.
26. Pantukan (Maraut R.) 1 strip E-W, 3000' x 198'. Sodded, clay loam, rolling land from W. From W-first 2250' up 5½% grade, next 390' up 12% grade, last 360' up 6% grade. Take-off from E only; alight from W. Surrounded by timber mountains.
27. Bassa Pt. (Samal Id.)  
07.12 N, 125.43 E 1 strip 2001' x 501'. No other information available. Lengthened to bomber length and in use April 1944.
28. Ipil  
07.06 N, 125.38 E 1 strip 1626' x 198'. Grass surface. Unserviceable April 1944(?).
29. Cabaguio  
07.06 N, 125.37 E 1 strip 2850' x 360' with paved runway 2598' x 195'. Coral bone surface. White circle in center of runway. Road transportation. Unserviceable April 1944(?).
30. Matine (Talomo) Between km 3 on National Road S of Davao City and the Matina R, between National Road and the beach, under construction but not complete April 1944. No further details.
31. Libby 1 strip 3000' x 600' between km 10 and 14 on National Road S of Davao, April 1944.
32. Dumuy (Daliao) 1 strip 5000' x 900' on Furakawa Plantation between National Road and the beach. April 1944.
33. Buayan 1 strip half finished April 1944; now measures 9000' x 4000' (approx).
35. Dadiangas  
06.08 N, 125.10E 1 sandy runway 1980' x 165'. Being enlarged for 2 runways end of 1941. All weather. Communication facilities at headquarters of the National Land Settlement Company. Being enlarged by Japs April 1944.

SECRET


36. Makar  
06.06 N, 125.09 E 1 strip 1950' x 651'. Smooth, sandy turf. Limited road transportation, motor transportation available.
37. Santa Cruz  
06.56 N, 125.25 E 1 strip 2601' x 651'. Road transportation.
38. Mt. Matutum  
06.24 N, 124.58 E (approx) (Unclassified)  
1 strip 4500' x 300'. Gravel, level, soft when wet. Unserviceable April 1944.
39. Baracoton  
No information, but field reported April 1944.
40. Alar  
06.16 N, 124.44E 1 strip 1250' x 125' on level grassy plain. Fairly open environs. Unserviceable April 1944.
41. Tomagon  
No information, but field reported April 1944.
42. Buluan No. 1  
06.42 N, 124.48 E 1 level strip 3279' x 198'. Sodded, sandy clay; all weather. Water transportation only. Unserviceable April 1944.
43. Kabakan  
07.09 N, 124.49 E Work stopped; field too wet for landings; converted into dummy field. Dangerous for landings. Road and waterway.
44. Pikit  
07.05 N, 124.48 E Rectangular N-S. Road and waterway.
45. Bual  
07.11 N, 124.30 E Rectangular; level. Road and water transportation.
46. Kibawe  
07.30 N, 125.01 E (approx) 1 level strip 2624' x 246'. Sodded, clay loam; all weather. Train communications only.
47. Cotabato  
07.12 N, 124.14 E 1 slightly rolling strip 2640' x 165'. sodded, hard ground; all weather. Road and water transportation. Being improved by Japanese April 1944.
48. Uao  
07.38 N, 124.48 E Irregular, 1075' x 575' E-W. 3rd class road to National Highway, 12 miles to E.
49. Maramag No. 2  
07.46 N, 125.02 E (Unclassified)  
5000' x 250'. Grass, soft after hard rain, but good drainage; suitable for medium and light A/Ps. Serviceable as Elg April 1944.
50. Maramag No. 1  
07.46 N, 125.01 E (Unclassified)  
1 strip 3000' x 300'. Grass, soft after hard rain, but good drainage; suitable for medium and light A/Ps. Road transportation. Serviceable as Elg April 1944.
51. Malabang  
07.38 N, 124.03 E 2 level strips, cross-shaped: each 2624' x 328'. Grass surface with coral base; excellent drainage; all weather. Road & water transportation. Serviceable April 1944 (?).

- 52. Malangas  
07.36 N, 123.02 E  
Roughly rectangular, still not completely cleared; small, scrubby. (Scanty, out-of-date information) Limited road transportation; water transportation to city of Zamboanga and other coastal points.
  
- 53. Capisan  
Several miles to E of Wolfe Field in rice paddy. Construction begun by US Army Engineers before surrender. Last report Japanese activity April 1944, construction being pushed. Further details not available.
  
- 54. Zamboanga (Wolfe Field)  
.06.56 N, 122.02 E  
1 strip 2297' x 200'. Adobe rock foundation. Road and water transportation. Lengthened to W by Japanese. Last report March 1944.
  
- 55. Malusu  
1 strip reported 3500' in length. Completed September 1943, confirmed.

**MINDANAO**  
**GENERAL HEADQUARTERS**  
**SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA**  
**Military Intelligence Section**  
**General Staff**  
**AIRFIELD STATUS**  
**15 APRIL 1944**



- OPERATIONAL AIRFIELD
- AIRFIELD UNDER CONSTRUCTION
- U AIRFIELD UNSERVICEABLE
- E AIRFIELD PREPARED FOR EMERGENCY USE





~~SECRET~~

PATTERN OF ENEMY DISPOSITIONS VISAYAN AREA  
15 April, 1944

UNCLASSIFIED

Location	Date	Strength
<u>Panay</u>		
Ibajay	Feb '44	30
Banga	Feb '44	20
Capiz	Feb '44	200
Sigma	Feb '44	40
Pilar	Feb '44	100
Estancia	Feb '44	10
Sara	Feb '44	20
Dumarao	Feb '44	140
Passi-Calinog	Feb '44	100
Baratoc Nuevo	Feb '44	30
Maasin-Cabatuan	Feb '44	50
Santa Barbara	Feb '44	100
Iloilo City area	Feb '44	1800
Guimaras Id (Buenavista)	Feb '44	10
Guimbal	Feb '44	50
San Joaquin	Feb '44	50
San Jose area	Feb '44	250
Total		3000
<u>Masbate</u>		
Masbate	Jan '44	90
Aroroy	Jan '44	30
Milagros	Jan '44	30
Dimasalang	Jan '44	30
Total		180
<u>Negros</u>		
Sipalay	Feb '44	50
Kabankalan	Feb '44	100
Binalbagan	Feb '44	50
LaCarlota-LaCastellana	Feb '44	50
Pontevedra	Feb '44	50
Murcia	Feb '44	200
Valladolid	Feb '44	50
Bacolod area	Feb '44	1600
Silay	Feb '44	200
Saravia-Manapla area	Feb '44	500
Cadiz-Fabrica	Feb '44	50
Sagay	Feb '44	50
Escalante	Feb '44	50
Calatrava	Feb '44	200
San Carlos	Feb '44	150
Vallehermoso	Feb '44	50
Guihulngan	Feb '44	150
La Libertad	Feb '44	50
Bais area	Feb '44	50
Tanjay	Feb '44	50
Dumaguete	Feb '44	200
Siquijor Id, San Juan	Feb '44	30
Larena	Feb '44	10
Liloan	Feb '44	10
Zamboanguita	Feb '44	20
Siaton	Feb '44	30
Total		4000
<u>Cebu</u>		
Samboan	Mar '44	50
Alegria	Mar '44	50
Dalaguete	Mar '44	700

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~  
**UNCLASSIFIED**

Damanjug	Mar '44	200
Barili	Mar '44	50
Carcar	Mar '44	50
Naga	Mar '44	200
Toledo	Mar '44	200
Asturias	Mar '44	200
Cebu City area	Mar '44	16000
Liloan	Mar '44	2000
Opon	Mar '44	<u>300</u>

Total 20000

Bohol

Tagbilaran area	Feb '44	220
Guindulman area	Feb '44	<u>180</u>

Total 400

Leyte

Panaon Id.	Apr '44	250
Cabalian	Apr '44	20
Sogod	Apr '44	20
Malitbog	Apr '44	30
Matalom-Bato	Apr '44	30
Hindang-Inopacan	Apr '44	10
Baybay	Apr '44	20
Abuyog	Apr '44	20
Dulag	Apr '44	10
Burauen	Apr '44	20
Ormoc	Apr '44	50
Carigara	Apr '44	20
Tacloban	Apr '44	<u>500</u>

Total 1000

Samar

Basey	Apr '44	30
Balangiga	Apr '44	20
Pambujan	Apr '44	40
Borongan	Apr '44	10
Taft	Apr '44	150
Wright	Apr '44	150
Catbalogan	Apr '44	100
Calbayog	Apr '44	200
Palapag	Apr '44	100
Catarman	Apr '44	50
Allen	Apr '44	100
Sta Rita	Apr '44	<u>50</u>

Total 1000

Note on map that enemy garrisons occupy only coastal towns and key road junctions. Garrisons are small and widely scattered and generally perform police duties in occupied areas. With roads in poor condition and generally subject to guerrilla action it would take some time to gather these totals into forces of any value to the enemy. In the meantime removal of present garrisons would allow underground organizations to come to light and augment present active guerrilla forces in harassing the Japanese behind their lines.

Guerrillas have been instructed to refrain from taking action against these garrisons which would incite retaliatory activity or bring about increased garrison strength on the part of the Japanese, hence garrisons which are small exist in close proximity to sizeable guerrilla forces, for the present.

Garrisons shown on Panay and Negros have not changed substantially since date of report indicated.

~~SECRET~~  
**UNCLASSIFIED**





~~SECRET~~

GUERRILLA DISPOSITIONS IN THE VISAYAN AREA  
15 April 1944

UNCLASSIFIED

Location	Date	Total
<u>Panay</u>		
West Coast	March 1944	3000
Southern Iloilo	March 1944	4000
Capiz Province	March 1944	3000
Northeast Panay	March 1944	<u>3000</u>
Total		13000
<u>Negros</u>		
South Coast	Jan 1944	1000
Southeast Negros	Jan 1944	500
West Coast	Jan 1944	1000
East Coast	Jan 1944	2000
North Negros	Jan 1944	<u>3500</u>
Total		8000
<u>Cebu</u>	Oct 1943	5000
<u>Leyte</u>		
Southern Leyte	Oct 1943	1200
Central Leyte	Oct 1943	800
Northwest Leyte	Jan 1944	<u>500</u>
Total		2500
<u>Samar</u>		
South Coast	Feb 1944	500
West Coast	Oct 1943	500
North Samar	March 1944	<u>1000</u>
Total		2000
GRAND TOTAL		30500

Shaded areas on map represent localities in which guerrillas can move most freely at present. Agents and underground organizations exist in most occupied areas.


Note on map that guerrilla forces are concentrated in areas generally not developed by road nets, not accessible to coasts suitable for operational use or for landing supplies, or in mountainous areas, much of which was unexplored before the war. Active enemy launch patrols are attempting to prevent inter-island communication and activity along unoccupied coastal areas.

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED




UNCLASSIFIED



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA  
Military Intelligence Section  
General Staff

GUERRILLA FORCE DISPOSITIONS  
15 APRIL 1944



UNCLASSIFIED



**UNCLASSIFIED**

STATUS OF AERODROMES AND LANDING GROUNDS IN THE VISAYAS  
15 April 1944

1. Odiongan (Tablas Id)  
12.21 N, 121.57 E  
2 strips: NE-SW 2940' x 102'; NW-SE 2580' x 102'. Natural grass land sloping down towards sea; all weather. Poor approach at NE owing to hills. Water and road transportation. Unserviceable January 1944.
2. Tabung Pt.  
11.56 N, 121.57 E  
1 level strip 2297' x 165'; 3281' x 328' extended Sept 1941. Natural sodded ground; soft in wet weather. Road and water transportation. Unserviceable Jan 1944.
3. Lambunao  
11.03 N, 122.29 E  
1 strip 2640' x 165'. Road transportation. Unserviceable Jan 1944.
4. Tiring  
Construction on field between Santa Barbara and Cabatuan, Iloilo Prov started Dec 1943 and work reported complete in April 1944. Details not available, may possibly be same as Santa Barbara Field. (No. 5)
5. Santa Barbara  
10.49 N, 122.33 E  
(Unclassified)  
8000' x 200'. Black top; drainages on sides, but of doubtful efficacy in rainy season. Field still under construction when Japs moved in. B-25's and P-40's have landed here. Not in use Jan 1944.
6. San Jose de Buenavista  
10.46 N, 121.56 E  
1 level strip 3937' x 328'. Sodded, hard sandy loam; all weather. Road and water transportation. Serviceable and used occasionally Mar 1944.
7. Miagao  
10.39 N, 122.14 E  
1 strip 1875' x 324'. Land and water transportation. Unserviceable Nov 1943.
8. Mandurriao  
10.43 N, 122.32 E  
1 strip 2400' with paved runway; extendable to 3937'. Road and water transportation. Serviceable and used occasionally, Feb 1944.
9. Iloilo (Burnside Field)  
10.42 N, 122.35 E  
2 level paved runways: 1980' x 99'; 2220' x 99'. All weather. Hangar and administration building. Road and water transportation. Not used Mar 1944.
10. Valladolid  
10.29 N, 122.55 E  
1 strip 3280' long, dry weather only. Possibly same as La Carlota (No. 11).
11. La Carlota  
10.26 N, 122.54 E  
Landing strip 2625' x 132'; center strip 100' wide surfaced with shells and treated with molasses and sand to keep down dust. Road and rail transportation. Unserviceable Nov 1943.
12. Binalbagan  
10.12 N, 122.50 E  
4500' x 200'. Rolled earth, bad when wet. Zero approaches. National Highway (paved road) adjoining field. Docks for inter-island boats at Binalbagan 3 km away. Unserviceable Nov 1943.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

UNCLASSIFIED

13. Hinamlayan  
10.06 N, 122.53 E  
1 strip 1800', dry weather only.
14. Sipalay  
Construction started Dec 1943 and confirmed Feb 1944. No details available.
15. Strop  
09.59 N, 122.30 E  
1 strip 4920' x 261'; graded and rolled; 99' center strip of half-inch shell, packed by roller. Unserviceable Nov 1943.
16. Kabankalan  
10.00 N, 122.49 E  
1 level strip 1710' x 387'. Sodded ground. Water and road transportation. Unserviceable Nov 1943.
17. Magallanes (Magdiwang)  
(Sibuyan Id)  
12.29 N, 122.31 E  
1 strip 1500' x 192'. Road transportation. Unserviceable Dec 1944.
18. Banga (Daja)  
11.34 N, 122.18 E  
1 strip 1980' x 108'. Sodded ground; all weather. Road fairly nearby. Unserviceable Jan 1944.
19. Capiz  
11.31 N, 122.45 E  
1 level paved runway 2325' x 99'. All weather. Road and water transportation. Unserviceable Jan 1944.
20. Loctugan  
1 2000' strip with rock foundation. Field kept in operational condition by Japanese as of May 1943. Not used up to that time.
21. Dumarao  
11.16 N, 122.41 E  
4920' x 459'. All weather. To be ready Feb 1942. Unserviceable Jan 1944.
22. Sara  
11.14 N, 123.01 E  
1 strip 3900' x 330'. Road transportation. Unserviceable Jan 1944.
23. Dingle  
11.00 N, 122.40 E  
1 strip 1800' x 330'. Roads to Capiz and Iloilo. Not in use Jan 1944.
24. Saravia  
10.51 N, 123.00 E  
Landing strip 4950' x 660' under construction in Feb 1942. Sandy loam. Concrete roads.
25. Fabrica  
10.54 N, 123.21 E  
1 gravel runway 3937' x 99'. Grass strip 2625' x 164'. All weather. Near provincial road. Believed considerably enlarged by Japanese, Feb 1944.
26. Bacolod  
10.40 N, 125.57 E  
2 runways 2052' and 1881'. Sodded gravel foundation; all weather. Surfaced runway under construction, Jan 1943. Water and road transportation. Believed enlarged by Japanese and paved. In use Apr 1944.
27. Tanjay  
09.30 N, 123.08 E  
1 strip 1500' x 192'. Road and rail transportation. Unserviceable Nov 1943.
28. Dumaguete  
09.21 N, 123.18 E  
1 strip 2640' x 165'. Sodded, sandy, black loam, soft in wet weather. Road and water transportation. Being enlarged by Japanese Feb 1944.
29. Bagupantao Pt.  
12.27 N, 123.15 E  
Cleared strip. Unserviceable Dec 1943.


UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

30. San Isidro  
12.28 N, 123.19 E  
1 strip 1650' x 99'. Water transportation. Unserviceable Dec 1943.
31. San Quentin  
12.27 N, 123.18 E  
1 strip 1721' x 300'. Well sodded and smooth; all weather. Hills at one end. Unserviceable Dec 1943.
32. Aroroy (Siwayan)  
12.29 N, 123.24 E  
1 strip 1920' x 99'. Sodded, sandy ground; all weather. Road. Unserviceable Dec 1943.
33. Masbate  
12.22 N, 123.38 E  
1 strip 2990' x 240', central portion 1968' x 98' paved; all weather. Water transportation. Unserviceable Dec 1943.
34. Medellin (Cebu Id)  
11.08 N, 123.58 E  
1 strip 3920' x 105'. Road and water transportation. Unserviceable Nov 1943.
35. Tuburan (Cebu Id)  
10.42 N, 123.50 E  
1 strip 4920' x 98'. Was being surfaced Jan 1942. Road and water transportation. Unserviceable Nov 1943.
36. Cebu  
New field reported to east of road which passes along east side Lahug Field (No. 39). Details have not been received except that landing strip extends to the coast at Mabolo. Nov 1943.
37. Opon  
New strip under construction between barrios of Look and Marigondon on Mactan Id. Strip reported between 2000 and 5000 feet long in coconut grove, construction being pushed Apr 1944.
38. Cebu (Lahug)  
10.20 N, 123.54 E  
2 runways 2940' and 2020'. Sodded ground; all weather. Road, rail and water transportation. Improved and in use April 1944.
39. Valencia (Leyte Id)  
Clearing for airfield 13 km north of Ormoc reported begun Mar 1944.
40. Ormoc (Leyte Id)  
11.01 N, 124.37 E  
1 strip 4920' x 390'. Road and water transportation. Being improved by Japanese Apr 1944.
41. Burauen  
New field under construction, reported Apr 1944.
42. Hinundayan (Leyte Id)  
10.20 N, 125.14 E  
Under construction Feb 1942. Further details not available. Unserviceable Jan 1944.
43. Malitbog (Leyte Id)  
10.09 N, 125.00 E  
Approx 4500'. Unserviceable Jan 1944.
44. Ubay (Colonias)  
10.03 N, 124.28 E  
1 strip 3930' x 195'. Dry weather only. Road and water transportation. Serviceable as Elg November 1943.
45. Carmen (Bohol Id)  
09.50 N, 124.12 E  
1 strip 4920' x 654'. Clay soil, serviceable in wet weather uncertain. Road to Tagbilaran. Serviceable as Elg Nov 1943.


UNCLASSIFIED

- ~~SECRET~~
46. Tagbilaran (Bohol Id)  
09.41 N, 123.51 E  
1 strip 3936' x 197'. Sodded, hard, limestone ground. All weather. Water and road transportation. Serviceable as Elg Nov 1943.
47. Danao  
New field reported under construction near Danao on Panglao Id, Mar 1944.
48. Calbayog  
12.05 N, 124.33 E  
2 level strips each 2625' x 165'. Sandy loam. Road and water transportation. Unserviceable Jan 1944.
49. Catarman  
12.31 N, 124.38 E  
1 level strip 2760' x 327'. Sandy ground; all weather. Road and water transportation. Unserviceable Jan 1944.
50. Borongan  
11.36 N, 125.26 E  
1 strip 2376' x 198'. Clayish loam; paved runway 99' wide. Unserviceable Jan 1944.
51. Anahao Id (Hernani)  
11.15 N, 125.33 E  
1 level landing strip 1980' x 75'. One end sodded, other sandy; all weather. Water transportation by launches. Unserviceable Jan 1944.
52. Tacloban (Cataisan Pt)  
11.14 N, 125.01 E  
2 level strips; 2640' x 330'; all weather; 2640' x 99'; good for Elg only. Sodded, sandy ground. Road and water transportation. 1 strip lengthened by Japanese Jan 1944.



- OPERATIONAL AIRFIELD
- AIRFIELD UNDER CONSTRUCTION
- Ⓢ AIRFIELD UNSERVICEABLE
- ⓔ AIRFIELD SUITABLE FOR ELG ONLY

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
 SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA  
 Military Intelligence Section  
 General Staff  
**STATUS OF AIRFIELDS**  
 15 APRIL 1944





**UNCLASSIFIED**

(To Accompany Incl. No. 14)

~~SECRET~~

KNOWN SOUTHERN LUZON ENEMY DISPOSITIONS  
15 April 1944

<u>Manila</u>	10,000
<u>Batangas &amp; Laguna Feb. 1944</u>	
Nasugbu	20
Calatagan	20
Los Banos	800
Lipa	400
Batangas	200
Lucena	200
Calauag Area	100
<u>Camarines Norte Dec. 1943</u>	
Daet Area	500
<u>Camarines Sur Feb. 1944</u>	
Libuanan	140
Calabanga	120
Naga	2,000
Iriga	120
Bato	120
<u>Albay Feb. 1944</u>	
Ligao - Polangui Area	500
Legaspi Area	1,000
<u>Sorsogon Dec. 1943</u>	
Sorsogon	200
Bulusan	50
Bulan	100
<u>Marinduque March 1944</u>	250
<u>Mindoro March 1944</u>	
E Mindoro	1,000
N Mindoro	600
	<hr/>
Total	18,440

The total Luzon strength is estimated to be 46,000 or more. Dispositions of 18,440 shown on attached map are the only dispositions actually known on Luzon. The remaining troops are believed to be concentrated mainly in the central Luzon valley and Cagayan Valley, which are believed to be important training and depot areas.

~~SECRET~~


**UNCLASSIFIED**



UNCLASSIFIED

# CENTRAL LUZON SOUTHERN LUZON - MINDORO


GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA  
Military Intelligence Section  
General Staff  
**KNOWN ENEMY DISPOSITIONS**  
**SOUTHERN LUZON**  
**15 APRIL 1944**



P A C I F I C

O C E A N

S I B U Y A N



UNCLASSIFIED



LUZON GUERRILLA ORGANIZATIONS  
15 April 1944

UNCLASSIFIED

1. Guerrillas operating under direction of Gov. Roque Ablan, formerly Governor of Abra Province. These guerrillas are active in the mountains of the Ilocos Norte-Abra area. Agents of the Villamor, Praeger, Phillips intelligence nets have contacted Governor Ablan's agents since June 1943. Strength and equipment of this group unknown.
2. Guerrillas under the direction of Manriques operating somewhere in northern Luzon, probably Mountain Province. This group is composed of the remnants of the Nakar Force which was active after the surrender until Col. Nakar was captured in late 1942. Remnants of the Nakar guerrillas were subsequently directed by Lt. Col. Manuel Enriques until his capture about June 1943. Little is known of the present strength and equipment of these remnants.
3. Guerrillas known to be operating in E Pangasinan, reportedly under the direction of Charles Joseph Cushing, the brother of James Cushing, Cebu Area Commander. Further details of this unit are not known.
4. Guerrillas operating under the leadership of Edwin Ramsey, O-368746, formerly of the 26th Cav. The unit is in Nueva Ecija and apparently has regular contact with guerrillas in the Manila-Central Luzon area.
5. Guerrillas active under the direction of Col. Gyles Merrill, formerly 26th Cav. This group was part of the guerrillas originally operating under Lt. Col. Claude Thorp in the Central Luzon area. Col. Thorp was captured in late 1942 and Col. Merrill has been leading the Zambales group since. Further details of this unit have not been received.
6. The "Hucbalajap" guerrillas operating mainly in Pampanga with affiliated units in Batangas Province and Manila. The leaders of this group are not known. The organization is reported to be modelled after communist groups in China and its activities ruthless. It has been very active in harassing Jap supplies and communications in the Central Luzon area.
7. The MARKING guerrillas. This group is in the Rizal-Manila area, active in sabotage and "removal" of obnoxious puppet officials. The band was formerly coordinated with Col. Thorp in Zambales and led by Col. Hugh Straughn who was reported to be captured in mid-1943. The group is still active. No further details have been received.
8. Guerrillas operating under the direction of Capt. Bernard Anderson, O-360167 AC, located in E Tayabas, apparently extending to the coast. Agents from Peralta and Fertig have contacted Anderson at various times. Radio contact has never been established due failure of equipment. Further details of this unit have not been received.
9. Guerrillas operating under direction of Capt. Zabat, formerly connected with the Albay Constabulary. Little is known of the group. They are reported to be active through much of the Bicol region. Col. Peralta on Panay is the only one who has had contact with this group. The disposition of Bicol guerrillas formerly under Gov. Wenceslao Q. Vinsons, formerly Governor of Camarines Norte, is not known. Some reports state that he was captured and his guerrillas broken up.
10. Guerrillas operating on Bondoc Peninsula under the direction of "General" Vera. The group is independent and has been reported irregularly since July 1942. These guerrillas recently captured three towns on the Peninsula. No further details are known.
11. Guerrillas active under the direction of Salvador Escudero, formerly Governor of Sorsogon. The group is believed to number a thousand or more and have been active since 1942 and are subject to considerable pressure from the Japanese. They have assisted numerous friendly people.

UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED


~~SECRET~~

# LUZON & NORTHERN VISAYAS

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
 SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA  
 Military Intelligence Section  
 General Staff

LUZON GUERRILLA ORGANIZATIONS  
 15 APRIL 1944

NUMBERS REFER TO NOTES  
IN INSERT SHEET.



UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~



SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INFORMATION  
15 April 1944

ECONOMIC INFORMATION:

1. Living Conditions: The general conditions reported during the past few months are unchanged. There are further reports of civilians leaving Manila but no figures are available. From Negros it is reported that the Japanese are taking palay and other foodstuffs without regard to civilian needs so that apparently by May and June the food situation on that island will be serious. The same appears to be true in Panay. In northern Mindanao the Japanese continue to seize civilian rice stores and in northern Agusan Province they have been harvesting and taking away the local palay crop.
2. Agriculture: Rice crop in Luzon is reported from an accurate source to be 60% of normal. Cotton in Luzon appears to have been somewhat of a failure. Large acreages planted in central plains of Bulacan failed to bloom and the cotton gin established at Plaridel will be unused. Castor bean culture is likewise a total failure. Japanese military authorities are said to be worried over alcohol production which is bound to suffer due to reduced cane plantings. Protracted rains and heavy floods destroyed food crops in north Mindanao but as usual the enemy is seizing all that is available. The Furakawa plantation in Davao has been partially converted to corn fields and quantities of coconut oil, alcohol, etc., are being produced for military use.
3. Transportation: Inadequate means of transportation, especially rail difficulties, are mentioned in one report as one of the principal causes for wide-spread famine conditions in Manila and most of Luzon. Tracks are in bad shape, partly due to frequent sabotage and because little maintenance is done. Trains are very crowded. Tickets under the daily ration quota are difficult to obtain, and are usually procurable only in black market. In late March the rail trip from Manila to Legaspi took 12 days. Two sections of tracks south of Lucena were out at that time. A reliable report states that the road between Tayabas and Camarines Norte has been completed.
4. Industry:
  - a. Fuel: It appears that the production of butanol planned at the Del Carmen Central will not be realized this year.
  - b. Lumber: Zamboanga Province, the "Lactuan Maigui Sawmills" (spelled as received) has purchased the complete machinery of the Pitchell's Mills and is inquiring into the condition of the Santa Nino Mills. In Davao the capacity of the sawmill at Tiongko has been doubled. Another mill at Tambongan has the same capacity.
  - c. Shipping and Shipbuilding: In Manila the capacity of the slipways at Malabon for dry docking barges has been increased from 4 to 8. The puppet governor of Misamis Or. is attempting to organize small boat construction at Cagayan. In the middle of March the SS Del Rosario was almost ready to re-float, the holes being filled with cement. In Davao a shipbuilding and repairing center has been established at Panakan, the lumber coming from Tiongko and Tambongan. At "Hito Unkabu" (spelled as received), the Philippine Marine Transportation Bureau has 2 ships on the Manila-Iloilo-Cebu run: the Ohni Maru (SS Fathom), 500 tons, and the Mihara Maru, 1200 tons.
  - d. Mining: The Japanese at Pambujan Sur are not re-opening the Samar Iron Mine and are apparently stripping the mine of machinery and scrap iron.
  - e. Economic Planning: General Manuel Roxas has been appointed chairman of the Economic Planning Board which is to deal principally with the serious food problem. General Roxas

~~SECRET~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

has apparently accepted the appointment. Other members of the Board are: Ephidio Quirino of Ilocos Norte and Senator Rodriguez of Rizal Province.

POLITICAL INFORMATION:

1. Government: In southern Bukidnon Province the free government has been demoralized by recent Japanese activity. In northern Bukidnon and in Misamis Or. the free government is functioning well. A move is on foot to establish a free government in Masbate.
2. Bureau of Constabulary: It appears that use of the BC against guerrillas has been at least a partial failure in Misamis Occ., Cebu and Lanao. In Zamboanga City authority has been given to recruit over 200 new BC; however a training academy will not be opened there. It is reported from Cebu that the pay scale for the BC has again been raised by allowing age bonuses over and above regular pay. The Provincial Governors and Inspectors in the Visayas met in Cebu City 14-16 April.
3. Morale: It is reported that the people in Luzon remain loyal, except for spies operating in Manila in pay of the Japanese plus the few collaborators, and that the constabulary personnel are ready to turn against the enemy when the time is ripe. Other sources indicate an unswerving loyalty from all classes of Filipinos and state that the morale of Allied supporters has even improved of late. A prominent leader at present in Mindanao states "They want Americans to come back -- how, when or with what conditions never mind -- and relieve them from present suffering". The civilians in Malaybalay and Cagayan are demoralized. The morale of civilians in free areas in Bukidnon has improved somewhat with the arrival of medical supplies.
4. Civilian Defenses: Air raid practices are being held in Davao City. Civilians are forced to leave the streets and enter air raid shelters. Aid stations are assigned and manned. It appears that blackouts, begun in Manila on April 1, will continue indefinitely. Blackouts are enforced at Cagayan and Tacloban. Air raid shelters and camouflage are being prepared in both these cities.
5. Atrocities: In northern Zamboanga, Japanese raiding forces are reported to have committed numerous atrocities against civilians, particularly women and children - raping, bayonetting, smashing heads against trees, etc. In Cebu during a terror raid more innocent civilians were bayoneted. In south Iloilo, Samar, Negros and Leyte Japanese raiding parties were carrying out similar activities.
6. Propaganda: The new Japanese moving picture "Down with the Stars and Stripes" has been completed. American prisoners were forced to take prominent parts and to operate captured tanks and guns.

AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES:

1. Civilian internees: No reference.
2. Prisoners of War: At the Davao Penal Colony, most of the American Prisoners of War are suffering from malaria, many are unable to do any work, but the able bodied men are laboring on airfield construction projects in that area. The enemy have constructed barbed wire fences around the work areas and have increased the number of guards with as many as thirty Japanese soldiers and two officers with each labor party to maintain close surveillance.

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED



~~SECRET~~

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA

WEEKLY SUMMARY  
AND  
G-2 ESTIMATE  
OF THE  
ENEMY SITUATION  
  
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

~~SECRET~~



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA  
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

I-III: WEEKLY SUMMARY OF ENEMY INTELLIGENCE  
IV: G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION  
V: MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

NO:  
10

DATE  
23/29 Jul 44

I GROUND

1. Luzon: All bridges Cent Luzon to N good condition.
  - a) Manila: Southern Army Staff officers live at Alhambra Apts. Lrg nbr Japs who arrived Luzon May & Jun carried Dutch occupation Jap currency. Marshal TERAUCHI rptd to be in command of both naval & army units in PI.\* Navy gas stored port area sabotaged. Allied invasion Europe & Pacific victories cause extreme psychological & financial repercussions. 5 Jun: 9 Generals rptd Manila Hotel. 26 Jun: Jap spies in city killed daily. Rice now costs 1300 pesos per cavan. Conscripted labor no longer used for food production; now used a/d constr. Addtl A/A & ammo rptd W Rizal Stadium. Approx 500 M/T obsvd Wallace Field & Luneta. 2 Jul: Lrg group Amer A.C. POW departed Manila for Japan. 18 Jul: 7 Amer & Fil killed for burning oil tanker at Pier 5. Anti-Axis priests, ministers & nuns confined, rptd tortured & some murdered. Addtl A/A rptd vicin Luneta.
  - b) Ilocos Norte: Unkn nbr A/A Gabu a/d.
  - c) Mountain Prov: Jap troops matured & seasoned; recruits trng Camp John Hay.
  - d) Abra: Few Japs rptd.
  - e) Ilocos Sur: Bridges covered by pillbox-shaped stone embankments with galvanized iron roof.
  - f) La Union: 3 med tanks, 80 horses; Jap troops old & seasoned.
  - g) Rizal: Officers quarters both sides entrance rd Nichols a/d.
  - h) Laguna: 26 Jun: Guerr raid Muntinglupa POW camp; release 60 POWs & seize all arms & ammo.
  - i) Tayabas: 20 Jul: Japs garr Mauban, Infanta, Dingalan.
  - j) Camarines Norte: Japs garr Daet, Paracale & Mambulao.
2. Mindoro: 19 Jul: Japs departed Pinamalayan for Calapan; BC remain.
3. Palawan: Brookes Pt attacked by Jap gunboat with hvy & LMGs. No landing rptd.
4. Panay: Iloilo: 15-17 Jul: 1500 Japs with approx 16 arty pieces departed; destination unkn.
5. Bohol: 18 Jul: 70,000 cavans rice capt'd by Japs.
6. Leyte: Dulag: Wharf under constr.
7. Samar: 20 Jul: All Jap E & N coast garrs except Taft & Laoang evacuated hurriedly.
8. Mindanao: 20 Jul: Indics that enemy forces in Visayas to be brought to N coast Mindanao.
  - a) Davao: Tambungon wharf being enlrg'd by army. 2 coastal guns, 12" & 14", fr Corregidor emplaced SE coast Talikud Id; ammo & 4 3" A/A behind coastal guns. Jap wounded rptd removed fr tpts to hosps during blackouts. 2 Jul: 600 Japs moved fr Daliao to Padada. 5 Jul: Malalag: 500 marines, 1000 Inf, 200 unassem a/c, 20 tanks, 5000 drums aviation gas unloaded. 9 Jul: Sta Ana: 7000 boxes dynamite unloaded, temp stored M B K bodega. 14 Jul: Lrg nbr marines, ammo & arty rptd unloaded Sasa wharf. 4000 troops, 100 motorcycles & 170 trucks unloaded. 18 Jul: High mil officials held important

- conference at Licanan a/d. 21 Jul: Malalag beaches heavily defended with lrg cal guns, A/A & electrified wire.
- b) Agusan: Enemy rptd to constr new trail between Azpitia & Tago R, via Nuevo Sibagat & Maygatasan.
- c) Surigao: Enemy mapping area 10 kms inland fr Tandag. Air raid shelters under constr in Tandag, M/T rd open fr Surigao City to Lanuza, cart trail to Marihatag. Enemy proceeded Tago R to Libas.
- d) Misamis Or: Cagayan: A/A guns High School are 20mm Oerlikons. A/A rptd wharf, prob no S/L or sound detectors; A/A crews appear untrnd. 15 Jul: 3/5000 troops rptd departed for Davao. Sm party troops & supplies to Kabakan, Cotabato. 20 Jul: Lrg quantity aviation gas & machinery stored Gusa tunnel, Macabalan wharf & unkn school. Gusa tunnel, 9 kms E of Cagayan, now completed. 8 A/A rptd Macabalan, 1 A/A Gusa tunnel.
- e) Misamis Occ: Indics Japs plan permanent occupation coast towns.
- f) Bukidnon: Del Monte: 4 20mm A/A guns, location unrptd. 8000 drums aviation gas N Bukidnon; 2000 at Malaybalay. Troops, gas & bombs moving S over hwy. Constr temp barracks stopped Del Monte 7 a/d.
- g) Zamboanga: W coast clear. Japs garr Aurora, Tukuran, Labangan, Pagadian. Sibago Id: 3 guns located vicin old lighthouse. Zamboanga City: Japs tptg troops by a/c fr San Roque, & Sta Maria a/d. 19 Jul: A/A guns San Roque & Sta Maria a/d. 4 6" coastal guns vicin Pettit barracks; 4 at Customs House; 2 at Trade School; 2 between Calarian & beach; 2 at Phil Dessicated Coconut Plant. Recodo: Gas, oil & food stored. 20 Jul: 8000 troops departed Zamboanga after 1 wk stop-over; destination unkr 21 Jul: Recruiting civilian laborers for work landing fields discont'd.

\*COMMENTS: (1a) New role of Marshal TERAUCHI considered very doubtful; he is CG Southern Army. Defense of PI is responsibility of XIV Army Lt. Gen. KURODA.

## II AIR

### 1. Luzon:

- a) Batangas: Lipa: 10 Jul: 50 T/E Bs, 52 Fs & approx 500 pilots.\*
- b) Ilocos Norte: Gabu: 25 Jul: A/c refuel on way S.\*
- c) Manila: 18 Jul: Sev German a/c obsvd, identity doubtful, believed M 109's & 110's, carefully guarded while on grd. Neilson: 10 Jul: 36 T/E Bs, 70 S/E Bs & 43 Fs.\* Nichols: 10 Jul: 14 T/E Bs, 47 S/E Bs & 39 Fs.\* Neilson-Nichols: 25 Jul: Now joined, both being improved & enlrgd.\*

### 2. Panay:

- a) Antique: Dunhill (San Fernando): 20 Jul: Sonia flights approx same as previous rpts. San Fernando: 25 Jul: 2 T/E & 30 S/E including 4 under repair. MG practice using cylindrical cloth tied to plane tail. No further improvement field.
- b) Iloilo: Estancia: 22 Jul: 5 Tess to SE. 23 Jul: Lily & Topsy to N; 2 u/i a/c, Tess, Topsy to SE. 24 Jul: Rufe & u/i a/c to NW; 2 Topsy to SE. 25 Jul: 2 Topsy, 2 Lily, Pete & Thelma to SE; 2 u/i Topsy to N. Mandurriao: 25 Jul: 4 Fs under repair & 1 courier landed & took off.\* San Dionisio: 15-17 Jul: 2 u/i a/c, Mavis, Topsy, 3 Tess to N; 12 Tess, Helen, 3 Topsy, 23 u/i a/c, Oscar, Dinah to NE. 23 Jul: Helen to N, 3 Zekes to S. 24 Jul: 11 u/i a/c to SE.\* 25 Jul: Tess, u/i a/c, & 3 Topsy to S. Topsy to N. Tiring: 25 Jul: 13 Fs excluding 2 dam.\*

3. Cebu: Kawit: 18 Jul: 6 Petes & 1 4/E F/B.

4. Negros: 21 Jul: Engr Unit working Lanog Lanog, Caduhaan & Fabrica a/ds under Capt KURIHARA, using Code Number 2401. Fabrica: 25 Jul: YEYSOMOTO BUTAI here using Code Number 15315.\* Bacolod: 25 Jul: KATOBIHI BUTAI uses code CAARRO (Nbr also) 15315?

5. Leyte: Anibong Pt, Tacloban: 25 Jul: 2 S/Ps.\* Cataisan: 25 Jul: 4 T/E a/c.\* Dulay: 27 Jul: Field being improved by rolling runway with gravel foundation. 4 fields worked in Dulag & Burauen: Dulag, San Pablo, Buri, Mojon. Others mere clearings. No a/c has been stationed. Valencia: 27 Jul: S/E a/c stationed since 10 Jul; patrols sea lanes Leyte-Bohol & Leyte-Cebu daily.\*

UNCLASSIFIED

## 6. Mindanao:

- a) Agusan: Waloe: 22 Jul: 2 Bs, 3 Sonias, Tess, 3 Bettys to S. Baylo: 25 Jul: 2 Rufes to N.
- b) Bukidnon: 20 Jul: Extensive improvement Valencia #2; 2½ kms wide fr Casilarong Bridge on Natl Hwy to Malibatohan Bridge; length 4 kms fr Jagcol to Pulangi R E-W crossing hwy. Twice pre-war size.\* Malaybalay: 25 Jul: 1 B.\*
- c) Cotabato: Buayan Field: 23-24 Jul: Considerable plane activ, arrivals & departures both N & S.\*
- d) Davao: 16 Jul: Rumor Jap civilians in Davao that 30 Amer a/c over Zamboanga Prov to N. 17 Jul: 8 Fs fr E\* & 3 Bs & 7 Fs fr N landed Davao City. 25 Jul: Gulf N Davao, Samal: Past 2 wks planes practice dive bombing lrg ships. Planes dive 65° angle, bombs released 500'; ship maneuvers during bombing. Total all Davao fields 600/700 a/c, both Fs & Bs.\* Licanan: 22 Jul: B & 7 Fs fr N landed. 10 Fs left due S.\* 24 Jul: Mandawao. Nanio not same.\* No info on Mandawao. Nanio completed, work temp stopped. 25 Jul: Daily practice dog fighting. At times all a/c engage, other times 2 a/c fight while 3rd flies above as if on guard. A/c approach Licanan fr Gulf & circle left to land. All a/c land & take off towards Bay. 25 Jul: S/P base, locn being checked. Matina: 16 Jul: B nbrs series 50--311, 315, 332. Padada: 25 Jul: Varies 20/90 Bs & Fs. B nbrs series 50--52, 54, 62, 152, 161, 164. Sasa: 16 Jul: 4/E F/Bs nbrs KEA 21, 27, 87. 26 Jul: Army & Navy planes continue fixed & moving target practice dive bombing in Sasa waters.
- e) Misamis Oriental: Balingasag: 15-17 Jul: 3 Ts & 1 B to N; 7 Ts, 3 Bs & 3 Fs to S. 20 Jul: 3 Fs to S. 21 Jul: F & T to N; 4 Ts to S. Cagayan: 7 Jul: 6 badly dam Fs arrived by boat fr N. 20 Jul: Slight air activ. 22 Jul: No air activ. Lumbia: 25 Jul: 1 B.
- f) Zamboanga: 19 Jul: Between San Roque & San Jose nipa bldgs under coconut trees house a/c. 22 Jul: 9 Bs San Roque-Sta Maria Fields.\* Hangars under coconut trees SE corner San Jose-San Roque road junct. Undergrd hangars SE & NE corners. Fields mined across runways; mines 50 meters apart. 22 Jul: T/E patrol B daily Tina to Dipolog. 21 Jul: Zamboanga City: Recruiting of civilian laborers for work on fields stopped.

\*COMMENTS: (1a) About 50 more than estimated normal complement. Increase may be expected at this large field. (1b) Laoag, known refueling point. (1c) Neilson, about 60 more than normal maintaining Nichols-Neilson average. Nichols, about 50 less than normal. Possibly depot a/c flown to other fields. Nichols-Neilson junction confirms previous reports. (2b) Mandurriao, approx normal complement. San Dionisio, 24 Jul 11 u/i a/c to SE believed movement of part of a unit. Tiring, approx normal complement. (4) Unit at Fabrica believed to be 103d Training Flying Regt. (5) Normal a/c at Anibong Pt. and Cataisan. Valencia, first report operational. (6b) Confirms report of 7 Jul 1944. Malaybalay, Del Monte and Lumbia show considerable decrease. Planes may have moved to Cagayan or Valencia or training units may have become operational. Large amount of gas for number of aircraft usually in northern Bukidnon/Malaybalay area. May be transported overland to Davao to avoid submarines. (6c) Rapidly becoming more active. Used by Navy for training or by recent pilot graduates. May serve as ferry point to N.E.I. (6d) Aircraft from east landing City of Davao possibly from Palau. Total 600/700 aircraft all Davao fields possible with addition of reported 200 crated aircraft at Padada. Licanan: 22 Jul: Aircraft departed south probably for Buayan or SWPA. Mandawao, new field, exact location unknown, possibly near Davao Penal Colony. Padada is one of main areas in Davao for assembling aircraft. (6f) First report San Roque operational.

## III NAVY

## 1. Luzon:

- a) Manila: 17 Jun: Jap tanker rptd burned at Pier 5 by sabotage. 27 Jul: Japs rptd commandeering all sailboats of 35 T & up. These are loaded with troops & rice at Pier 3 & leave for unkn destination.\*

UNCLASSIFIED

- b) Batangas: 28 Jul: New type of subchaser rptd in Batangas Bay. Description: 35-40' o.a., 10' beam, metal hull, 2 engines, transom stern, low canvas covered bridge, 2 oval raked funnels (1' high), sm masts, & apparently have depth charges at stern.
- c) Bicol: 24 Jul: 1 med freighter rptd loading copra & hemp Tobacco Bay. 27 Jul: Japs rptd using following anchorages for naval vsls since early Jun: Albay Gulf, San Miguel Bay, Mambulao Bay.
- 2. Panay: Iloilo NE Coast: 24 Jul: Mtr launch rptd to have struck anchored mine NE of Pan de Azucar Id.\*
- 3. Leyte: Tacloban: 16 Jul: 1 lrg & 2 sm tpts entered & unloaded few boxes. 26 Jul: same lrg & 1 sm tpt presumably loaded with troops left for S.
- 4. Cebu: 18 Jul: 56 med & hvy barges rptd at Liloan. Med barges have 100 man capacity, 1 mtr, automatic bow ramp, hvy barges are army type A of 120 man capacity. Both types armored. 22 Jul: Sm vsl with lrg torpedo hole amidships rptd arriving Cebu Hbr for repairs.
- 5. Mindanao:
  - a) Zamboanga City: 21 Jul: 2 tpts & 4 u/i warships rptd at wharf.
  - b) Davao: 14 Jul: Tpt rptd as unloading lrg nbr marines, arty & ammo at Sasa wharf. Same date 4 CA, 25 DD, many sm warships rptd in immediate vicin. 18 Jul: Approx 70 vsls rptd in Gulf. Various types of naval & merch vsls. 26 Jul: 2 sized barges rptd being built in Bunawan, 1 30' long 20' wide, 12' high; other is 24' long, 10' wide & 8' high.

\*COMMENTS: (1a) Reflects growing shipping difficulties of the Japs. (2) Indicates that fleet anchorage in Guimaras Strait is protected by mine fields.

IV G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION:

1. Summary of the Enemy Situation:

a. Activities in Northern Philippines:

Luzon: Heavy ground activity noted throughout Bicol Peninsula; increased ground activities along the northwest coast. Conscripted labor no longer used for food production, but devoted to airdrome construction.

b. Activities in Central Philippines:

General: Evidence indicates that considerable supplies are being sent into the Visayas; increased use of sailing craft for inter-island movement of troops and supplies indicated.

Leyte: Valencia airfield operational.

c. Activities in Southern Philippines:

General: Ground movements south via Sayre Highway; heavy ground preparations indicated throughout.

Mindanao: 600/700 aircraft reported Davao City. Estimated 200 unassembled planes at Padada.

d. New Identifications:

Mobile Combat:\* Est Strength

163 Ind Inf Bn (30 IMB)	Davao Prov ?	2/44	800 ?
164 Ind Inf Bn (30 IMB)	Davao Prov ?	3/44	800 ?
165 Ind Inf Bn (30 IMB)	Davao Prov	2/44	800 ?
167 Ind Inf Bn (30 IMB)	Cagayan ?	12/43	800 ?
169 Ind Inf Bn (31 IMB)	Iloilo Prov	6/44	800 ?
170 Ind Inf Bn (31 IMB)	Capiz Prov ?	6/44	800 ?
171 Ind Inf BN (31 IMB)	Antique Prov ?	6/44	800 ?
172 Ind Inf Bn (31 IMB)	Cebu	6/44	800 ?
173 Ind Inf Bn (31 IMB)	Cebu	6/44	800 ?
Signal Unit (31 IMB)	Cebu City	6/44	150 ?
179 Ind Inf Bn (32 IMB)	Batangas Prov	4/44	800 ?
180 Ind Inf Bn (32 IMB)	Batangas Prov	4/44	800 ?

Base Defense and Service Units:

2nd Ship Arty Regt	El Manila	6/44	500 ?
3rd A/Fd Constr Hq	Hq Manila ?	2/44	50 ?
	Br Davao	5/44	50 ?
5th Fd MP Unit		1/44	200 ?
61st Anchorage	Br Surigao	6/44	75 ?

\* Previous general location assumed; identity and location now established as indicated.

UNCLASSIFIED

2. Conclusions.

a. Enemy Capabilities:

Operations in the Northern Philippines:

- 1) Development and Reinforcement of Luzon.
- 2) Air Defense in the Northern Philippines.

Operations in the Central Philippines:

- 3) Development and Reinforcement of East Coast and Inter-Island Positions of the Visayas Group.

Operations in the Southern Philippines:

- 4) Defense of Mindanao.
- 5) Air Activity in the Southern Philippines.

Operations in the Philippines:

- 6) Related Naval Activity.

Operations in the Northern Philippines:

1) Development and Reinforcement of Luzon: During the past few weeks movements have been noticeably toward the central and northern sectors of Luzon. An average of fifty-five loaded trucks were estimated passing daily through Balete Pass. Another significant trend in Japanese developments of Luzon has been the movement of troops to the east coast, and to the southeast toward the Bicol Peninsula. It will be recalled that the 33rd Independent Mixed Brigade appeared to be shifting toward the Lamon Bay Region. These previous events have a familiar ring in this week's messages.

The strength in Central Luzon is still fluctuating considerably. It seems that troops are massed here and then fanned out to the western and northern coastal sectors. In San Fernando, north of Lingayen Gulf, some 2,000 soldiers were concentrating. In addition, several small towns along the west coast are showing signs of being strengthened.

Road improvements continue throughout the northern and central areas. All bridges are now reported in good condition. All highways and railroads are still heavily used by the Nipponese Army. Bridges in Ilocos Sur (central west coast) are reported protected by stone pill boxes covered with heavy galvanized iron roofing.

In the Bicol Area, the strength appears to be increasing. In the Province of Albay heavy troop movements are indicated. The strength along the east coast of Camarines Norte is mentioned as 3,000 men; large garrisons are at Daet, Paracale, and Mambulao. The indicated strengthening of the Camarines Norte sector is not surprising. Its relatively good road nets and beaches mark it as a highly important area--it offers an ideal back door entrance to Manila.

So a picture of trends is discernible: the Japanese are making rapid strides to buttress Luzon's northwest coast and the Bicol Peninsula against attacks from the sea.

In this big picture of reinforcing Luzon is Manila. On the 3rd of July, some fifty-seven transports were in the harbor--on the 10th of July, thirty-five. As has been said, troops disembarked in Manila are quickly moved to Luzon's coastal sectors. It is believed that some of this strength is used to convert the Independent Mixed Brigades to divisional strengths; some of the strength is also believed used for organization of task forces, tailored for specific sectors depending on the type of terrain the force will be required to defend.

This information demonstrates that the preparations for the defense of Luzon are making progress. The task of defending this lengthy coastline will naturally require painstaking planning. Luzon is 40,420 square miles, about the same size as the State of Kentucky. The Nipponese appear to be wasting no time in developing three factors, so essential to a defense: strength, supplies, and good road nets.

2) Air Defense in the Northern Philippines: The importance the enemy places upon airfield construction in Luzon is indicated by the report from Luzon that conscripted labor is no longer used for food production, but is devoted to airfield construction. While this report may be somewhat exaggerated, at least 25 airfields are being put into shape in Luzon.

This construction centers around certain areas, the principal areas, or air centers being Bicol, Batangas, Manila, Clark and Lingayen. In addition the past few weeks have indicated that the enemy plans airfield construction along the east coast of Luzon, in Tayabas Province. To date,

UNCLASSIFIED

these plans have been executed only to the extent of improving pre-war Baler airfield. In the Batangas, Manila and Clark air centers, the enemy has planned, has under construction or in operation, so many airfields (approx. 37), that it is doubted if he will launch many more airfield enterprises. In the Bicol and Lingayen air centers (approx. 14 airfields), he will probably build more airfields. Another airfield or two can be expected in Northern Luzon in the near future, to handle heavy aircraft traffic to more southerly Philippine Island regions.

The report of 351 aircraft on the Nichols, Neilson and Lipa airfields as of 10 July, is approximately 60 more aircraft than are normally observed on these 3 airfields. While all the aircraft are reported as bombers and fighters, some of them are probably used for training purposes. It is reasonably well established that Lipa airfield is one of the large training centers in Luzon, probably devoted mainly to bombers. From this report and from other increases noted in various parts of the Philippines, it is estimated from ground reports that there are from 1500 to 1600 aircraft, of all types, in the Philippines. From 750 to 800 of these aircraft are believed to be located in Luzon.

Conclusions:

1. Airfield construction in Luzon is one of the main enemy considerations.
2. There are from 750 to 800 aircraft in Luzon.

Operations in the Central Philippines:

3) Development and Reinforcement of East Coast and Inter-Island Positions of the Visayas Group: Discussions regarding logistical trends in the Visayas have been presented in previous summaries. There have been numerous indications that supply levels were being increased throughout this area. And previous statistical data reveals that the Ports of Cebu and Iloilo handle considerable shipping. Here, then, are a few of the notable contemporary trends toward making the Visayas, and other areas in the Philippines, self sustaining as regards supplies.

The Japanese are reported commandeering all sailboats of thirty tons, or greater capacity. Presently, it is not known whether these craft will be moved to the Visayas or be spread throughout the Philippines. The Visayas appear to offer the greatest need for these craft. But this item suggests some interesting implications; it implies that steps are being taken to improve communications, i.e., possibilities for moving troops from rear to forward areas, not to mention the possibility that the Jap is hard pressed for coast-wise shipping. It also implies that the logistical set-up will be strengthened, i.e., the levels of supplies will be increased. The enemy's New Guinea fiasco resulted partly from a logistic breakdown; it is possible that some lessons were learnt from this.

But that is not the entire current picture. Reports during the 23rd-29th July period reveal, again, that considerable shipping is in the Visayan area: viz., Cebu 152,150 tons; Leyte 14,500; Panay 25,500; and Negros 12,000. In addition, it is significant that transports continue to unload materials at Tacloban; it will be recalled that shipping has been seen in this locality on several occasions. Currently, then, we can say the Japanese are improving the logistical situation in the Visayas.

And this brings to light the tactical preparations, which usually work in close harmonious cooperation with logistical planning. The Island of Samar is displaying signs of being strengthened. It is indicated that about 900 men are concentrated at Laoang (north coast); this is a slight increase over previous figures. On the eastern coast, the locality of Taft is again mentioned as having some 500 troops in its area. But the heaviest activity was noted along the west coast, notably in the Calbayog and Catbalogan areas where approximately 5,000 troops were indicated assembling. This strength, of course, is not conclusive evidence that these troops will remain on Samar. Thus, these trends define anew the relation of activity along the east coast and that in the central Visayas, especially in the sphere of defensive tactics.

It is believed this activity is linked with the enemy's current tactical training program. That is, he is moving troops from rear to forward areas--believed to be reserves--to acquaint them with trails, terrain, and time and space factors. This thought is best reflected in

Summary 7: viz., "The tactical and strategical principles involved would follow the preconceived maneuver, i.e., to acquaint reserves with areas or sectors that are to be reinforced, counter-attacked, and defended."

Operations in the Southern Philippines:

4) Defense of Mindanao: From the foregoing discussion on the Visayas it was revealed that heavy shipping movements are taking place in its central islands. This activity no doubt is linked with other areas. Evidence at hand indicates that some strength in the Visayas is being moved to Mindanao. The heavy activity along Mindanao's north coast, the movement of troops and supplies south via the Sayre Highway, and the spreading out of units from Davao Gulf, lend validity to the assumption that Nipponese commanders are giving serious attention to the defense of this southern Island, protecting the Philippines' south flank.

Playing an important part in this defense program is the town of Cagayan. The shipping here is very active. It is indicated that some 3,000 troops recently left Cagayan for Davao, via the Sayre Highway; cumulative evidence shows that Cagayan's strength fluctuates considerably, revealing that it is used principally for one purpose - a staging area. Large quantities of aviation gas, machinery and ammunition dumps are observed around Cagayan. And to protect all this, a large number of anti-aircraft batteries were moved into the area.

It is a known fact that the most strategically important sector in northern Mindanao is the Surigao north and east coasts. But before this area is discussed, it is well to mention that several points along the northern coast and several localities along the Sayre Highway are showing signs of increased activity. For example, there is evidence that the Japs plan to permanently occupy coastal towns in Misamis Occidental Province. In the area north of Bukidnon Province, 8,000 drums of aviation gas were reported; in the Malaybalay area some 2,000 drums. Large amounts of gasoline and bombs were observed moving by trucks along the Sayre Highway.

The Japs' interest in the Surigao coastal area seems to be growing in intensity; this interest is reflected in a review of this week's messages.

Current reports state that there are some 10,000 troops spread along the Surigao east coast. This is significant information because the strength report is in line with previous G-2 estimates, indicating that the enemy may, at least, hold this strength between 10,000 and 12,000, not to mention the possibility that it may increase. It is also reported that a number of artillery pieces, horses, and carts are here. This infers that horse drawn artillery may be a part of the force defending the Surigao coast. This would be in line with the organization of a task force, i.e., tailoring a unit to operate in terrain which they are expected to defend. Nor is the Jap overlooking the development of his communications. Roads are now reported open from Surigao City to Lanuza (about fifty miles south - along the coast). Mapping of the coast line, and areas 10 miles inland, is being initiated. Numerous air raid shelters have been built. All this data, and the report that there is enough food stored in the area to feed troops for seven months, certainly indicates that the Nipponese are preparing for one of their traditional last ditch fights.

And finally a word needs to be said about the great Port and defense bastion - Davao Gulf. During the recent period the tempo of activity here increased; troop movements south continued, while an influx of men and supplies was being maintained without interruption. This story is evident in the following excerpts from the week's messages. Unloaded from transports were approximately 4,000 troops and 1,800 civilians, road rollers, tanks, 100 motorcycles, trailers, 170 trucks, 3,000 solid rubber tires, large quantities of food stuffs and other items. In the Malalag area (south of Padada) some 500 marines, 1,000 infantry, 200 unassembled planes, 20 tanks, and 5,000 drums of aviation gasoline were unloaded. Similar activity was reported at Sasa. As regards coastal installations, the Malalag beaches are reported heavily fortified with large calibre guns, anti-aircraft and electric wire. Other reports state that two large coastal guns - 12 or 14 inches - were brought from Corregidor and emplaced on the southeast coast of Talikud Island; large ammunition storage chambers are behind these weapons. This information regarding coastal defenses is not new; it will be recalled that similar information was published in previous summaries.

Space does not permit a discussion of Zamboanga and other areas along the south coast. But fragmentary data does reflect that more attention is being given to these places. For example, Zamboanga's defenses are being strengthened and troops continue to funnel through her ports. The Illana Bay region is coming into the lime-light of defense preparations.

From the foregoing data, it would appear that this conclusion can be drawn safely: Preparations for the defense of Mindanao are being carried out at a rapid pace and increasing intensity.

5) Air Activity in the Southern Philippines: Airfield construction in Mindanao continues in the more forward areas, and has slackened somewhat in the more rear areas.

In Davao, confirmation has been received of the construction of another airfield called Mandawao. Its exact location is not known, but it appears to be located north of Licanan airfield, but south of the Davao Penal Colony. It is not a part of Licanan airfield. Valencia #2 (Bukidnon Province) continues to be enlarged, and is now estimated to be twice its pre-war size. Apparently the enemy is concerned with the axis of his air route from Manila to Davao, Valencia #2 being on the direct route.

In the Zamboanga area (not on the Manila-Davao route) civilian labor is no longer used for airfield construction. One of the two fields under construction, San Roque, is now operational. The other, Ayala, may become operational in the near future.

Air operations in the Davao area continue to portray the apprehension with which the enemy views the possibility of air raids and amphibious actions. Air raid drills continue. Fighters are constantly dog fighting over Licanan (believed to be main Davao fighter airfield), and aircraft are practicing dive bombing against ships in Davao Gulf. While all this air activity may be characterized as training, it is probably the training of operational, rather than training units.

It is estimated from ground reports, that there are approximately 525 aircraft, of all types in Mindanao. The vast majority of these aircraft are located in the Davao Gulf-Sarangani Bay area. Of these 525 aircraft, it is believed that a majority are first line combat aircraft.

Conclusions:

- 1) Airfield construction in Mindanao continues, particularly in the Davao area and along the Manila-Davao air route.
- 2) Operational training is being stressed in the Davao area.
- 3) There are approximately 525 aircraft in Mindanao, of which a majority are believed to be first line combat aircraft.

Operations in the Philippines:

6) Related Naval Activity: Merchant shipping reported in Philippine waters for the week ending 29 July, totalled 110 ships of 344,150 tons as compared with 142 ships of 287,120 tons for the previous week. It is reported that the Japs have commandeered all sailing craft of 30 tons and upwards. These craft will probably be used for inter-island movement of men and supplies, and this use reflects the increasing shortage of larger shipping units. As the enemy continues to reinforce their Philippine garrisons, the problem of supply will become progressively more acute, and increased use of all types of vessels available may be expected. No significant change in major naval units was reported during the past weeks; the enemy is still believed to be using a number of light cruisers for escort duty, particularly for the protection of tanker convoys.

b. Relative Probabilities:

1) Development and Reinforcement of Luzon: The Japanese are expected to make rapid strides to buttress the Bicol Peninsula against attacks from the sea.

2) Air Defense in the Northern Philippines: Airfield construction is expected to become of prime importance in Luzon; aircraft in Luzon believed to number 750 to 800.

3) Development and Reinforcement of East Coast and Inter-Island Positions of the Visayas Group: The Japanese are expected to improve their logistical and tactical situation in the Visayas by moving a number of sailing craft into the area.

~~SECRET~~  
**UNCLASSIFIED**

4) Defense of Mindanao: Preparations for the defense of Mindanao are expected to be carried out at a rapid pace and with increasing intensity; more emphasis will probably be placed on the south coast.

5) Air Activity in the Southern Philippines: Airfield construction continues in Davao area and along axis of Manila-Davao air route. Operational training in Davao area continues. Number of aircraft in Mindanao is approximately 525.

6) Related Naval Activity: It is not believed that the enemy has sufficient naval strength in Philippine waters to seriously threaten our operations in the South West Pacific Area.

~~SECRET~~  
**UNCLASSIFIED**



APPENDIX XXV

EXTRACTS FROM ATIS PUBLICATIONS DEALING WITH  
 JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

	Page
Police Preventive Measures against Enemy Espionage and Fifth Column Tactics, 11 Jan 1943 .....	1
Tightening of Counterintelligence Controls, 16 Feb 1943 .....	2
Tightening of Counterintelligence Controls, 6 Dec 1943 .....	4
Watari Group Intelligence Report, 1-15 May 1944 .....	5
Watari Group Intelligence Report, 16-31 May 1944 .....	6
Watari Group Intelligence Report, 1-10 June 1944 .....	6
Watari Group Intelligence Report, 11-20 June 1944 .....	7
Watari Group Intelligence Report, 1-10 July 1944 .....	7
Watari Group Intelligence Report, 11-20 July 1944 .....	7
Shobu Group Intelligence Report, 21-31 July 1944 .....	7
Staff Intelligence Report, 31 July 1944 .....	8
Shobu Group Intelligence Report, 1-10 Aug 1944 .....	8
Shobu Group Intelligence Report, 11-20 Aug 1944 .....	8
Nao Group Intelligence Report, 8-25 Aug 1944 .....	9
Nao Group Intelligence Report, 26 Aug - 5 Sep 1944 .....	9
Shobu Group Intelligence Report, 1-10 Sep 1944 .....	9

TO: APPENDIX XXV

Extracts from ATIS publications dealing  
with Japanese intelligence and counterintelligence

POLICE PREVENTIVE MEASURES AGAINST ENEMY  
ESPIONAGE AND FIFTH COLUMN TACTICS (1)

Philippines MP TAKA\* Order No 38, 11 Jan 43  
Military Secret

From: Director of Police Duties Section, Philippines MP  
Unit, Kodama, Kazunao\*  
To: Each section (or detached unit) CO

\* \* \* \* \*

In this second year of war, although there is little chance of forecasting what methods or schemes the enemy will employ, it is not difficult to see that he will use every available means of sabotage. Combining this with his military effort, he will seek to obstruct the growth of our military forces, which depends upon practical use of products derived from development of the south. We must be especially on guard against sabotage of airplanes and submarines. Security against such sabotage will depend on use of wireless and on countermeasures directed against propaganda devices. It must be realized that these are the factors which will condition the peace of the Philippines. It is believed that each unit is already gradually devising proper countermeasures.

Since it is easy to neglect subversive warfare until it actually flares up, the following projected countermeasures are to be referred to, and spy networks are to be quickly established in the necessary areas. These areas and vital supplies must be guarded, and all means of liaison must be used to the fullest extent. It is to be kept in mind that the following examples are derived from stratagems used by the enemy in the BURMA area and in the environs of naval stations in JAPAN. We must be on guard against the use of these methods in this area.

Examples of Enemy Stratagems

1. Use of spies and the sending in (by sea or air) of radio personnel to establish liaison with Australia and America. (These agents are to report weather data necessary for air raids and information on Japanese shipping movements.)
2. Landing of small numbers of leaders to take command of guerrilla units.
3. The murdering of prominent Filipino and Japanese civilians and landing of espionage agents to destroy ships, airplanes, mines, etc. (These agents are apt to carry concealed on their persons powerful explosive materials, invisible ink, poison, materials to start fires, etc.)
4. Landing of agents to foster political intrigues. (These agents may be expected to carry orders from Roosevelt, Quezon and MacArthur. They may also attempt to kidnap prominent Filipino civilians.)

---

Note: The symbol \* indicates an exact ROMAJI transliteration of the original KANA.

(1) ATIS Enemy Publication No. 343, "Reports on Counterintelligence, Propaganda and Fifth Column Activities in the Philippines," 30 Mar 45, pp 2-3.

5. Landing of agents to disrupt the economic system. (These agents may carry counterfeit military currency and Filipino notes and counterfeiting materials.)
6. Landing of espionage agents and fifth columnists to direct Allied air attacks, and to spy on Japanese shipping.
7. Supplying enemy bandits with materiel, ammunition, new code books, communication materials, food, heavy oil, etc.
8. Acquisition of native spies along the coast to gain knowledge of the Japanese shipping situation.
9. These agents are mainly trained Americans and Filipinos. However, Chinese and Japanese may also be used.

Note: Of these examples, No. 3 should be given the most attention.

#### TIGHTENING OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CONTROLS (2)

Philippine MP, TAKA No 111  
Military Most Secret

From: Philippine MP Unit, Director of Police Duties Section,  
Kodama, Kazunao, 16 Feb 43  
To: All Detachment CO's

\* \* \* \* \*

Because it was difficult to estimate, at the time we occupied the Philippines, just what the situation would be in regard to liaison between the islands and America and Australia, no special requests for counterintelligence reports were made, even in the monthly reports on public order.

Later, our repair work on radios did not proceed as we had expected it would, and we did not capture the anticipated number of enemy wireless sets which were in touch with America and Australia. In fact, many new enemy wireless sets have appeared recently. These radios are, of course, in touch with submarines and America and Australia. Almost certainly they were brought in by submarine.

As is shown in a recent report (PHILIPPINE MP TAKA Report No 38), it is not difficult to imagine that the enemy will embark upon a plan of sabotage (perhaps a part of the forces have landed already) and not simply gather spy reports. Consequently, counterintelligence in the Philippines at the present time must be aimed at the bases of the United States Army elements and guerrillas who remained behind.

The control of counterintelligence and the maintenance of public order within the islands has, of course, a direct and important bearing on military operations. While we can be confident that each unit is progressing steadily in the development of countermeasures (based on past intelligence reports), we must redouble our efforts in this direction. A spy network must be established and expanded. Supplementary methods, such as organizing persons living in coastal villages or engaged in fishing and shipping as guards, offering rewards, etc., must be utilized. Related information must be gathered, hidden radios and enemy wireless sets captured, articles (including persons) necessary for security must be safeguarded, and the causes of destruction, epidemics, fires, etc., discovered. Thus, passive counterintelligence must be carried out thoroughly if we are to attain our ob-

---

(2) ATIS Enemy Publication No. 343, pp 9-10.

(2)

jective quickly.

The method of reporting these conditions will be as follows:

Note: Because there is an insufficient amount of basic information concerning the underground warfare, these methods should be taught in conjunction with the regular training (refer to separate volume accompanying MP report of December of last year).

1. Special reports.

Will include items concerning enemy propaganda, sabotage, and spy reports as well as the situation, the frustration of plots (active counterintelligence) and passive counterintelligence.

2. Monthly reports.

In addition to putting the new section 10 in the general monthly report on public order and writing a report on the general situation as regards counterintelligence (passive and active), detailed matters must be submitted in a special table.

3. Points requiring attention.

a. Enemy spy reports, propaganda, and sabotage can be divided into two main types, that which the enemy regular army (American and Australian) carries out, and that which defeated guerrillas carry out independently. Naturally the greatest stress should be laid upon the former, but the difficulty lies in discriminating between the two. Detachments should endeavor to study the actual incidents with this in mind, utilizing all aspects of counterintelligence.

b. Special, high-ranking officers at the unit headquarters shall be responsible for matters related to propaganda directed to the Philippines from the United States and Australia.

c. All reports submitted after this notice is received will follow the directions set forth herein.

TIGHTENING OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CONTROLS (3)

Watari Staff Counterintelligence No 98, 6 Dec 43

From: Watari Group Chief of Staff

To: Philippine MP Unit CO

\* \* \* \* \*

The activities of the enemy guerrillas in the Philippines have recently been well concealed, and in addition the activities of enemy spy organizations and of the fifth column have been increasingly intensified. In view of the seriousness of the present situation in the Philippines, the advance base of the Southern Co-Prosperity Sphere, it is desired that all units carry out counterintelligence indoctrination and methods. "Outline of Recent Enemy Spy and Fifth Column Activity" is being forwarded separately as material for instruction and reference, together with "Outline of Counterintelligence Measures to be Taken in Army Units."

---

(3) ATIS Enemy Publication No. 343, pp 49-50.

## Outline of Recent Enemy Spy and Fifth Column Activity

### I. Report on Spies

The objective of enemy spying, up to now, has been to secure information about our forces and especially about naval and air establishments in rear areas. They seek to win over the police, government officials and liberated prisoners, and they resort to all sorts of cleverly disguised activities.

\* \* \* \*

Examples:

\* \* \* \* \*

C. The enemy directive concerning the gathering of information about Japanese forces deals with the following points:

1. Overall plans for the defense of the Philippines.
2. The detailed plans for the defense of each area.
3. Detailed facts concerning ground units.
  - a. Garrison units (Shubi)
  - b. Equipment
  - c. Forces
  - d. Commanding officers of forces
  - e. Dispositions
  - f. Morale
  - g. Discipline
  - h. Condition of training
  - i. Status of provisions
  - j. Resources to be used by the troops
  - k. Storehouses
  - l. Ammunition dumps
4. Information on ground units.

Strive to determine the duties the Japanese authorities have assigned all ground units. Even if this information cannot be determined, code names (abbreviated names) and code numbers of the units should be secured. Japanese Army units usually have a code name and a code number which indicates the division. (The numbers usually consist of four arabic numerals.) The number of the regiments within divisions are usually successive numbers. The names of officers are usually used for code names and the names used are only those recorded on army rolls. The countless code numbers are more important than code names.

5. Battles in which the units participated and the language spoken (Malay, Chinese, or Filipino).
6. Names of the cities or areas in Japan in which the units were stationed before joining the present forces.
7. Names of all unit CO's (Colonels and above). (The first name is very important.)
8. Clubs, cabarets, bars and other places of amusement used exclusively by the Japanese forces.
9. Are EM permitted in the places mentioned in the preceding item?
10. What sort of motion pictures are now being shown in Manila? What, if any, American pictures are shown which indicate feelings of the people toward the Japanese Army and Navy?
11. Are army personnel below the rank of officer addicted to the following? What sort of thing are they

addicted to?

- a. Sake
- b. Gambling
- c. Prostitution
- d. Horse racing
- e. Exercise

\* \* \* \* \*

Watari Group Intelligence Report B No. 153, 1-15 May 1944 (4)

\* \* \* \* \*

5. Submarines are appearing in Philippine waters with greater frequency in order to intercept our supplies. Especially in the coastal waters of Mindanao, the situation is becoming acute. Since our forces occupied Mindanao, the enemy has lost the important places on the east coast where submarines can put in. There are many authenticated instances recently of the enemy seeking places to put in on the southern coast, especially near Lebak and southeast Pagadian in Zamboanga Province.

6. Enemy wireless communication in the Philippines has as usual been active and cleverly conducted. Harada Group of Mindanao, in an effort to destroy enemy communication to the United States and Australia, secured the cooperation of six Navy bombers and carried out a bombing raid on 4 and 5 May against WAT, the largest enemy wireless station. As a result, the enemy communication network was disorganized, and the bandit group was confused. Each punitive unit is concentrating on the destruction of radio stations and is zealously carrying out punitive action. Because of the present situation, it is important to destroy the radio stations beamed to the United States and Australia and the principal command stations (WAT, WPI, MACA, VIM, PGA, ERT, TKA).

7. It appears that the enemy bandits have been secretly constructing airfields to be used in the future attack by the American Army. They are striving to keep established airfields secret. It is necessary to exercise particular vigilance in Zamboanga and western Lanao Provinces on Mindanao.

Watari Group Intelligence Report B No. 154, 16-31 May 1944 (5)

\* \* \* \* \*

2. American landing preparations, especially the landing of directing personnel, weapons and materials by submarine are progressing greatly. Enemy zones of operations are the environs of central radio stations, coastal regions, and Mindanao Island (Davao, Lanao and eastern Zamboanga Provinces). The enemy is putting his plans into effect through the gaps in our disposition.

3. As enemy resistance becomes highly organized, such clandestine activities as circulation of propaganda leaflets and terrorism are growing apace in Manila. Propaganda agitation among constabulary units throughout the islands by the defeated bandits is gradually intensifying.

Our investigations for the most part are dependent on surrendered bandits and those connected with bandits. All

---

(4) ATIS Enemy Publication No. 359, "Guerrilla Warfare in the Philippines," 28 Apr 45, Part I, pp 19-20.

(5) ATIS Enemy Publication No. 359, Part I, p 33.

such mentioned the following propaganda points:

- a. Boasting about the superiority of the American Army.
- b. Certainty of the return of the American Army.
- c. Coercion of adamant individuals with the aim of rising up in unison during the American invasion.

\* \* \* \* \*

5. The number of enemy radios sending reports on our shipping is increasing. Three are now directly engaged in communication of ship movements to Australia. We are at present trying to identify the signals; and we surmise that the stations are on islands near the main channels such as Mindoro, Gimalas, Bohol, Surigao, and Basilan.

Watari Group Intelligence Report B No. 155, 1-10 June 1944 (6)

\* \* \* \* \*

4. Bandit radio stations are as active as before. The important station WAT seems to have suffered great damage as a result of several surprise attacks by us. Station MLX and KUS have been communicating with their sub-stations recently; the extent of internal and external communication has not changed. One of our units made a surprise attack on Station Maca on Samar, beamed to America and Australia. A total of 22 transmitters were seized and other important successes obtained.

Watari Group Intelligence Report B No. 156, 11-20 June 1944 (7)

\* \* \* \* \*

3. The appearance of new enemy wireless stations is as frequent as before. In particular the enemy has recently brought in many small-type wireless sets which are used for communication within the islands. Wireless communication has increased considerably. The bandits seem to have learned about our interception and plotting, for they are skillfully concealing their stations and are successfully preventing interruption of communication by our punitive units. Station Maca alone is equipped with 10 to 20 wireless sets. More accurate information must be collected to destroy these stations.

Watari Group Intelligence Report B No. 158, 1-10 July 1944 (8)

\* \* \* \* \*

2. The bandits on the islands, while secretly increasing their strength and organizing their fighting power, are chiefly endeavoring to reconnoiter the state of our military installations, especially air and shipping installations.

\* \* \* \* \*

4. Enemy radio communication continues brisk, and the enemy seems to have made considerable preparation against interruption by our punitive operations. Although we captured seven transmitters and 15 receivers in punitive operations

---

Note: The symbol \* indicates an exact ROMAJI transliteration of the original KANA.

(6) ATIS Enemy Publication No. 359, Part I, p 44.

(7) ATIS Enemy Publication No. 359, Part I, p 54.

(8) ATIS Enemy Publication No. 359, Part II, p 1.

against Station Maca on Samar, communication continues as before (interrupted only two weeks).

Watari Group Intelligence Report B No. 159, 11-20 July 1944 (9)

\* \* \* \* \*

1. Because of preparations for counterattack and the advent of the rainy season, our punitive activity must be restrained. We must guard against the bandits building up their strength on the sly.

\* \* \* \* \*

3. Enemy submarines move about freely, especially in the waters northwest of Luzon. Out shipping losses have not been light. Thirty-eight submarines have appeared during these 10 days, an increase of 16 over the previous 10 days.

4. As before, there is much radio communication. Station WAT broadcast weather reports to Station KAZ in Australia for four days beginning the 12th. This situation needs attention.

Shobu Group Intelligence Report B No. 1, 21-31 July 1944 (10)

\* \* \* \* \*

4. Wireless stations are still active. Station RIO on Cebu Island is the central station and, in conjunction with Stations KUS and WAT, has started two-way communication with Australia. Furthermore, on Panay, Samboan\* and Mi\* Islands, six stations have appeared, reporting shipping news with simple codes.

Staff Intelligence Report No. 8, issued by 31 Independent Mixed Brigade, Southern Army, 31 July 1944 (11)

\* \* \* \* \*

In the latter part of July, the enemy radio stations MAI, WPI, and RIO in the Visayan Sector were as yet actively engaged in interisland communication. On the 29th, for the second time we intercepted a message somewhat like a weather report.

Station RIO is located in the vicinity of Aroginsan\*, east of Kandiagan.

Station BRF 8 was located on Height 741, west of Cebu City on 22 July.

A message somewhat like a weather report was sent by station URO on 29 July to station GNA, on Cebu or Panay. Position of URO unknown.

GNA, which appeared on 29 July, is believed to be located on Cebu Is.

Negros Is: NPI (INBA) serves as a relay station for Negros Is, and is near the border of a province through which the upper stream of the Shiparai\* River flows.

KAM - Located in the upper stream of the Bago\* River near Tarosu\*.

---

Note: The symbol \* indicates an exact ROMAJI transliteration of the original KANA.

(9) ATIS Enemy Publication No. 359, Part II, p 10.

(10) ATIS Enemy Publication No. 359, Part II, p 19.

(11) ATIS Current Translations No. 146, 31 Jan 45, ADVATIS No. 15, Doc No. 600402, p 4.

KRT - Located in the mountains east of Murcia.  
KCO - Located in the vicinity of Murcia.  
FNS - Vicinity of Dancalan.  
MP6 - 16 km south of Dancalan.  
KLM - Vicinity of Areguriyahada\*, northeast of Murcia.  
MIW - In the mountains west of Jimalalud.  
MRO - Near the western border of Girufugan\* Province.

Panay Is:

MIA serves as nucleus station for the Panay network (radio). Its call sign has been changed recently. Operates frequently.

MIA - Located near Alfonso, south of Libacao.  
GNA - Vicinity of Malinao.  
DXR - Madalag vicinity, east of Passi.

Bohol Is: After the subjugation, both MBF and MBS kept radio silence. By the latter part of July, they were totally silent.

Shobu Group Intelligence Report B No. 2, 1-10 Aug 1944 (12)

\* \* \* \* \*

4. Enemy radio stations are active. Station WAT and nine others (three on Panay, three on Mindanao, and three whose locations are unknown) are broadcasting meteorological reports and airplane warnings to Australia. This activity should be noted.

Shobu Group Intelligence Report B No. 3, 11-20 Aug 1944 (13)

\* \* \* \* \*

1. Bandit activities.

a. Increased precautions are necessary as the bandits who hitherto have been scattered and operating independently have recently begun attempting to gather at strategic points and to consolidate their positions.

b. Bringing in of necessary personnel and supplying of ammunition and arms by submarine has increased the activity of the bandits to some degree.

\* \* \* \* \*

d. Enemy communication by radio with Stations MAI and GNA in Panay and Station Maca in Samar has increased.

NAO Group Intelligence Report B No. 1, 8-25 Aug 1944 (14)

\* \* \* \* \*

3. Enemy radio communication is as brisk as ever. On every island the principal radio stations communicate directly with Australia. They frequently broadcast weather reports and apparently plan to send information about our Army to guide the enemy air force.

---

Note: The symbol \* indicates an exact ROMAJI transliteration of the original KANA.

- (12) ATIS Enemy Publication No. 359, Part II, p 28.  
(13) ATIS Enemy Publication No. 359, Part II, p 40.  
(14) ATIS Enemy Publication No. 359, Part II, p 48.

Enemy bandits are preparing to send signals by radio as an air defense measure. In one area the measure has been in effect since the beginning of July. Station KUS on Mindanao, the center of radio activity, transmits the reports of various observation stations to the enemy air force.

NAO Group Intelligence Report B No. 2, 26 Aug - 5 Sep 1944 (15)

\* \* \* \* \*

2. Enemy wireless communication is active. KUS (MLX) on Mindanao Island is the main transmitting station. The chief transmitting stations on Panay, Mai and Gna, have combined recently in the mountains east of Culasi. The main strength of the bandit groups seems to be gradually concentrating in the same area.

3. There are indications of a gradual increase of enemy submarine activity in the vicinity of Biri Island in the western part of Samar and Homorhon Island southeast of Samar. Communication with land is taking place again and again by means of various types of signal shells.

Shobu Group Intelligence Report B No. 5, 1-10 Sep 1944 (16)

\* \* \* \* \*

3. Radio communication.

a. The highest development of bandit communication is on Panay, followed by Negros.

b. The recent appearance of stations UUZ, KRP, MAG and KRM on the coast of Samar must be noted.

c. The increase in enemy air attacks has been accompanied by a gradual increase in two-way communication of weather reports and bombing results.

---

(15) ATIS Enemy Publication No. 359, Part II, p 54.

(16) ATIS Enemy Publication No. 359, Part II, p 61



APPENDIX XXVI

ATIS CURRENT TRANSLATION NO. 149

	Page
Brief .....	1
ADVATIS Translation No. 33, 16 Division Intelligence Reports, 19 Dec 43 - 5 Jul 44 .....	2
Kaki Intelligence Report No. 170, 19-26 Dec 43 .....	2
Kaki Intelligence Report No. 1, 5 Jan 44 .....	4
Kaki Intelligence Report No. 6, 17 Feb 44 .....	5
ADVATIS Translation No. 37, Documents on Police Affairs, 1943 .....	7
Organization Charts:	
Kalapabi Group .....	12
MacArthur's Fifth Column in Manila .....	13
Espionage Network in the Philippines .....	14
Anti-Japanese National Army .....	15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
**UNCLASSIFIED**

APPENDIX XXVI

BRIEF OF  
CURRENT TRANSLATION  
NO. 149

HGD/TS/11

ADVATIS 33 - Doc No 600646 - Captured Levte (4 - 11 Nov 44)

Extracts from bound mimeographed file of 16 Div intelligence reports covering period 19 Dec 43 to 5 Jul 44. Issued by 16 Div Hq, kept by 3 Bn, 9 Inf Regt.

Contents:

Guerrilla disposition and activities; Japanese political countermeasures and punitive operations; guerrilla factional disputes.

- \*\* 1. Kaki (16 Div) Intelligence Report No 170 (19-26 Dec 43)
- \*\* 2. Kaki Intelligence Report No 1 (5 Jan 44)
- 3. Kaki Intelligence Report No 2 (10 Jan 44)
- 4. Kaki Intelligence Report No 3 (17 Jan), with organization chart of Abanseniya\* (Avancena) (1) guerrillas
- 5. Kaki Intelligence Report No 4 (27 Jan)
- 6. Kaki Intelligence Report No 5 (7 Feb)
- 7. Appendix to Kaki Intelligence Report No 5 (11 Feb)
- \*\* 8. Kaki Intelligence Report No 6 (17 Feb)
- 9. Kaki Intelligence Report B-7 (17 Feb - 7 Mar)
- 10. Kaki Intelligence Report B-8 (17 Mar)
- 11. Kaki Intelligence Report B-10 (7 Apr), with organization chart of guerrilla units in western Batangas Province.
- 12. Kaki Intelligence Report B-11 (21 Apr)
- 13. Kaki Intelligence Report No 14 (28 May)
- 14. Extracts from instructions of Div CG (5 Feb)
- 15. Special Report 1-28 Feb by Kaki Force Hq
- 16. Kaki Special Intelligence Report 13-3 (5 Mar)
- 17. Kaki Special Intelligence Report No 5 (26 Mar)
- 18. Special Report No 5 (27 Mar)
- 19. Kawazoe Punitive Unit Intelligence Report No 1 (8 Jun)

\*\* Interesting Item:

Instructions given 5 Feb by Div CG indicate policy of killing guerrilla P'sw captured in battle and of showing leniency to those who surrendered prior to a punitive operation.

In killing P'sw, "great care will be taken that no policemen or member of the general public are present to witness the occurrence, which should take place in some secluded spot. Remember not to leave any traces."

\* \* \* \* \*

\*\*ADVATIS 37 - Doc No 600875 - Captured Tacloban (22 Oct 44)

Extracts concerning guerrilla activities and pro-Japanese Filipinos from bound mimeographed and handwritten file

-----  
\*\* Items marked thus are reproduced in whole or in part in this Appendix.

(i) アバセニヤ

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
**UNCLASSIFIED**

titled "Documents on Police Affairs (General)", kept by Tacloban MP Sec for the year 1943.

Contents:

Detailed information concerning guerrilla organization, leaders, activities, etc, and pro-Japanese Filipinos, including Government officials, miscellaneous notes on public order in the Pacific Area.

Organization Charts: (See pages 12 to 15 incl.)

- \*\* 1. Kalapabi Group.
- 2. Chinese Assassination Group.
- \*\* 3. MacArthur's fifth column in Manila.
- \*\* 4. Espionage network in the Philippines.
- \*\* 5. Anti-Japanese National Army.

Interesting Items:

- 1. Surrender of Col Cushing: "In the early part of Feb, his wife Mercedes Cushing, was imprisoned by the Dagupan MP Section.... He later surrendered, but alone."
- 2. "Women are one of the big problems of the administration of the southern area. Especially is this the case in Java, where peaceful conditions have been restored, and an odd rivalry has sprung up between the civilians who work for various business houses and the soldiers for Dutch women."
- 3. "At present the shortage of rice is very great in Singapore, and Mayor Otatsu too is very much worried about this and he is encouraging the Chinese to smuggle rice."
- 4. "Unemployment situation of the persons who surrendered and returned to Luzon. 37% of all released are unemployed and in serious straits."
- 5. "On 2 Jul 43, Isuzu Maru was sunk by a mine (improvised by guerrillas) at Larena Harbor, Siquijor Is."

\* \* \* \* \*

600646

26/52/119/GD/TM/RFM

7 Jan 45

ADVATIS TRANSLATION NO 33

Extracts from bound mimeographed file of 16 Div Intelligence Report covering period 19 Dec 43 to 5 Jul 44. Issued by 16 Div Hq; kept by 3 Bn, 9 Inf Regt. Leyte - 4 - 11 Nov 44.

16 DIV INTELLIGENCE REPORTS 19 DEC 43 - 5 JUL 44

KAKI INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO 170  
19 to 26 Dec 43

1. GENERAL SITUATION

The amnesty decree which was issued one month ago has gradually been producing satisfactory results at certain localities. However, among guerrillas, there are some elements who do not fully understand the true intention of this amnesty and of the sincerity of the Imperial Army, and who are afraid of surrendering due to the fear of being punished.

2. ACTIVITIES TO BRING ABOUT SURRENDER

A. Northern Sector

The governor, town-heads and village-heads of Nueva Ecija Province have established a peace committee to appeal to the guerrillas to surrender.

B. Southeastern Sector (Bulacan Province and part of Rizal)

The town-head of Angat got in touch with Felipe Del Santos (calls himself 24 Co CO of the Anti-Japanese National Army) (TN Hukbalajaps) to appeal to the latter to surrender but in vain.

C. Southern Area (Pampanga Province)

The governor of this province completed the first phase of surrender plan and now has undertaken the second phase. He has just contacted with Lois (Luis) Taruc to talk him into surrender.

D. Southern Manila Sector (Rizal, Cavite)

On 22 Dec, Napoleon (subordinate of Sakariyasu\* (Zacarias) (1) Marcos, CO of Amadeo Sector Unit, Cavite Province, who has already surrendered) and about 300 men surrendered to Bonifuaashe\* (Bonifacio) (2), Under Secretary of Home Affairs.

Plans are being set up to work upon Patricio Erni and Sebastian Debera\* (DeVera) (3). There is a possibility of Erni's surrendering in near future.

E. Southern Luzon, Laguna, Mindoro Sector (Laguna, Tayabas, Batangas Province)

Vincente Umali replied on the 19th that he will give his decision by 15th Jan of next year to Binihian Town-chief (acting provincial governor).

Garcia Guerrillas (Mindoro Is) have expressed their intention to surrender without consulting Maj Ruffy, Supreme CO of Mindoro.

3. INFORMATION ON GUERRILLAS

Central Luzon, Northern Sector

Leaders of remnants of American guerrillas, T. W. Atwell, Capt Anderson, and Marcos held a conference in the beginning of December and agreed to combine the guerrillas under their influence.

Combined CO:	Anderson (American)
C of S:	T.W. Atwell (American)
CO, Northern Sector (including Manila):	Ramsey (German-American)
CO, Cavite Section:	Charles Waruson*(4) (American)
CO, Tabayas, Laguna, and Rizal Sector:	Marcos Augustin

Former Luzon American Guerrilla Unit is trying to combine all front line guerrillas in Central Luzon (including Anti-Japanese Army) through Capt Garcia, formerly of 45 Co of Anti-Japanese National Army. Remnants of guerrillas in Laguna Sector have been organized into Luzon Guerrillas under Marcos. Lapham, McKenzie and Serapika\* (Serafica) (5) Guerrillas are now located at San Jose Area.

Eusebino\*(Eusebio) (6) Aquino, Juan Carlos, Ramon Shimbirio\* (Simbirio) (7), Pablo Aquino and Manuel Baharuto\* (8) are hiding in southern sector of Concepcion, McKenzie and Pedro Kahokon\* (Cajucon) (9) Guerrillas have been intimidating the inhabitants in Panta Bangan and Bongabon respectively to obtain rations.

- 
- |            |           |
|------------|-----------|
| (*1) etc:- | (6) エウゼビウ |
| (1) サクリヤス  | (7) シンビリヲ |
| (2) ホニフアシヨ | (8) バハルト  |
| (3) テベラ    | (9) カホコン  |
| (4) ワルン    |           |
| (5) セラヒウカ  |           |

Killing and injuring of pro-Japanese Filipinos by guerrillas have recently become active. On the 18th, the town-head of Licab, his family and two policemen were kidnapped by guerrillas. On the 19th, a policeman of Tarlac (formerly guerrilla leader, Capt England) was shot to death while on patrolling duty.

Southeastern Sector

An element of Marcos Guerrillas was reported to have moved to northern area of Bulacan Province. Marcos and Yay Panlillo with approximately 200 men are active in Balaoan Village and San Miguel.

- Armament: Heavy MG's: 4
- Grenade dischargers: 2
- Automatic rifles: 2
- Rifles and pistols: many

Marcos seems to be trying to contact Anti-Japanese National Army.

Southern Sector

Jose Banal and about 200 men, mainly Chinese guerrillas, are active in Denarupian\* (Dinalupihan) (1) and Maramibo\* (2) Mountains. Their headquarters seem to be located in between Denarupian\* (1) and Olonagapo. Note! Jose Banal is using an alias of Capt Basco.

Ferunansho\* (Fernando) (3) Sanpan\* (4) is believed to be trying to organize underground work in Mexico City.

Pampanga Provincial police member Morisesu\* (Moises) (5) Santos, (21 yrs) who returned to his home in San Mateasu\* (San Mateas) (6) Village of San Fernando Town under the pretext of illness, appears to be organizing a bandit group. Konradoarugasu\* (7) member of resident Mexico police unit carried away two rifles and some ammunition on 14th Dec. It appears that he has joined the bandits.

KAKI INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO 1

5 Jan 44

Pedro Kahokon\* (Cajucon) (8) (A Co CO) of 300 Co of American Guerrillas has renamed his company UGAF (United Guerrillas Armed Force) and, with approximately 100 men, is hiding in the vicinity of Bongabon Town, Nueva Ecija Province.

3 Co of Anti-Japanese National Army seems to be located in the mountains 8 km southwest of Pio, Porac. Requisition of food is carried out by them from villages near Florida-Blanca, Porac. They are equipped with one light MG, three automatic rifles, 100 pistols and 50 rifles.

Pashiko\* (Pacifico) (9) Buriones (Briones?) and 300 men of Nueva Ecija Province Anti-Japanese National Army is believed to have entered a camp in Mabaya Mountain 7 km north of Moron on the 28th. Moron's Town-head made a request to the constabulary and also submitted a petition to the "government" and to Gen Francisco asking for reinforcement and mopping-up.

Northern Sector Garrison Unit (Keibi) reported on the 27th that Peripekurara\* (Felipe) (10), Pablo Aquino and Monte

- |             |               |
|-------------|---------------|
| (1) デナルピオン  | (6) サン マテアス   |
| (2) マランニホ   | (7) コンラ ドアルガス |
| (3) フェルナンシヨ | (8) カホゴン      |
| (4) サンパン    | (9) パシコ       |
| (5) モリセス    | (10) ペリペクララ   |

Negro, elements of Tarlac Province Anti-Japanese National Army, are collecting weapons at Bataan Area.

Terry, Marcos and Cabalhin Guerrillas are active in Santa Maria Area. They have no intention of surrendering.

Vincente Umali doesn't seem to have any connection with Marcos and Cabalhin. He is somewhat Americanized and calls his unit "Quezon's Guerrillas."

Erni's party from Cavite Province is still continuing looting of jewels, clothes and food.

Capt Birisha\*(Barros?)(1) and his men are hiding in Polillo Island which is under jurisdiction of Maj Redor. James Atwell (American) seems to be acting as a staff member of this group.

Leader of Marinduque Guerrillas, Untalan replied that he could not surrender without his senior officer, Col Peralta's order, that he would co-operate with the present Philippines Government faithfully, that he would not resist Japanese Army whatever and finally said that he would disband his party upon establishment of public order. (As reported by a doctor of Gasan Town who interviewed him to persuade him to surrender).

Northern Bicol Sector

Padoa\* (Padua)(2) and Turko Guerrillas have no intention to surrender. Recently Padoa\*(2) Guerrillas became active. Gonzales Guerrillas are active in Basudo Sector and are collecting food and clothes. They refused to surrender without Turko's order despite persistent appeal by the town-head of Basudo. Guerrilla leader, Turko and his men (300) are hiding in the vicinity of Tabugon (10 km northwest of Caramoan) and are gathering youths in the vicinity.

The main camp of Romero Guerrillas is located in Koman-gin\*(3) Area (17 km east of Calabanga). They are conscripting the youths in that area by force. They boastfully said that they will receive arms from Padoa\*(2) and will attack Calabanga when their strength reaches 150.

\* \* \* \* \*

Los Banos

KAKI INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO 6

17 Feb 44

McKenzie, CO of Fil-American Guerrillas, Lapham (American), Serapika\*(4) and 100 men are wandering around south-east sector of Bangcay Mountains - Guimba Area.

Amado Santa Ana\*(5), 7 Co CO of Fil-American Guerrillas seems to have been assassinated last Dec by his own men.

Maj Buriones (Briones?) of Fil-American Guerrillas (formerly of Anti-Japanese Army) is believed to be in the mountains east of Orogambo\*(6) Town and is collecting weapons.

Capt Serabika\*(7) agreed to surrender and gave his signature to CO of Cabanatuan Police Patrol Unit on 24 Jan at Bondoc.

Capt Puranku\* (Franco?)(8) was dispatched from Nueva Ecija Province to Furukawa\*(9) Mines in Zambales Province to agitate the employees of the said mines as a prelude to riot.

Col Merrill's Party is active in Zambales Province.

33 officers of Jose Manekisu\*(Manikis)(10) Guerrillas (Anderson's faction) were arrested on 3rd.

Whereabout of Anderson is unknown.

Among members of former Ganappe's\*(11) Party which expressed its willingness to co-operate with us, there are some who, taking advantage of having possessed arms, threaten inhabitants and loot goods.

- (1) ヒッリンヤ
- (2) パドア
- (3) コマンジン
- (4) セラピカ
- (5) アマドサンタアナ
- (6) オロガンボ

- (7) セラピカ
- (8) フランク
- (9) フルカワ
- (10) マネキス
- (11) ガナツパー

UNCLASSIFIED

ADVATIS TRANSLATION NO 33

7 Jan 45

26/54/119/GD

Col Mata has recently moved to north of Santa Maria. He is suffering from malaria.

Pedro Babanta\* (Mabanta)(1), intelligence liaison personnel of Marcos Guerrillas, received various news from San Francisco and other sources by short wave receiver in Manila and gave information to Marcos.

Maj. Orosuko\* (Orozco)(2) and two other officers of Col Dabitto's\*(3) Guerrillas were captured.

The majority of Furca\*(4) Guerrillas surrendered, but their loyalty is doubtful.

Enemy Activities Discovered by Shun\*(5) Force Hq:

In order to obtain funds, guerrilla units in Luzon issued USAFFE Activity Bond and are communicating with guerrillas in Visayas and Mindanao.

Upon investigation of Franco, Bera\*(6), Reesu\* (Vera-Reyes)(7) (CIO-12) (in charge of printing and distribution of above mentioned bonds and who were arrested in Jan in Manila), it was revealed that the persons responsible for this activity are MDI and RJ 37 who have some connection with "Maj Gen" Fertig. The following information was obtained from the letters addressed to Philippines "Guerrillas" Hq from MDI and RJ 37.

CIO is a code name for Special Service Organization (Intelligence Dept). No 12 designates the order of the rank of members of the said dept. In addition to CIO, AI 1071, 902 are also used.

CIO requested Lapham and McKenzie to make a list of guerrillas. They have already received such lists from Capt Anderson (believed to be the one who is the leader of remnants of American Guerrillas in Central Luzon) and Capt Ramsey.

Capt Yamamoto\*(8) of Kaki Forces Hq and 56 men, are carrying out mopping-up operations against Abanseniya\*(Avancena) (9) Guerrillas.

\* \* \* \* \*

Extracts from instructions given 5 Feb by Div CG of Kaki Force and reproduced 8 Feb 44 by Kaki 6554 Force (TN 9 Inf Regt, 16 Div.)

Psw will be liquidated (TN "O" in the original.) on the battlefield. And the bad elements amongst those who surrender will be unhesitatingly, but unostentatiously liquidated, (TN "OO" in the original.) and will be counted amongst those killed in battle.

By PW is meant one who is captured on the field of battle, whereas the expression "those who surrender" covers bandits who voluntarily give themselves up prior to any punitive expedition, or who are won over to our side. Psw will be interrogated on the spot, and where no further detailed examination would be profitable from the intelligence point of view, they will be summarily liquidated (TN "OO" in the original.)

When a PW is liquidated (TN "OO" in the original.) in this way, great care will be taken that no policemen or member of the general public are present to witness the occurrence, which should take place in some secluded spot. Remember not to leave any traces.

- |           |           |
|-----------|-----------|
| (1) バババンタ | (6) ベラ    |
| (2) オロスゴ  | (7) リイス   |
| (3) グビット  | (8) 山本    |
| (4) フルオア  | (9) アバセニヤ |
| (5) シエン   |           |

UNCLASSIFIED

ADVATIS TRANSLATION NO 33

7 Jan 45

172/38/DSB

Bad elements amongst those who have surrendered should be detained for a period, and the reactions of the people observed. When the latter have forgotten the incident, these bad elements will be secretly and quietly liquidated, (TN "0" in the original.), or under the pretense of taking them off to some distant place, they will be unostentatiously liquidated (TN "00" in the original.) these steps being taken in such a way as not to excite the feelings of the people.

Others who surrender should be given a course of instruction and then released on the guarantee of the PI Govt. Should there be any who surrender directly to the PI Govt, we must immediately be informed, and they will only be released after a course of instruction.

600875

14 Jan 45

172/38/DSB/TMS/ABM

ADVATIS TRANSLATION NO 37

Extracts from bound mimeographed and handwritten file titled "Documents on Police Affairs (General)", kept by Tacloban MP Section for the year 1943. Marked "Secret." Tacloban - 22 Oct 44.

PHILIPPINES POLICE AFFAIRS, 1943

Kodama, Kazuma (\*1) Chief of PI MP Unit Police Affairs Section.

Nagahama, Akira (\*2) PI MP Unit Co.

Hirario Aberiyana\* (Hilario Abellana)(3), governor of Cebu Province, joined the guerrillas on 16 Jan 43. He is 46 years old.

Oct 43 to Nov 43

Arrested all of the staff of 34 Guerrilla Div in Manila.

By the surrender and capture of leaders such as Lt Cols Nakar, Thorp and Capt Barudesu\* (Baldes?)(4), the resistance of guerrillas has decreased to a great extent.

Aquino, who is Director of General Affairs of the new PI Service Gp and three members of his staff went to San Fernando, Tarlac City and Cabanatuan City for three days from 14 Jan 43 and gave lectures to the Filipinos, urging them to cooperate with the Japanese and go all out for the construction of a new PI. Lecturers were Benigno Aquino, Dominadoru Tan\*(5), Jose Laurel, and Alfonso Mendosa.

Former Fil-Am Army Maj Fueriyoru\*(6) and 19 other released PsW, including Biriya\*(7), Capt Kasuterio\*(8) (MO), Baton Maraki\*(9), Capt Garibaya\*(10), Capt Chiyabesu\*(11), Capt Aposutoru\*(12), 1st Lt Puno\*(13), 1st Lt Babisuta\*(14) (MO), 1st Lt Sanruisu\*(15), Ragurosa\*(16), and Santosu\*(17) attended a meeting at Davao and expressed their gratitude for the kind treatment they are receiving from the Japanese Army. They realize that Japan is their true friend and promised that they would cooperate with the Japanese Army from now on and build a new PI.

(\*1) etc:--

(1) 兒玉一真  
(2) 長浜 彰  
(3) ヒラリオ アベリヤナ  
(4) ハルデス  
(5) ドミナドル タン

(6) フエリヨル  
(7) ホリヤキル  
(8) カステリオ  
(9) バトンマラキ  
(10) ガリバヤ  
(11) チャベス

(12) アホストル  
(13) フノ  
(14) ハビスタ  
(15) サンルイス  
(16) ラグローサ  
(17) サントス

Following officials made pro-Japanese statements after being impressed by Tojo's proclamation of PI independence.

- Laurel, Chief of Internal Affairs
- Abero\*(1), Vice-Minister of Justice
- Arusan\*(2), Chief of Agriculture and Commerce
- Arabutto\*(3), Chief of Accountant's Bureau
- Hesusu\*(4), Chief of Finance Bureau
- Shiyaran\*(5), Chief of Farm Bureau
- Tameshisu\*(6), Chief of Forestry and Marine Products Bureau
- De Leon, Chief of National Treasury Bureau; Chief Secretary
- Oshiasu\*(7), Asst Chief of Education and Public Welfare Dept
- Mendoza, Director of Luzon Service Gp
- Aquino, Director of General Affairs of Service Gp
- Laurel, Service Gp Local Branch Office Chief
- Ramos, Service Gp Propaganda Bureau Chief
- Hose Fuigerasu\*(8), Vice-Mayor of Manila City
- Ruperto Cristobal, Bagumapanahon\* Sector Chief
- Enrike De Manaroto\*(9), Basai\*(10), Sector Chief
- Gregorio Felipe, Balintiouac Sector Chief
- Juan Gabriel, Parnaque Sector Chief
- Hose Devuirena\*(11), Makati Sector Chief
- Furorenshio Jikurusu\*(12), Deriman\*(13), Sector Chief
- Pidoro PI Kurusu\*(14), Mandaluyong Sector Chief
- Yusutakio\*(15) Baragutasu\*(16), Bagumbayan Sector Chief
- Regino Yusutakino\*(17), San Juan Sector Chief
- Korunerio Koradero\*(18), Caloccan Sector Chief
- Roberto Teodoro, Bagungudewa\*(19) Sector Chief
- Furio Furansha\*(20), City Associate Judge
- Victor Alfonso, City Treasurer
- Emu Ikashiano\*(21), City Sanitary Engineer

List of guerrilla leaders and strengths in Cebu, Bohol, Iloilo and Bacolod. American officers among them are as follows:

- Lt Col Haso Fenton Command the entire guerrillas
- Lt Col James Cushing on Cebu.
- Lt Col Kurefu\*(22) Dated 5 Feb 43.
- De Marudanaru Uiriamisu\*(23) (TN Rank not mentioned.) -

Commands the entire guerrilla forces on Bohol Island.

The following made pro-Japanese speeches concerning

Tojo's proclamation:

- Berunarudo Toresu\*(24) - Governor of Leyte
- Kaetano Esu Rusero\*(25) - Governor of Samar
- Kintero\*(26) - Town Headman
- Tohei, Takeshi\*(27), Tacloban MP Section CO
- Pro-Japanese lecturers concerning the organizing of

Service Gps.

(\*1) etc:-

- |                 |                  |                   |
|-----------------|------------------|-------------------|
| (1) アベロ         | (10) ハサイ         | (19) バグングデワ       |
| (2) アルサレ        | (11) ホセデヴイレナ     | (20) フリオアヂンシマ     |
| (3) アテブツト       | (12) フロレンシヤ ジクルス | (21) エムイカシデアノ     |
| (4) ヘスス         | (13) デリマン        | (22) クレフ          |
| (5) シヤラン        | (14) ヒドロピ クルス    | (23) デマダラル ウイリアムス |
| (6) タマシス        | (15) エスタキオ       | (24) ベルナルド トレス    |
| (7) オシアス        | (16) バラグタス       | (25) カエタノ エズ ルセロ  |
| (8) ホセ ヨイゲタス    | (17) レジノ エスタキオ   | (26) キンテロ         |
| (9) エンリケ デ マナロト | (18) エルネリオ ゴルデロ  | (27) 東平 健         |

Rafueru Marutenesu\* (Rafael Martinez)(1) - A member of the Upper House

Vicente De La Cruz - Manager of Leyte Newspaper

The following made pro-Japanese speeches concerning

Tojo's proclamation:

Francisco Martinez - Proxy for Cebu Governor

Hoan Samora\*(2) - Mayor of Cebu

Kurisupiano Raponto\*(3) - Cebu Chief of Police

Paurino Goriyasu\*(4) - Attorney

Binabira\*(5) - Former Financial Commissioner

Notification from Kodama, Kazuma to 22 Flying Brigade or 10 Indep Flying Unit (Manila), 26 Flying Regt (Sentai) (Clark Field).

Guerrilla leader (American) Maj Charles Joseph Cushing (age 40), surrendered to Tayug Garrison Unit (Keibi) in Pangasinan Province on 7 Mar 43 at 1400 hrs. After the fall of Bataan he went under the command of Lt Col Thorp.

In the early part of Feb, his wife Mercedes Cushing, was imprisoned by the Dagupan MP Section. He was urged to surrender and Natividad Town Sanmakario\*(6) was completely surrounded. He later surrendered, but alone. After surrendering, he promised to actively cooperate with the Japanese Army.

We are using him to make Maj Rakuhamu\*(7) (American) of the same band and the remnants of the guerrillas surrender.

Captured Maj Alcantara Piripitomohan\*(8), and 1st Lt Benromero\*(9) of Lt Col Marcos Guerrillas Staff at Tanay and Pililla Towns in Rizal Province on 3 Mar 43.

Former Ganap party members now working for PI Central Administration and Kalapabi. Dated 12 Mar 43.

A. Former Ganap party members in local office.

1. Adoriano Kapa\*(10), headman of Bulacan Province San Jose Del Monte Town.

2. Sanchiyo EI Saribiya\*(11), headman of Rokuban\*(12) Town in Tayabas Province.

3. Herarudo Makishino\*(13), headman of Unisan\* in Tayabas Province.

B. Former Ganap party members in Kalapabi Group.

1. Benigno Ramos, former Ganap Sakudarisuta\* Party Leader, now Director of Propaganda Bureau of New PI Service Gp.

2. Rikarudo Enrire\*(14), resided in Japan for four years as Ramos's secretary, now in charge of Kalapabi Motion Pictures.

3. Soiro Chiyon KO\*(15), not appointed to office although he passed the civil service examination. Became newspaper contributor, and editor of Ganap organ "Sakudaru"\*(16). Now canvassing for Kalapabi.

4. Samuson Paromaresu\*(17), in charge of the programme for Kalapabi, because he was formerly a Ganap member.

5. Antonio Belisario, at present Kalapabi typist.

Note: According to the inside story of Kalapabi, it appears that practically all of the 19 persons employed in the Kalapabi Propaganda Bureau are related to Ganap.

(\*1) etc:-

(1) ラフエル マルテネス

(2) ホアン サモラ

(3) クリスティアノ ラポント

(4) パウリーノ ゴリヤス

(5) ビンバヒラ

(6) サンマカリオ

(7) ラクハム

(8) ヒロシヒトモハン

(9) アンロメロ

(10) アドリマノカハ

(11) サチヨ エイ サリビヤ

(12) ロクバン

(13) ハラルド マキシノ

(14) リカルド エンリ

(15) ヴィロ 4ヨシ コ

(16) サクダール

(17) サムソン パロマレス

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ADVATIS TRANSLATION NO 37

14 Jan 45

172/38/DSB

Heruman Parouna\*(1) (21 years old) was appointed as a temporary policeman of Tanauan Town in Jul 42, and on 25 Aug 42 he was assigned to duty at the dance held in Kuware\*(2) Village with his friend Ingurashiya Menjyora\*(3).

But on 26th at about 0300 hrs before returning to the town to report, he was captured by Piripa\*(4) and seven other guerrillas with weapons and he was immediately taken to Tonguoppu\*(5) Village.

He was questioned by Capt Reimondo Aruparesu\*(6) (self-appointed) and was forced to join the guerrillas. He was assigned to KP and other odd jobs. Later he gave himself up to Tanauan Garrison Unit on 25 Mar 43.

He gave the following information to Japanese.

1. The guerrilla group is led by 2d Lt Baruderian\* (Balderian)(7) (calls himself Col Suroresu\*(8). He has direct control of the fighting unit, weapon manufacturing squad, and first-aid squad. He also controls other small guerrilla bands.

2. Guerrillas under his direct control number 100, including bolo, rifle and pistol units.

3. Guerrilla units (20 or 30 guerrillas in various villages).

4. First-aid squad led by Shinko's Mistress Konchinka\* (Cinco's)(9). Squad is composed of seven or eight women who have a knowledge of nursing.

5. They have nine typewriters.

6. No radio.

7. The guerrilla group has engaged with the Japanese Army three times.

a. Dagami attack (19-22 Nov 44)

b. Pasu\*(10) attack in the vicinity of Tolosa (2 Feb 43)

c. Engaged with punitive force at Tabontabon (undated)

8. He has eight women spies in his Hq (four names mentioned - Sanin\*(11), Inin\*(12), Panshi Tehano\*(13) and Rore Kashiiran\*(14)) and also five secret agents in various villages.

9. The so-called guerrilla units are volunteer defense corps composed of citizens of various villages and their main duties are to supply food, and observe and notify the movements of the Japanese Army.

10. As a method of obtaining food the guerrilla group orders the guerrilla units to collect a certain amount of food every week from each house. They also turned the old sugar refinery mill of Malabagu Village into a cock-fight arena and collected taxes.

The cock-fights are held on Thursdays and Sundays and numerous villagers and guerrillas attend on those days.

11. Manufacture of Weapons: They make pistols (feed one round at a time) and hand-grenades (which do not work) at Binotoan\*(15) Barracks under the leadership of Yutarire\*(16), former worker of Tanauan (Town) pistol manufacturer.

His helpers are as follows: Francisco Pakin\*(17), Philip Moru\*(18) and Perayo Rireru\*(19). (TN Description of the hand-grenades are given on page 422.)

12. Takes extreme security measures against Japanese Army, by posting sentries and observers.

(\*1) etc:-

(1) ヘルマン ハロウナ

(2) クワレ

(3) イングラシヤ メンジヨラ

(4) ピリパ

(5) トングロツポ

(6) レイモンド アルパレス

(7) バルテリヤン

(8) スロレス

(9) コンタンカ

(10) ハス

(11) サンイレ

(12) インイン

(13) パンシ テハノ

(14) ローレ カシラン

(15) ビノトマン

(16) エタリレ

(17) フランシスコ ハンギン

(18) フィリッポ モル

(19) ペラヨ リレル

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

13. Antonio Shinko\* (Cinco) (1) has a wife with one son and two daughters, living in Tanauan Town, Kategubiyan\* (2) Village, and six mistresses (names mentioned on page 425) in Binontoan\*(3) Barracks.

14. He is prepared with emergency rafts for the purpose of running away.

Horuhe Kamachiyo\*(4) (39 years of age), former governor of La Union Province was threatened by the guerrillas, so was forced to offer public and personal fund of 420 Pesos on May 42.

Later he deserted and fled but, facing starvation and regretting what he had done, he gave himself up to Balayan\*(5) Garrison Unit (Keibi) on 16 Nov 42. He promised to cooperate for the construction of New PI.

Sgt Rodoiru\*(6), leader of Shiraga\*(7) Sector Guerrilla Unit, north of Catbalogan Town in Samar Province and Sgt Andoresu\* (8), leader of Loquilocon Sector Guerrilla Unit in Wright Town surrendered on 1 to 3 of Apr with 18 subordinates.

Pasutoru Salazar gave a pro-Japanese speech on the Emperor's Birthday representing Leyte Provincial Governor.

On 5 May, Tosa Maru\*(9), (600 tons) of 2 Shipping Transport Sector Unit (crew, one Japanese and 29 Filipinos) was sunk by American submarine off Miagao, Iloilo Province, Three of the crew (one Japanese and two Filipinos) are reported missing.

Administration Director of Southern Special Resources Research Group, Takatsu, Shichitaro\*(10) (37 years of age) was arrested for making the following statements at the lecture meeting sponsored by the Southern Administration and Research Association of Osaka Chamber of Commerce and Industry on 25 Jan.

\* \* \* \* \*

5. Peace and order in PI is unsatisfactory. There are still remnants of defeated troops in the mountainous regions to the number of about 5000. It is said that there were about 20 enemy raids between Sep and Nov on the way to Mankayan\*(11).


The truck drivers hauling copper ore were more and more frequently shot at, and because of that it has become difficult to obtain drivers. It is also being said that when the Army CG was on a tour of inspection, a Regt CO who was accompanying him was killed.

Unemployment situation of the persons who surrendered and returned to Luzon. 37% of all released are unemployed and in serious straits.

(\*1)  
 (1) アントニオ シンコ  
 (2) カテグビヤン  
 (3) ビンントアン  
 (4) ホルヘ カマチヨ  
 (5) バラヤン

(6) ロドイル  
 (7) シラガ  
 (8) アンドレス  
 (9) 土佐  
 (10) 高津七太郎  
 (11) マンカヤン

KALAPABI Organization Chart with the names of various department chiefs and their sub-officers.



Col Nagahama (\*1), head of the Philippine Kempei Unit appealed in a public address to the Filipinos for closer cooperation and for the abandonment of any feeling of antagonism and resistance.


Supervision of exchange of Japanese and American internees.

150 American internees to be exchanged left Manila Station on 26 Sep 43 and arrived at San Fernando safely, where another internee from Baguio Internment Camp was added to the group.

Then they boarded the exchange ship Teia Maru(\*2) and left port at 1900 hours.

It was on 23 Sep that this group was examined at Santo Tomas Internment Camp, and a number of items were confiscated.

Chart showing MacArthur's fifth column men at Manila.



Home address: Mangapeniko\*(3) 187-B;  
 6, 76, 42 (TN Sic.)  
 Business address: Fuanruna\*(4), Manila


---

(\*1) etc:-  
 (1) 長濱  
 (2) 帝亞  
 (3) マンガペンニコ  
 (4) ファランナ  
 (5) マラテ

ESPIONAGE NETWORK IN THE PHILIPPINES

ADVATIS SWPA  
Doc No 600875

ADVATIS TRANSLATION NO 37  
14 Jan 45



Information of this organization was obtained from MONFOTO's\*(6) CEBU-MINDANAO liaison officers and from Capt IBANEZ, in charge of CEBU Intelligence. The information seems to be reliable.

At present he has run away to LEYTE and is being sought.


- (\*1) etc:- (1) マヌエル ローハス  
(2) マック レア  
(3) マヌエル ローハス  
(4) モンテリバノ アルフレド  
(5) トーマス コンフェーリール  
(6) モンフォート

- (7) キリル モンフォート  
(8) エフレン ピラエック  
(9) ホセ デルビリヤル  
(10) アルビン ラサオ  
(11) ロマン ラバディヤ  
(12) デオニシウ セビヤル



CHART SHOWING ORGANIZATION OF ANTI-JAPANESE NATIONAL ARMY (\*1)

ADVATIS SWPA  
Doc No 600875



(\*1) etc:-

Note: The 5, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17,  
and 18 companies have been  
destroyed by our punitive  
units.

- |                  |                |                |                  |                |
|------------------|----------------|----------------|------------------|----------------|
| (1) 抗日国民軍        | (5) エリクス マナロット | (9) ユーセオ アキノ   | (13) ペドロ カホカム    | (17) ペドロ カギリナン |
| (2) カストロ アレハンドリノ | (6) ルイス タロック   | (10) チサル ピン    | (14) ママエロ パハルト   | (18) ホリト       |
| (3) ルイス タロック     | (7) サンパレス      | (11) ラモン シンベリオ | (15) マリマノ ピアン    | (19) フアン オアール  |
| (4) ホセ バナール      | (8) グレゴリオ メンドサ | (12) ペリパ クララ   | (16) エスタンシラオ クララ |                |

- 15 -

UNCLASSIFIED

ADVATIS TRANSLATION NO 37

14 Jan 45

172/38/DSB

UNCLASSIFIED





APPENDIX XXVII

EXAMPLE OF INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONS

BY CEBU GUERRILLAS

APPENDIX XXVII

EXAMPLE OF INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONS BY CEBU GUERRILLAS

On 31 March 1944, 14 Japanese staff officers and Vice Admiral Shigeru Fukudome, IJN, Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet, en route by airplane from Palau to Davao (the Japanese Headquarters), crashed in the region of Cebu, four kilometers offshore. Eleven of the group saved themselves by swimming to shore. According to Fukudome's statement, the pilot was attempting to make an emergency landing. "...As the moon had just gone down, the sudden darkness caused the pilot to misjudge the altitude and so crashed from an altitude of 50 meters. This sudden darkness plus the fact that the pilot was worn out, I believe, caused the crash." (1) According to a radio message (2) from Lt. Col. James Cushing to General MacArthur, there were rumors that the plane was shot down by anti-aircraft fire from a submarine.

The survivors were captured by natives who, having determined that the Japanese had not come with aggressive intentions, treated them kindly. Because the Admiral was badly injured, he was taken to a native home after an eight-day trip through the mountains. While being treated by Filipino doctors and nurses, he was visited on 8 April by Lt. Col. Cushing, leader of the Cebu guerrillas. Cushing told him not to worry as long as he was in his hands. Cushing addressed him as General, thinking he was General Twani Furomei, Commanding General of Land and Sea Forces in Macassar. The Admiral did not correct him and was known by this title until his true identity was discovered.

On 9 April, at midnight, Cushing suddenly visited him again. He said there were some Japanese Army men who had come to look for the Japanese staff officers and were causing the natives trouble. Cushing promised to release Fukudome and his party if he would send word to the Japanese Army not to kill or injure the natives. The message was sent, and the Japanese group was released. Fukudome left Cebu on 15 April by plane for Manila and went from there to Tokyo, where he arrived on 20 April.

According to Fukudome, his rescue by the Japanese Army force was "...not as a result of a search made by the Army on the basis of any information regarding my party, but because they happened to come there in the course of their periodical mopping up operations around the island." (3)

Contrary to this statement, Cushing said that the enemy knew the prisoners were on the island. In one of his messages, Cushing said:

JAP CAPTIVES FROM PALAO. ENEMY AWARE THEIR PRESENCE  
HERE. WE ARE CATCHING HELL. WE ARE STAGING A FAKE  
REMOVAL FROM THIS ISLAND TO WITHDRAW PRESSURE, WHILE  
AWAITING YOUR FUTURE ORDERS. SOUTHEAST COAST CEBU  
IMPOSSIBLE NOW. WILL MAKE EVERY ATTEMPT TO HOLD THE  
JAPANESE GENERAL AND NEXT RANKING OFFICER. PLEASE  
RUSH ADVICE: NORTHEAST COAST STILL CLEAR FOR SUB-  
MARINE. (4)

(1) "Interrogations of Japanese Officials," by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific), Vol. II, p. 520. Hereafter cited as IJO.

(2) "GHQ Messages in the Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines," Cushing to MacArthur, Appendix to Vol. I, Message No. 8, 9 Apr 44. Hereafter cited as "GHQ Messages."

(3) IJO, p. 522.

(4) "GHQ Messages," Message No. 11, 9 Apr 44. Cushing was wrong.

In spite of Cushing's reluctance to surrender the Admiral to the enemy, it was necessary to do so. Although the enemy did not know it, Cushing had only 25 soldiers against approximately 500 Japanese soldiers. In southern Cebu, Japanese soldiers, reported (5) to be 300 strong, were looking for the prisoners.

No verbal information was obtained from the prisoners themselves; but a roll of very important documents, wrapped in waterproof material of some sort, was found on the island by fishermen (sources do not indicate exactly where). These documents contained a file of operational orders of the combined enemy fleet and a file of naval dispatches. They were sent by submarine to Negros Island and from there to Brisbane, to be translated by ATIS.

It may be logical to assume that these documents were aboard the ill-fated plane that carried the Admiral. The Japanese were quite aware of their loss and took active steps to regain them. It will suffice to say that their value prompted the enemy to offer in April a reward of 50,000 (believed to be yen) for them. Through deduction or intelligence, or both, the Japanese seem to have arrived at the conclusion that Cushing possessed the all-important papers. How vital the lost documents were to the enemy is best illustrated by the events that followed.

On 22 May Takeshi Watanabe, the commander of the Imperial Japanese Naval Garrison of Cebu, sent an ultimatum to Cushing, in the form of a leaflet dropped from a fighter plane. The message read in part:

...RETURN UNCONDITIONALLY UNTIL THE NOON OF 30TH MAY, 1944, ALL DOCUMENTS, BAGS, AND CLOTHING EITHER PICKED UP FROM THE SAID AIRPLANE OR ROBBED OF THE PASSENGERS AND CREW, TO THE MAYOR OF SAN FERNANDO FOR SAFE KEEPING. WE NOTIFY YOU THAT IN CASE WHEN YOU FAIL TO FULFILL OUR DEMAND STATED IN THE SECOND CLAUSE, THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY WILL RESORT TO DRASTICALLY SEVERE METHOD AGAINST YOU. (6)

When the ultimatum expired and the documents had not been surrendered to the Japanese, there were reprisals by land, sea, and air. In a message of 16 June 1944 Cushing said:

PLANES BOMBED AND STRAFED FOR TWO WEEKS ENDING ON TWELFTH SINCE THEN THERE IS DAY AND NIGHT PLANE ACTIVITY PASSING OVER CEBU....(7)

---

(5) "GHQ Messages," Message No. 12, 9 Apr 44.

(6) Ibid., Message No. 37, 22 May 44.

(7) Ibid., Message No. 52, 16 Jun 44.



APPENDIX XXVIII

AIB DIRECTIVE, 6 July 1942

July 6th, 1942

G.H.Q., S.W.P.A.  
Mil. Intell. Section, G.S.

SUBJECT: DIRECTIVE COVERING THE ORGANIZATION CO-ORDINATION AND OPERATION OF INTER-ALLIED UNITS KNOWN AS SPECIAL OPERATIONS, AUSTRALIAN SECTION, SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, AUSTRALIAN SECTION, COMBINED FIELD INTELLIGENCE SECTION AND MILITARY PROPAGANDA SECTION.

1. Information

a. General Headquarters, South West Pacific Area assumes, as of 1200 hours July 6, 1942, responsibility for the direction and co-ordination of the following Inter-Allied Units:

- 1) Special Operations, Australian Section (Inter-Allied Services Department).
- 2) Secret Intelligence Service, Australian Section.
- 3) Combined Field Intelligence Section.
- 4) Military Propaganda Section.

b. The combined organization will be designated Allied Intelligence Bureau, and the sub-units thereof Sections "A", "B", "C", and "D" respectively.

2. Mission

a. The mission of Allied Intelligence Bureau will be to obtain and report information of the enemy in the South West Pacific Area, exclusive of the continent of Australia and Tasmania, and in addition, where practicable, to weaken the enemy by sabotage and destruction of morale and to lend aid and assistance to local efforts to the same end in enemy occupied territories. Information of the enemy will be forwarded to the Controller of Allied Intelligence Bureau by the most expeditious means available, and the Controller will be responsible for its prompt report to this Headquarters and to other appropriate authorities interested.

3. Organization

a. The Bureau will be organized as outlined in Appendix "A", attached hereto.\*

b. Colonel C.G. Roberts, A.M.F., is appointed Controller.

c. Major Allison W. Ind, U.S.A., is appointed Deputy Controller.

d. Chiefs of Sections are appointed as follows:

"A" Section: Lt. Col. G.E. Mott (British Army).

"B" Section: Commander R. Kendall, R.A.N.

"C" Section: (to be appointed)

"D" Section: Commander J.C.R. Proud, R.A.N.V.R.

e. Sub-section heads will be appointed by the Controller, after consultation with the appropriate Chief of Section.

f. A co-ordinating staff will be set up to aid and assist the Controller. Commander Allied Land Forces, Commander Allied Naval Forces, Commander Allied Air Forces and Admiral Coster will each appoint a liaison officer to serve on this co-ordinating staff. It is desired that the officers so appointed be chosen from the Operations Sections of the Headquarters concerned. The appointments will be subject to approval of General Headquarters. Their duties shall be from time to time to arrange for transport, supply and such other assistance as Allied Intelligence Bureau may require.

\*APPENDIX "A" not included

g. The Controller will be responsible to this Headquarters for the efficient functioning of the Bureau and the execution of missions directed from time to time by this Headquarters.

h. The Deputy Controller, in addition to his other duties which may be prescribed by the Controller, will be the Finance Officer for the Bureau and will be directly responsible to the Commander in Chief for the proper expenditure of funds placed to his credit for the financing of the operations of the Bureau. His duties and responsibilities in this connection are further amplified in Annex "1", attached hereto.

i. The Chiefs of Sections, under the general supervision of the Controller, will have immediate charge of their respective sections and will be responsible for the execution of missions allotted thereto.

j. "A" Section is charged generally with obtaining information of the enemy and his activities and with the execution of acts of sabotage against the enemy. Special secret instructions will be issued from time to time.

k. "B" Section is charged with the collection of information of the enemy and his activities through certain special means and channels concerning which detailed secret instructions will be issued from time to time.

l. "C" Section is charged with obtaining all possible information about the enemy, his dispositions, movements, strength, etc., through such agencies as coast watchers, native agents and civilian operatives, now or hereinafter assigned to this Section. Its personnel in enemy occupied territories will co-ordinate closely with the Commanding Officer of Allied offensive operations in their territory. This Section will initially be sub-divided geographically into three (3) sub-units covering, respectively; (1) the North East Area (east of the eastern boundary of Dutch New Guinea, extended south to the coast of Australia and north to the boundary of South West Pacific Area); (2) the Philippine Archipelago Area; and (3) the Netherlands East Indies Area.

m. "D" Section is charged with the preparation of propaganda material, useful to the other sections and initially for dissemination by them. Its activities will be expanded as occasion requires, after plans have developed for co-ordination with other agencies which may be set up in this field.

n. Throughout the Bureau, excessive staff and complex organization will be avoided. The need for flexibility and mobility will be kept in mind. Office procedure will be kept as simple as possible, and paper work reduced to the absolute minimum.

#### 4. Administration

a. The Controller will report to this Headquarters from time to time, as required, regarding the activities in which the Bureau is engaged and will obtain its concurrence before fresh activities are undertaken.

b. Section Chiefs will keep the Controller currently advised and will submit each week to the Controller brief status and activity reports.

c. Every effort will be made to expedite intelligence reports to this Headquarters.

d. Assignment of personnel to the Bureau and its sections from the Allied Services will be arranged through the Controller. Such personnel records, etc., as may be required by the appropriate Allied Services will be handled by the Section Chiefs. Effort will be made by the Controller and Chiefs of Sections to reduce to the minimum routine, personnel and property reports.

e. The Controller and his Co-ordinating Staff will be the sole Channel for requests of transportation, supply and such other assistance as may be required from the several commands for fulfillment of its missions.

For the Commander in Chief:

/s/ R. K. Sutherland  
/t/ R. K. SUTHERLAND,  
Major-General, USA,  
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

/s/ C. A. Willoughby  
/t/ C. A. WILLOUGHBY  
Brigadier-General, GSC,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2.

Encls: Annex "I" - Finance - Administration  
Appendix "A" - Organization Chart\*

Distribution:

1. G-2, G.H.Q.
2. The Prime Minister.
3. Commander, Land Forces, S.W.P.A.
4. Commander, Air Forces, S.W.P.A.
5. Commander, Naval Forces, S.W.P.A.
6. C.G., U.S.A.F.I.A.
7. 1st Naval Member, R.A.N.
8. Admiral F.W. Coster.
9. Col. C.G. Roberts.
10. Major A.W. Ind.
11. Lt. Col. G.E. Mott.
12. Commander R. Kendall, R.N.
13. Commander J.C.R. Proud, R.A.N.V.R.

-----  
\*Appendix "A" not included

July 1st, 1942.

ANNEX I: FINANCE ADMINISTRATION:

1. The Allied Intelligence Bureau will be financed by credits made available by the United States, Australian and Dutch Governments, participating as equal partners, as heretofore arranged. The Commander in Chief, South West Pacific Area, will be responsible to the Governments concerned for the proper utilization of the funds so provided.

2. The initial appropriation agreed to is £45,000, payable by each Government in lump sums of £ 15,000 or installments thereof as required. This appropriation, initially made to cover the expenses of Inter-Allied Services Department may, by subsequent agreement, be utilized when, as and if required to meet the expenses of "A", "B", "C" and "D" Sections, or any of them as directed by the Commander in Chief. Additional sums for the same purpose will be requested by the Commander in Chief from time to time as required, based on budget estimates submitted by the Sections and transmitted by the Controller with his approval to this Headquarters.

3. All funds contributed by the said Governments for this purpose will be transferred to the Deputy Controller, who will be appointed an Agent Finance Officer, will be deposited in a bank approved by these Headquarters and will be subject to withdrawal by the Deputy Controller alone. The Deputy Controller will handle these funds in accordance with United States Army Regulations governing the expenditure of secret funds, and from time to time when required, will make to the Commander in Chief a secret report as to their disposition. To assist the Deputy Controller in accounting matters, suitable military or civilian personnel will be provided. Section Chiefs may provide their own accounting personnel, if a need thereof is apparent, and will account for sums appropriate to the Sections as directed by the Deputy Controller.

4. Budgets: From time to time, as required, Section Chiefs will submit to the Deputy Controller an estimate of funds required by them, together with a brief statement of the activities (in general) for which such funds are necessary. When satisfied as to the uses to which such money will be put, the Deputy Controller will make credits available. Section Chiefs will acknowledge by receipt such credit appropriations from the Deputy Controller. The receipt will state, in broad terms, the purposes for which the funds will be utilized. These receipts will be drafted in such manner as not to disclose secret operations. These receipts will be utilized by the Deputy Controller as "sub-voucher receipts," to support his primary vouchers to the Finance Officer.

/s/ R.K. Sutherland

OFFICIAL:

/s/ C.A. Willoughby  
/t/ C.A. WILLOUGHBY  
Brigadier-General, G.S.C.  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2



APPENDIX XXIX

OPERATIONAL AND LOGISTICS PLAN FOR PENETRATION  
OF THE PHILIPPINES BY AIB PARTIES

10 APRIL 1943

AREA: PHILIPPINES. 10th District.

ANNEXURE: 3.

Place or Area in which AIB party would operate	Special elements of information to be supplied*	Size or type of party	Means of introduction	Earliest date at which AIB party would be introduced. M - date of Allied attack in force	Eventual Realization
<b>I. DAVAO (1)</b>					
a. Davao Harbor	Marine traffic	) To be determined	Overland or	May 5	Completed except Marant (Initiated by "Fifty" party)
b. Davao Airfield	Air traffic	) by Lt. Col. Fertig,	vinta by Lt. Col.		
c. Davao City	Military roads	) but dependent	Fertig - supply		
d. Malita	Marine coast watchers	) somewhat on our	by submarine if		
e. Surup & Luban	Marine and C.W.	) ability to	necessary		
f. Marant	Air traffic	) supply			
<b>II. SARANGANI ISLAND (2)</b>					
a. Sarangani Straits	Marine (convoy)	) 1 leader	Submarine	June 1	Sarangani Straits completed (Initiated by "Fifty" party, completed and expanded by PRS)
b. Sarangani Bay	Marine (landings)	) and 5 men			
c. Palmas Island	Enemy marine & air	)			
d. Buluan	Air	) (secret			
e. Tampacan	Air	) station)			
<b>III. BAGANIAN PENINSULA (3)</b>					
a. Pagadian Bay area (Tukuran)	Sea and air patrol and all land information, relative to landings destined for this area	) 1 leader ) 1 radio expert ) 1 radio asst. ) 3 agent watchers ) 6 men and 3,000 lbs.	Operational submarine	June 1	Completed (Initiated by "Fifty Party")
b. Dumanguilas Bay area					

\* All parties will have as their basic mission the supply of information of enemy Army, Naval and Air dispositions, strengths, installations and movements.

Notes on above:-

- (1) The Davao party already has been considered in special orders being carried by the C.O. "Fifty" party.
- (2) One operational submarine to carry six men and 4,000 lbs. for Project II.
- (3) " " " " " six men and 3,000 lbs. " Project III.

AREA: PHILIPPINES. 10th District.

ANNEXURE: 3.

Place or Area in which AIB party would operate	Special elements information to be supplied*	Size or type of party	Means of introduction	Earliest date at which AIB party would be introduced. M - date of Allied attack in force	Eventual Realization
<b>IV. BASILON ISLAND (4)</b>					
a. Zamboanga	Marine, air & roads	1 leader.	Operational	May 1	Completed (Initiated by "Tenwest" party)
b. Jolo	Marine and post	1 radio expert	submarine		
c. Tapul	Marine	3 watchers			
d. Tawi Tawi	Marine	5 men and 3,000 lbs.			
<b>V. LANAOG (5)</b>					
a. 8 Del Monte airfields	Air & troop movements.	At discretion and organization C.O., 10th Mil. Dist.	Overland and vinta (possibly further supply by submarine).	May 1	Completed through Guerrilla - PRS cooperation
b. Malabalay	-do-				
c. Dansalan	-do-				
d. Illigan	-do-				
e. Valenca	Air				
f. Malabang	Air & troop mvts.				
g. Maramag	Air				

\* All parties will have as their basic mission the supply of information of enemy Army, Naval and Air dispositions, strengths, installation and movements.

Notes on above:-

(4) One operational submarine to carry five men and 2,000 lbs. for Project IV.

(5) It is assumed that the C.O. 10th District already will have in-operation some phases of this proposed intelligence net. However, his ability to organize it fully and to operate it is dependent upon our ability to supply him with necessary signal equipment and some personnel. Therefore, any plan looking toward the efficient operation of a 10th District net, must include provisions for sending in several tons of technical, medical and personal equipment. It is not intended that these suggested nets be operated in conjunction with AIB secret stations. In fact, the AIB stations must be entirely secret, in order to provide us with an assured channel in case of military disaster to 10th District Forces. It is planned to introduce and supply AIB parties by a submarine. However, it is suggested that the time has arrived for serious consideration of Major Gunn's plans for supplying this area by B-25 or other aircraft, stripped down for ultra-long distance operations to the end that the C.O. 10th Military District will receive supplies by this means.

AREA: PHILIPPINES. 6th & 10th District.

ANNEXURE: 3.

Place or Area in which AIB party would operate	Special elements of information to be supplied *	Size or type of party	Means of introduction	Earliest date at which AIB party would be introduced. M - date of Allied attack in force	Eventual Realization
V. LANA O (Cont'd)					
h. Cotabato	Air & troop mvts. )	At discretion and organization C.O., 10th Mil. Dist.	Overland and vinta (possibly further supply by submarine)	May 1	Completed through Guerrilla - PRS co-operation.
i. Cagayan	Sea, air & troop mvts. )				
j. Gingoog	Sea and air mvts. )				
VI. MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL (6)					
a. Zamboanga Peninsula area	Sea, land and air movements )	Under C.O. 10th Mil. Dist.	Overland	March 15	Completed through PRS and Guerrillas.
b. Misamis Occid. area	Sea and air movements )				
VII. MISAMIS ORIENTAL (6)					
a. Coast area	Sea, land and air movements )	Under C.O. 10th Mil. Dist.	Overland	March 15	Completed.
VIII. SURIGAO (6)					
a. Agusan coast (Buluan Bay)	Sea, air traffic )	Under C.O. 10th Mil. Dist.	Overland and surface small boat.	April 25	Completed.
b. Dinigat Island	-do- )				
c. Surigao Island	-do- )				
d. Lianga Bay	-do- )				
IX. 6th District (PANAY) (7)					
a. San Jose	Sea & air movements )	Under direction C.O., 6th District	Overland (originally by submarine)	March 10	Completed.

\* All parties will have as their basic mission the supply of information of enemy Army, Naval and Air dispositions, strengths, installations and movements.

Notes on above:-

(6) See footnote 5, page 2.

(7) The introduction and supply of parties listed above would require priority assignment of non-operational submarine, or if this is impossible, the use of operational submarines on every northward trip. It is assumed that C.O., 6th District will require arms, ammunition and signal equipment to be supplied from Australia.

Place or Area in which AIB party would operate	Special elements of information to be supplied *	Size or type of party	Means of introduction	Earliest date at which AIB party would be introduced, M - date of Allied attack in force	Eventual Realization
AREA: <u>PHILIPPINES. 6th, 7th and 8th Districts.</u> ANNEXURE: <u>3.</u>					
<b>IX. 6th Dist. (PANAY) (Cont'd)</b>					
b. Pandan Bay	Sea & air movements	Under direction C.O., 6th District	Overland (originally by submarine)	March 10	Completed.
c. Capiz	Sea, air & troop mvts				
d. Pilar Bay	Sea & air movements				
e. Iloilo	Sea, air & troop mvts				
f. Santa Barbara	Air traffic				
<b>X. 7th District (NEGROS) (8)</b>					
a. Bacolod	Land, air & sea mvts	"Planet Party"	--	Party in net operating March 10	Carried on and ex- panded by PSS/PRS.
b. La Carlota	Air movements				
c. Binalhagen	-do-				
d. Cadiz	Land, air & sea mvts				
e. Dumaguete	-do-				
<b>XI. 8th District (CEBU &amp; BOHOL) (8)</b>					
a. Medellin	Air traffic	Preferably AIR party organized by WIO, supplied from Australia	Overland and surface boat -- supplies by submarine	July 1	Supplied and expanded by PRS, largely through PARSONS.
b. Tuburan	-do-				
c. Cebu City	Land, air & troop mvts				
d. Argao	-do-				
e. Tagbilaran	-do-				
f. Talibon	Air & sea mvts				
g. Ubay	Air and sea mvts				
h. Anda	Sea watcher				

\* All parties will have as their basic mission the supply of information of enemy Army, Naval and Air dispositions, strengths, installations and movements.

Notes on above:-

(8) See footnote 7, page 3.

AREA: PHILIPPINES. 5th and 9th District.

ANNEXURE: 3.

Place or Area in which AIB party would operate	Special elements of information to be supplied *	Size or type of party	Means of introduction	Earliest date at which AIB party would be introduced. M - date of Allied attack in force	Eventual Realization
<b>XII. 9th District (LEYTE, SAMAR) (9)</b>					
a. Ormoc	Air & sea mvts )	AIB party	Submarine	September 1	Supplied and expanded by SMITH, PARSONS and others of PRS.
b. Tacloban	-do- )	1 leader			
c. Panaon Island	-do- )	1 radio			
d. Rabin Point	-do- )	expert			
e. Catarman	-do- )	1 radio			
f. Calbayag	-do- )	assistant			
g. Sungi Point	-do- )	3 men			
h. Borongan	-do- )	6 men and			
i. San Bernardino Pssge	-do- (important) )	2,000 lbs.			
<b>XIII. 5th District (SOUTH EAST LUZON &amp; MASBATE) (10)</b>					
a. Masbate City	Land, air & sea mvts )		Submarine and	October 1	Largely organized and supplied by PRS working through PARSONS, SMITH, WHITNEY, Jr. and Luzon Guerrillas.
b. Siwayan	Air & sea mvts )	AIB party	small surface		
c. Caduruan Point	-do- )	5 men,	boat		
d. Pulanquat Point	-do- )	2,000 lbs.			
e. Bugui Point	Land, air & sea mvts )				

\* All parties will have as their basic mission the supply of information of enemy Army, Naval and Air dispositions, strength, installations and movements.

Notes on above:-

(9) See footnote 7, page 3.

(10) As indicated above, the Masbate coverage would be by AIB party, while it is tentatively planned to make use of the Camarines guerrilla units for coast watching in southeastern Luzon. Signal supplies particularly for these units would be dependent upon submarine transportation.

AREA: PHILIPPINES. 4th and 5th District.

ANNEXURE: 3.

Place or Area in which AIB party would operate	Special elements of information to be supplied *	Size or type of party	Means of introduction	Earliest date at which AIB party would be introduced. M - date of Allied attack in force	Eventual Realization
<b>XIII. 5th Dist. (S E LUZON &amp; MASBATE) (Cont'd)</b>					
<u>f.</u> Sorsogon (P)	Land, air & sea mvts	} Camarines and Luzon guerrilla units supplied from Australia	} Supplies by submarine	} October 1	} Largely organized and supplied by PRS working through PARSONS, SMITH, WHITNEY, Jr. and Luzon Guerrillas.
<u>g.</u> Legaspi (P)	Sea and air mvts				
<u>h.</u> Cabarian	-do-				
<u>i.</u> Naga (P)	Land, air & sea mvts				
<u>j.</u> Bantuin Point	Sea & air mvts				
<u>k.</u> Bondoc Point (P)	-do-				
<u>l.</u> Catanauan	-do-				
<u>m.</u> Lucena (P)	Land, air & sea mvts				
<u>n.</u> Polillo Island (P)	Air & sea mvts				
<u>o.</u> Balar Bay	-do-				
<u>p.</u> Marinduque	-do-				
<b>XIV. 4th District (MINDORO, PALAWAN, CENTRAL LUZON (11))</b>					
<u>a.</u> San Jose	Land, air & sea mvts	} AIB party 4 men, 3,000 lbs.	} Submarine	} Minus 30 days M. *	} Organized and operated by PRS.
<u>b.</u> San Jose II	Air mvts				
<u>c.</u> Wasig	Air mvts				
<u>d.</u> Calapan	Land, air & sea mvts				
<u>e.</u> Paluan Bay	Sea & air mvts				

\* All parties will have as their basic mission the supply of information of enemy Army, Naval and Air dispositions, strengths, installations and movements.

Notes on above:-

(11) The Central Luzon units of the 4th District would be composed chiefly of individuals included in the Parsons' intelligence net. Transportation of Comm. Parsons, plus one or two key agents, together with signal equipment, would be necessary. The list of stations given is based upon the ideal and it is quite likely that these should be compelled to accommodate our needs to a very much less elaborate net. Observation posts marked (P) are suggested as priority points.

AREA: PHILIPPINES. 3rd and 4th Districts.

ANNEXURE: 3.

Place or Area in which AIB party would operate	Special elements of information to be supplied *	Size or type of party	Means of introduction	Earliest date at which AIB party would be introduced. M - date of Allied attack in force	Eventual Realization
<b>XIV. 4th Dist (MINDORO, PALAWAN, C LUZON) (Cont'd)</b>					
f. Culion Island	Land, air & sea mvts	AIB party	Submarine	August 1	Organized and operated by PRS.
g. Dumarán	Sea & air mvts				
h. Puerto Princesa	Land, air & sea mvts	3,000 lbs.			
i. Brook's Point	Sea & air mvts				
j. VERDE Island	Sea & air mvts		Overland and submarine	Minus 30 days M. *	Eventually largely realized through Comdr. ROWE, SMITH, PARSONS and Luzon Guerrillas.
k. Batangas (P)	Land, sea & air mvts				
l. Lubang Island (P)	Sea & air mvts	AIB - Parsons' net party			
m. Cape Santiago	Sea & air mvts				
n. Nasugbu (P)	Land, sea & air mvts				
o. Ternate	-do-				
p. Lipa	Sea & air mvts				
q. Cavite (P)	Land, sea & air mvts				
r. Manila (P)	-do-				
<b>XV. 3rd District (12)</b>					
a. Bataan	Air & sea mvts	Parsons' net plus	Supplied by air or submarine	Some operating now. Others minus 30 days M.	Organized largely through Luzon Guerrillas, although not extensively (Initiated in 1942-3 by AIB)
b. Cabcaben	-do-				
c. Mariveles	-do-	Luzon guerrilla units			
d. Subic	-do-				

\* All parties will have as their basic mission the supply of information of enemy Army, Naval and Air dispositions, strengths, installations and movements.

Notes on above:-

(12) Since we have been advised that Northern Luzon listed in Projects XV, XVI and XVII, guerrilla units are operating precariously on very short supplies, we must assume that they could not carry on the functions indicated above without a considerable reinforcement of their equipment and personal needs. Dropping by aircraft or landing by submarine are the only possible means. Observation posts marked (P) are suggested as priority points.

Place or Area in which AIB party would operate	Special elements of information to be supplied *	Size or type of party	Means of introduction	Earliest date at which AIB party would be introduced. M - date of Allied attack in force	Eventual Realization
AREA: PHILIPPINES, 1st, 2nd and 3rd Districts. ANNEXURE: 3.					
XV. 3rd Dist., (Cont'd)					
e. San Fernando	Land, air & sea mvts	) Parsons' net plus Luzon guerrilla units	) Supplied by air or submarine	) Some operating now. Others minus 30 days M.	) Organized largely through Luzon Guerrillas, although not extensively (Initiated in 1942-3 by AIB).
f. Clark Field	Air mvts				
g. Plaridel	Air mvts				
h. Iba	Air & sea mvts				
XVI. 2nd District (13)					
a. Lingayen	Land, air & sea mvts	) 2nd District Guerrillas	) Supplied by air or submarine	) Minus 30 days M.	) Organized largely through Luzon Guerrillas, although not extensively (Initiated in 1942-3 by AIB).
b. Tarlac	Land & air mvts				
c. Cabanatuan	-do-				
d. San Fernando (L.U.)	Land, air & sea mvts				
e. Naguilian	Sea & air mvts				
XVII. 1st District (13)					
a. Bayombong	Air & land mvts	) 1st District Guerrilla Units	) Supplied by air or submarine	) Minus 30 days M.	) Organized largely through Luzon Guerrillas and PRS submarine supply.
b. Echague	-do-				
c. Bontoc	-do-				
d. Baguio	-do-				
e. Vigan	Land, air & sea mvts				
f. Loag	-do-				
g. Aparri	-do-				
h. Iligan	Land and air mvts				

\* All parties will have as their basic mission the supply of information of enemy Army, Naval and Air dispositions, strengths, installations and movements.

Notes on above:-

(13) See footnote 12, page 7.



APPENDIX XXX

SUMMARY OF ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS OF ECLGA

USAFFE LUZON GUERRILLA ARMY FORCES  
HQ, EAST CENTRAL LUZON GUERRILLA AREA  
In the Field

15 May '45

SUBJECT: Summary of Organization and Operations of ECLGA.

TO : Commander-in-Chief, GHQ, SWPA, Thru Channels.

1. ORGANIZATION:

1.1. The accompanying organization chart #1, indicates the strength and disposition of troops, East Central Luzon Guerrilla Area, as organized and commanded by the undersigned. Total strength is 38,361 of which 23,234 are recognized, 12,010 are still attached with Sixth Army combat units. Inclosure No 3, copy of "Report of Activities Since Surrender of Bataan," dated 20 October '44, submitted to SWPA, outlines the background of the organization and is self-explanatory. All organizations listed as East Central Luzon Guerrilla Area were organized and are under the overall command of the undersigned, as substantiated by official records on file.

1.2. Equipment, supplies and funds for operations previous to landing of American Forces of Liberation were obtained mainly upon the subscription of the people. Except for Lt. Comdr. George Rowe, USNR, and Lt. Col. E. Andrews, who lent us radio sets and equipment, no other aid was received from GHQ, SWPA, either directly or indirectly.

1.3. Experienced USAFFE officers composed my staff, the most of the District and Division Commanders. The unit, as a whole, was organized and operated strictly in accordance with military procedure and regulation.

1.4. The Intelligence Unit, organized as indicated in accompanying chart #2, is centrally controlled and coordinated. It provided counter-checked, sifted and evaluated information of immediate operational importance on land, air, and sea movements, including enemy identifications, data essential to long range strategic planning, and counter-intelligence.

2. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS SINCE 1942 TO DATE:

2.1. Intelligence Activities

2.1.1. A cross section of the activities of the ECLGA, (substantiated by official records on file) reveal the predominance of land, naval, aerial, and miscellaneous military intelligence, and counter-espionage operations accomplished by our Intelligence Nets as spread out in Pangasinan, Tarlac, Nueva Ecija, Bataan, Bulacan, Pampanga, Rizal, Cavite and Manila. From these sources, vital information on the enemy's installations, concentrations, strength and dispositions, locations of airfields, dispersal area, depots, factories; axis of communication, identifications of units, movements by land, air and sea, tactics and methods, were delivered to my headquarters then atop Mt. Balagbag, (by couriers and/or radio) where they were sifted, classified and evaluated properly, then transmitted by radio to GHQ, SWPA, and dispatched by couriers for delivery by submarine thru Colonels Fertig and Peralta (until September, 1944) and Lt. Comdr. George Rowe, USNR, in Mindoro, since October, 1944. Aircraft warning and naval sighting observation posts were set up at Mt. Balagbag (which overlooked Manila Bay) with the aid of a telescope. Pin-point observations on effects of Allied bombings were also reported from these observation posts.

2.1.2. Particular attention is drawn to intelligence op-

erations in Manila and suburbs right under the vigilant watch of the Kempei-Tai and in a territory infested with enemy troops and spies. The largest counter-intelligence net of the ECLGA also operated inside Manila. Operatives worked as laborers and employees in airfields, communication centers, supply depots, railroad terminals, shipping yards, Port Area, government offices, factories, Japanese Military Administration offices, including Fort Santiago, and rendered daily reports on their missions, took census of salient details of installations, seizing or duplicating secret maps and sketches, determined the enemy's intentions, traced his communication lines, studied his tactics and methods, evaluated his equipments and at opportune times, sabotaged his installations and liquidated his counter-intelligence agents. During the Leyte campaign, this net successfully identified enemy units, including high-ranking Commanders, dispatched to Leyte as reinforcements. Daring intelligence agents rubbed elbows with the Japanese MP, and in this role, they helped in the rescue of apprehended guerrillas, and gave timely warning of possible raids on guerrilla headquarters by the enemy. Prior to the battle of Manila, when Japanese counter-espionage activities reached threatening proportions, operatives laboring under extremely precarious and hazardous circumstances, stuck to their assignments at the risk, and in many cases, the cost of their lives, and turned in detailed and highly reliable information on the enemy's defense plans in Manila, supplemented by maps and sketches of pillboxes and fox-holes, street barricades, mined streets, bridges and buildings, gun emplacements, troop strength, dispositions, and movements, and other tactical information. From September, 1944, when the first Allied air-raid struck at Manila, the Manila Intelligence Unit played an enviable role in spotting enemy air defenses and maneuvers, plane dispersion areas, naval activities, troop billets and potential military installations, contributing largely to the accurate bombing, and the consequent destruction of military objectives in and around the City. Casualties among operatives were heavy and many were tortured to death by the Kempei-Tai, all in line of duty.

## 2.2. Sabotage Activities

Directives issued by this headquarters coordinated sporadic raids and sabotage activities, although seriously handicapped by lack of arms and materials. Sabotage machines were improvised and made in Mt. Balagbag from chemicals and local materials smuggled from Manila and slipped through strict vigilance by the enemy. Intrepid saboteurs swam to enemy vessels anchored at Manila Bay on June 16, '44, and managed to set afire a tanker loaded with gasoline. The fire spread out to another transport and cruiser anchored nearby. In Pampanga, Bataan, Bulacan, Rizal, Pangasinan and Tarlac, enemy communication lines were tampered, small patrols ambushed, supply dumps were raided, bridges were burned, rice stock and alcohol of the "BIBA" were diverted to guerrillas with the aid of USAFFE officers holding key positions in the "BIBA", as directed by my G-2, who held a ranking position there. Arms were obtained by raiding enemy dumps or small garrisons and waylaying army trucks. On 25 July '44, a steamship anchored at Pasig River, loaded with rice, crude oil and other supplies, was set afire. On 15 July '44, part of Piers 5 and 7 were burned, also some bodegas of the National Development Company and the Philippine Refining Company.

## 2.3. Propaganda Activities

These consisted of dissemination of news broadcasts from San Francisco and the "Voice of Freedom," posting wrappers of American made chocolate bars with the words "I SHALL RETURN - MACARTHUR"

and typewritten thereon "COMPLEMENTS FROM THE VOICE OF THE MISGUIDED ELEMENTS" on bill-boards, inside toilets of first class theaters, street-cars, busses and other places on June 20 '44. On or about 15 June '44, a large sign was written in charcoal on a bulletin-board inside Fort Santiago, reading "WARNING - THE AMERICANS ARE COMING."

#### 2.4. Combat Operations

2.4.1. Encounters with "Hukbalahaps" in Pampanga, Bataan, and Bulacan, were forced by the former on our units in the provinces mentioned. As per official documents turned over to C.I.C. and G-2, Sixth Army, several atrocities were committed against our men, and endangered the security even of my Headquarters in Mt. Balagbag.

2.4.2. Our troops were engaged with the enemy in Meycauayan, Bulacan, three days before the 37th Division advance guard reached the town. Members of our units in Pangasinan, Tarlac, Nueva Ecija, Bataan and Pampanga, readily and immediately reported to beachheads since landings were made in Pangasinan, and have been assisting actively in combat operations of the Sixth Army. By-passed enemy pockets of resistance, specially in the vicinity of Meycauayan, Bulacan, were mopped up by our troops. The conduct of the various districts under the command of this headquarters is not surprising, considering that on or about October '44, all elements under this command were issued warning orders and detailed directives pertinent to expected landing operations in Luzon.

3. Copies of G-1, G-2 and G-3 periodic reports have been forwarded to GHQ, SWPA, as evidenced by documents in our files.

/s/ Edwin P. Ramsey  
/t/ EDWIN P. RAMSEY  
Major, Cav., AUS  
Commanding

#### Inclosures:

- Incl. No. 1 - Organization Chart, ECLGA.
- Incl. No. 2 - Organization Chart, Military Intelligence Section, ECLGA.
- Incl. No. 3 - Copy of "Report of Activities Since Surrender of Bataan," Dated 15 March '45.






# RECAPITULATION


OF  
PROGRESSIVE ORGANIZATION InCL. 5-B  
CHART OF ECLGA

BY YEAR

AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1942




AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1943.



- NOTES:**
1. Partial reorganization of Pampanga M.D. converting Squadrons into Inf  $\frac{1}{2}$  Units.
  2. During the year, Manila M.D. War reorganized twice first, sectors changed into Division and lastly into Inf Regts.
  3. Mountain Corps Regt fully organized.
  4. General Service Troops (ECLGA) expanded into a Regt.
  5. Buboon Combat Forces, 1st and 2nd Prov Regt of Tarlac, and Western Pangasinan M. D. organized.
  6. As of 31 December 1943 ECLGA Units totaled an approximate strength of 2,040 Officers and 21,832 Enlisted Men.

# AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1944



Condensation of "Report of Activities  
Since Surrender of Bataan" 15 March 1945.

23 October 1946

BRIEF HISTORY, EAST CENTRAL LUZON GUERRILLA AREA

1. The USAFFE Luzon Guerrilla Army Forces was originated by Lt. Col. Claude A. Thorp (Cav) USA, having been sent out of Bataan in February 1942 on a guerrilla mission by General MacArthur.

2. Shortly prior to the surrender of Corregidor, Col. Thorp lost radio contact with USAFFE Headquarters. Upon the arrival of the undersigned and Capt. Joseph R. Barker II at Mt. Pinatubo around 20 April 1942, Col. Thorp decided to plan large-scale long-range guerrilla operations.

3. Luzon was divided into four geographical area commands. The East Central Luzon Guerrilla Area originally commanded by Capt. Joseph R. Barker II was one of these, including all provinces from Lingayen Gulf to Manila, between the Zambales mountains and the Sierra Madre mountains including Manila and Bataan. The other three Area Commands were the West Central Luzon Guerrilla Area, (Zambales); Northern Luzon Guerrilla Area, (everything north of Pangasinan and Nueva Ecija); Southern Luzon Guerrilla Area, (everything south of Manila.) The Southern Area was never organized under Col. Thorp's authority, due to the death of Capt. Jack Spies, 26th Cav (PS), who had been appointed as the commanding officer for that area, and who died in Bulacan enroute to that area. The Northern Area was only partially organized by Major Praeger, prior to his capture. The West Central Area was organized by Capt. McGuire, however, after his death in early 1943, disintegrated into small rival groups.

4. The planning and groundwork for the Guerrilla Forces was laid prior to 15 May 1942, the date the ECLGA was originally authorized by Col. Thorp. On the same day (15 May 1942), Hq. ECLGA authorized certain independent units together with some units previously organized by Col. Thorp. Also on 15 May 1942, Col. Thorp issued GO #1, officially assuming command of all guerrilla forces in Luzon and laying down the basic policies the guerrilla forces would operate under. A copy of this order is in the office of G-3 Section, Guerrilla Affairs, AFWESPAC.

5. After the original headquarters at Barrio Timbo, Porac, Pampanga was raided in August 1942, ECLGA maintained a highly mobile headquarters moving from one Province to another, carrying out the organization of the area and unifying wherever possible all independent units of genuine guerrillas actually operating against the Japanese. In May 1944, a permanent Hq. was established at Mt. Balagbag, north of Montalban, Rizal where it remained until 15 January 1945 when forced to withdraw due to enemy action.

6. Col. Thorp was captured in the latter part of September 1942, near Tarlac, Tarlac. After Col. Thorp's capture was definitely established, Capt. Barker assumed command of USAFFE LGAF in addition to his duties as CO, ECLGA.

7. Captain Barker was captured near Manila on 13 January 1943, at which time the undersigned, being second in command, assumed command of ECLGA.

8. Organization and operations rapidly and continually increased until the peak of the organization, plans, training and operation was reached in December 1944. A comprehensive study of the development of ECLGA may be found in the "Progressive Organizational Chart - ECLGA," copies of which are in the Guerrilla Affairs,

G-3 Section, AFWESPAC.

9. The distribution of propaganda began prior to 15 May 1942 and increased in efficiency and scope as the organization grew.

10. Intelligence nets were developed within the organization to a very high degree of efficiency until complete and accurate Intelligence coverage of all of Central Luzon was available from the middle of 1943 on. Copies of these reports were forwarded via Col Fertig in Mindanao, Col Peralta in Panay and Col Abcede in Negros. Verification of the efficiency of this intelligence coverage may be had from records of G-2 Section, GHQ, SWPA.

11. From 15 May 1942, ECLGA maintained continuous intelligence and command functions until the liberation.

/s/ Edwin P. Ramsey  
/t/ EDWIN P. RAMSEY  
Lt Col, Cav, AUS  
On Duty, G-3 Sec  
Guerrilla Affairs, AFWESPAC

Top #3)  
R-16262-E.2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA

**PHILIPPINES  
INTELLIGENCE GUIDE**

10 FEBRUARY 1944

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~



**UNCLASSIFIED**

~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~

**GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA**

**PHILIPPINES  
INTELLIGENCE GUIDE**

**10 FEBRUARY 1944**

**UNCLASSIFIED**

General Headquarters  
Southwest Pacific Area  
10 February 1944.

The Philippines Intelligence Guide contains a broad outline of information to be obtained by intelligence sources in the Philippines for the use of the War Department and of GHQ, SWPA.

The purpose is to provide basic instruction and guidance for all intelligence gathering agencies functioning in the Philippines area under the direction of this Headquarters.

Its scope will be supplemented by the War Department Manuals and other publications attached hereto as References and Appendices, and by such directives or other specific instructions as may hereafter become necessary.

By command of General MacARTHUR:

R. K. SUTHERLAND,  
Major General, U. S. Army,  
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

C. A. WILLOUGHBY,  
Brig. General, U. S. Army,  
A. C. of S., G-2.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>PAGE</u>
I. Introduction . . . . .	1
1. Bibliography . . . . .	1
2. Purpose . . . . .	1
3. Instructions for use of this Guide . . . . .	1
4. Security . . . . .	2
II. Tactical Data on Enemy Military Forces . . . . .	3
1. Dispositions and Strength . . . . .	3
2. Order of Battle and Organization . . . . .	3
3. Lines of Communication and Transport . . . . .	4
4. Indications of Enemy Intentions & Movement . . . . .	4
5. Supply Arrangements & Installations . . . . .	5
6. Enemy Tactics and Methods . . . . .	5
7. Enemy Materiel and Equipment . . . . .	6
8. Discipline & Morale of Japanese Army . . . . .	7
9. Captured Documents & Interrogation of POW . . . . .	7
III. Summary of Naval Information . . . . .	7
1. Ship Movements & Ships in Port . . . . .	7
2. Shipping Routes . . . . .	8
3. Harbor Defenses . . . . .	8
4. Ship Repair Facilities . . . . .	8
5. Hydrography . . . . .	8
6. General . . . . .	8
7. Geographical . . . . .	9
IV. Basic Air Information . . . . .	9
1. Locations of Air Installations . . . . .	9
2. Airfield Activity . . . . .	9
3. Enemy Air Activity . . . . .	9
4. Allied Air Attacks . . . . .	10
5. Enemy Air Order of Battle . . . . .	10
6. General Target Information . . . . .	10
7. Weather . . . . .	10
V. Information Regarding USPIF Forces . . . . .	10
1. Organization, Equipment and Training . . . . .	10
2. USPIF Supplies and Communications . . . . .	11
3. Personalities . . . . .	11
4. Requirements . . . . .	11
VI. Geographical Information . . . . .	11
1. General Description of Terrain . . . . .	11
2. Offshore Conditions . . . . .	12
3. Coastline . . . . .	12
4. Roads, Tracks and Trails . . . . .	12
5. Rivers and Streams . . . . .	12
6. Lakes and Swamps . . . . .	12
7. Mountains and Ridges . . . . .	13
8. Vegetation . . . . .	13
9. Effects of Monsoons . . . . .	13
10. Errors in Existing Maps . . . . .	13
11. Weather Conditions . . . . .	13
VII. Political & Economic & Psychological Information . . . . .	13
1. Living Conditions . . . . .	13
2. Propaganda and Censorship . . . . .	13
3. Health and Sanitation . . . . .	14
4. Mines, Mills, Factories, etc . . . . .	14
5. Utilities: Power, Gas, and water . . . . .	15
6. Food, Animal and Vegetable Products . . . . .	15

**UNCLASSIFIED**

7. Communications . . . . .	15
8. Finance and Trade . . . . .	16
9. Situation Regarding Articles of Daily Use . . . . .	16
10. Local Government . . . . .	16
11. Relations between the Japanese & Filipino Population . . . . .	17
12. Civil Service, etc . . . . .	18
13. Prisoners of War . . . . .	18

**UNCLASSIFIED**

**[REDACTED]**

I. Introduction.

1. Bibliography.

- a. WD letter, file AG 383.6 (12-23-42) OB-S-B, subject: "Additional Annexes to G-2 Periodic Reports Respecting (1) "Information from Prisoners of War;" (2) "Information from United States Military Personnel Escaped from Enemy Custody", dated 5 January, 1943.
- b. WD letter, file MID 320.2 Japan, subject: "Information Needed Regarding the Japanese Army", dated 10 September 1943.

2. Purpose. The purpose of this questionnaire is to provide instruction and guidance for USPIF and other intelligence personnel in their activities in the Philippines incident to the search for and the forwarding of information required by the War Department and by GHQ, SWPA relative to:

- a. The Japanese Military and Naval forces.
- b. Japanese operations, both present and planned in the Philippines and elsewhere.
- c. Geography and Meteorology of the Philippine area.
- d. Economic, Political and Psychological factors.

3. Instructions for the use of this guide.

- a. Philippine intelligence agencies must be prepared to provide GHQ with the following classes of information:
  - 1) Information of immediate operational importance now such as large scale land, air and sea movements to or from the Philippines. Of special importance are enemy identifications.
  - 2) Data on which long range strategic plans may be based, such as construction of new airbases, etc.
  - 3) Later when invasion is imminent and taking place, data of immediate importance such as recent arrival of reinforcements, etc.
- b. This guide provides a broad outline of information desired in the above categories and is not to be taken as comprehensive or exclusive. It includes and supplements previous directives. It is appreciated that a complete answer to all questions in this guide is beyond the capabilities of any one observer in the Philippines, and such is not required. The first objective of Philippine intelligence agencies should be to keep GHQ, SWPA advised of all significant, up-to-the-minute information concerning enemy forces and activities in the Philippines. For the present GHQ is primarily interested in a. and b. above and information on items marked with an asterisk in the questionnaire should be sent by radio promptly and as frequently as available. Other information, unless of unusual nature or importance, should not be sent by radio but by mail via usual transportation. As much as possible of this latter information should always be available on call. It will require that an intelligence organization be developed, and instructed to meet this requirement. The organization must be centrally controlled, carefully coordinated, and capable of prompt action. (See FM 30-5, SECT. III and IV). Changes in priorities may be indicated from time to time by GHQ.
- c. Details of pre-war information are already available and need not be collected. Information on present condition, changes or alterations, amount of rehabilitation effected if previously destroyed, amount of

- work and equipment necessary to recondition installations and industrial equipment is required.
- d. Throughout the guide references are made to Manuals listed below. The manuals provide a more detailed expansion on the items of information listed in the guide, suggest methods of obtaining information and provide background information useful to the intelligence agent. (See FM 30-5, SECT. VIII).
  - e. To facilitate accurate evaluation of information, all items of information reported will be dated and marked with the appropriate classification as to source and as to accuracy, according to the following table:

- 1) Classification of source:
  - A - Completely reliable.
  - B - Usually reliable.
  - C - Fairly reliable.
  - D - Reliability doubtful.
  - E - Reliability cannot be judged.

- 2) Classification of information:
  - 1 - Report confirmed by other source.
  - 2 - Probably true report.
  - 3 - Possibly true report.
  - 4 - Accuracy doubtful.
  - 5 - Improbable report.
  - 6 - Truth cannot be judged.

EXAMPLE: Information probably true from a source usually reliable will be reported as follows: (B-2).

Rumors and surmises will not be used as verification of sources. Every effort should be made to insure that information reported as fact has not originated in vaguely known information, gossip or rumor. (See FM 30-5, SECT. I).

- 4. Security. This is a CONFIDENTIAL document and care must be taken to insure its safety. It will be destroyed by burning when necessary to prevent its falling into enemy hands.

APPENDICES:

- 1 - Memorandum on Enemy Identifications.
- 2 - Summary of Messages on Reporting Ship Sightings.
- 3 - Silhouettes of Jap naval vessels.
- 4 - Jap Merchant Ship Tonnage Charts.
- 5 - Jap First Line Planes Silhouettes.

REFERENCES:

- FM 30-5, Mil. Intell., Combat Intelligence.
- FM 30-10, Mil. Intell., Observation.
- FM 30-15, Mil. Intell., Examination of Enemy Personnel.
- FM 30-25, Mil. Intell., Counter Intelligence.
- TM 30-480 Handbook Jap Military Forces.

II. Tactical Data on Enemy Military Forces

**UNCLASSIFIED**

1. Dispositions and Strength (Show as much information as possible on maps. Date of information is important).
  - \* a. Front line units: Report location, strength and branch of service (i.e. Inf. Arty, Air, Signal, etc.).
  - \* b. Units in rear areas: Report locations, strength and branch of service.
  - \* c. Mechanized units: Report location, strength, number and types of vehicles.
  - \* d. Reserves: Report location, strength, composition and movements.
  - e. Note location of all Headquarters (of units or areas).
  - \* f. Troop movements: Report strength and composition of all bodies of troops moved. Origin and destination of movement. What transportation used (foot, motor, land or sea).
  - g. Location of observation posts and Radar (RDF) stations (for detection of hostile craft). Locations of military radio stations, code rooms, intercept stations and message centers.
  - h. Detachments and patrols: Location, strength, movements and mission (i.e. combat, reconnaissance, etc).
  - \* i. Bureau of Constabulary: Locations, strength and movements of units.
  - \* j. Enemy casualties: Report numbers sick, wounded and killed.
  
2. Order of Battle and Organization (Study TM 30-480 Chapters 1 and 2 for guidance and for information already known).
  - \* a. Designation of units, i.e. 3rd Co, 236th Regt, etc. Give location of each unit identified and date of identification.
  - \* b. Unit code names and numbers (Study APPENDIX 1 for explanation and guidance, also TM 30-480).
  - \* c. First and last names and ranks of commanders of all units.
  - \* d. Commissioned officers: First and last names and rank, professional background and military experience desired.
  - \* e. Other personnel: First and last names, rank, army serial number, branch of service and unit.
  - \* f. District or sub-district (in Japan or elsewhere) from which personnel are recruited; dates of induction; periods of training; at what locations trained.
  - \* g. What are previous stations of units and personnel?
  - \* h. Experienced or inexperienced troops. What battle experience have they had?
    - i. Old or young troops? Conscripts or volunteers?
    - j. Any non-Japanese personnel (i.e. Chinese, Filipinos, Koreans, etc) in Jap army service? For what purpose are non-Japanese personnel used? (for use of civilians see n. below)
    - k. Replacements: Do these come from other Divs or units, or are they newly trained troops?
    - l. Japanese army organization: Report strength and armament of units of all branches of the service. Composition of units, i.e. numbers of sub units in them and branch of each sub-unit. Chain of command.
  - \* m. Any new types of units observed or reported? Location? When observed or reported? How do these differ from more familiar units?

**UNCLASSIFIED**

UNCLASSIFIED

- a. Civilians: Any used by Japanese army? In what capacity? Jap or Filipinos or others? Were they residents of PI prior to war? Give names and past history if obtainable.
  - c. Women used in Japanese Army: What duties do they perform, i.e. drivers, clerks, mechanics, etc?
  - d. Limited service units: What use, if any, is made of inferior type and defective personnel, i.e. drivers, clerks, MPs, etc.?
  - g. What is the organization of the Tokumu Kikan? Is it completely a part of the Army? What functions does it perform in the Philippines. (The Tokumu Kikan is a spy-counter espionage - propaganda organization possibly connected with the BC or the police and obtains information on both civilians and military activities).
3. Lines of Communication and Transport of military significance. For information on other communication and transport see PART VI, para 4 and PART VII, para. 7. Show as much on maps as possible. Date of information is important.
- a. Routes used by the Japanese for supply, communication and troop movements as land, water or air.
  - b. What other land and water routes not now used (or infrequently used) are available?
  - c. Give terminal points, trace on map and give length of land routes previously constructed or under construction by the Japanese.
  - d. For each land route under a. b. or c. above give following data: type (improved road, track, trail, etc), surface (paved, unimproved, etc), width, vehicle capacity (large trucks, footpath, etc), state of maintenance (all-weather, dry weather, only, etc).
  - e. Important defiles (bridges, mountain passes, fills, etc.) on land routes.
  - \* f. Motor transport used: Number and types of vehicles used in specific movements. Numbers and types and locations of vehicles observed in parking areas.
  - g. Any local transport used? To what extent? How much available and where?
  - \* h. Barges: Number and location. Are they used for supply and troop movements? Between what points or areas? (NOTE: This is a new and important development in Jap army supply and movement. Movement of this traffic should be watched carefully).
  - \* i. Other types of vessels used for supply and troop movement. Number and description of each type. Between what points and areas used.
4. Indications of Enemy Intentions and Movements. Date of information is important.
- \* a. Report arrival of shipments of troops in the Philippines. Strength, composition (incl. branch of service). From what area? (China, SWPA, etc.). Character of troops (replacements, detachments, whole units).
  - \* b. Report departure of troops from Philippines. Give strength and composition. Obtain destination if at all possible to do so.
  - c. Note assembly of bodies of troops in vicinity of embarkation points. Find purpose of assembly (preparation for embarkation, rehabilitation, garrison, etc.). Particularly note units previously reported elsewhere in Philippines.

UNCLASSIFIED

- \* d. Note assembly of unusual numbers of cargo vessels at any point, particularly of known ports of embarkation as Cebu. Report number, type and size of vessels.
  - e. Construction of defensive works: General description. Trace positions on maps. Number, character and specific locations of works, i.e. pill boxes, trenches, foxholes, underground shelters, obstacles (wire, anti-tank or anti-personnel mine fields, etc), gun emplacements (give type and caliber of guns, e.g. AA, light arty, medium arty, anti-tank guns, etc.).
  - f. Are defenses (1) fully manned, (2) lightly held (3) unoccupied?
  - g. Number and types of routes leading to organized areas (i.e. motor roads, tracks, trails, water only, etc).
  - \* h. Construction of new airfields, improvement or expansion of existing fields. Location of new strips, dispersal areas, size and capacity of same. Length and width of new or improved strips. (NOTE: Information of pre-war fields is already available. Only information on new fields and alterations to old fields is desired).
  - \* i. Arrival of aircraft not previously based in the Philippines. Departure of a/c from PI bases (particularly applies to large formations of a/c).
  - \* j. Appearance of new types a/c on PI fields, especially any long-range, land-based heavy bomber types, or rocket armed fighters (for common types see APPENDIX 5).
  - \* k. Arrival, departure or continued presence of strong naval elements. Give types, number and description of vessels (See APPENDIX 2, 3, and 4). Destination of outbound elements and areas from which arriving elements come are particularly important.
  - l. Note development of strategic bases such as Davao, Zamboanga, Cebu City, etc.
5. Supply Arrangements and Installations (Show on maps where possible).
- a. Location and size of depots. Type of supplies stocked. Levels of stocks (filled, partially empty, etc).
  - b. Dumps: Location, type, and quantity of supplies stocked. (Motor fuel and ammunition particularly important).
  - c. Refineries and fuel tanks. Locations and capacity. Type of gasoline stocked (aviation, motor, etc).
  - d. Dock facilities: Condition of pre-war, improvements or alterations to old facilities, location and details of new construction, vessel capacity. For reporting other information of similar nature see PART II, para. 6.
  - e. Types and amounts of supplies procured locally or from other areas in PI. Proportion of supply procured in PI to that brought from Japan or elsewhere.
6. Enemy Tactics and Methods. (Information on new tactics or modified tactics is desired. For information already available study carefully TM 30-480, Chapter 8).
- a. Note training and activities, manœuvres and daily drills. Particular attention to new or unusual forms of training of troops stationed in islands.

- b. From POW or other sources obtain information on offensive and defensive tactical principles and methods.
  - c. Has any training been noted in tactical methods not previously used by the Japanese? Any field exercises or manœuvres for purpose of testing such methods?
  - d. What proportion of training time is devoted to night operations and what to daylight operations?
  - \* e. What is the character of training given chemical troops? Is training conducted in using gas? What types of gas?
  - f. Do service troops (i.e. Engineers, Signal Corps, Quartermaster units, etc) receive training in use of weapons or occupation of defensive positions? If so, how much training do they receive?
  - \* g. Note any training in amphibious warfare. In loading and unloading on or from sea borne vessels. The strength and designation of units receiving this training is important.
  - h. To what extent are field exercises and manœuvres conducted by forces composed of different branches of the service?
  - i. To what extent are ground, naval, and air forces trained in coordinated action?
  - j. How do the Japanese use artillery? What missions are assigned each caliber gun units? How does the Artillery cooperate with Infantry?
  - \* k. How does the air support ground troops? What methods of coordination are in use (e.g. flares, panels, smoke, etc), particularly methods by which ground troops identify their locations to air.
7. Enemy Materiel and Equipment. (Information on new equipment or new adaptations of old equipment desired. For information already available study carefully TM 30-480, Chapters 4 & 5).
- a. Quantity, type, model (year and number) and condition of all weapons (either in hands of troops or in depots and dumps).
  - b. Type, caliber, and range of Artillery, Anti-aircraft and Anti-tank guns. Methods of fire direction. Where weapons described are emplaced, or (if held mobile) where located.
  - c. Description of tanks and other mechanized combat vehicles. Type (light, medium or heavy), weight of each type vehicle, armament, amphibious or land-going only?
  - d. Type and quantity of munitions available. In what depot is each type stocked? Describe munition storages (type of construction, dispersion, etc).
  - \* e. Description of chemical equipment and munitions. Of particular importance is the quantity and nature of gas, smoke or other chemical munitions.
  - f. Searchlights. Number and location. Types. Range.
  - g. Barrage balloons. Where used? Describe.
  - h. Radar and RDF equipment (see PART II, 1.g.). Description. Types. Ranges. Any information obtainable on effectiveness of this type of equipment.
  - i. What units, types of vessels and aircraft are equipped with Radar?
  - j. Communications equipment. Description of telephone, telegraph, radio and visual signal equipment in hands of troops. Quality of equipment. Are there shortages of any types?

- k. What types of heavy equipment (bull dozers, tractors, graders, etc.) and what type of materials are used in road building, bridge building, construction of defensive installations, construction of ammunition storages, etc. by the Japanese? What items are procured or seized locally?
- \* l. Detailed description of any new items of military equipment appearing in PI, particularly new or improved types of guns, tanks, Radar equipment and airplanes. Note especially appearance of heavy, long-range land-based bombing airplanes. Quantities of each item observed!
- \* m. Movement of any items under k. above out of the Philippines. Destination if at all obtainable.
- n. Information on effectiveness of all Japanese weapons and ammunition. (Compare with other Japanese weapons and with Allied weapons).

- 8. Discipline and Morale of Japanese Army (see also TM 30-480, Chapter 7).
  - a. State of discipline and morale prevailing in units stationed in PI, in units arriving from or departing for other stations.
  - b. Complaints of, or dissatisfaction with military service, with respect to conditions in Japan.
  - c. Matters bearing on state of morale in the Japanese army or in Japan.
  - d. Motives behind surrender of Japanese soldiers.
  - e. What Allied weapons are most feared by Japanese troops?
  - f. In what Japanese weapons have the troops most confidence?
  - g. What diseases are prevalent among Japanese troops? What proportion are lost from duty by disease? For what periods? How many die?

- 9. Captured Documents and Interrogation of POW (Send by radio important information obtained).
  - a. Definition: All official documents of the Japanese armed forces, Ground, Air or Naval (orders, directives, plans, maps, charts, intelligence summaries, etc). All personal documents of military or naval personnel (letters, to or from soldiers; pay books, diaries, etc). Identification tags, insignia, etc. Geographical data, maps and charts from either Japanese or Philippine sources.
  - b. Relative to captured documents study and follow instructions in FM 30-15, Sect. IV. Note carefully additional items and specific breakdown of items in FM 30-15, Sect. IV.
  - c. Interrogation of POW: Use this questionnaire as a guide, particularly PARTS II, III and IV. In all cases obtain as many answers to 2. and 4. above as possible. Note also and follow carefully FM 30-15, Sect. II, para. 16.

III. Summary of Naval Information. (Show as much information as possible on maps).

- 1. Ship movements and Ships in Port. (See APPS. 2, 3, & 4: detailed instructions and methods of reporting).
  - \* a. Number, type and tonnage of ships arriving in and departing from the Philippines. Give dates and

UNCLASSIFIED

- locations observed. Destinations of outbound ships and locations from whence incoming ships came, if at all obtainable. NOTE: This applies to both cargo and naval vessels.
- \* b. Number and types of ships in port. Locations. Dates observed.
2. Shipping Routes.
- a. Routes followed by ocean convoys.
  - b. Coastal shipping routes and schedules.
  - c. Number, type and tonnage of ships on all routes.
  - d. Number, types and tonnage of ships in convoys. Number and types of escort vessels.
3. Harbor Defenses.
- \* a. Location and extent of minefields, nets, booms and other obstructions.
  - \* b. Channels through each of the above items.
  - \* c. Usual times of exit and entry through harbor barriers.
  - \* d. How barriers operated, including recognition signals used.
4. Ship Repair Facilities.
- a. Location and capacity of dry docks, floating docks, marine railway and slips in all parts of islands. (By map if possible). Report only condition of old facilities, alterations to same or new construction.
  - b. Number and types of ships salvaged or under repair. When observed?
  - c. Name and description of damaged ships. Obtain time, date and location where they were damaged and how.
  - d. Rapidity with which repairs are effected.
5. Hydrography.
- a. Navigation aids, lighthouses, operating lights, buoys, beacons in place and whether in operation or not (all parts of islands).
  - b. Obtain enemy charts, particularly those showing routings, exits and entries into harbors or controlled areas, depth of water along coasts.
  - c. Describe radio aids to navigation and weather reporting systems in use.
6. General.
- \* a. How is shipping controlled and operated, i.e. regulations for cargoes carried, use of ships, etc.
  - \* b. Naval organization functioning, including names of naval ships, their division, squadron or fleet force.
  - \* c. General extent and coverage of surface and air patrols. Give kind of craft used, time of departure and return of patrols, what routes and areas they cover. (show on maps)
  - d. Present condition of pre-war harbor and docking facilities in all parts of islands, improvements in equipment, replacements and additions, reconstruction of piers, work necessary to place these in operating condition, etc.
  - e. Present or potential smuggling operations that might be of use. Names of personnel involved.
  - f. Location, capacity and present stocks of naval fuel storage. What are facilities available for refueling ships?

UNCLASSIFIED

- g. Small craft including bancas, etc. What use do the Japanese make of these craft? What cargoes are normally carried? Rates? What controls on this traffic are enforced by the Japanese?

7. For Geographical Information pertaining to naval movements, see PART VI.

IV. Basic Air Information. Study also PART II, 4.h to j.

1. Locations of Air Installations. (Show as much on maps as possible).

- a. Location of airfields and seaplane bases (obtain accurate maps and diagrams where possible).  
b. Dumps - location and contents, particularly aviation gasoline and bombs.  
c. Buildings - location and use.  
d. Airplane dispersal areas, locations, capacity for aircraft.  
e. New airfield construction - length and width of runways. Number of runways, type of construction. By how much can strip be lengthened? For old fields report only present condition, work necessary to place in use or details of improvements or alterations made since occupation and possibility of lengthening.  
f. To what extent are air installations listed above camouflaged? What types of camouflage used in each case?  
g. AA positions and caliber.  
h. Balloons or other defenses.  
i. Searchlight positions.  
j. Wireless and radar locations.

2. Airfield Activity.

- a. Location and number of refueling points. Methods of refueling.  
b. Location of repair points and spare parts depots, particularly aircraft engines.  
c. Location of bomb loading points and methods.  
d. Are plane tanks drained at night?

3. Enemy Air Activity.

- a. Numbers and types of planes on fields or observed in air, nature of movement, i.e. reconnaissance patrols, training flights (if latter, describe tactics practised).  
b. Time and direction of arrival and departure.  
c. Airfield approach procedure.  
d. Do flights follow any regular schedules? If so, what are they?  
e. Rendezvous location of fighters with bombers.  
f. Visual sighting methods, i.e. air-ground, ground-air and plane to plane (wing signals, lamps, rockets, flares, etc). Note especially practices used in training and for airfield approach.  
g. Airplanes failing to return from offensive missions.  
h. Are planes in use for ferrying or freight carrying? Nature of freight carried.  
 \* i. Unusual concentrations of transport planes. Locations. Dates.

UNCLASSIFIED

4. Allied Air Attacks (See footnotes).
  - a. How much warning was received by the enemy? How reported?
  - b. What defensive measures are taken?
  - c. Give results of our attacks.
  - d. What are methods and time of airfield repair?
  - e. Effect of attack on (1) troops and (2) civilians.
5. Enemy Air Order of Battle.
  - \* a. Date and location of arrival and departure of air units (i.e. 4th Air Army, 12th Air Bgd, etc. or 76th Ind Air Squadron, etc.--the Japanese have both types of air units) or movements of large flights of planes. Destinations or place from which planes come is important.
  - \* b. Ranks, names and duties of air officers (first and last names).
  - c. Are air facilities Army or Navy air service?
  - d. Figures, letters or emblems on airplanes.
  - \* e. Names, code names or code numbers of Units. Code name usually appears on a board or flag outside Hq. See also APPENDIX NO. 1.
  - f. Markings on staff cars.
6. General Target Information.
  - a. Location and size of airplane factories or assembly plants, oil refineries, etc.
  - b. Other information covered in PART II, 3,5, and 7, PART IV: 1. and 2.
7. Weather.
  - a. Prevailing wind in vicinity of new fields.
  - b. Prevailing weather conditions in vicinity of new fields.

NOTE: It will be wise to plan for the establishment of reliable watchers at chief enemy operational fields. These will be essential in providing last minute target information to our pilots, in giving adequate warning of enemy air movements against our forces and in assessing damage done by our own air attacks. For the present, items marked for priority should be sent by radio. Permanent target installations should be noted carefully on maps which will be forwarded as rapidly as possible to GHQ. Other information should be forwarded as available.

V. Information Regarding United States Philippine Island Forces (USPIF).

1. Organization, Equipment and Training.
  - a. Organizations, strength and dispositions of USPIF units. Areas under control of USPIF units.
  - b. Extent of field fortifications in regimental areas, giving types and locations.
  - c. Intelligence instruction, facilities and organization. How many have received any intelligence training? How much training?
  - d. What training facilities for officers, NCOs, etc. are available for each branch of the service?
  - e. Equipment, training, experience and performance of troops and commands (by area).
  - f. Intelligence organization: i.e., coastwatcher, port and airdrome contacts, extent of coverage,

UNCLASSIFIED

frequency of contact with agents and method of contact, improvements desired and equipment needed. Counter intelligence facilities, policies and practices, if any.

- g. Type of liaison maintained between adjacent units.
  - h. Ability of units to move from one area to support another. What are the limiting distances?
2. USPIF Supplies and Communications.
- a. Communications.
  - b. Ordnance: Numbers and types of guns. Supplies of ammunition available. Performance of equipment on hand and recently received. Effect on the enemy.
  - c. Transport: Land: Type and serviceability of land transport and spare parts, etc. Water: Type and serviceability of craft available. (See PART VII: 7. for transport in occupied areas).
  - d. Fuel supplies: Type available, quantity produced and where. Fuel storage facilities available and stocks on hand.
  - e. Engineer Equipment: Type, quantity and condition of equipment available.
  - f. Supplies of food available to USPIF forces. What areas are under cultivation by USPIF supporters? How much food, in excess of USPIF requirements will be available in July 1944, Dec. 1944, April 1945? (See also PART VII: 6 for further questions).
  - g. In what areas would this food be available?
3. Personalities: a) Civilian and USPIF persons suspected of collaboration with Japs voluntarily or persons who may be a menace to security. Provide verified information to support charges or reasons to suspect. b) Leading civilians in communities who have proved their loyalty, integrity and leadership.
4. Requirements.
- a. Personnel: What personnel are most needed from outside sources? State priorities. Should American Filipinos be brought in from outside? What do you think of use of a section of Hawaiian Filipinos now in standard training in the States for use as a sort of commandos? What would be the effect on local people? What American officers are required?
  - b. Miscellaneous.

NOTE: The purpose of this part of the questionnaire is to enable GHQ to better assess the USPIF situation and capabilities and the requirements for preparing the organization to meet specific demands in the future. Discretion should therefore be used in reporting the information indicated.

Since considerable information is already available, reports will probably concern changes in the present situation, unless specific requests are received from GHQ.

VI. Geographical Information. (Obtain photographs, sketches, and maps wherever possible). See also PART II: 3.

- 1. General description of terrain.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

2. Offshore Conditions.
  - a. Depths. (Charts if possible).
  - b. Obstructions (reefs, sandbars, etc.) Give locations and extent.
  - c. Prevailing winds. Direction, speed in each area. Seasonal changes are important.
  - d. Tides and currents. Describe.
  
3. Coastline.
  - a. Description of potential landing beaches. For each beach give length, width, grade, depth of water offshore at high and low tide, type of bottom of beach (coral, sand, etc). Whether or not approach by water is obstructed by reefs, etc. If so, where, and what channels exist through obstructions.
  - b. Description of areas behind landing beaches. Type of terrain (flat, rolling, mountainous, cliffs, swamps). Type and extent of vegetation (heavily wooded, sparse woods, open terrain, etc). Roads, tracks and trails in vicinity of beaches. Whether they lead inland or are parallel to beaches is important. Streams emptying into sea in vicinity of beaches (size, whether bridges or fordable). Important terrain features behind or near beaches. (Mountains, prominent hills, towns and villages, etc). How far from beaches.
  - c. Location and description of prominent identification marks of each area described above as seen from the sea.
  - d. Areas having overhanging foliage (useful for hiding small boats, etc).
  
4. Roads, Tracks and Trails. (See also PART II, 3. and PART VII, 7.).
  - a. Detailed description of roads, tracks, and trails, terminals, trace on map and distances. Time of trip between specified points by vehicle and on foot. For each route give: width, surface (pavement, unimproved, etc), capacity (large trucks, jeeps, foot only, etc).
  - b. Type of country traversed (wooded or open, flat, rolling or mountainous).
  - c. State of maintenance, improvements in progress or planned. Possibility of improvement.
  - d. Defiles. Bridges, fords, mountain passes, fills. Are streams under bridges fordable. What other routes (if any) by-pass defiles listed above? What is size and type of construction of each bridge?
  
5. Rivers and Streams.
  - a. Width, depth, direction of flow, strength of current.
  - b. Floods (seasons and extent).
  - c. Type of banks on each side (flat, swampy, gentle slopes, cliffs).
  - d. Fordable or not and in what areas.
  - e. Vessel capacity. Size and draft of vessels able to traverse streams. Between what points?
  - f. What type of country do streams traverse (heavily wooded, open, mountainous, rolling, flat).
  
6. Lakes and swamps. Size. Location. Effect of wet or dry seasons on these areas.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

- 7. Mountains and Ridges.
  - a. Height, location and direction of ridge line. Height and location of prominent points.
  - b. Description. Spurs and valleys leading toward ridge lines. Do valleys contain axial streams? Describe road nets within each valley.
  - c. In what areas are ridges generally parallel? What direction do parallel ridges and valleys follow?
  - d. Vegetation in mountain areas. What areas are heavily wooded, sparsely wooded, low brush covered, open? Types of vegetation.
  - e. Over what areas do prominent points afford observation? What areas can you see from them?
- 8. Vegetation: Location, extent and types of forests, penetrability of forests, characteristic vegetation types; things to avoid and aids to strange troops in areas.
- 9. Effects of monsoons, protection from weather, peculiar local conditions.
- 10. Errors in existing maps.
- 11. Weather conditions and their probable effect on movements and operations.

NOTE: It is not intended that answers to this portion of the questionnaire should be furnished immediately. GHQ will later ask for terrain information on specific areas. This PART is included for guidance of local personnel so that they may be familiar with the type of information which will be asked for by GHQ and it will serve as a guide in securing information when required. It may be wise to assign personnel to cover roughly the strategic areas of the district with this in mind. Note carefully paragraph 3.b. of Introduction for Use of this Guide.

VII. Political, Economic and Psychological Information (both free and occupied areas).

- 1. Living Conditions.
  - a. Changes, cost of living, rations or shortages. Note attempts to relieve shortages by use of substitutes or rationing, economies, etc.
  - b. Under what conditions do the population in general live under the Japanese? Area restrictions, curfew, passes, blackout? How strict is the enforcement of these laws? What passes or personal identifications are issued?
- 2. Propaganda and Censorship.
  - a. Radio Propaganda (both enemy and Allied).
    - 1) How often are radio broadcasts heard? What are best times?
    - 2) What stations are heard? What programs liked best?
    - 3) What are regulations on receiving sets? On listener? Short, long, or medium wave sets?
    - 4) What types of people own sets and what do people have to do to get them? Do more, or less people listen to the radio than before the war? What do they think of the programs?
    - 5) Is repetition of programs in various dialects worth the time it requires?

**UNCLASSIFIED**

- How often is radio news posted on bulletin boards and news circulated by mimeo or typed sheets? Obtain samples.
- 7) What is the effect of our propaganda on the enemy? On Filipinos of various classes? What are the strong or weak points of our own or the enemy's propaganda? Suggestions to improve our own or to counter enemy propaganda.
- b. Non-radio Propaganda (both enemy and Allied).
- 1) What forms of non-radio propaganda in use?
  - 2) Indicate trends, methods, effectiveness, and suggestions. Are posters, pamphlets, speeches and parades used and how much? What local people or politicians do this? How are they regarded by the Filipinos?
  - 3) Newspapers - who controls, what are policies, etc.?
  - 4) What movies are shown? American, Japanese, other?
  - 5) Where is the Japanese language taught? What inducements are there to learn, is it compulsory, is it required for any business or legal action?
  - 6) What is effect of leaflets dropped from Allied planes?
  - 7) What are favors or privileges granted those who cooperate with the Japanese?
- c. Censorship - methods of and effectiveness.
- d. Education. 1) What changes have been made in the subjects taught in the public schools? - in the teaching personnel? - in the number of grades open and the enrollment? Do these changes meet with popular approval? 2) How has private education been affected?
3. Health and Sanitation.
- a. General conditions, remarks on epidemics; affected areas, causes, how serious, and what efforts to remedy?
- b. What proportion of American USPIF personnel, or civilians have:
- |                 |                                 |
|-----------------|---------------------------------|
| malaria         | typhus                          |
| dysentery       | chronic colds                   |
| tropical ulcers | other diseases as cholera, etc. |
| influenza       | many noticeably under weight?   |
| beri beri       |                                 |
- c. Are the government provincial hospitals and dispensaries in operation? Are their services improved or have they deteriorated? Has their capacity been increased? Are Japanese medical advisors attached to them? Are Japanese public health advisors or inspectors in evidence? Are Philippine sanitary inspections active? Have they been extended?
- d. Quantities of medical supplies and preventatives needed, items locally produced, etc. State priorities of needs. Medical personnel needed? State types.
4. Mines, Mills, Factories (apply questions to each type of business, i.e., sugar, cotton, iron, etc.).

**UNCLASSIFIED**

- a. Statistics of production.
  - b. Location and capacity of plants and source of power.
  - c. Extent of rehabilitation and details of improvements, or items needed to place plant back in production.
  - d. Types of employees and working conditions.
  - e. Location and quantities of stores.
  - f. Changes made in former plant to produce items not formerly produced.
  - g. Any new plant? Capacity, etc?
  - h. Any pre-war plant now abandoned?
5. Utilities: Power, gas and water.
- a. Location and capacity of plants and source of power.
  - b. Area and industries served.
  - c. How most easily disabled.
  - d. Extent of rehabilitation and details of improvements, items needed to place plant back in production.
  - e. What restrictions in use?
6. Food, Animal and Vegetable Products.
- a. Chief articles of food available by areas. Quantity available for local consumption and shipment elsewhere.
  - b. Types of food formerly available not now available or available only in limited quantities. How has occupation affected types of foods grown and quantities produced?
  - c. General condition of agriculture, total area under production compared to pre-war figures.
  - d. Civilian population adequately fed? Breakdown by areas and classes.
  - e. How is food secured by USPIF? Location, organization and description of USPIF food production projects, capability of expanding production; equipment and supplies needed.
  - f. What are USPIF facilities for storing or preserving a supply of food? Quantity, capacity and by whom controlled? How about occupied areas?
  - g. Is shortage of food apt to contribute to a breakdown of defense if the Japs undertake a prolonged campaign against the USPIF?
  - h. Animals - types and quantities available (for Army use).
7. Communications - see also PART II, para. 3; PART V, para. 2 and PART VI, para. 4.
- a. Telephone, telegraph and cable stations:- location, equipment available and needed, how controlled and operated.
  - b. Radio - location of stations, equipment, source of power - for long and short wave. What are frequencies and call signs?
  - c. Railroads: Commodities hauled, origin and destination. Condition of track and equipment, effect of weather on operations. Facilities for supply and equipment. How or where is system most easily disabled? What has happened to privately owned dock, sugar central, mine, etc. railroads? Be specific. What is condition of track and equipment? New tracks laid or old ones removed, mileage and gauge of each, extent of track, etc. How much equipment is now available?

UNCLASSIFIED

roads, condition, improvements and extension. transport facilities available. Equipment available for construction of roads. Present capacity for military use. Location, type of construction, length, width, capacity of principal bridges.

- e. Shipping: see PART III.
- f. Trails and tracks: see Geographical, PART V.
- g. What are fuel requirements, storage facilities, stocks on hand, location of stocks and source of supply?

8. Finance and Trade.

- a. Currency: What types of money in circulation, what is relative value - to what extent is each used, acceptability of U.S. dollars? Regulations and restrictions. What attempts to prevent inflation?
- b. Finance: Regulations and restrictions, budget, investments, stocks and bonds, credit facilities for commerce, agriculture, industry? Current interest rates? Extent and control of usury, etc.?
- c. Trade (see also PART VII, para. 1.a). Regulations and restrictions? How generally is barter resorted to? What are articles of barter? What areas exchange goods?
- d. Business: Who owns or controls? Are Japanese taking over business formerly in the hands of Chinese or Filipinos? What are regulations and restrictions on specific businesses and industries?
- e. Real estate: Values of various types (urban, suburban, residential, business sites, agriculturallands, etc)? Volume of sales? Cost and amount of building construction as compared with pre-war cost.

9. Situation Regarding Articles of Daily Use.

- a. Clothing: What is situation in free and occupied areas, USPIF, Japanese, civilians? Are shortages in free areas sufficient to impair morale seriously and contribute to collapse of resistance? In the case of general population, to constitute a serious hardship?
- b. Miscellaneous articles as leather goods, articles made of coconut products, wooden articles, articles made of native woven cloth, toilet goods, etc. Are there any imported Japanese goods? Quantities, prices, popularity?

10. Local Government (free and occupied areas).

- a. For each province.
  - 1) Who are provincial officials? Who has been left in office by the Japs? Who have been replaced, and where are they now? Who are the new office holders? Outline their previous records in public and private life.
  - 2) To what extent are provincial officials carrying out their normal functions, i.e., general supervision, meetings of provincial boards, collection of taxes, courts of first instance?
  - 3) To what extent are the officials trusted by the Japs? Have they more power, or less than before Jap occupation? Do they openly cooperate

UNCLASSIFIED

with Japanese? Do they say they are pro-Philippine or pro-Jap? Do they openly attack the United States? Procure copies of speeches, letters, or public statements. Are they secretly cooperating with the guerrillas? If so, how?


- b. For each Municipality.
  - 1) Who are municipal officials? Who have been left in office, who have been replaced and where are they now, and who are the new incumbents?
  - 2) To what extent are they carrying out their normal functions, i.e. meetings of council, collection of taxes, inspection of markets, municipal police, justice of peace courts, operation of schools. What is extent of their powers and cooperation with the Japanese program? Do they openly attack the United States? Procure copies of speeches, letters, or public statements. Are they secretly cooperating with the guerrillas? If so, how?
  - 3) Who are the officers of the Neighborhood Associations? What are the chief activities of the Neighborhood Associations? How large is the membership? What is the feeling of the people towards the Neighborhood Associations?
  - 4) Who are the officers of the Kalibapi? What are the chief activities of the Kalibapi? What is the feeling of the people toward the Kalibapi?
- c. Jap treatment of different nationals (especially Chinese and Spanish), economic, and religious groups and their reaction; the relation and attitude of these groups to each other, to the previous and present government of the Philippines, and the Allies.
- d. Organization and function of civil police, Military Police or Kempei, secret police, Tokumu Kikan (see PART II, para. 2.q.) semi-officials agencies such as patriotic societies or big companies. What measures are taken by Japs for internal security? (Guards, spies, informers?).
- e. Best means of moving freely and safely. Passes - where required, who inspects, types needed for any movement. Obtain samples.

11. Relations Between the Japanese and the Filipino Population.

- a. What is the attitude of the Japanese (MPs, civilians, civil and military officials) toward the Filipino people?
- b. Are people oftentaken up for questioning? Who does this? How are they treated?
- c. How has personal freedom changed under the Japanese administration? Use of the mails, telegraph, telephone, freedom of travel on roads, railroads and boats, strictness of censorship, freedom of religion, amusements.
- d. restrictions imposed by the Japanese: area restrictions, curfew, blackouts. How strictly are these enforced?
- e. Have the Japanese taken people for compulsory labor? To what extent? Where? For what types of labor? Are they paid for their work?

- f. What people besides those mentioned in PART VII, para. 10 have been replaced in their jobs by Japanese or by people working for the Japanese or trained by them? (Telephone operators, postmen, hotel keepers, barmen, waiters, taximen, bank clerks, shopkeepers, newspaper workers, radio station personnel, etc.)
  - g. What are the relations with Japanese clubs, or Japanese colonies such as at Davao or with pre-war Japanese commercial firms? What are the pre-war Jap inhabitants doing now? What is their Army or Navy rank, and job?
  - h. How are the Japanese military leaders regarded? As soldiers? As Statesmen?
12. Locations of prisons, police stations, town halls, Hq of political parties, banks, post offices, offices of the civil government or of the Japanese military administration, offices of Japanese companies, newspaper offices, printing presses, especially any new installations. How are they staffed, and what local people work there or are familiar with them? How are they guarded or defended?
13. Prisoners of War.
- a. Where are the camps - for Allied PWs, for civilian internees?
  - b. How are the people there treated, fed, clothed?
  - c. Is there any way to get mail out or food in? How? Who knows these channels?
  - d. Is there evidence of the placing of informers among the prisoners? Who?
  - e. What branch of the Japanese Army or Navy questions POW? What methods of interrogation are used? What questions do they ask?

NOTE: The purpose of this part of the questionnaire is to enable GHQ and the Philippine government to better assess the local situation and the requirements to meet specific demands in the future. Discretion should therefore be used in reporting information indicated and in all except urgent cases information should not be sent by radio.



ENEMY IDENTIFICATIONS

Information on the identification of Japanese Army units in occupied areas is desired. Below, in the order of its importance to the Enemy Identification Section of G.H.Q., is set out the type of information desired. Comments below each section attempt to indicate the method and the relative ease with which it is believed the information can be obtained without arousing undue suspicion.

1. Actual Designation of the Units: Japanese Army Units, like other Armies are divided into numbered organizations, such as 5th Division, 21st Regiment, etc. If possible, obtain these designations or names. COMMENTS: In peacetime such information could be easily obtained, inasmuch as all ranks wore arabic numerals on their collar flaps, designating their regiments. Thus a member of the 21st Infantry Regiment has a brass "21" on his collar flap. It is possible that in rear areas this practice is still adhered to, although all troops so far observed have removed these collar ornaments. Nevertheless, it is believed that Japanese troops have the same failing as Allied troops, in not realizing the necessity of keeping the designation of their units secret. It is possible such information could be obtained during conversation by asking outright to what unit a particular Jap belongs.

2. Code Numbers and Names: Each Japanese Army unit (larger than a battalion) has a code number. These numbers run from 1 to 10,000. The majority of numbers encountered in combat areas are of four digits (the numbers 1 to 1,000 are possibly assigned to various permanent garrison troops in Manchuria). The code numbers of organizations within a division would seem to be in blocks of twenty. These numbers follow in sequence beginning with "0" and ending with "9"; for example, 6820-6839, or 4080-4099. Not enough identifications have been made to establish the above as a definite fact, but Divisional code numbers checked in SWPA seem to follow this rule. No set system for Independent Unit numbers has yet been noted.

The code name of a unit is not nearly so important as its number. The system of assigning code names is not fully known, but generally each Army and each Division has its code name, and subsidiary units take the code name of the ranking organization (for instance, the code name of the 17th Army is OKI and all units coming under the command of the 17th Army are known as OKI units, although previously they may have had other code names. Code numbers do NOT change. COMMENTS: It is believed that attempts to obtain this information from Japanese troops will arouse immediate suspicion. Code numbers and names of units receive a "most secret" classification in the Japanese Army and experience with prisoners has indicated that in a great many cases they actually do not know the code name or number of their unit. Officers, in all probability, do, and the same would apply to the old-time army men, but these men probably are more security minded than the newer recruits.

3. Names of Commanders: The next best way to obtain Order of Battle information is to obtain the FULL name and RANK of the unit commander. Japanese family names are not nearly so varied as in English. Therefore, it is necessary, if definite identifications are to be made, that the first,

as well as the last name of commanders be obtained. Most Japanese troops know the last name of their commander because the Japanese, in practice at least, have adopted the system of naming a unit after its commander. It is probable that many Japanese troops will not know the first name of their commander. If so, the last name and rank should be forwarded. If the last name of enough unit commanders from an occupied area are received, definite identifications could be made through information already available. In general, names below the rank of major should be ignored.

A list of military terms used is set out below. These terms would always be preceded by a name (usually the Commander's name - sometimes by a code name).

HOMEN GUN	Army Group
GUN	Army - American Corps
SHUDAN	Group
SHIDAN	Division
RYODAN	Brigade
HEIDAN	Group - American Reg't Combat Team
RENTAI	Regiment
DAITAI	Battalion
CHUTAI	Company
SHOTAI	Platoon
BUNTAI	Section
HAN	Squad
SHITAI	Detachment
BUTAI	Usually Bn and above
TAI	Unit

Note: Word "Butai" is very loosely used - can refer to almost any sized unit - examples: Mo "Butai" meaning Mo unit - in this case 18th Army. Yazawa "Butai", meaning Col. Yazawa's Regiment, or Kuwada "Butai", meaning Major Kuwada's Battalion. COMMENTS: This information should be easy to obtain, as Japanese troops almost invariably refer to their units by this method.

4. Recruiting Areas: Japan is divided into four districts, East, North, Central and West. Each of these four districts is again divided into sub-districts, which are consecutively numbered from 1 to (say) 100. When the Japanese recruit is first called to the colors, his regiment is known by the code number referring to his recruiting district. For instance, the 144th Infantry is known to have been recruited in West 34 District and Japanese prisoners from this regiment, captured in the New Guinea area, steadfastly maintained that they did not come from the 144th Regiment, but from the West 34 Unit or "Butai".

COMMENTS: Fairly complete information is available on the recruiting districts of the various Japanese regiments, and information such as the above, if obtained, should be forwarded. It also would be valuable to know, for instance, that a majority or numbers of troops in a particular area come from Kobe, Tokyo or other cities towns or districts in Japan. No Jap should become suspicious of attempts to find the geographical location of his civilian home in Japan. Attempts to get information of its code designation might arouse suspicion.

5. Previous Stations: Another aid to identification would be to forward data on previous stations or combat experience of the troops. Considerable information is available on dispositions of the Japanese Army prior to, and including the, present war, and it is possible, through a process of deduction, if information were furnished as to previous experience

UNCLASSIFIED

of a Japanese unit, that identification could be made. Along the same lines, the fact that Japanese troops spoke a particular native language, such as Malay, or any of the Chinese, as well as Philippine, dialects, would be of considerable value.

Note: Generally speaking, do not bother with information dealing with units smaller than a battalion and also confine yourself principally to obtaining information on combat troops (infantry, artillery, etc).

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

6

# UNCLASSIFIED

Appendix 2

## SUMMARY OF MESSAGES, ETC. ON REPORTING SHIP SIGHTINGS

1. Flash coastwatcher reports (Where radios are available). In reporting sighting give latitude first, then longitude, dropping hundreds and the words "latitude" and "longitude", "degrees" and "minutes". Classification of merchant ships will be determined from chart attached as Appendix 4. Course; speed in knots or classified as slow, medium or fast; load as empty, light or loaded will then be reported. Classifications of naval vessels will be determined by Appendix 3.
2. Where no radio watcher available, obtain periodic summarized reports showing number, types, load and direction of ships passing in main channels, in harbors and straits. This information is useful in determining importance of the route and the extent of the enemy shipping effort.
3. Ship names and numbers are useful in tracing ship movements.
  - a. Numbering: The system of numbers on ships is not yet entirely clear. To aid in determining the system in use by the enemy, where possible give number and location of number on the ship (i.e. on side of ship or funnel) and type and tonnage of the ship in question. Also give date of arrival and departure at ports and name if known.
  - b. Ship names: Give names of ships in port where possible, with date of arrival and departure of ship.
4. Launches and small boats. Except where troop movements are concerned reports of this movement are not necessary but it is advisable to watch this movement closely for any unusual activity. See also Part II.3.h.
5. Cargoes handled at important ports: Collect periodic summaries of strategic cargoes entering and leaving ports.
6. Hospital ships: Report names, dates of arrival and departure of hospital ships from ports. If cargo carried on ship, state type and quantity. It is most important this information be carefully graded (see Introductory Notes, para. 3.d.). Find origin of voyage or destination if possible.

# UNCLASSIFIED



## SIMPLIFIED JAPANESE WARSHIP RECOGNITION

### INSTRUCTIONS

On sighting a naval ship, the following procedure is to be used:

1. Determine Division from this sheet.
2. Turn to Division selected to determine Type and Class.
3. Ship will then be reported by type and class when possible. Where symbols are shown for type this will be used instead of type. E.G. One stack cruiser of MOGAMI class will be reported as One CA MOGAMI class

---

#### DIVISION "A" Patrol & Minecraft, Destroyers, Light Cruisers



Bridge, Stack and Mainmast widespread with Bridge well forward and Mainmast well aft.

---

#### DIVISION "B" Heavy Cruisers



Bridge, Stack and Mainmast closely grouped amidships.

---

#### DIVISION "C" Battleships



Pagoda bridge structure considerably higher than stack. Bridge, Stack & Secondary control form three distinct elements.

---

#### DIVISION "D" Aircraft Carriers (CV)



Flight Deck outline.

NOTE: No separation as to class.

---

Smaller craft and submarines (SS) are not included in this chart.

---

DIVISION "A" - Patrol & Minecraft, Destroyers, Light Cruisers

Bridge, Stack and Mainmast widespread with Bridge  
well forward and Mainmast well aft.

PATROL & MINECRAFT - ONE STACK



DESTROYERS (DD) - TWO STACKS



NOTE: There are several types of destroyers but the differences are small and therefore not shown here.

LIGHT CRUISERS (CL) - FOUR, THREE, or ONE STACK

Class Recognition

FOUR STACKS



NAKA

THREE STACKS



KUMA - NATORI CLASS

ONE STACK



AGANO CLASS

Built-up turret arrangement forward



YUBARI

Large inverted "Y" stack.

DIVISION "B" - HEAVY CRUISERS

Bridge, Stack and Mainmast closely grouped amidships.

---

HEAVY CRUISERS (CA)

Class Recognition:

ONE STACK



TONE CLASS

All main batteries forward of bridge.



MOGAMI CLASS

---

TWO STACK



NACHI CLASS

Two stacks raked. Stacks with mainmast just abaft No. 2 stack



ATAGO CLASS

No. 2 Stack NOT raked.

---

DIVISION "C" - BATTLESHIPS

Pagoda bridge structure considerably higher than stack. Bridge, Stack & Secondary control form three distinct elements.

---

BATTLESHIPS (BB)

Class Recognition

ONE STACK



FUSO CLASS

Stack divides distance from bridge to secondary control.



ISE CLASS

Stack well forward of center of distance between bridge and secondary control.



NAGATO CLASS

All three elements grouped closely as all main batteries are forward and aft.

---

TWO STACKS




KONGO CLASS

---

# J. M. S. T.


## JAPANESE MERCHANT SHIPPING TONNAGE



### FOX DIVISION

(Freighter Division)


Split well separating bridge from deckhouse



### FOX TARE DIVISION

(Freighter Transport Division)


Short composite deckhouse



### TARE DIVISION

(Transport Division)

Long composite deckhouse at least one-third the length of the ship



### SUGAR DIVISION

(Stack Aft Division)


**INSTRUCTIONS.** The above are the call signals for each shipping division. On sighting a ship, the following procedure is to be used :

- (1) Select a similar deckhouse from this sheet for determination of division.
- (2) Turn to the division selected and determine the sub-division number.
- (3) Ship will then be reported with call signal listed opposite the selected sub-division. E.g., one freighter falling within sub-division Able will be reported as One Fox Able.

When details necessary for classification cannot be determined, the ship will be reported as Mike Victor (merchant vessel) with estimate of tonnage if possible.

FOX TARE DIVISION - FREIGHTER TRANSPORT

## Short Composite Deckhouse




FOX TARE ABLE 7000/8500 G.T.

1. Minimum of four masts, any or all may be goalposts.
2. Flush deck.\*
3. Maximum of two lifeboats to a side on deckhouse.

Normal cruising - 16 knots  
Average Maximum - 19 knots

\* No breaks in deck at mast No. 2 and 3 positions.

AIKOKU MARU class carries three lifeboats - 10,500 G.T.




FOX TARE BAKER 5500/7000 G.T.

1. Minimum of four masts, any or all may be goalposts.
2. Well decks.\*
3. Maximum of two lifeboats to a side on deckhouse. Six ships carry three.

Normal cruising - 14 knots  
Average Maximum - 16/17 knots

\* Breaks in deck at masts No. 2 & 3 positions.


When difference between FOX TARE ABLE and FOX TARE BAKER cannot be determined report ship as FOX TARE UNCLE (Unidentified) 5500/8500 G.T.



FOX TARE CHARLIE 2000/4500 G.T.

1. 80% will be two masts centred on forward and after decks; others 3 masts and 4 masts.

Normal cruising - 10/11 knots  
Average Maximum - 12/13 knots




FOX TARE DOG 1000/1500 G.T.

1. Two or three masts with foremast on forecastle deck, and when 3 masts No. 2 mast against deckhouse.
2. Deckhouse will be aft of amidships.

Normal cruising - 10 knots.

TARE DIVISION - TRANSPORT

Number of stacks will not be reported unless more than one long deckhouse at least one-third the length of the ship



TARE ABLE 9000/12,000 G.T.

1. Five lifeboats to a side on deckhouse.


OR

1a. Four lifeboats to a side on deckhouse.

2. A minimum of three masts.

Normal cruising - 14/15 knots  
Average maximum - 16-1/2 knots

\* KAMAKURA MARU carries 7 lifeboats - 17,000 G.T.




TARE BAKER 7000/9000 G.T.

1. Four lifeboats to a side on deckhouse.

2. Maximum of two masts.

Normal cruising - 16 knots  
Average maximum - 18-1/2 knots




TARE ABLE TWO STACKS 8/10000 G.T.

1. Minimum of four lifeboats to a side on deckhouse.\*

Normal cruising - 15 knots  
Average maximum - 18 knots

\* ASAMA and TATUTA MARU carry seven lifeboats - 17,000 G.T.



TARE BAKER TWO STACKS 4000/6000 G.T.

1. Three lifeboats to a side on deckhouse.\*


\*Only Five Ships fall in this division.

NOTE: Transport (one stack) under 7000 G.T. will carry three lifeboats but deckhouse will be less than one-third of length of ship. Hence, these will fall in FOX TARE CHARLIE Division.

FOX DIVISION - FREIGHTER

Splitwell Separating Bridge from Deckhouse

NOTE: Sampson Post in splitwell will not be counted as a mast.




FOX ABLE 5500/7500 G.T.

1. Minimum of three masts.\*
2. Maximum of two lifeboats to a side on deckhouse.

Normal cruising - 11 knots  
Average maximum - 13/14 knots

- \* The extra Sampson Post or Posts will be located fore and/or aft against the deckhouse or separated from the deckhouse the distance of one hatch.



FOX BAKER 4000/5800 G.T.

1. Maximum of two masts.\*
2. Maximum of two lifeboats to a side on deckhouse.

Normal cruising - 10 knots  
Average maximum - 12/13 knots


- \* Four hatches.

When difference between FOX ABLE and FOX BAKER cannot be determined report ship as FOX UNCLE (Unidentified) 3500/8000 G.T.

NOTE: Freighters under 3500 G.T. - The splitwell will be of such small dimension that no hatch in well will be possible and the deckhouse will appear composite. Hence, these ships will be under the FOX TARE CHARLIE Division.

SUGAR DIVISION

## Stack Aft




SUGAR ABLE 7000/10,300 G.T.\*

1. Catwalks will create heavy line running from forecastle to and from bridge to poop.
2. No hatches.

	Large	Small
Normal cruising	16 knots	12
Average maximum	19 knots	14

\*This Division composed entirely of tankers.




SUGAR BAKER 1500/2500 G.T.\*

1. Hatches.
2. Bridge separate and forward.

Normal cruising - 10 knots  
Average maximum - 13 knots


\* Two exceptions carry three large goalposts - 4500 G.T.



SUGAR CHARLIE 500/1000 G.T.

1. No bridge forward, only a mast.
2. Hatches.

Normal cruising - 10 knots.



SUGAR TWO STACKS \*17/19,000 G.T.

1. Two parallel stacks.
2. Slipway in the stern.

Normal cruising - 13 knots  
Average maximum - 15 knots

\*HAKKO MARU has bridge amidships - 6000 G.T.

MIKE VICTOR - merchant vessel unclassified - conditions such that detail could not be seen and tonnage is estimated.

## APPENDIX 5


### JAPANESE FIRST LINE PLANES

For recognition purposes only.

#### INSTRUCTIONS:

1. These silouhettes are of current types of Japanese planes.
2. They are arranged in the order in which the planes of each type are most likely to be seen.
3. This is not necessarily a complete collection of combat types. Details of new types should be reported, as shape of wing and wing tip, proportion of length of wing to plane, shape of tail, etc.
4. Study the silouhettes given here carefully, noting especially the details mentioned in (3).
5. In reporting, give code word for type of plane if distinction can be made. E.G., Report 2 fighters of the HAMP class as "two HAMPS".
6. These code names are used in all theaters in which these planes are seen.


ZEKE - FIGHTER



Span 39' 5"      Length 29' 7"


---

HAMP - FIGHTER



Span 36' 2"      Length 29' 9"


OSCAR - FIGHTER



Span 37' 9"      Length 29' 2"


---

TONY - FIGHTER



Span 39' 3"      Length 29' 0"  
(Approximate Figures Only)

NICK - FIGHTER



---


RUFE - FIGHTER FLOATPLANE



Span 39' 5"

Length 33' 10"


PETE - FLOATPLANE



Span 36' 2"      Length 30' 6"


---

JAKE - FLOATPLANE



Span 45' 0"      Length 34' 0"  
(Approximate Figures Only)


DINAH - RECONNAISSANCE



Span 48' 0"      Length 36' 0"  
(Approximate Figures Only)


---

KATE - TORPEDO BOMBER



Span 52' 0"      Length 34' 0"


VAL - DIVEBOMBER



Span 47' 7"      Length 35' 5"  
(Approximate Figures Only)

---

SONIA - RECONNAISSANCE



Span 39' 6"      Length 30' 6"  
(Approximate Figures Only)

LILY - BOMBER



Span 58' 0"      Length 42' 0"  
(Approximate Figures Only)


---

NELL - BOMBER



Span 82' 0"      Length 54' 0"  
(Approximate Figures Only)

SALLY - BOMBER




Span 74' 8"      Length 52' 0"

(Approximate Figures Only)

---


BETTY - BOMBER



Span 82' 4"      Length 64' 0"

(Approximate Figures Only)

HELEN - BOMBER



Span 68' 0"      Length 54' 0"  
(Approximate Figures Only)


---

CHERRY - FLYING BOAT



Span 85' 0"      Length 55' 6"  
(Approximate Figures Only)


MAVIS - FLYING BOAT



Span 131' 0"      Length 82' 0"  
(Approximate Figures Only)


---

EMILY - FLYING BOAT



Span 125' 0"      Length 84' 0"  
(Approximate Figures Only)


TESS - TRANSPORT



Span 95' 0"      Length 64' 5"  
(Approximate Figures Only)

---

TOPSY - TRANSPORT



Span 74' 0"      Length 52' 8"